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This ethnography examines the relationships between political 
discourse, ritual practice, cultural performance, and circular migration 
in producing ethnic identity for the Thangmi, a Himalayan community 
dispersed across border areas of Nepal, India, and the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region of China. With a population of approximately 
40,000, the Thangmi speak a distinct Tibeto-Burman language, and 
maintain a religious system which draws upon aspects of shamanic, 
Hindu and Buddhist practice in a synthetic manner. This dissertation 
shows how Thangmi subjectivities are forged in a transnational 
dialectic between discursive statements of cultural absence and 
ritualized expressions of cultural presence, prompting a 
reconceptualization of how both ethnicity and ritual work within 
contexts of mobility. 
The Thangmi have been almost entirely absent from lay, 
political, and academic discourses on ethnicity in all three of the 
national contexts in which they live. There are no previous substantive 
ethnographic publications on the group. Yet many Thangmi view 
ethnography as a valuable asset within the politics of recognition, so 
   
beyond its theoretical imperatives, this dissertation is intended as a 
documentary resource for the community. As such, it demonstrates the 
continued value—and complicity—of ethnography in serving both 
academic and political agendas. 
This dissertation explores the history of Thangmi migration from 
Nepal to India and the TAR, and illustrates how contemporary cross-
border movements bring members of the Thangmi community into 
contact with three different national policies for recognizing minorities 
and legislating difference. The dissertation describes Thangmi 
participation in the broader janajati, or “indigenous nationalities”, 
movement in Nepal, as well as their campaign for government 
recognition as a “Scheduled Tribe” within India’s reservations system.  
This work is based primarily on ethnographic research 
conducted in Nepal’s Dolakha, Sindhupalchok and Kathmandu districts; 
the Indian states of West Bengal (Darjeeling District) and Sikkim; and 
China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region (Nyalam County). It also draws 
upon textual and multi-media sources. The resulting analytical 
approach bridges depictions of ethnicity as a political construction 
dependent largely on discourse, and those of identity as a subjective 
production dependent largely on practice, to offer an empirically rich 
study of contemporary ethnic identity as lived in a cross-border 
environment. 
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Map of the research area1
                                                
1 Prepared in consultation with the maps department at Olin Library, based on 
multiple maps of the region held by Cornell University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is an ethnography of the Thangmi, also known as 
Thami.2 They are a Himalayan ethnic group of approximately 40,000, 
who speak a Tibeto-Burman language, and whose religion draws upon 
aspects of shamanic, Hindu and Buddhist practice in a synthetic 
manner. The Dolakha and Sindhupalchok districts of central-eastern 
Nepal are home to the largest concentration of Thangmi,3 but there is 
also a substantial population in the Darjeeling district of India’s West 
Bengal state, as well as in the neighboring Indian state of Sikkim.4 
Cross-border circular migration between these locations, as well as to 
the Nyalam region of China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), which 
immediately borders Nepal, is a salient feature of Thangmi economic, 
social and cultural life. 
Such normative statements about the Thangmi are always 
incomplete. Even the superficially straightforward description I have 
just provided entails a range of difficult representational choices. 
Traces of those choices will still be evident to some readers, even in 
the carefully-considered wording in the paragraph above, through 
                                                
2 The ethnonym that members of the group use to refer to themselves in their own 
language is “Thangmi”, but official documents in both Nepal and India refer to them 
as “Thami”. I therefore use the term “Thangmi”, except when citing direct quotations 
or referring to associations and publications that use “Thami”. 
3 According to the 2001 population census, there are 22,999 Thangmi in Nepal 
(HMG/N 2001). I believe this number to be a substantial underestimate for the 
reasons described in Shneiderman and Turin (2006: 128-130) and Turin (2000). 
4 A survey conducted by Darjeeling municipality in 2004 enumerated 4,500 Thangmi 
in the urban area of its jurisdiction alone, while by 2005, an ongoing Bharatiya Thami 
Welfare Association survey had documented close to 8,000 Thangmi across the states 
of West Bengal and Sikkim. Verifying these numbers is difficult, given the large 
number of Thangmi who move back and forth between Nepal and India as circular 
migrants. 
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which I have sought to include as many Thangmi as possible by opting 
for a description in which they might recognize parts of themselves. To 
say anything further at this juncture about who, in fact, the Thangmi 
are, think themselves to be, or have been thought to be by others—at 
individual and collective levels, in religious, cultural, social, historical, 
political or economic terms—would be to undermine the ensuing 
content of this ethnography. The eight chapters that follow explore 
these questions in detail, and taken as a whole, the answer is more 
than the sum of its parts. 
 
Framing Arguments 
The first underlying argument of this thesis is that ethnography, in the 
classically empirical, holistic sense, still has an important role to play 
in contributing to projects of recognition, regardless of how 
transnational, globalized, hybrid, or multi-sited such projects and their 
agents may be. This position is one of four interlocking arguments that 
shape the entire text, although the ethnographic material presented in 
each chapter speaks to a different balance of concerns. The other 
arguments are as follows. 
Taking as a starting point Edmund Leach’s supposition that “the 
maintenance and insistence upon cultural difference can itself become 
a ritual action expressive of social relations” (1964: 17), the second 
argument is that ethnicity emerges in a process of ritualization, the 
sacred object of which is identity itself. Multiple forms of action, which 
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unfold in as many frames, produce feelings of belonging for those who 
engage in them, including shamanic practice, cultural performance, 
political meetings, life cycle events, the work of everyday subsistence, 
and migratory movement. Such actions articulate the self-conscious 
agency of individuals to produce their own identities in a manner 
conditioned by, but not limited to, the power relations inherent in the 
multiple frames within which they operate. 
The third argument is that the nation-states in which people live 
are paramount among these frames, but not in a singular or exclusive 
manner. Rather than acting as identity-determining structures, I 
suggest that individual nation-states act as flexible identity-framing 
devices, especially for those who cross national borders on a regular 
basis. Transnational populations may come to value the prospects for 
belonging available within each frame—in terms of national ethos 
surrounding the conceptualization of hierarchy and difference, and the 
associated state policies regarding recognition and benefits—and may 
view circular migration as a mechanism for maintaining access to these 
social, cultural and political experiences, as well as to the economic 
profits which are more commonly highlighted in analyses of migration. 
Ethnicities that emerge in such contexts are simultaneously shaped by 
the imperatives of recognition in individual nation-states, and 
dependent on cross-border movement between multiple countries for 
their continued existence. This argument articulates a middle way 
between depictions of ethnicity as determined entirely within the 
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structures of individual modern nation-states, and narratives of 
globalization and deterritorialization which imply that locality and 
national borders are no longer primary factors in shaping ethnic 
identities. The argument also dispels the notion that ethnicity is 
experienced homogeneously by each individual participating in its 
production, refocusing instead on the heterogeneity of experience, 
both among the collective, and within individual subjectivities, as 
constitutive of the whole. 
The fourth and final argument is that even in an era in which 
discourses of indigeneity, authenticity and religious purity strongly 
shape processes of identification, the trope of synthesis can provide a 
powerful mode for articulating and enacting identities that do not fit 
squarely within received categories. Such synthesis may be 
conceptualized in terms of religious syncretism, racial hybridity, 
cultural mixture, or even dual citizenship. The action of effecting 
synthesis in an agentive manner in any one of these domains, or 
across them, can itself be productive of identity. Engaging in synthetic 
action produces a certain kind of subjectivity—synthetic subjectivity—
which, through self-recognition, transforms an awareness of that 
synthesis in process into a feature of identity itself. 
 
Common Distinctions, Distinctive Commonalities 
Although these arguments emerge out of my ethnographic fieldwork 
with the Thangmi community, they are by no means exclusive to the 
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Thangmi. Finding a balance between distinctiveness and commonality 
is an important concern for Thangmi individuals in their self-
representations, just as it is for me in my ethnographic representation 
of them. On the one hand, producing an identity recognizable as such 
both to one’s self and others requires the demonstration of difference, 
through linguistic, cultural, religious or other social practices. On the 
other hand, such differences must be articulated in commonly 
understood idioms in order to have the desired effect. As described in 
Chapter 3, non-Thangmi individuals who seek to understand what 
makes the group distinctive often ask, “Which other ethnic groups are 
you like?” In order to be meaningful, the answer to this question must 
first allude to the characteristics of other better-known groups and 
then make a claim for distinctiveness in relation to them. The value of 
distinctiveness is lost unless it is relationally situated within a shared 
set of reference points. 
By the same token, when I describe the importance of a 
particular action or discourse in constituting Thangmi lives, I do so not 
in order to assert Thangmi exceptionalism, but rather in the spirit of 
using this fine-grained ethnography of a particular group to raise 
larger questions about how ethnicity and identity are produced, ritual 
and politics enacted, cross-border migration lived, and consciousness 
experienced for people who may have something in common with 
those who recognize themselves as Thangmi. At the most intimate 
level, this category of commonality includes those who identify as 
  7 
members of other janajati (ethnic nationality) groups in Nepal, as 
Indians of Nepali heritage, and as border people vis-à-vis the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region of China. At the next level of abstraction, the 
category also includes those who define themselves, or are defined by 
others, as indigenous, tribal, marginal, or “out-of-the-way” (Tsing 
1993), anywhere in the world. At the most general level, the category 
can be expanded to include all those whose lives entail cross-border, 
transnational, diasporic, or migratory movements, and hybrid or 
syncretic practices. In short, although at analytically relevant moments 
I make explicit how Thangmi actions, beliefs, and experiences are 
similar to, and different from, those of others, for the most part these 
relational positionings are left implicit, and the empirical material I 
present should be read as evidence of both distinction and 
commonality. While I tell the Thangmi story for its own sake, this 
narrative comes to articulate with many others through the telling. 
 
Times and Places 
I began research with the Thangmi in September 1999, when I received 
a Fulbright Fellowship in Nepal to do what I imagined to be “basic 
ethnographic research” in the Thangmi villages of Dolakha and 
Sindhupalchok districts. At that point I had already spent several years 
in Nepal and spoke passable Nepali, having traveled to the country first 
as an undergraduate student in 1994 and 1995, and then as the 
coordinator for an American educational program from 1997 through 
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the first half of 1999. While thus employed, I made my first visits to 
Thangmi villages in early 1998 in the company of Mark Turin (now my 
husband), who was conducting research on the Thangmi language 
towards a PhD in descriptive linguistics from Leiden University in the 
Netherlands. Hoping to find something to read about this group of 
people whom I was encountering for the first time, I scoured the 
bookstores of Kathmandu for an ethnography of the Thangmi, but 
could find nothing. The initial impetus for my Fulbright project, and 
eventually this PhD, emerged out of that absence, the historical 
reasons for which are described in Chapter 1. 
Knowing that different dialects of the Thangmi language were 
spoken on either side of the Kalinchok ridge which defined the district 
boundary between Sindhupalchok to the west and Dolakha to the east, 
I chose as the focal points of my study one Village Development 
Committee (VDC) in each district: Chokati-Latu in Sindhupalchok and 
Suspa-Kshamawati in Dolakha. I spent the better part of the 1999-
2000 academic year living between these two field sites, and made 
extended trips to other Thangmi villages such as Piskar, Alampu, 
Lapilang and Dumkot in the course of the year. The more time I spent 
in these villages, however, the more I realized that there were other 
places that I needed to visit. Interviews with Thangmi individuals on a 
range of topics often turned towards experiences of living in India, 
particularly in Darjeeling (and occasionally Sikkim, Assam, and even as 
far as Bhutan), or references were made to family members who were 
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currently there. Stories about travel to Tibet also cropped up, 
especially from older community members who had traveled there 
before the border was closed in the wake of China’s occupation of 
Tibet in the 1950s. One colleague pointed me towards a Nepali 
language short story that described a Thangmi woman working in 
Darjeeling bazaar (Adhikari 1997),5 while another colleague suggested 
that there might be a Thangmi population in China’s TAR.6 
It was becoming increasingly clear to me that the Thangmi were 
anything but sedentary inhabitants of bounded villages, and that in 
order to understand the Thangmi whom I had come to know in Nepal, I 
would need to travel to India, and I hoped the TAR as well. I visited 
Darjeeling for the first time in 2000 towards the end of my Fulbright 
scholarship, and the conversations that I had there with settled 
Thangmi who held Indian citizenship, as well as circular migrants from 
Nepal, convinced me that understanding the complex cross-border 
relationships between people in both locations would be key to 
understanding what Thangminess meant to all of them. It would take 
some years before I could visit the TAR to learn how this third location 
fit—and in some ways, did not fit, as I shall describe below—into the 
overall picture. 
                                                
5 Thanks to Rhoderick Chalmers. 
6 Sueyoshi Toba, a Japanese linguist, had conducted brief research on the Thangmi 
language (Toba 1990). In 1999, he showed me photocopies of the then-current 
Ethnologue publication, which stated that the Thangmi language was spoken in 
Tibetan areas of China in addition to Nepal. The current version of this catalogue is 
online at <http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=thf>, last 
accessed November 30, 2008. 
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After completing three years of coursework at Cornell from 
2001-2004, I returned to Asia for fieldwork in October 2004, with a 
proposal to conduct multi-sited research in all three locations. For the 
best part of four years, Kathmandu was the base from which I visited 
many different locations. From 2004 to 2006, I spent three months in 
Darjeeling and Sikkim each year (totaling nine months). After 
submitting a request for three months of research permission in the 
TAR, I was granted a five-week research permit in April 2005, two 
weeks of which was spent processing paperwork in Lhasa, leaving me 
exactly three weeks to conduct research in Nyalam county, along the 
border with Nepal. In between these trips to India and the TAR, for 
several weeks at a time I returned to each of the Thangmi villages in 
Nepal that I had first visited in 1999. I also spent time in Kathmandu 
getting to know Thangmi ethnic activists based in the city, as well as 
other political activists and members of so-called “civil society” (see 
Chapter 5 for a discussion of this term) active during this particularly 
tumultuous period of Nepal’s modern history. I began writing this 
dissertation in early 2007 while still living in Kathmandu, and was 
therefore able to revisit my field sites in Dolakha and Sindhupalchok 
throughout the writing process. Although I have not returned to India 
since completing my last long period of fieldwork there in December 
2006, I had several opportunities to bring my knowledge of events in 
Darjeeling up to date by talking at length with Thangmi from India who 
visited Kathmandu in 2007 and 2008. 
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 The ethnographic present of this dissertation thus spans a 
decade, from 1998 to 2008. Much of my initial research in the 
Thangmi areas of Nepal was conducted in the earliest phase of my 
fieldwork, predating my formal enrolment as a graduate student. To 
the extent possible, I rechecked all of the information that I had 
gathered in these early years during later phases of fieldwork, after I 
had refined my ethnographic and theoretical focus. In this dissertation, 
I include various materials collected in multiple locations throughout 
this decade of research: descriptions of practices, performances and 
conversations; transcriptions of ritual chants and stories; direct 
quotations from interviews and speeches; translations of publications; 
and excerpts from official documents and correspondence. Whenever 
the specific timeframe and location in which an event occurred or a 
document was collected is relevant, I have done my best to include this 
information. 
 
Bracketing Out the TAR 
One important sub-set of the ethnographic data that I collected is not 
fully discussed in this dissertation: the material that resulted from my 
time in the TAR in 2005. There are two reasons for this omission. The 
first is that due to the very short time that I was ultimately able to 
spend in the TAR, I could not conduct in-depth work comparable to 
that which I conducted in India and Nepal. This resulted in a “thinness” 
to the TAR data, which made my early attempts to interweave it with 
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the “thicker” material from Nepal and India awkward, both in terms of 
narrative style and analytic consistency. Second, my most important 
discovery in the TAR was that people who might have once identified 
as Thangmi there now hid those histories in order to assimilate to a 
Sherpa identity, apparently because this category was more easily 
recognizable to the Chinese state. For this reason, in the TAR I found 
no individuals engaged in projects of recognition as Thangmi, or 
invested in producing or reproducing a “Thangmi identity” per se, with 
the result that many of the questions around which this dissertation is 
structured were moot. 
I concluded that I could not do the TAR side of the story justice 
without addressing an entirely different set of questions that moved 
away from my focus on Thangmi identity, and opened up an 
investigation of the geopolitics of ethnicity in the China-Tibet-Nepal 
borderlands in a broader, relational sense. While this is a worthwhile 
project which I am continuing to pursue, it does not feature fully in 
this dissertation. Presenting the material from the TAR requires a 
different analytical frame, as well as additional context from a broad 
set of secondary sources, and a detailed review of the production of 
Sherpa, Tibetan, and Chinese ethnic and national identities over time.7 
For all of these reasons, although the mythical role of Tibet as the 
attributed source of some aspects of Thangmi identity and practice is 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, and the historical and contemporary 
                                                
7 Some initial forays in this direction appear in Shneiderman (2006). 
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role of Tibet as a short-term trading and migration destination for 
Thangmi from Nepal is addressed in Chapter 4, a more nuanced 
analysis of border ethnicities and identities in Nyalam County will have 
to be addressed in the future. Until that time, I direct interested 
readers to a short piece in Himal South Asian in which I outlined some 
of the dynamics at play in the TAR (Shneiderman 2005a). Nonetheless, 
the experience of conducting ethnographic work in the TAR provided 
an important third frame of reference, setting into relief some of the 
situations I had encountered in Nepal and India as specific to those 
locations, and the insights thus gained are incorporated into the 
present work. 
 
Thangmi “in” Nepal and India: Terminological Choices 
The people represented in this dissertation are, then, largely those 
whom I describe as “Thangmi in Nepal” and “Thangmi in India”. This 
somewhat awkward terminology requires clarification, as otherwise it 
may appear that these phrases defeat my own objective of defining 
Thangmi identity as a quintessentially transnational one, which is 
never “in” only one place. 
Brian Axel pinpoints the potential problem with such 
terminology on the first page of his ethnography of the Sikh diaspora: 
“One would be hard put to say that, preferring the local to the global, 
there are no diasporas, rather Chinese in New York or, for example, 
Sikhs in London” (2001: 1). He opts instead for the doubled “Sikh 
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diaspora as a diaspora” (Axel 2001: 8) to reiterate that it is the 
diaspora itself that is his object of study, not “exemplary” members of 
it in any particular location (Axel 2001: 1). While I explain in more 
detail in Chapter 6 why the Thangmi case complicates Axel’s definition 
of diaspora, my point here is that taking a diaspora, or any other type 
of multi-sited community, as the object of one’s study does not 
obviate the need to evaluate carefully how various members of it orient 
themselves within specific nation-state frameworks at specific 
historical junctures. 
Since one of the key arguments of this dissertation is that 
nation-states serve as important frames for human action, which 
individuals consciously recognize as such, it is essential to deploy a set 
of terms to indicate the specific actions effected within each nation-
state frame. However, the chosen terms must also recognize that 
action carried out within each frame often implicitly, and sometimes 
explicitly, references actions carried out within other frames. Here, 
“Thangmi in Nepal” and “Thangmi in India” serve as the shorthand for 
this set of concepts. In other words, when I write “Thangmi in Nepal”, I 
mean, “Thangmi acting in relation to the nation-state of Nepal as a 
primary frame, although they may have spent time in India, or at other 
times have acted in relation to the nation-state of India as a primary 
frame, and/or may be aware of the relationship between the two 
frames as a factor in shaping their actions, even if they have not 
actually visited the other country”. “Thangmi in India” means the 
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converse. By “Thangmi in Nepal” or “Thangmi in India”, I do not intend 
to imply, for instance, “Thangmi who have never left Nepal” or 
“Thangmi who have a certain essential quality because they were born 
in, or live in, India”. The word “in”, then, locates a set of actions within 
the ideological framework of a nation, not a body within a bounded 
physical territory. Sometimes, I also use the terms “Thangmi from 
Nepal” when referring to “Thangmi acting in relation to the nation-
state of Nepal as a primary frame, but who are physically present in 
India at the point of action”, and “Thangmi from India” when I mean 
the opposite. 
Why do I not simply use the more obvious terms “Nepalese 
Thangmi” or “Nepali Thangmi”, and “Indian Thangmi”? Each of these 
terms carries its own baggage, and has the effect of offending some 
subset of the people ostensibly described by it, often for political or 
legal reasons which must be taken seriously. These points have been 
argued at some length, so I cannot cite every position, but here I offer 
a general overview of the most relevant issues for this dissertation, and 
offer a few key examples of how these terms have been used in recent 
academic literature. 
 “Nepalese” was once the commonly agreed upon English term 
for citizens of the nation-state of Nepal, as well as for the country’s 
lingua franca. However, in recent decades, this term has generally 
fallen into disuse, viewed by Nepali-speaking intellectuals as a colonial 
invention that does not match the ethnonym that people use to talk 
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about themselves and their language, which is instead “Nepali”.8 Other 
intellectuals, however, seek to recuperate “Nepalese” as the term of 
choice to refer to citizens of Nepal, arguing that “Nepali” only fully 
includes mother-tongue speakers of the Nepali language, while 
excluding native speakers of the many other languages spoken within 
Nepal’s borders. For the most part, recent academic work in English 
tends to follow the convention of using the term “Nepali”, as 
established by Nepal-based writers.9 
“Nepali”, however, is a more ambiguous term, since it can be 
used to refer to the language, as well as to a broad cultural complex, 
neither of which carries any inherent indication of citizenship. This 
usage is most widespread in the Nepali-speaking areas of India, 
including Darjeeling and Sikkim, where people identify themselves as 
linguistically or ethnically Nepali, yet are Indian citizens who feel 
frustrated by assumptions that the term “Nepali” refers only to people 
who are citizens of Nepal. In its most extreme form, this frustration 
manifested in the attempt to do away with the term “Nepali” altogether 
                                                
8 Michael Hutt argues that both “Nepali” and “Nepalese”, as well as “Gorkha” and 
“Gorkhali”, were coined by the British (1997: 113), and that there was no equivalent 
indigenous term that was not caste or ethnic group-specific to denote nationals of 
Nepal before these colonial terms were appropriated (1997: 116). 
9 David Gellner’s 2003 edited volume, Resistance and the State: Nepalese 
Experiences, is a notable exception. Gellner argues that there is nothing more 
offensive about “Nepalese” than there is about “Japanese”, for instance, when used in 
English (personal communication), and that “Nepalese” is felt by many to be more 
inclusive for the reasons described above. 
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in favor of “Gorkhali” during the agitation for a separate Nepali-
speaking state of “Gorkhaland” within India in the 1980s.10 
Many individuals with whom I worked in Darjeeling used the two 
terms “Nepali” and “Gorkhali” interchangeably, while some insisted on 
the exclusive use of “Gorkhali”, and yet others dismissed “Gorkhali” as 
associated with a political agenda which they did not support, and 
opted simply for “Nepali”.11 For those who used the term “Nepali” to 
describe themselves, the implication was not “citizens of Nepal”, but 
rather “citizens of India who are members of an ethnic group defined 
by its shared Nepali language and cultural practices”.12 To describe this 
large category of people—including many Thangmi in India but also 
extending beyond them to include members of many other groups—I 
have opted for the term, “Indian citizens of Nepali heritage”.13 Early on 
in my research, I made the mistake of using the term “Nepali origin” 
                                                
10 See Chalmers (2003, Chapter 5) for a thorough historical discussion of these 
terms. 
11 In Sikkim, these dynamics are different once again, with many people using the 
term “Sikkimese Nepali” rather than “Gorkhali” to describe themselves. Although 
“Sikkimese Nepalis” share the historical experience of migration and the 
contemporary experience of participation in the Nepali-language public sphere, they 
generally seek to disassociate themselves from the political agenda of Gorkhaland 
that the term “Gorkhali” alludes to, since as “subjects” (the official term used) of the 
state of Sikkim they enjoyed a different set of privileges from their Darjeeling 
counterparts in the state of West Bengal. This is just one example of how historical 
differences and their ensuing effects on the policy of not only nation-states, but 
federal states, districts and even smaller administrative units, can create frames of 
their own within the over-arching frame of a nation-state. 
12 Michael Hutt addresses this connotation with the title and content of his article 
“Being Nepali Without Nepal”, which describes what he terms the “Nepali diaspora in 
India” (1997). 
13 The hyphenated term “Nepali-Indian” (in the multi-cultural sense of African-
American or Anglo-Irish), or the unhyphenated “Indian Nepali”, along with “Nepalese-
Indian” and “Indian Nepalese”, are also used in various publications to various effects. 
None of these are used consistently enough to be appropriated here. 
  18 
instead, which angered many of my interlocutors, since by invoking a 
putative “place of origin” in another nation-state, it seemed to 
dislocate people from the Indian nation in which they proudly claimed 
citizenship. The phrase “Nepali heritage”, on the other hand, was 
acceptable, and even desirable, since it used the term “Nepali” to 
denote a cultural and linguistic heritage, rather than political belonging 
in a specific nation-state. 
During my fieldwork in India, I found that people who preferred 
to use the term “Nepali” to indicate their cultural heritage were often 
irked when they heard it applied to circular migrants who appeared to 
be “from Nepal”. To Indian citizens of Nepali heritage, the usage of 
“Nepali” to refer to people who are presumed to hold citizenship in 
Nepal, but come to India for short-term labor, effectively implies that 
everyone of Nepali heritage is de facto a Nepali citizen, and therefore 
does not have rights to citizenship in India.14 This complicated logic 
emerges out of the fact that the terms of the Indo-Nepal Friendship 
Treaty of 1950 preclude the possibility of dual citizenship in the two 
countries. This legal reality generates constant anxiety among Indians 
of Nepali heritage in Darjeeling that they may be expelled from India 
                                                
14 Tanka Subba (1992) therefore proposes a definitional rubric by which “Nepalese” 
should be used to refer to citizens of Nepal, while “Nepali” should be used to refer to 
the ethnicity within India. A 2005 article by Vimal Khawas in The Hindu newspaper 
advocates the uptake of this scheme in popular discourse, which I have indeed heard 
used fairly frequently in India 
<http://www.hindu.com/op/2005/06/19/stories/2005061901081400.htm>, 
accessed November 22, 2008. However, this is problematic from the perspective of 
many individuals who are indeed citizens of Nepal, yet reject the term “Nepalese”, for 
the reasons described above. I thank Tanka Subba for engaging in an extended 
discussion of these issues with me. 
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en masse, as individuals thought to have been in a similar category to 
them indeed were in the 1980s and 1990s from the Indian states of 
Meghalaya and Mizoram further to the east, as well as from the 
neighboring country of Bhutan (Hutt 2003). 
For all of these reasons, I do not use the term “Nepali” as a noun 
to refer to people. I do, however, use it in two other ways. First, I use it 
as an adjective to refer to several broadly conceived complexes of 
practice that transcend national boundaries: language, literature, 
society, history, heritage, media, and the public sphere. In a variation 
on this theme, I use the term “pan-Nepali” to refer to the ethnic 
identity that people from a broad range of groups of Nepali heritage in 
India share (in contrast to particularly “Thangmi”, “Tamang”, or 
“Newar” ethnic identities, for example). Second, for lack of a better 
option, when necessary I also use “Nepali” to denote objects that are 
specifically linked to the modern nation-state of Nepal, in which cases 
its meaning should be clear: for instance, “the Nepali state”, “Nepali 
citizenship”, “Nepali legislation”, “Nepali state policy”, and “the Nepali 
national framework”. 
The category of “Indian” is equally vexed for different reasons. 
While people of Nepali heritage who hold Indian citizenship fight for 
recognition of their Indianness while in India, when they travel to, or 
live in, Nepal they downplay it as much as possible. In Nepal, only 
citizens of Nepal may own land, and “Indians” in particular are 
stereotyped as the imperious big brother next door whom everyone 
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loves to hate. As described in further detail in Chapter 4, many Indian 
citizens of Nepali heritage in fact continue to own land in Nepal, and to 
work in the private sector as teachers, doctors and entrepreneurs. All 
of these occupations entail the production of Nepali citizenship papers, 
despite the fact that almost all of these individuals already hold Indian 
documents.15 This production of dual citizenship puts these individuals 
in a large, quasi-illicit category, making them highly attuned to the 
threat of legal action, even if it rarely becomes a reality. For this 
reason, although many Thangmi in Nepal are in fact “from India”, just 
as many in India are “from Nepal”, the former group prefer not to be 
set apart from other Thangmi in Nepal as “Indian”. For the people with 
whom I worked, “Indian” did not have the same connotations of a 
particular ethnic, cultural or linguistic heritage in the manner that 
“Nepali” did, so I use the term “Indian” only in a manner equivalent to 
the second usage of “Nepali” above: to refer to the “Indian state”, 
“Indian citizenship”, “Indian legal framework”, and so forth. 
These issues, which have great implications for how Thangmi 
identity is conceptualized and produced, are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. In short, using the terms “Thangmi in Nepal” and “Thangmi 
in India” (which I hereafter remove from quotation marks), and 
                                                
15 While migrants from Nepal to India are largely unskilled laborers, migrants from 
India (of Nepali heritage) to Nepal are generally skilled white collar workers. The 
latter phenomenon extends far beyond the Thangmi, with many of Kathmandu’s 
most desirable schools and other institutions staffed by individuals of all ethnic 
groups who hail from Darjeeling, Sikkim, Assam and other Nepali-speaking regions 
of India. The political, historical and economic processes that have produced these 
cross-border flows are worthy of further research, as are the anxieties that the Nepali 
and Indian state policies on borders and citizenship create. 
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variations on those themes, helps to avoid reifying any particular set of 
assumptions about what an individual’s citizenship status may be, or 
how they may relate to the broadly conceived notion of “Nepaliness”. 
Despite my best efforts, I may not have used the rubric that I outline 
here consistently, for which apologies. 
 
Locality 
Although the Nepali and Indian states are key frameworks in relation to 
which Thangmi identity is articulated, neither Thangmi in Nepal nor 
Thangmi in India are homogenous groups. During early phases of 
analysis, I was tempted to map all vectors of difference within the 
Thangmi community onto these national categories, but later I came to 
see that other cross-cutting factors were also at play. Some of the 
most important factors are economic status and education (addressed 
in Chapter 3), age (described in Chapters 3 and 8), gender (which 
except for a brief discussion in Chapter 7 is not addressed fully in this 
dissertation), and locality. In Chapter 4, I argue explicitly for an 
attention to “translocality”, which I suggest can capture some of these 
differences across location. For the moment, I want to explain briefly 
where some of the most important localities are. 
In Nepal, the majority of Thangmi live in rural hill villages in 
Dolakha and Sindhupalchok (with a much smaller, but still notable, 
number in Ramechhap district). I use the phrases “Thangmi village(s)” 
and “Thangmi area(s)”, to refer to geographically specific locations 
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within these districts where there are substantial concentrations of 
people who identify as Thangmi, who themselves refer to their places 
of residence as “Thangmi villages” (although members of other ethnic 
groups usually also live in, or near, these settlements). Some of the 
largest and most important Thangmi villages are Alampu, Chokati, 
Dhuskun, Dumkot, Lapilang, Piskar, Surkhe, and Suspa. A very small 
number of Thangmi live in urban Kathmandu (Nepal’s only truly 
metropolitan city), along with a similar number in semi-urban towns in 
the Tarai districts of Jhapa and Udayapur.16 Both of these two groups 
are comprised almost entirely of individuals who settled in these towns 
recently, having grown up either in rural villages in Nepal, or in 
Darjeeling. I often refer to such groups as “Kathmandu-based 
Thangmi” and “Jhapa-based Thangmi”, since their locations—and the 
positionalities associated with them—set them apart from the majority 
of Thangmi in Nepal, who live in rural hill districts. Each district, village 
and hamlet has its own particularities as well, which with the exception 
of the dialect difference between Sindhupalchok and Dolakha, are 
impossible to describe schematically. Since these localized differences 
are important within the cultural politics of Thangminess, I pay careful 
attention to locality, whenever possible indicating exactly where an 
event took place, or where an individual was from. Since, as described 
above, I spent the bulk of my time in two villages (Suspa and Chokati), 
                                                
16 In a 2004 survey, I found approximately 400 Thangmi to be full-time residents of 
Kathmandu. However, the majority of these individuals were still officially registered 
as residents of Dolakha or Sindhupalchok. The 1999 publication Dolakhareng 
estimates that there are approximately 300 Thangmi in Jhapa. 
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more of my material comes from those locations, although I have 
included information from as wide a range of sites as possible. 
In India, the majority of the Thangmi population live in urban 
Darjeeling municipality or adjacent quasi-urban settlements such as 
Alubari, Jawahar Basti, Jorebunglow, Mangalpuri, and Tungsung. There 
are also small concentrations of Thangmi in rural areas throughout the 
district (both on tea plantations such as Tumsong, and in villages such 
as Bijen Bari, Rangbull, and Tin Mile, all of which I visited), as well as in 
Sikkim. Thangmi residence patterns are rarely ethnically homogeneous 
in India in the manner that they are in Nepal, so I have not used 
geographical terms to refer to the places where individual Thangmi live 
in India. However, to the extent possible, I note the specific location 
where an event occurred or a person was from. 
 
Methodologies and Sources 
The village setting in which I conducted my early work in Nepal lent 
itself to the traditional ethnographic method of participant-
observation, both of daily life and ritual practice. I also conducted 
many formal and informal interviews. I sought out gurus (shamans) 
and village elders in particular, as well as a range of common people of 
all ages and backgrounds.17 I used a mini-disc audio recorder to 
                                                
17 After this first usage, the term guru appears without italics throughout the 
dissertation for ease of reading. 
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capture many of these one-on-one encounters, as well as to record 
ritual chants as they were practiced. 
I also used photography, both to document events, and to serve 
as a springboard for discussion when I later returned photos of these 
events to the people who had participated in them. Whenever possible, 
I have included relevant photographs to illustrate the text of this 
dissertation. (All photos are my own unless otherwise noted.) Later, as 
I expanded my work to India, I also developed my use of visual 
materials as an ethnographic tool, and began to use a digital video 
camera in addition to a mini-disc and a digital still camera. Shooting 
video of practice and performance events in one location and showing 
it to people in other locations became a defining methodology of my 
multi-sited work. I organized small viewings in villages, as well as 
large public programs in Kathmandu and Darjeeling, in order to show 
video footage and elicit comments. Several of these events are 
described in the text of this dissertation. These programs often 
became forums for broad-ranging discussions about Thangmi identity 
itself, among diverse groups of Thangmi who might not otherwise 
have met. My own role in the process of Thangmi identity production, 
both through such events and other actions, is discussed in detail in 
Chapters 1 and 8. 
I first attended a meeting of the Nepal Thami Samaj (NTS), the 
ethnic association that represents Thangmi within the Nepal Federation 
of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), in Kathmandu in late 1999. NTS 
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meetings, conferences and events quickly became another key site of 
my fieldwork, both in Kathmandu and in various Thangmi villages. The 
same is true for the Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association (BTWA), the 
parallel organization in India. Working closely with officers of both 
organizations, over time I copied a range of documentary materials 
from their associational archives, which I discuss throughout this 
dissertation. The histories of these national organizations, as well as 
other local Thangmi organizations at various times and places, are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
Later in my fieldwork, I also conducted detailed genealogical 
work with three extended families in Nepal and three in India. 
Unraveling the intricacies of kinship helped me gain a better 
understanding of migration and settlement patterns, as well as 
marriage practices and family relationships.18 Finally, I conducted a 
micro-survey on economic issues, in particular property ownership, 
migration and family size in one ward of Suspa-Kshamawati VDC, 
Dolakha District, Nepal, which included 130 Thangmi households.19 In 
India, the BTWA was in the process of conducting a comparable survey 
                                                
18 Thangmi kinship structures in the abstract sense have been well-described by 
Turin (2004b, 2006); in my research I focused instead on marriage and settlement 
patterns in practice. 
19 Several of the questions in this survey were modeled on those asked by Creighton 
Peet (1978) in the same area 25 years earlier in order to facilitate comparison of 
these two data sets over time. During the period of my fieldwork, the Dolakha district 
branch of the NTS also conducted its own survey of Thangmi populations in Dolakha, 
as did NEFIN. I have received the data from the former survey, but am still awaiting 
information on the latter. Eventually, I would like to compare the survey structures of 
each of these with my own, and consider the social and political implications of such 
intensive surveying for ethnicity and identity formation. 
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during the period of my fieldwork, and I accompanied the 
organization’s officers on several of their data collecting trips. 
Throughout this dissertation, I draw extensively upon four book-
length compilations of writing by Thangmi individuals that have been 
published by Thangmi organizations. After much consideration, I have 
decided to cite these publications by their titles, rather than their 
authors. There are several reasons for this choice. First, since all of the 
authors share the last name Thangmi or Thami, citation by last name 
would prove confusing. Second, although each publication lists the 
editor (or in some cases a long list of editors) of the entire compilation, 
individual articles are only erratically attributed to individual authors, 
making it difficult to ascribe authorship for each article. Finally, as is 
described in Chapter 5, since each publication is geographically, 
historically and ideologically positioned as a whole, I believe readers 
will find it most useful to become familiar with the titles of the four key 
book-length works that are referenced throughout the dissertation. 
These are Nan Ni Patuko (2054 VS),20 Dolakhareng (1999), Niko 
Bachinte (2003) and Thami Samudayako Aitihasik Chinari ra Sanskar 
Sanskriti (2061 [2056] VS).21 In parenthetical citations, I use the 
                                                
20 When citing years in Nepal’s Vikram Sambat calendar, I use the abbreviation VS. 
The Vikram Sambat calendar is approximately 57 years ahead of the Gregorian 
calendar. 2054 VS is therefore 1997-1998 AD, while 2061 VS is 2004-2005 AD. 
Whenever possible I cite publications by the Gregorian year, however, in cases where 
that date is not provided in the original publication, this is not possible unless one 
knows the exact month of publication, since the Vikram Sambat year runs from 
approximately April through March of two Gregorian years. 
21 Although actually published in 2061, the book bears the date 2056 on its front 
page. The manuscript was allegedly submitted to NFDIN in 2056, but the book was 
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following one-word abbreviations for these four publications 
respectively: Patuko, Reng, Niko and Samudaya. 
 
Languages, Assistance and Transcription 
For the most part, I conducted research in the Nepali language. Most 
speakers of the Thangmi language are fully bilingual in Nepali, which is 
the lingua franca in Darjeeling and Sikkim as well as in Nepal. Ritual 
practice is conducted largely in Thangmi, in which I gained basic 
competence over the course of my fieldwork. However, in order to 
understand the details of Thangmi language content, I worked with Bir 
Bahadur, a young Thangmi man fluent in both Thangmi and Nepali. He 
provided on-the-fly translation as events or conversations were 
unfolding, detailed transcription and translation work of recorded 
materials, and a wealth of his own knowledge and analytic insight, 
which is mentioned at relevant points throughout the text. The term 
“research assistant” in no way describes the depth of Bir Bahadur’s 
contribution to my work over the course of a decade, yet I feel it is the 
most accurate way to describe the formal aspect of our relationship in 
the context of a scholarly manuscript. 
Frequently in India, but also occasionally in Nepal, informants 
chose to speak with me in English, or in a combination of Nepali and 
English. Even people who did not speak English per se often sprinkled 
                                                                                                                                       
only actually published in 2061. An unofficial manuscript copy was in circulation 
before the official publication date. 
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their conversation with English words. The documents which I collected 
were also in a combination of Nepali and English. 
To the extent possible, I have indicated the language in which 
statements were made or in which a text was published, using single 
quotation marks to set off words used in English within an otherwise 
non-English sentence. Terms from Nepali, Thangmi, Tibetan and 
Sanskrit are presented in italics, with the following abbreviations: (N) 
for Nepali, (T) for Thangmi, (T*) for Thangmi ritual language, (Tib) for 
Tibetan, and (Skt) for Sanskrit. Nepali and Thangmi terms and 
conversation are presented in a modified phonetic form without 
diacritics. Proper place, ethnic, and personal names (i.e. Kathmandu, 
Newar, Bir Bahadur) are capitalized but not italicized. I hope that 
specialist readers will forgive this somewhat eclectic approach towards 
representing the linguistic diversity which I encountered in my research 
in the effort to make the content of it accessible to a broad 
interdisciplinary audience. 
 
Chapter Outline 
The rationale for the structure of this dissertation is presented in more 
detail in Chapter 1. Here, I provide the reader with a basic outline. 
Chapter 1 builds upon George Marcus’ notion of “complicity” and 
Charles Hale’s proposal for “activist research” in an exploration of the 
role of social science within the politics of recognition, by way of a 
historical review of Thangmi experiences of representation. Drawing 
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particularly on the work of Erving Goffman, Maurice Godelier, and 
Richard Handler, Chapter 2 explores the ritualized nature of ethnicity, 
as produced within multiple nation-state frames through practices and 
performances which take identity as their sacred object. Through an 
analysis of Thangmi origin myths and writings, Chapter 3 posits the 
category of the “original” as a site of contested power between 
different groups of Thangmi, particularly gurus who locate that power 
in oral practice, and activists who seek to appropriate that power in 
written texts. Chapter 4 examines pragmatic aspects of Thangmi 
cross-border migration, considering the cultural and social dimensions 
of belonging that make such movements an ongoing lifestyle choice. 
Chapter 5 traces the history of Thangmi associations in Nepal and 
India, focusing on how they have been shaped by historically 
contingent, state-specific paradigms for social progress, while also 
communicating with each other across borders to create a 
transnational Thangmi public sphere. Presenting a detailed description 
of propitiation practices and cultural performances that affirm the 
power of territorial deities in Thangmi ritual, Chapter 6 explores the 
divergent ways in which Thangmi conceptualize their attachment to 
territory. Chapter 7 details the role of clan affiliations in constituting 
Thangminess through the practice of life cycle rituals, including birth, 
marriage and death. Through a consideration of the Thangmi role in a 
Newar-orchestrated Dasain ritual in Dolakha bazaar, Chapter 8 
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explores questions of agency and power, both Thangmi and my own. 
This dissertation closes with a short epilogue and a bibliography. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Conceit of Ethnography: 
Social Science and the Politics of Recognition 
 
“There is no idea about the origin of the Thami community or the term 
‘Thami’. Their history is indeed obscure. Neither the scanty literature 
that is available on them nor their own traditions speak enough about 
their history and culture ... The Thamis do not have any exclusive ritual 
worth mentioning.” 
- anthropologist Tanka Subba, writing in the Anthropological Survey of 
India’s People of India series (1993: 184-185) 
 
“The government does not know us yet. We must make them come to 
know us”.1 
- Latte Apa, Thangmi guru in Darjeeling, India2 
 
“We have a request for all scientists and scholars: please do research 
about the Thami, please write about us, and we will stand ready to help 
you.” 
- Tahal Bahadur, president of the Thami Youth Congress, writing in the  
   publication Thami Samudaya (2061 [2056] VS: vi) 
 
“If the Thangmi forgot to worship Bhume, the deity would not 
recognize us. If the deity does not recognize us, how can others 
recognize us?”3 
- Man Bahadur, resident of Suspa, Dolakha, Nepal 
 
The Thangmi recognize themselves as a distinctive group, yet they 
have remained almost entirely absent from social science scholarship 
on the Himalayan region, as well as from political and popular 
discussions of ethnicity. The four epigraphs presented here provide a 
range of opinions on why this is the case, and what this absence 
                                       
1 Original Nepali: Sarkarle hamilai chineko chhaina. Chinaunu parchha. 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all informants cited in this dissertation share the last name 
“Thangmi” (when they introduce themselves) or “Thami” (when they write their name 
on official documents). I therefore refer to individuals by their first names only. 
3 Original Nepali: Thangmile bhumelai mana birseko bhae deutale hamilai manyata 
dindaina. Deutale hamilai manyata diena bhane arule kasari manyata garna sakchha? 
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means for contemporary Thangmi individuals. Writing in the 
Anthropological Survey of India’s People of India series, Tanka Subba 
(1993) provides one of the few contemporary introductions to the 
group, but emphasizes the group’s “obscurity” and laments that the 
fact that their “traditions” do not adequately demonstrate “history and 
culture”.4 The next two quotations above, from a senior Thangmi guru 
in India and a youth activist in Nepal respectively, represent opinions 
held by a wide range of Thangmi individuals, who feel that both 
political and academic attention from non-Thangmi others are 
essential tools in their project to rectify a history of misrecognition. 
Within academic discourse, such misrecognition has resulted in 
descriptions like Subba’s which stereotype the Thangmi as “backwards” 
and lacking in recognizable culture.5 In concert with other historical 
factors, such social scientific representations have contributed to the 
near complete absence of the Thangmi from political discourse in the 
contemporary nation-states in which they live, at least until very 
                                       
4 Laura Jenkins (2003: Chapter 3) details the highly politicized nature of the People of 
India project in which this assessment appeared, showing how the volumes produced 
were marshaled to support a range of ideological agendas. She also explains that the 
writers, “based their findings about each community on an average of five key 
informants ... and spent an average of 5.5 days researching each community” 
(Jenkins 2003: 49). Tanka Subba himself told me that he had only three days to 
complete his profile of the Thangmi, and spent much of that time trying to locate 
appropriate informants (personal communication). All of this suggests that while 
Subba’s assessment was based on extremely thin data, its political effect—which 
many Thangmi perceive as a damning relegation to obscurity—was substantial. 
5 For instance, Rajesh Gautam and Ashoke Thapa-Magar’s Tribal Ethnography of 
Nepal, which was modeled on the People of India project, claims that Thangmi, “are 
unable to lie, cheat or deceive” (1994: 314), that “they are not clean in their habits” 
(1994: 314) and that “when a Thami is seen it is clear that these people have recently 
renounced their uncivilized ways and have adapted to modern society” (1994: 323). 
See also Sapkota (2045 VS) and Rana (2049 VS) for similar treatments in Nepali. 
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recently. The final quotation above suggests that, for many Thangmi 
for whom ritual practice remains a key mode of both cultural 
production and social reproduction, campaigns for academic or 
political recognition can not be successful unless divine recognition 
from territorial deities like Bhume is maintained. This form of divine 
recognition is premised upon appropriate ritual behavior in the 
presence of the sacred.6 
With reference to broader debates over the politics of 
recognition in multicultural societies (Taylor 1992; Povinelli 2002; 
Appadurai 2004; Graham 2005), this chapter explores the ways in 
which Thangmi come to know themselves and others as Thangmi 
within complex fields of action and knowledge shaped by interlocking 
schemes of ritual, political, and social scientific recognition. Although 
the desire for political recognition from the state is a relatively new 
phenomenon for many Thangmi, recognition from other sources 
outside the realm of Thangmi social relations, particularly from the 
divine world, has long been a key force in constituting those relations 
and the identities they produce. I suggest that contemporary Thangmi 
encounter a range of “recognizing agents”, from territorial deities to 
the Nepali and Indian states to (I)NGOs and anthropologists to 
members of different caste and ethnic groups, each of which reaffirm 
different aspects of identity when they come into conversation with 
                                       
6 Bhume is a non-gendered, animistic earth deity (described in detail in Chapter 6); I 
therefore refer to the deity as “it”, rather than using “he” or “she”. 
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Thangmi individuals or collectivities. In particular, I consider how social 
scientists (in the Thangmi case, me) may engage in a productive form 
of what George Marcus has called “complicity” (1999) when they 
become recognizing agents who catalyze community efforts to achieve 
recognition from other non-Thangmi sources. Ethnography that works 
to transform the “terms of recognition” (Appadurai 2004) for particular 
groups can contribute to Appadurai’s call to strengthen anthropology’s 
engagement with the future, by treating culture not only as evidence of 
a collectivity’s past, but as a toolkit which members of that group may 
utilize as they craft their future.  
The object of description in this dissertation is the process of 
producing Thangminess as a totality, which simultaneously depends 
upon and transcends the geographical, political, religious and cultural 
borders by which it is defined. Each chapter of this dissertation reflects 
the complexity of this process, with data and analysis from a range of 
field sites, which when organized thematically, highlights the 
heterogeneous, yet collectively produced, nature of contemporary 
Thangminess. By using the conceit of ethnography as an organizing 
principle, with chapters loosely structured around “traditional” 
anthropological subjects such as ritual, myth, economy, territory, 
political organization, clans and the life cycle, and the dynamics of 
power and agency, I seek to demonstrate that reflexive, multi-sited 
research with transnational communities does not preclude in-depth 
description of such fundamental aspects of social life. That the rubric 
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“Thangmi” describes a diversity of experiences which are not easily 
reconciled within a standardized, singular identity is a fundamental 
premise of my work; yet using the form of a monographic ethnography 
allows me to create the singular social scientific profile that diverse 
members of the Thangmi community commonly desire, for reasons 
which will become clear below. 
The ensuing text is not precisely what any single individual or 
interest group within the varied, transnational Thangmi community 
might like me to write, but rather a “bird’s eye view” (Briggs 1996) that 
shows how all of the people I have come to recognize as Thangmi are 
engaged in the disparate range of day-to-day actions that comprise 
culture in the making.7 Yet there should be something here for 
everyone, pieces taken-for-granted and contentious, which as a whole 
add up to a first Thangmi ethnography that contributes to a range of 
Thangmi aspirations, as well as my own. 
 
What’s in a Name?: The Problem of (Mis)Recognition 
Recent discussions of multiculturalism have identified “the politics of 
recognition” as a crucial arena in which modern subjects validate their 
                                       
7 Briggs references Foucault’s notion of the panopticon to explain that the social 
capital of his university job, his academic funding and everything else about his 
positionality as an ethnographer enabled him to “construct a much wider range of 
intertextual relationships between discourses” (1996: 457) than the other individuals 
involved in constructing certain practices as “authentic” or “inventions of tradition” 
(including indigenous performers, state officials, and so forth). The exigencies of my 
own comparable situation will be explored further in this chapter and throughout the 
dissertation, but here I want make clear that I do not see my role as one of 
“evaluating claims ... regarding the ‘authenticity’” of any type of action (Briggs 1996: 
458), but rather one of presenting all possible perspectives to the extent possible. 
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own self-worth through the assertion of identity. Philosopher Charles 
Taylor has argued that political recognition of a group and its 
constitutive members’ distinctive identities, “is not just a courtesy we 
owe people”, but in fact, “a vital human need” (1992: 26). Laura 
Graham (2005) has taken this argument a step further to suggest that 
“existential recognition” at the popular level is a necessary 
precondition for indigenous peoples’ equality within modern 
multicultural polities.8 As Graham puts it, the political projects of the 
Xavante indigenous group in Brazil are, “designed to change the 
Xavante’s status within the broader public sphere from unknown to 
known, from not existing (- existence) to existing (+ existence) within 
a wide nonindigenous public consciousness” (2005: 632). Such 
transformations can alleviate the negative effects of non-recognition 
or misrecognition, which, according to Taylor, “can inflict harm, can be 
a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and 
reduced mode of being” (1992: 25). Moving from the psychological to 
the economic effects of misrecognition, Appadurai suggests that, 
“poverty is partly a matter of operating with extremely weak resources 
where the terms of recognition are concerned” (2004: 82), and that the 
foundation for developing capacity for economic development is 
community control of the “terms of recognition”.  
                                       
8 Chapter 6 describes Thangmi positionalities in relation to the transnational 
discourse of indigeneity. 
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Many Thangmi indeed feel that they have suffered a range of 
negative effects from a history of “misrecognition”. These are variously 
expressed in the psychological terms of having an “inferiority complex” 
(see Chapter 3), the economic terms of poverty, the social terms of 
exclusion and discrimination (see Chapter 4), and the cultural terms of 
“backwardness” (see Chapter 5). In social interactions, Thangmi often 
find that they are mistaken for Kami, a dalit blacksmith caste, or 
Dhami, a socially marginalized group of folk healers, due to the similar 
sounds of their names.9 They are just as frequently misrecognized as 
members of other ethnic groups, such as Tamang or Kirant, both by 
the general public, scholars, and members of those groups who seek 
to claim the Thangmi population as part of their own.10 Basant (the 
General Secretary of the BTWA for several years until his death in 
2003), who had been born and raised in Darjeeling, explained in an 
interview, “In school, other kids would tease me as Kami, so I really 
wanted to study Thangmi history so I could respond and fight back. 
The more I studied, the more I realized I couldn’t understand without 
going to Nepal.” 
                                       
9 This homophony led Darjeeling-based poets in the early part of the 20th century to 
frequently use “Thami” and “Kami” as the final syllables in rhyming couplets that 
described the Nepali community of Darjeeling. For example, see Chalmers’ citation of 
Parasmani Pradhan (n.d.): “Limbu, Jimdar, Tamang, Khas, Magar, Gurung, Hayu, 
Chepang and Kami; Sunwar, Lapche, Kusunda, Giripuri, Thakuri, Tharu, Newar, 
Thami; calling ourselves the Nepali jati and all speaking the Nepali language; saying 
that this indeed is our language, [all] respect the mother tongue with mind and body” 
(Chalmers 2003: 236). 
10 Tanka Bahadur Rai (2041 VS) states that the total Thangmi population is around 
70,000, which should be added to the total numbers of the Kirant population. 
Similarly, Uttar Kumar Rai (1997) claims that since the Thangmi language is related to 
the Kiranti languages, the Thangmi population should be classified as “Kirant”. 
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Thangmi in Nepal and India, including those who spend time in 
both countries, are indeed bound together by their name and its 
history. Encoding caste, ethnicity, religion, and/or regional origin, 
names carry a contemporary power which is a legacy of historical 
classification projects: Nepal’s Muluki Ain—the 1854 national legal 
code which rigidified caste and ethnic hierarchies (Höfer 2004 
[1979])—and the colonial Anthropological Survey of India (Cohn 1987) 
respectively. While in both countries, “Thami” is the group’s official 
name, and this is what appears on citizenship cards in Nepal or ration 
cards in India, typically as a surname, the term is an ambiguous 
signifier. Members of the group for the most part prefer their own 
ethnonym, “Thangmi”, to describe themselves whenever possible,11 
while most non-Thangmi are unfamiliar with either “Thami” or 
“Thangmi”. Neither name conveys enough information for outsiders to 
easily categorize those who hold it, since most people in Nepal and 
India simply do not know what ‘Thami’, and even less ‘Thangmi’, 
indexes in terms of ethnicity, religion or region. 
“Thami ke ho?” “What is Thami?” is a common Nepali language 
refrain which all Thangmi hear throughout their lives in both Nepal and 
India. As Nirmala, a young woman from the village of Dumkot in 
                                       
11 In Darjeeling, the term “Thangmi” is used less often in public contexts, both 
because most Thangmi in India do not speak the Thangmi language in which this 
ethnonym is used, and because they are concerned that using a different name than 
the one by which they are officially classified might unduly complicate their efforts to 
gain government recognition as a Scheduled Tribe. However, in private conversations 
several Thangmi expressed to me that if it were administratively possible, they would 
like to change their name to “Thangmi” in India. The politics of this issue are 
described further in Chapter 7. 
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Dolakha, whose father and brothers had been to India often (although 
she had never been herself), explained: 
 
Everyone in the bazaar asks, “Thami ke ho”. I want to tell them 
“Yo Thami ho”—“This is Thami” [pointing to herself]. But that is 
not enough, we need to know our history and culture so we can 
explain. Some of the books published in Darjeeling which I have 
read, like this one, are very helpful in that way. 
Nirmala held up a copy of the Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association’s 
2003 publication, Niko Bachinte (“Our Morning” in Thangmi). 
Superimposed over a photo of a Thangmi guru in Nepal (which I had 
taken early in my fieldwork), the text on the back cover of the 
publication began with the question, “Thami ke ho?” [see Figure 1.1]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Back cover of Niko Bachinte: “Thami ke ho?” at the top 
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What was often encountered as a flippant query from curious 
outsiders had become a burning rhetorical question that the 
community posed to themselves to answer. Unpacked somewhat, the 
question actually means, “How do you fit into familiar systems of 
classification?”, or, “Where is your place in the social order?” (cf. 
Douglas 1966). As will become clear below, the lack of clear 
signification of the Thangmi ethnonym derives in part from a history of 
misrecognition, which many Thangmi have themselves exacerbated by 
intentionally misrepresenting themselves as members of other better-
known groups. The result is that despite their different citizenships 
and life experiences in Nepal and India, the current generation of 
Thangmi are drawn together by their desire for an “existential 
recognition” (Graham 2005) of a distinctive cultural presence, which 
might help fill the discursive absence surrounding their name. 
 
Missing: the Thangmi from Himalayan Anthropology 
Why have the Thangmi been so misrecognized, at worst missing 
entirely from scholarship, as well as political and popular discourse, 
and at best conflated with other groups with whom they in fact have 
little linguistic, cultural or religious commonality? Was there something 
about the way they conceptualized or produced their identity which 
made them undesirable research subjects, or made them 
unrecognizable to the states in which they lived? Or had they 
intentionally avoided attention? My early interest in the Thangmi was in 
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part driven by the desire to understand this complex set of historical 
and epistemological questions, to understand how and why the 
Thangmi discursive absence from the existing scholarship and identity 
politics of the region had been constructed over time, particularly in 
relation to the rich cultural presence that I had observed in Thangmi 
ritual practice. My still incomplete explanation lies at the intersection 
of the unusually synthetic nature of Thangmi identity production with 
the histories of anthropology and state formation in the Himalayas.  
The anthropology of Nepal began in earnest in the 1950s, when 
the country’s Rana rulers opened its borders to the outside world. 
After World War II, the emphasis in anthropology lay in documenting 
“culture”, then still defined as a discrete set of traits attached in a 
primordial manner to unique and bounded ethnic groups. At the same 
time, the early attempts of the Nepali nation-state to codify ethnicity 
through the Muluki Ain had provided what appeared to be a 
comprehensive list of groups awaiting study when the country opened 
for research. The 1854 legal code provided the skeletal framework 
upon which modern notions of ethnic identity have been built in Nepal 
over the last 150 years (Höfer 2004 [1979]), and the Thangmi were not 
in it.12 
                                       
12 In addition to Höfer’s annotated translation of the Muluki Ain itself (2004 [1979]), 
other works that have contributed substantially to our understanding of the historical 
processes of ethnicity and nation formation in Nepal include Burghart (1984), Levine 
(1987), Holmberg (1989), Gellner, Pfaff-Czarnecka and Whelpton (1997), Fisher 
(2001) and Guneratne (2002). 
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Brian Houghton Hodgson’s (1874, 1880) work on Nepal’s 
peoples in his capacity as British Resident further solidified the nascent 
caste and ethnic categories propagated in the Muluki Ain.13 Since the 
Ranas did not allow Hodgson out of Kathmandu, he never conducted 
ethnographic research per se, working rather with several high-caste 
assistants who collected data throughout the country and shared their 
notes with him back in Kathmandu. Hodgson’s ethnic and linguistic 
classifications provided the descriptive backdrop from which many of 
the first ethnographers to work in Nepal after 1950 chose their 
subjects of study, as well as the classificatory schemas through which 
they interpreted their data (Holmberg 1988). Hodgson did not refer to 
the Thangmi in his substantial corpus of materials on Himalayan 
languages and ethnology. The Thangmi first appear in colonial 
materials in George Grierson’s 1909 Linguistic Survey of India with 
what contributing author Sten Konow calls “incomplete” data, collected 
entirely from a population of 319 Thangmi speakers enumerated in 
India (mostly in Darjeeling and Sikkim) in the 1901 census (Grierson 
1909: 280-281).14  
Seeking distinctive groups that could be studied in their totality 
within single villages, the first generation of Himalayanists was 
                                       
13 For a recent analysis of Hodgson’s contributions to Himalayan Studies, see 
Waterhouse (2004). 
14 Hodgson’s comparative vocabulary of the “Eastern Sub-Himalayas” lists the 
following groups: Sherpa, Lhopa, Lepcha, Limbu, Kiranti, Murmi [later known as 
Tamang], Newar, Gurung, Magar and Sunwar (1874: Tables 1 – 4, preceding part II). 
Additional essays describe the “broken tribes” of the eastern Himalayas, but nowhere 
are the Thangmi mentioned. 
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attracted to a range of field sites afforded by Nepal’s ethnic diversity. 
As Holmberg, March, and Tamang explain, “anthropology in its focus 
on specific kinds of questions has, with notable exceptions, produced 
an ahistorical image of Nepal as an array of discrete societies and 
cultures” (1999: 7-8). The Austrian count Christoph von Fürer-
Haimendorf conducted one of the earliest and most well-known of 
such studies, detailing the Sherpa (1964). He was soon followed by 
others, such as French ethnographer Bernard Pignède, who studied the 
Gurung (1993 [1966]) and American John Hitchcock who focused on 
the Magar (1966). Groups not listed as discrete units early on, either in 
the Muluki Ain or in surveys like Hodgson’s and Sylvain Lévi’s (1905), 
were in general not selected for ethnographic study in this era. The 
anthropological paradigm of culture, as it was understood at the time, 
intersected with existing local dynamics to privilege certain 
ethnographic subjects over others within the “regional ethnography 
traditions” of Nepal (Fardon 1990). Some groups, such as the Thakali 
and Sherpa, have received extensive scholarly attention 
disproportionate to their small population size, while others, such as 
the Thangmi, have received almost none, despite their relatively large 
population.15 
                                       
15 The 15,000 strong Thakali population of lower Mustang was already the most 
studied ethnic group in Nepal by 1985, being the subject of over fifty published 
works by fifteen different scholars of various disciplines (Turin 1997: 187). The 
Sherpa have been scrutinized in a similar manner. See particularly Adams (1996) and 
Ortner (1999a, b) for two views on how this extenisve ethnographizing has shaped 
Sherpa identities. 
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Beyond Mark Turin’s recent in-depth description of the Thangmi 
language (2006), which shows that Thangmi is a distinctive Tibeto-
Burman tongue most likely related to both the Rai-Kiranti and Newar 
languages, it remains the case today that there is no authoritative 
social scientific work on the Thangmi.16 The very small body of existing 
material on the group is largely inaccessible, in the form of Creighton 
Peet’s unpublished 1978 PhD thesis,17 the fieldnotes of Christoph von 
Fürer-Haimendorf (who passed through the area several times but 
never made an in-depth study of it) and the French linguist Genevieve 
Stein (who worked in the village of Alampu in the 1970s, but never 
published her findings), and locally published materials that are now 
out-of-print or otherwise hard to track down (Sapkota 2045 VS; Toba 
1990).18 Newspaper articles in the Nepali media are another source of 
information, but with some notable exceptions (Lall 1966), these are 
generally based on secondary sources of questionable veracity and 
tend to represent the Thangmi in a folkloristic idiom, casting them as a 
quaint, “backwards” group worth noticing for their cultural oddities, 
                                       
16 The Thangmi/Thami language has long been a subject of discussion in work on 
comparative linguistic classification (Benedict 1972; van Driem 2001, 2003; Grierson 
1909; Shafer 1966, 1974; Stein 1972; Toba 1990), but Turin was the first to do 
extensive field research on the language and its speakers. 
17 Creighton Peet’s 1978 thesis did not focus on the Thangmi in particular, but rather 
on economics and migration in general in an unnamed village in Dolakha district. 
However, a substantial proportion of his informants were Thangmi, and his thesis 
contains a wealth of asides about Thangmi life, which are cited as appropriate 
throughout this dissertation. 
18 Father Casper Miller’s Faith Healers in the Himalaya (1997 [1979]) is a notable 
exception: it has been reprinted in Nepal and India several times and is still readily 
available. Although not exclusively about the Thangmi, it contains two chapters that 
describe Thangmi ritual practice in the broader multi-ethnic context of Dolakha 
district. I discuss Miller’s work in detail in Chapter 8. 
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such as their supposed belief that they are “the offspring of yeti” 
(Manandhar 2001).19 
In several compendia, the Thangmi are classified as a sub-group 
of other better-known groups, such as the Tamang (Bista 1967: 48; 
Gaborieau 1978: 107; Majupuria and Majupuria 1978: 60, 1980: 57), 
Kiranti (Lévi, as cited in Riccardi 1975: 23), or even Parbatiya Hindus—
the Gurkha officer Eden Vansittart believed that they were “one of the 
Adhikari clans” of the “Khas grouping” (1918: 70).20 A debate about the 
meaning of the ethnonym “Thangmi”—which most likely derives either 
from the Tibetan mtha’ mi “people of the border” or thang mi “people 
of the steppe”—is quite literally relegated to the footnotes of 
Himalayan anthropology.21 Summarizing the probable historical 
relationships between Himalayan groups, Nick Allen suggests that the 
ethnonym of what he calls, “the lowly Thami” (1978: 11, n.2), may be 
related to Tamang, Thakali or Gurung ethnonyms, citing footnotes 
from the work of well-known Himalayanists Alexander Macdonald and 
Michael Oppitz to back up this proposition. Such references seem to 
                                       
19 Original Nepali: Yetiko santan. This assertion has no basis in Thangmi cultural 
practice, and when this article was published, the Nepal Thami Samaj submitted a 
critical letter to the editor refuting Manadhar’s claims. Some time later, NTS members 
also protested when a Manandhar was awarded a prestigious journalism prize. 
However, Dolakha-based Manadhar’s journalism on the Thangmi (the article cited 
here is only one of several on a range of topics) seems to strike a popular chord with 
the general Nepali public by using the discourse of “wildness” (cf. Skaria 1999) to 
fetishize the Thangmi as an indigenous oddity. 
20 Linguistically speaking, Thangmi share more with the Kiranti Rai and Limbu groups 
than with the Tamang, and if asked to state which groups they feel closest to, most 
Thangmi will cite the Rai and Limbu. However, due to their residence in an area with 
a substantial Tamang population, they have more often been erroneously classified 
as a Tamang sub-group. See Chapter 3 for details of indigenous Thangmi schemes of 
ethnic classification. 
21 See Turin (2006) for details of these possible etymologies. 
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take on a life of their own, with more recent scholarly works repeatedly 
citing the same supposition without offering new evidence (Steinmann 
1996: 180; Pommaret 1999: 65-66; Fisher 2001: 224, n.13). A 
recruitment manual for the Gurkha regiments of the British Army, 
although recognizing the Thangmi as a distinct group, sums up the 
prevailing attitude towards them with the abrupt dismissal: “Coarse in 
appearance, and the inferior of the other races in social and religious 
matters, they do not merit further description” (Northey and Morris 
1928: 260). 
 
Ethnic Politics, Complicity and the Ethnographic Contract 
This lack of available and accurate scholarly material about the 
Thangmi is not simply an abstract academic concern. It also has 
concrete consequences within the crucible of contemporary janajati 
(indigenous nationality) and tribal politics within the nation-states of 
Nepal and India respectively, both contexts in which ethnographic 
monographs, articles, and public exposure are important sources of 
real and symbolic capital for those agitating for increased recognition 
and benefits from the Nepali and Indian states.22 In Nepal, the Nepal 
Thami Samaj (NTS) is a member organization of the Janajati Mahasangh 
(also known in English as the Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities, or NEFIN), and is working within that framework for 
                                       
22 See Gellner (2007) and Hangen (2007) for recent histories of the janajati 
movement, and Jaffrelot (2006), Shah (2007), and Kapila (2008) for comparable 
reviews of tribal politics in India. Chapter 5 of this dissertation describes Thangmi 
experiences of both in depth. 
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political rights, as well as development dollars from the INGOs who 
support the Nepali state.23 In India, where the Thangmi have been 
listed as an Other Backwards Class (OBC) since 1995, the Bharatiya 
Thami Welfare Association (BTWA) is engaged in the process of 
applying for Scheduled Tribe (ST) status, both at the state and central 
levels. Although the history of anthropology, classification, and state 
policy on either side of the border have led to different specific 
equations for recognition, the fact remains that in both countries 
today, being a people without an ethnography is tantamount to being 
invisible, or at least unrecognizable, to the state and other outside 
observers. These dynamics will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5, 
here I provide a brief contextualizing introduction. 
Since Nepal’s 1990 return to democracy,24 the generation of 
Thangmi who have come of age during the era of janajati politics 
(roughly speaking, those between 20 – 40) have begun to make 
conscious decisions to valorize Thangmi identity at the national level 
rather than retreating from it. Many activists involved with campaigns 
for national recognition and cultural preservation have spent much of 
their lives in urban Kathmandu, away from the rural villages where 
ritual is most conspicuously practiced under the direction of Thangmi 
                                       
23 Over the last decade in Nepal, the Maoist movement has provided an alternative 
framework for making political claims on the state. I have detailed the ways in which 
many Thangmi have become involved with Maoist ideology and practice elsewhere 
(Shneiderman 2003; Shneiderman and Turin 2004); here I focus for the most part on 
identity-based agendas. 
24 See Hoftun, Raeper and Whelpton (1999) for a good overview of this political 
transformation. 
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gurus. Such activists are often unfamiliar with the divine terms of 
recognition offered by territorial deities, and therefore place more 
value on political recognition from the state. During the period in 
which I began fieldwork, the Nepali state had no system of affirmative 
action, no promised benefits for those who could demonstrate ethnic 
uniqueness, no national forum in which cultural performances were 
encouraged and accorded political clout, and much less a sympathetic 
official audience. But the situation is now changing rapidly: in May 
2008, the first-ever elected Constitutional Assembly met for the first 
time. Some of the major items on the agenda for deliberation during 
the assembly’s two-year tenure were federal restructuring along ethnic 
lines, and developing a system of affirmative action.25 In these 
circumstances, having a recognizable identity encoded in an 
ethnographic tome—the heavier the better—seems newly important to 
those groups concerned about receiving adequate recognition in a 
state that may well be restructured along ethnic lines. 
In India, by contrast, there has long been a dialectic between 
indigenous self-representation and state-sponsored ethnography 
(Cohn 1987, Dirks 1992), which resulted in legally-binding ethnic and 
caste classifications. In particular, the Sixth Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution, as promulgated in 1950, provides for the “upliftment” of 
marginalized groups through official recognition (known as 
                                       
25 See Middleton and Shneiderman (2008) for a discussion of these current issues. 
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“scheduling”) and quotas.26 Since the late 1990s, the Thangmi in India 
have been focused on securing Scheduled Tribe (ST) status within the 
reservations system, which would offer them perceived political, 
educational and economic benefits.27 These descendants of Thangmi 
migrants, who left Nepal as long as 150 years ago, for the most part 
no longer speak the Thangmi language, and often grew up in 
environments where Thangmi ritual practitioners were not part of their 
experience.28 But in the process of applying for ST status—for which 
groups must provide as much ethnographic evidence as possible—
many Thangmi in India have recently become interested in 
rediscovering Thangmi “culture”, particularly through the mode of 
what they call “collection”.29 This refers both to compiling existing 
publications about themselves, and doing their own ethnographic and 
linguistic research—often along with audio or video recording to 
                                       
26 There is an extensive literature on the history of Scheduled Tribes and Castes in 
India; see especially Galanter (1984) and Jenkins (2003). 
27 Before applying for Scheduled Tribe status, the Bharatiya Thami Welfare 
Association submitted their application for recognition as an “Other Backwards Class” 
(OBC) in 1992, a designation which they received in 1995 at the West Bengal state 
level. Then, inspired by the success of the Tamang and Limbu communities in 
attaining ST status in 2003, the Thangmi submitted their official application in 2005. 
28 See Hutt (1998) for a description of the motivations for migration from Nepal to 
Darjeeling. Kennedy (1996) provides a general history of Darjeeling. 
29 Nowhere does the Indian Constitution specifically mention the criteria for 
recognizing Scheduled Tribes. It is only after some digging that one finds the semi-
official criteria established in 1965 by the Lokur Committee, which are: a) Indication 
of primitive traits; b) Distinctive culture; c) Geographical isolation; d) Shyness of 
contact with the community at large; e) Backwardness. (I am grateful to Townsend 
Middleton for providing these details.) Although there is no official statement 
requiring groups to submit ethnographic materials, the first two points above are 
almost universally interpreted by applicant groups to mean that ethnographic 
materials are required. 
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“document” and “videoalize” (both terms used by Thangmi in English) 
Thangmi cultural practice. 
The potential for social science research to contribute to such 
ethnic movements, as well as to become complicit in them, has been 
discussed at length by scholars working elsewhere in the world, 
particularly in Latin America (Fischer 1999; Warren and Jackson 2002; 
Hale 2006) and Australia (Myers 2002; Povinelli 2002). In these 
regions, scholars (both foreign and native) have contributed 
ethnographic knowledge to indigenous land rights claims, cultural 
performances, and various other mediations between the indigenous 
groups they work with, and broader national and international publics. 
The results of such engagement between scholar and subject are 
always complex, and rarely morally clear-cut, which has led some 
scholars to suggest that social science and indigenous activism are 
best kept separate (Lecomte-Tilouine and Dollfus 2003). Such 
arguments deny the unavoidably fraught nature of entering into what 
we might call the “ethnographic contract”, in which information about, 
and access to, a desired set of knowledge and actions is exchanged for 
some form of social scientific recognition. Often this contract remains 
unspoken, and certainly unsigned, yet it evokes expectations and 
aspirations on all sides from the moment that we first engage with 
those from whom we wish to collect what is termed “data”, in a terse 
turn of phrase that explicitly excludes the intersubjective aspect of the 
ethnographic project. In exchange for our data, I believe that scholars 
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conducting ethnographic work have an ethical responsibility to, at the 
very least, investigate potential avenues for contributing to the 
agendas of those with whom we work. In the Thangmi case, these 
include bolstering the group’s public profile through the production of 
social scientific knowledge about them. 
Charles Hale (2006) has recently shown how this kind of 
engagement with subaltern communities, which he calls “activist 
research”, may conflict with the prevailing model of cultural critique 
(Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986) across the social 
sciences. Hale contrasts the two approaches, arguing that activist 
research, although always politically compromised, has the potential to 
create uniquely generative theoretical spaces that move beyond the 
institutional academic commitments of cultural critique: 
 
Cultural critique, and the approach to ethnography it has 
spawned, is politically positioned, with primary (or even 
exclusive) commitments to the institutional space from which it 
emanates. Activist research, in contrast, affirms dual political 
commitments from the start. Activist anthropologists attempt to 
be loyal both to the space of critical scholarly production and to 
the principles and practices of people who struggle outside the 
academic setting. These dual political commitments transform 
our research methods directly: from the formulation of the 
research topic to the dissemination of results, they require 
collaboration, dialogue, and standards of accountability that 
conventional methods can, and regularly do, leave out of the 
equation. ... Activist research involves commitments that are not 
accountable to arbitration, evaluation, or regulation from within 
academia. Instead, it requires constant mediation between these 
two spaces, insisting that one need not choose between them 
nor collapse one into the other. 
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Dual loyalties to an organized group in struggle and to rigorous 
academic analysis often are not fully compatible with one 
another. They stand in tension, and at times, the tension turns to 
outright contradiction. At the same time, such tension is often 
highly productive. It not only yields research outcomes that are 
potentially useful to the political struggle with which one is 
aligned; but it can also generate new insight and knowledge that 
challenge and transform conventional academic wisdom. (2006: 
104-105) 
Cultural critique’s shift away from traditional ethnographic practice is 
often justified by highlighting the shortcomings of the earlier 
theoretical paradigms on which such ethnographic works were based, 
in particular their tendency to essentialize communities as bounded 
and frozen in time. Hale suggests that although the arbiters of cultural 
critique have positioned their theoretical approach as the only one that 
can adequately represent subaltern voices in a non-essentialized, 
politically correct manner, they face a problem when subaltern 
communities themselves choose to use theoretically unfashionable 
categories to advance their struggles: 
 
As long as the heavy weapons of deconstruction are aimed at the 
powerful, the proposal remains on high ground. But what about 
the other “sites” of a multisited ethnography? How do we 
responsibly address situations in which the relatively powerless 
are using these same vexed categories to advance their 
struggles? (2006: 102) 
This is precisely the situation I have encountered while working with 
the Thangmi in the era of identity politics in South Asia. Whatever my 
initial scholarly impulse might have been to demonstrate the 
constructedness of Thangmi ethnic identity, I have repeatedly been 
asked by a range of Thangmi individuals—including activists, ritual 
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practitioners, and just plain old people who have bumped up against 
the problem of misrecognition in their daily lives—to provide an 
essentializing ethnographic portrait of “the Thangmi” as a unified, 
unique, and historically unchanging group.30 Why shouldn’t they want 
this, when, for instance, an early request to the Government of India 
for recognition as a Scheduled Tribe was met with rejection and the 
directive to, “… submit total ethnographic material of your caste to the 
ministry”?31 Many anthropologists have made arguments along the 
lines of Sherry Ortner’s claim that, “the production of portraits of other 
cultures, no matter how well drawn, is in a sense no longer a major 
option” (1999a: 9). Yet it is precisely this definitive ethnographic 
portrait, presented in an authoritative academic voice, that many 
Thangmi desire, both as a validation of self-worth, and as a political 
tool. With no holistic portrait produced in the bygone days of 
anthropology when such work was not yet politically incorrect, why 
should Thangmi forgo this aspiration when their contemporaries in 
other Himalayan ethnic groups proudly brandish “their” ethnographies 
as important heritage objects that serve as evidence of their long-
standing recognizability? 
 
 
                                       
30 Although Nepali language materials are of more direct use to the communities 
themselves, English language materials are by and large perceived as having a higher 
prestige value, and are equally if not more in demand for political purposes. 
31 Letter from the Welfare Department of the Government of Sikkim sent to the 
President of the All Sikkim Thami Association, 13 October, 1999. 
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Strategies of Synthesis and Resistance 
For the Thangmi, as for many Himalayan groups, the desire to be 
recognized by social science and the state is relatively new, and entails 
a substantial transformation of earlier strategies of resistance. At the 
same time, Thangmi terms of engagement with a range of recognizing 
agents—divine, academic and political—are being rebalanced, although 
not altogether reconfigured.  
Recalling that Gurkha recruiters dismissed the Thangmi as not 
worthy of further attention, it is not incidental that fortune-seeking 
Thangmi men in the mid-19th to early 20th century heyday of the British 
empire lied about their ethnic affiliation so that they could join the 
Gurkhas as “Rai” or “Gurung”. As an elderly Thangmi man who had 
returned to his home village in Nepal after spending much of his youth 
in India explained, “At that time, if you said you were Thangmi, you 
just wouldn’t get a job”. As another man of the same generation who 
settled in Darjeeling put it, “You had to lie about your ethnicity to fill 
your stomach”. These are only some of the many ways in which 
Thangmi have been complicit in fomenting their own misrecognition 
over time. Historically, land and labor exploitation under the Rana and 
Shah regimes compelled Thangmi in Nepal to remain under the radar 
of state recognition whenever possible.32 Fear of the state, which 
                                       
32 Personal communication from Genevieve Stein, who described the Thangmi with 
whom she worked in Alampu village in the late 1960s – early 1970s “running and 
hiding” whenever state representatives approached. For general discussions of land 
tenure and state/local relations in Nepal see Caplan (2000 [1970]), Regmi (1976), and 
Holmberg, March and Tamang (1999). 
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primarily manifested in its tax-collecting form (older Thangmi still 
sometimes call representatives of the state “black men”), encouraged 
the insular maintenance of cultural practices, with the intentional 
avoidance of public forms of cultural objectification that might attract 
curious outsiders. As many Thangmi elders told me, they actually 
counted themselves lucky not to have been listed in the 1854 legal 
code of the Muluki Ain. This lacuna—which meant that the Thangmi 
name remained little known outside their localized area of residence—
encouraged Thangmi to misrepresent themselves as members of better 
known ethnic groups in encounters with authority. Although such 
behavior was at some level a strategy of resistance intended to avoid 
the potential for additional domination if they were to be noticed and 
classified by the state, it has over time created a vicious cycle in which 
contemporary Thangmi seeking employment or education in national 
arenas find that there is little or no name recognition of their ethnic 
moniker. In response, they have long continued to represent 
themselves as members of other groups rather than going to great, 
and often distressing, lengths to explain to others how the Thangmi 
actually fit (and do not fit) within rigidly stratified caste and ethnic 
hierarchies. 
One of the common reactions to such negative experiences was 
to migrate to India and beyond (particularly to Darjeeling and Sikkim, 
but also as far as Assam, Bhutan and Burma), either temporarily or 
permanently. But in India a different set of dynamics shifted desires 
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away from recognition as the discrete group “Thangmi”; until the early 
1990s most Indian citizens of Nepali heritage in Darjeeling had been 
focused on building a pan-Nepali identity and agitating for the 
separate Nepali-speaking state of Gorkhaland within India.33 Seeking 
recognition as “Thangmi” made little sense in that political moment, in 
which inter-group difference was played down, and the long-standing 
practice of inter-ethnic marriage in Darjeeling was valorized as the 
means of creating a pan-Nepali identity which transcended hierarchy 
and difference. 
The violent Gorkhaland movement ended in 1989 with the 
creation of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council (DGHC), an ostensibly 
autonomous council which was intended to cater to the specific needs 
of Darjeeling’s Nepali-speaking community.34 The creation of the 
DGHC was followed in quick succession by the causally unrelated, but 
equally important, implementation of the Mandal Commission report in 
1990, which revised India’s existing reservations system to create a 
new and improved set of benefits for those groups classed as 
Scheduled Tribes. With the promise of Gorkhaland fading, and a sense 
of disillusionment that the leadership had settled too quickly for the 
DGHC instead of a separate state, many groups of Nepali heritage at 
that time began to pursue the possibility of gaining recognition as 
                                       
33 The formation of Nepali national identity in Darjeeling in the literary sphere has 
been well-documented by Onta (1996a, 1996b, 1999); Hutt (1997, 1998) and 
Chalmers (2003). Subba (1992) has written a thorough social history of the 
Gorkhaland movement. 
34 See van Beek (2000) for a broader discussion of the autonomous hill council 
concept as implemented in Ladakh. 
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Scheduled Tribes, as a new way of making claims on the Indian state. 
This strategy, however, required a complete turnabout in attitude 
towards ethnic identity: during the Gorkhaland movement, the fight 
had been for recognition of “Nepali” as a unitary ethnic category, but 
now the battle was on for recognition of each individual group—
Tamang, Limbu, Magar, Thangmi, and so forth—as separate “tribal” 
units. 
Despite the increasing emphasis on Thangmi identity as a 
positive asset in both Nepal and India since 1990 (albeit for different 
specific reasons), disclaiming Thangminess remains a common 
strategy to forestall an uncomfortable barrage of questions from those 
unfamiliar with the Thangmi name. This is perhaps best understood as 
a self-defense mechanism. When I first began working in the Thangmi 
area in rural Nepal in the late 1990s, I would excitedly approach 
groups of people whom I heard speaking the Thangmi language in 
Charikot, the Dolakha district headquarters, only to be met with a 
quick switch into Nepali to answer my question, “Are you Thangmi?”, 
with a definitive “no”. Only several months into my first round of 
fieldwork was my reputation well-established enough to mediate such 
awkward experiences. 
Why did this happen, and how does such a defensive reaction 
that initially seeks to avoid recognition articulate with what I have 
described above as the Thangmi desire for recognition? Such 
ambivalence suggests that Thangmi may evaluate the different “terms 
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of recognition” offered by disparate “recognizing agents”—the state(s), 
researchers, their own deities—and weigh the pros and cons of being 
recognized in each context at each historical and individual moment. 
Why point yourself out to the state if it only extracts resources rather 
than offering them? Why identify yourself to a researcher who may not 
honor the terms of the ethnographic contract, at best failing to 
contribute anything of use to you, despite taking up your time, and at 
worst exacerbating existing problems of misrecognition? Opting out of 
such relatively uncontrollable regimes of recognition becomes a more 
viable option if, rather than the state, your most reliable source of 
“existential recognition” is in fact a territorial deity, like Bhume, whose 
beneficence can be ensured through the enactment of appropriate 
rituals. In return, such deities rarely fail to provide rain, sun, fertile 
soil, and perhaps most importantly, a sense of belonging, engendered 
by a special relationship with divine territorial powers, a relationship 
which does not require mediation from other entities like social science 
or the state. Chapters 2 and 6 of this dissertation develop the 
argument that territorial deities have long been primary recognizing 
agents for the Thangmi, even as many Thangmi have moved away from 
the territory in which those deities are believed to abide. Here, the 
point I wish to make is that although clearly tactics of recognition can 
be used as instruments of state domination, such arguments must be 
considered in tandem with explorations of the dynamics of recognition 
in other domains, such as the sacred, therefore shaking up the 
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assumption that the subjective desire for recognition is an exclusive 
creation of the “cunning” neoliberal state (Povinelli 2002: 16-17). 
The point of departure for understanding how Thangmi have 
historically controlled the terms of recognition in their interactions 
with outsiders is the manner in which Thangmi gurus and other 
community elders tend to respond to questions about Thangmi 
culture: with the assertion that there is no such thing. As Panchaman, a 
senior guru from the village of Phaselung in Dolakha district phrased 
this common refrain, “What? There is no Thangmi culture.”35 Such 
statements deny that the Thangmi have sanskriti, a Nepali term which 
evokes the “high culture” sense of “culture”, as defined in particular by 
the “great traditions” of Hinduism and Buddhism with their perceived 
purity, historical longevity, and textual authority. In the every day life 
of Thangmi villages, there is indeed little material culture—no icons, 
art, architecture, texts, or costumes—recognizable as distinctively 
Thangmi  in these terms. One can imagine why anthropologists 
seeking fertile ground for the study of culture might pass over a 
people whom not only have few objects demonstrating their culture, 
but outright deny that they have one. 
This apparent absence of recognizable cultural objects from 
non-Thangmi perspectives is belied by a rich cultural presence enacted 
through practice within the Thangmi community itself. Panchaman and 
others like him, who are quick to refute the notion of “Thangmi 
                                       
35 Original Nepali: Kohi? Thangmi sanskriti kehi pani chhaina. 
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culture” in discourse, spend their lives engaged in the production of it 
through the practice of myth, ritual, kinship, migration and daily life. 
Primarily conducted in the Thangmi language, by Thangmi gurus in 
conversation with localized territorial deities, these practices are 
deeply synthetic in the sense that they incorporate both Buddhist and 
Hindu motifs within the framework of shamanic practice, but they 
result in a synthesis that is uniquely Thangmi. 
This is just one of the ways that Thangmi cultural life is shot 
through with motifs of religious syncretism, linguistic creolisation, and 
racial hybridity.36 In the Thangmi origin story, chanted at the beginning 
of every ritual, the religion, language and even “racial” provenance of 
the Thangmi are explicitly articulated as being of mixed origin, as will 
be described in detail in Chapter 3. It is through the practice of such 
synthesis on an everyday basis that individuals become full members 
of the Thangmi cultural world. Such forms of mixture in themselves 
become definitive ethnic markers, resulting in a self-consciously 
synthetic mode of cultural production, which sets Thangmi identity 
apart from that of many other groups within Nepal. I do not mean to 
suggest that other groups are empirically any more “pure”—on racial, 
cultural, religious or linguistic levels—but rather that the Thangmi not 
only speak openly of the common processes of synthesis which other 
                                       
36 I follow Rosalind Shaw and Charles Stewart in defining syncretism as “the politics of 
religious synthesis” (1994: 7). 
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groups vehemently deny, but actively draw upon such mixture as a 
source for establishing their own sense of distinctiveness.37 
This emphasis on synthesis of all sorts, however, does not help 
in establishing a cultural presence within either Nepali or Indian 
national frameworks for categorizing ethnicity. Nepal’s Muluki Ain 
enshrined Hindu ideological principles that emphasized essentialist 
notions of cultural and religious purity, while India’s colonial 
classification projects reified pre-existing notions of “caste” and “tribe” 
(Dirks 2001). Perhaps unintentionally, the early anthropological 
tradition in both countries served to reinforce such ideas by 
disseminating its limited definition of culture within elite academic and 
political circles. Paradoxically, while Western social science has now 
gone to considerable lengths to disavow an essentialist understanding 
of culture, ethnic activists in Nepal and India have appropriated these 
very concepts of purity and autochthony and deployed them as 
political tools in their campaigns for indigenous rights vis-à-vis the 
states in which they live, which are perceived to require such 
                                       
37 At a 2003 conference in Kathmandu (Agenda for Transformation, organized by 
Social Science Baha) David Gellner presented a paper entitled “Public Order, Inclusion, 
Hybridity: Some Preconditions of Democracy in Nepal”, in which he suggested that 
most groups in Nepal had hybrid histories. I watched several ethnic activists critique 
Gellner’s argument aggressively, an exchange which continued in the Himalayan 
Times as several editorials and letters argued that a recognition of hybrid histories 
could never be in janajati interests. Gellner’s original paper remains unpublished but 
is available online at: <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/midea/pdf/darticle1.pdf>; the 
Himalayan Times exchange can be accessed at: 
<http://www.nepalresearch.org/archive/society/ethnicity/archive.htm>. Both sites 
were last accessed on November 30, 2008. 
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essentialist self-representations in exchange for official recognition.38 
This is precisely the dynamic that Charles Hale highlights in the 
passage quoted above. 
Thangmi self-representations as “lacking culture”, then, are 
voiced in acknowledgement of the lack of obvious cultural objects—
including a definitive ethnography or other social scientific 
publications—which would make the Thangmi easily recognizable 
within national systems that have advanced overly essentialized 
notions of “culture” as a static, pure, and clearly bounded thing 
maintained by discrete, homogeneous, and easily identifiable groups. 
The statement that “there is no Thangmi culture”, then, is not absolute, 
but contextual, taking on meaning only at the nation-state level in 
relation to perceived nationalist visions of “culture”—and therefore 
ethnicity—as inherent only in widely recognizable, objectified forms 
that can be used to easily classify discrete ethnic groups for state 
purposes. Such statements articulate an alternative “nation-view” 
(Duara 1995) of what it is to be a citizen of Nepal: that is, they make 
explicit the otherwise implicit hybridity underlying the very existence 
of Nepal as a nation. In this regard, Thangmi epistemologies have long 
recognized the nation-state’s formula for ethnicity, but ethnic 
consciousness has not been delimited exclusively by it. 
                                       
38 These criteria and their interpretations by ethnic organizations are described in 
detail in Chapter 5. 
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With this in mind, we can see how at certain historical moments, 
claiming to have “no culture” can be a form of resistance (Scott 1985), 
a convenient way to escape the apparently negative consequences of 
domination that are perceived to follow from state recognition. Such 
strategies may be particularly effective in a situation in which, as 
suggested above, the primary recognizing agent from which people 
derive self-worth is a sacred one, rather than a temporal one 
embodied by the state. But if and when the situation changes and 
recognition from the state becomes perceived as a necessary 
complement to divine recognition, then a historical reliance on 
synthetic cultural forms can be a liability.39 This is the juncture at 
which many Thangmi find themselves today, and the gap between the 
synthetic cultural practices that they know to be what makes them who 
they are, and their desire for a pure, distinct form of culture which can 
be easily objectified for political purposes often generates a great deal 
of subjective tension. In this context, an ethnography that symbolizes 
the former as the latter through the judicious use of social scientific 
framing can help show how such apparently contradictory forms of 
“culture” in action/ “no culture” in discourse can in fact both be part of 
the collective repertoire of a single group. 
 
 
                                       
39 I am not suggesting that political recognition ever entirely eclipses divine 
recognition; rather, that for most modern subjects the two are mutually constitutive 
and equally important in varying balances for varying individuals. See Chapter 2 for 
further details of this argument. 
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A Total Social Fact, or, “You Are Our God” 
My first serious Thangmi interlocutor in Nepal was Rana Bahadur 
Thami, the guru whose life story is described in detail in Chapter 3. 
Like the Thangmi speakers in the bazaar who evaded interaction with 
me by disclaiming Thangmi identity, this senior guru, who was well-
known as a vast repository of cultural, historical and ritual knowledge, 
was at first reluctant to speak with me. Bir Bahadur, with whom I 
worked as a research assistant, explained that Rana Bahadur did not 
want to talk with me at all unless I was willing to record the entirety of 
his ritual knowledge. Rana Bahadur had apparently had several 
unsatisfying experiences with researchers—foreign as well as Thangmi 
and non-Thangmi from India and Nepal—who wanted quick 
summaries of “Thangmi culture”, but did not want to spend the time 
observing or listening to the dense ritual action and recitations which 
comprise it. He explained that the problem with writing (as will be 
further explored in Chapter 3), was that it allowed the writer to pick 
and choose what to represent, whereas the oral tradition in which he 
had been trained required the full recitation of the entire ritual “line” 
(he and other gurus regularly used this English word to denote the 
fixed trajectory of each invocation) from an embodied place of 
knowledge which made it impossible to extract any piece from the 
whole. Therefore, if I was to write, or otherwise record (since audio and 
video technologies were, from his perspective, just embellished forms 
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of writing), anything at all, I had to do be prepared to record 
everything he knew. 
I told Rana Bahadur that I was ready to record and listen to as 
much as he wished to tell me. After several afternoons following the 
old guru’s schedule and recording whatever he said, I seemed to pass 
Rana Bahadur’s test. He announced that he was ready to “open” his 
knowledge to me, and every ensuing recording session (which covered 
diverse topics from life cycle rituals to origin stories to his life history 
to ethnobotanical knowledge and beyond) began with a chanted 
invocation in the same idiom used to propitiate deities, which went as 
follows: 
 
So and so (names and nationalities of previous researchers) came 
but did not want to listen to all of my knowledge, so I bit my 
tongue … Then they went back to their own countries, and this 
American woman came. She wanted to listen to everything and 
so I have opened my knowledge to her. I have sent as much as I 
know in her writing…and now the funerary rites can be done for 
this dead man. 
With my rudimentary understanding of the Thangmi language in which 
Rana Bahadur primarily spoke, I initially thought that these lines were 
simply part of his standard invocation. Upon analyzing them closely 
with Bir Bahadur, I was embarrassed to discover that I had been written 
into the chant itself. 
Initially I removed this part of the chant from all of my 
transcriptions, bracketing out Rana Bahadur’s repeated references to 
me as an anomaly that I did not really know how to handle. If I had 
become part of the chant, was what I was recording the “genuine” 
  66 
Thangmi culture that I sought, or was it already transformed by my 
very presence? (I was similarly disturbed when Darjeeling’s Latte Apa 
began a mortuary ritual with the statement, “Because she’s here, this 
time it’ll definitely be done by the real, old rules!”40). These are surely 
hackneyed questions in the literature on post-colonialism, authenticity 
and anthropological practice, but in my early days as a researcher I 
needed to puzzle it out for myself. 
Upon reflection, I came to see that from Rana Bahadur’s 
perspective, I was a useful recognizing agent, who by appearing at the 
end of his life, provided a sense of reassurance that the knowledge he 
had gained through years of ritual practice remained relevant in an era 
when much around him seemed to be changing. Even after I thought I 
had recorded everything he had to tell me in 1999-2000, in the 
remaining years before he died in 2003, he contacted me several times 
with urgent messages to come to Dolakha so he could tell me one 
more thing before he died, which he invariably said he was preparing 
to do any day. For Rana Bahadur, my recognition of him as a holder of 
culturally valuable knowledge became a personal obsession, which 
seemed to have little to do with a desire to publicize Thangmi culture 
or seek political recognition. My recognition of his special relationship 
with the Thangmi deities who had been the primary recognizing agents 
throughout his life seemed to augment the feeling of self-worth that 
he gained from that divine relationship. Rana Bahadur never asked me 
                                       
40 Original Nepali: Waha basera yaspali pakka purano niyam hunchha! 
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to publish what I had recorded with him, or to submit it to the Nepali 
or Indian state (as others later would); he accepted my terms of 
recognition and in exchange simply asked me to write down what he 
knew in its entirety without leaving anything out—to objectify his 
knowledge as a total social fact. 
Despite the superficial differences in their approach to Thangmi 
culture, it was also in this holistic sense that the Thangmi ethnic 
activists whom I later came to know wanted me to contribute 
information to their efforts to portray Thangmi culture as an embodied 
social fact. As the late Gopal Singh, the then vice president of the 
BTWA, phrased this sentiment in the opening essay of the 2003 Niko 
Bachinte publication, “Language is our breath, culture is the whole 
body” (Niko 2003: 7).41 Yet Thangmi identity, he continued, as 
embodied in “our pure language and pure culture”, has “not been fully 
brought to light” (Niko 2003: 7). In order to achieve these goals, Gopal 
Singhadmonished “all the Thami-loving brothers and sisters to remain 
honest and loyal to this ethnicity and to collect and publish proven 
facts relating to the Thami” (Niko 2003: 7). This echoes a similar 
emphasis on “scientific fact” in Thangmi publications from Nepal, 
where “truth” about the ethnic group and its history is depicted as the 
hard-won fruit of “research” on a positivist “reality”. One essay, which 
denies the incest that gives rise to the Thangmi clans (see Chapter 7 
for more details), suggests that such myths are to be discounted as 
                                       
41 Original Nepali: Bhasa hamro prana ho, sanskriti purnangka sarir. 
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“unscientific” since they are only “stories collected from the elders” 
rather than the results of “comprehensive research” (Samudaya 2061 
[2056] VS: 17). 
What did such statements imply about the value of my so-called 
“research”? If elders were not a legitimate source of authority about the 
culture and history of a community whose identity had long been 
premised on the embodied power of oral tradition to establish 
Thangminess as a total social fact, then what was? In “reality”, there 
was no alternative, more legitimate source of evidence for the claims 
that Thangmi activists in both Nepal and India wanted me to help them 
make. My sources—like Rana Bahadur—were the very “elders” whose 
knowledge was dismissed as “stories”, rather than evidence. But I felt 
compelled to honor my ethnographic contract with such elders by 
representing the stories they told me in their totality, even when such 
stories did not seem to yield the specific “research results” that my 
simultaneously binding ethnographic contract with activist informants 
stipulated.  
As I began to wade deeper into the ethical complexities of such 
multi-sited complicity (Marcus 1999) during my first in-depth 
fieldwork in Darjeeling in 2004, I lost sleep trying to figure out how my 
“research” fit into the picture and what it was that the Thangmi 
activists whom I was coming to know actually wanted from me. On the 
one hand, they were skeptical of what the empirical evidence that I had 
collected told them about themselves. On the other hand, they 
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repeatedly thanked me for sharing my research openly with them, 
telling me on numerous occasions, “You (respectful form) are our god”, 
or “You are our Sunari Ama”, the Thangmi ancestral mother (described 
in detail in Chapter 6).42 Being cast in this role as a quasi-divine culture 
creator felt not only uncomfortable, just as Rana Bahadur’s 
incorporation of me into his ritual chant had, but antithetical to the 
activists’ erstwhile requests for me to conduct positivistic, “scientific” 
research aimed at demonstrating a “pure” culture. At first I consigned 
such statements to the same conceptual category of inexplicable 
fieldwork ephemera in which I had put Rana Bahadur’s invocation of 
my presence. But as I heard them over and over again, back in Nepal as 
well as in India, these ascriptions of divine power continued to bother 
me, and I came back to them later as I strove to understand the 
relationship between research, ritual and politics in effecting 
recognition. 
Perhaps the critique of “research” based on the “stories of 
elders” was not actually a critique of those elders or their stories 
themselves, but rather of the interpretive frameworks of researchers 
who, based on short-term encounters with the community, had taken 
such “stories” at face value and concluded that the Thangmi had only a 
degenerate, if any, culture. By sticking with the ethnographic project 
past the point at which others had decided that the Thangmi were “not 
                                       
42 Original Nepali: Tapai hamro deuta hunuhunchha; tapai hamro sunari ama 
hunuhunchha. 
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worthy of future attention” (Northey and Morris 1928), I had 
demonstrated my commitment to Thangmi agendas, competing and 
contradictory though they might be. By appearing in the public domain 
alongside members of the Thangmi community repeatedly over a 
decade with all of the trappings of social scientific authority—
notebook, video camera, university affiliation, research funding, and 
above all, perceived access to political decision-makers—I was 
demonstrating to outside others that the Thangmi must have some 
kind of culture worth recognizing. 
It was in this sense that I became a recognizing agent—a catalyst 
who augmented Thangmi individuals’ sense of self-worth and the 
community’s visibility—and that the divine metaphor became 
comprehensible, if not entirely appropriate. For the Thangmi activists 
with whom I worked, “research” was in part a symbolic process that 
was not only about its empirical content, but also about its form as a 
mode of ritual action carried out in the public domain, the efficacious 
performance of which could yield pragmatic results from the higher-
level recognizing agents of the state (and/or the organizations that 
stood in for it, i.e. I/NGOs, particularly in Nepal). In this formulation, I 
was not so much like a deity as a ritual specialist, believed to be 
capable of mediating between the human and divine, the citizen and 
his or her state(s). 
At first I often tried to deny such powers—”I am just a student”, 
“No, I don’t have any powerful friends”, “No, I am not with any 
  71 
‘project’, I am just a researcher”—but over time it became clear to me 
that this was disingenuous. The reality was that unlike most Thangmi, I 
could and did command immediate attention when I walked into 
government or organizational offices (or wrote a letter to the editor, 
made a phone call, or engaged in cocktail conversation) to make a 
point about pressing issues, be it in regard to a badly managed road 
project, an idea for economic development, or a hurtful 
misrepresentation of the Thangmi community. It was not just Thangmi 
individuals who believed that my work could have concrete effects; 
other ethnic activists, politicians and bureaucrats lauded me for 
conducting “research” which no one else could be bothered to do so 
that the Thangmi might have a chance at future advancement. 
As one activist from a more prominent ethnic community told 
me at a NEFIN meeting, “Oh yes, the Thami are ‘highly marginalized’, 
which is why we don’t understand anything about them. Perhaps after 
you’ve done your research they can advance to ‘marginalized’”. In 
2004, NEFIN had inaugurated a five-tier system for classifying ethnic 
groups as “advantaged”, “disadvantaged”, “marginalized”, “highly 
marginalized” and “endangered”, in which the Thangmi are currently 
listed in the “highly marginalized” category.43 The patronizing 
undertone to this comment exemplified the less-than-welcoming 
reception I received from influential non-Thangmi ethnic activists in 
                                       
43 See Gellner (2007), Hangen (2007) and Middleton and Shneiderman (2008) for 
further details of NEFIN’s classification system and its effects. 
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both Nepal and India; many such individuals eyed me cautiously, often 
evading private meetings and sharing information only reluctantly. 
Apparently they were concerned that my research and in-depth 
engagement with the Thangmi might give this low man on the ethnic 
totem pole too much direct access to powerful recognizing agents, 
perhaps allowing the Thangmi to circumvent the existing internal 
hierarchies of janajati and tribal politics. From Thangmi perspectives, 
this was precisely the power that engendered the divine analogy: just 
as a shaman takes on divine power through his unusual capacity to 
control it, my perceived capacity to cut through endless red tape and 
power politics to directly influence representatives of the state and 
other organizations bordered on the supernatural. 
This is why, in the larger scheme of things, it didn’t really matter 
if my written research presented the specific empirical conclusions that 
the activists wanted. They were more interested in my research as a 
form of efficacious action, and my role as an outside figure of 
academic authority—a recognizing agent—whose very attention to the 
social fact of “Thangmi culture” legitimized the results of their own 
research, which in the end were the ones that they wanted to promote 
in representations to the state, not mine. 
In short, I, and social science as a whole, were useful as 
mediators between divine and political forms of recognition. It was not 
the case that Thangmi activists wanted to divest themselves entirely of 
their relationship with the territorial deities who had historically 
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provided them with a strong sense of recognition; rather they wanted 
to find new ways to reinterpret these relationships within the 
increasingly attractive terms of recognition provided by other 
recognizing agents, such as the states in which they lived. I could help 
in this process by presenting “data” about Thangmi history and 
culture—particularly about the special Thangmi relationship with 
territorial deities—as a total social fact which evidenced their “unique” 
identity to the powers that controlled state regimes of recognition. By 
telling me again and again that I was like a god, the Thangmi 
individuals with whom I worked ensured that I would feel obligated to 
act as such: if they acted in a ritually correct manner, by providing me 
access to all of the information I requested, then, like a deity who 
responds to rituals conducted according to the appropriate protocols, 
or like an ethnographer under the binding terms of an ethnographic 
contract, I was expected to deliver the goods. In a reversal of 
Malinowski’s classic argument for the value of fieldwork—which he 
claimed was important because only in that context does “the 
anthropologist have the myth-maker at his elbow” (1974 [1948]: 
100)—in this case, the “myth-makers” had the anthropologist at their 
elbow, ready to parlay the partial truths they wanted to tell about 
themselves into a totality worthy of recognition by a larger set of 
listeners. 
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The Purpose of Social Science 
But isn’t this kind of fait accompli—where informant and researcher 
complicitly help each other achieve their respective objectives without 
regard for the “truth”—frowned upon by social science? Should I have 
cast off the “divine” responsibility which weighed upon me heavily, 
opting out of the ethnographic contract by dismissing the statements 
of some sub-group of my Thangmi interlocutors (either gurus or 
activists, depending whose side I ultimately chose) as a bunch of hocus 
pocus that obscured my objective of describing Thangmi culture as it 
“truly” was?  
According to Maurice Godelier, whose work provides the 
theoretical anchor for the next chapter of this dissertation, the 
function of the social sciences is “critically assessing the spontaneous 
beliefs and the illusions that societies and individuals hold about 
themselves, as well as evaluating the learned theories which do not 
take these beliefs seriously or do not account for them” (1999: 109). 
Indeed, I found that if I was genuinely interested in understanding 
what truth, research, identity, culture, ritual or recognition meant to 
“the Thangmi” in the most diverse yet holistic sense, I had to walk a 
zigzagging line that took me across state borders as well as across the 
borders between “beliefs and illusions” and “learned theories”, a wide 
and contradictory range of which were held by members of the 
community themselves. Often the boundary between these categories 
blurred, for instance when the “learned theories” of Thangmi activists 
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did not take the beliefs of their own gurus seriously, thereby becoming 
illusions that the activists held about themselves. All of these theories 
and beliefs were equally Thangmi, equally “indigenous”, which meant 
that I had more than the “dual loyalties to an organized group in 
struggle and to rigorous academic analysis” of which Charles Hale 
speaks (2006: 105). Rather, I had multiple loyalties to multiple 
members of an internally disparate group engaged in multiple 
struggles in multiple nation-states. Many of the individuals with whom 
I worked were invested in presenting to me a totalizing view of what 
Thangminess was, in a manner which often marginalized someone 
else’s equally totalizing view. My own totalizing view therefore had to 
become one which could recognize all of these competing totalities 
simultaneously. 
Needless to say, I have found these tensions “highly productive” 
(Hale 2006: 105) in the moments when they have not been entirely 
overwhelming. Ultimately, these competing loyalties have impressed 
upon me the ethical imperative of listening to a diversity of voices 
within a putatively singular group, and recognizing all of the claims 
and counter-claims as equally part of the whole. Mary Des Chene has 
suggested that anthropologists working in what she calls Nepal’s 
janajati yug—“the era of ethnicity”—should: 
 
... listen more, earlier, and longer. That is, they should listen 
with care to those they would know about, not only while “in the 
field”, but before, during and after devising research projects. 
They should listen not only to individuals from their specific 
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research site but to any member of a group, and to those in the 
wider society within which that group lives (1996: 101) 
She then suggests that anthropologists should refrain from making 
broad, essentializing claims about the communities with whom they 
work. But what, then, if we make every effort to listen carefully, and 
the individuals with whom we work inform us that what they want is 
precisely such a holistic portrait of their community, despite the fact 
that they know such portrayals to be only partial truths? We must then 
listen to the reasons that they want this, and try to understand how, 
from the perspective of those we work with, social scientific research 
itself may be a form of identity-producing action that cannot be fully 
disentangled from the projects of recognition which it seeks to 
describe. 
Acknowledging the complicit place of ethnography (and 
ethnographers) in the interplay between contemporary forms of 
recognition—political, divine, academic and beyond—and harnessing 
this complicity as a productive tool, paves the way for ethnographic 
work to contribute to larger transformations of the terms of 
recognition themselves. To a historically misrecognized group like the 
Thangmi, that is what research is for. For social scientists, as Marisol 
de la Cadena and Orin Starn have recently argued in their discussion of 
contemporary indigeneity, “a role for careful, engaged scholarship can 
be to contribute to understanding and activism that recognizes the 
paradoxes, limits and possibilities” (2007: 22) of indigenous projects 
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of recognition. Although this dissertation may fall far short of the 
mark, such intentions guide my writing here. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Framing, Practicing and Performing Thangmi Ethnicity 
Colorful banners around Gangtok advertised the event: “Tribal Folk 
Dances of Sikkim, presented in honor of Shri P.R. Kyndiah, Union 
Minister of Tribal Affairs”. It was November 2005, and each ethnic 
organization registered in India’s state of Sikkim, as well as the 
adjacent Darjeeling district of West Bengal, had been invited to perform 
a single “folk dance” that best demonstrated their “tribal culture”. I 
took the opportunity to accompany the Darjeeling-based Bharatiya 
Thami Welfare Association (BTWA) members, with whom I had been 
working, on the 4-hour jeep ride up to Gangtok for the occasion. 
 In the rehearsal session just before the actual performance, it 
became clear that the 50-odd dancers from 14 ethnic organizations 
were well aware of the politically charged environment in which they 
were performing. All of these groups were seeking recognition from 
the central Indian government as Scheduled Tribes (ST), and each 
group sought to capture the minister’s eye with a carefully framed 
performance which demonstrated the “tribal” nature of their identity in 
a single dance number. The rehearsing groups received advice in the 
form of stage directions from the director of Sikkim’s Department of 
Culture, who told them brusquely, “Shake your hips faster and make 
sure to flutter your eyelashes! Remember, if you look happy the 
audience will be happy. And if they are not happy, why should they 
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watch you? You must make them feel comfortable and familiar with 
your culture.”  
 The Thangmi performance troupe—which was comprised of a 
combination of young migrant workers from Nepal who spent several 
months at a time in India, and slightly older Thangmi from urban 
Darjeeling with professional dance experience—took the director of 
culture’s suggestions to heart in their performance of what the emcee 
introduced as a “Thami wedding dance”. The participation of the 
dancers from Nepal, who knew how to perform the slow, repetitive 
steps that characterize Thangmi cultural practice in village contexts, 
made the choreographers more confident about the efficacy of their 
performance. On the other hand, the choreographers from Darjeeling 
knew how to transform these plodding moves into complex Bollywood-
style choreographed numbers that carried the weight of “culture” in the 
pan-Indian sense. The end result as danced for the minister [see Figure 
2.1] bore very little resemblance to anything one would see at a 
Thangmi wedding or other ritual event [see Figure 2.2], but the 
performance was greeted with resounding applause.1 Afterwards, the 
minister sent a message to the BTWA expressing his appreciation. The 
members of the group from India were pleased with the performance, 
and hopeful that it would serve as a catalyst in getting their Scheduled 
Tribe application approved quickly. 
                                                
1 Other groups performing at the same event, such as the Ma(n)gar, did not have 
such carefully choreographed numbers, and were actually booed by the audience. 
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Figure 2.1 “Thangmi wedding dance” performed in Gangtok, Sikkim, 
India, November 2005 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 “Thangmi wedding dance” in Chokati, Sindhupalchok, Nepal, 
February 2008 
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 Although they participated in the event with apparent 
enthusiasm, some of the members of the group from Nepal later told 
me that they felt uncomfortable with the way the choreographers—who 
were all from Darjeeling—had manipulated the cultural knowledge of 
those from Nepal by appropriating elements of ritual practice into an 
entirely different performance context. The dancers from Nepal found 
the experience unsettling for several reasons. First of all, the audience 
for which they were performing was not the assembly of deities 
propitiated through comparable elements of ritual action at home, but 
rather the representatives of a state in which they did not hold full 
citizenship. This difficulty could just about be overcome, since 
although such bureaucratic audiences might require different specific 
offerings than divine ones, the overall ritualized form of the event was 
similar. The larger problem was that the performers from Nepal 
themselves stood to gain little direct benefit from this transformation 
of practice into performance, since the Union Minister and his 
colleagues answered to the Indian state alone—Nepali citizens would 
not be eligible for any benefits that the Thangmi might gain in India if 
the Government of India recognized the group as a Scheduled Tribe. 
Finally, since the performers from Nepal were due to return home after 
the high labor season in Darjeeling, they might lose control over the 
future use of the elements of practice that they had contributed to the 
BTWA’s repertoire, and they feared that by the time they returned the 
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following year, such performances might be transformed into 
something unrecognizable. 
 The Thangmi from Nepal were not outright opposed to the 
performatization of practice—a process akin to what Richard Handler 
(forthcoming) has called the “ritualization of ritual”, following Goffman 
(1971: 79)—in fact, I had seen several of them applaud heartily at a 
similarly staged performance of a “wedding dance” at a conference in 
Kathmandu, Nepal hosted by the Nepal Thami Society (NTS) earlier in 
the same year [see Figure 2.3]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 “Thangmi wedding dance” performed at the Nepal Thami 
Society Second National Convention, Kathmandu, Nepal, May 2005 
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Rather, they felt that the political results had to be worth the 
phenomenological and ethical trade-offs that such transformation 
entailed. In other words, the objectification of culture was acceptable—
even desirable—as long as it was done in the service of a specific goal, 
and as long as the resulting field of performance was recognized as a 
complement to, rather than a replacement for, the field of practice out 
of which it emerged. Once the dust had settled, the Gangtok 
experience prompted some of the initially uneasy performers from 
Nepal to consider how they might also deploy cultural performance to 
bolster newly emerging claims to the Nepali state about their rights to 
special benefits as members of a “highly marginalized” janajati group, 
claims which, if recognized, could help create the material conditions 
necessary to maintain the field of practice itself. 
 From the evidence presented in this chapter, it should be clear 
that Thangmi individuals from diverse backgrounds in both Nepal and 
India possess a high level of self-consciousness regarding the 
differences between fields of ritualized action—such as practice and 
performance—in which they engage, and that they intentionally choose 
to deploy different types of action within different social “frames” 
(Goffman 1974, Handler forthcoming) in order to achieve a range of 
results from diverse recognizing agents. I further suggest that in the 
Thangmi case, this self-consciousness emerges in part through the 
experience of moving regularly between multiple nation-states 
through circular migration. Familiarity with more than one national 
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“frame” within which ethnicity is conceptualized and recognized 
enables Thangmi—both at the individual and collective level—to see 
the framing machinery through which ethnicity is produced and 
reproduced in each context, and therefore to take self-conscious, 
agentive roles in employing appropriate framing devices for their own 
purposes. These purposes may range from assuaging territorial deities 
through private household propitiations to assuaging skeptical state 
representatives through public cultural performances, but ultimately all 
of the ritualized action so framed has a shared sacred referent—
Thangmi ethnic identity itself. 
 In developing this argument, I draw particularly upon Erving 
Goffman’s work on the nature of “framing activity” (1974) and Maurice 
Godelier’s exposition of the sacred (1999), as well as Richard Handler’s 
discussions of “cultural objectification” (1984, forthcoming). 
Ultimately, I suggest that Thangmi ethnicity is a collective production, 
which synthesizes the disparate actions of individuals—who are often 
bound together by little more than name across nation-state, class, 
age, gender and other boundaries—into a coherent set of signifying 
practices and performances. 
 
Defining Practice and Performance 
Here I define ‘practice’ and ‘performance’ in a specific manner which 
may diverge from other received definitions. As I see them, the two are 
qualitatively distinct, but inextricably linked and mutually influential 
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fields of “ritualized activity”, which I follow Catherine Bell in defining 
as, “a particular cultural strategy of differentiation linked to particular 
social effects and rooted in a distinctive interplay of a socialized body 
and the environment it structures” (1992: 8). I acknowledge at the 
outset that most practice has a performative aspect (cf. Austin 1975, 
Bauman and Briggs 1990, Butler 1997a), and almost all performance 
can be seen as a form of “practice” in Bourdieu’s sense (1977, 1990). 
Nonetheless, I want to draw a distinction between practice and 
performance, which I believe can be helpful at the analytical level as we 
try to understand the dynamics of consciousness and objectification 
inherent in the process of producing ethnicity. At the level of action, 
there is no question that the edges of these categories blur into one 
another. However, as I shall argue below, the analytical categories of 
practice and performance reflect those that Thangmi themselves use to 
describe these processes, which suggests that such distinctions are 
worth paying attention to. 
In my discussion, “practice” refers to embodied, ritualized 
actions carried out by Thangmi individuals within an indigenous 
epistemological framework to achieve soteriological goals: to stop 
malevolent deities from plaguing one’s mind, for instance, or to guide 
a loved one’s soul to the realm of the ancestors. Practices, as I am 
specifying the term, are ritualized actions carried out “because we have 
always done them that way”. Their intended audiences are the syncretic 
pantheon of animistic, Hindu and Buddhist deities that comprise the 
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Thangmi divine world. Practices take place within the clearly delimited 
private domains of the household, or communal, but exclusively 
Thangmi, ethnic spaces. Practices, then, are the actions encapsulated 
in what Goffman calls “primary frameworks” (1974). 
“Performances”, in the contrast I am drawing here, are framed 
“keyings”, or “transformations”, in Goffman’s terms, of the practices 
found within primary frameworks. Performances are ritualized actions 
carried out within a broader discursive context created by political, 
economic or other kinds of external agendas. They are mounted for 
the express consumption of non-Thangmi audiences, which may be 
comprised of representatives of the Nepali and/or Indian state—as at 
the Gangtok performance with which this chapter began—or members 
of other ethnic communities, (I)NGO representatives, and (at least 
imaginatively) endless others.2 Performances take place in the open in 
public domains with the express purpose of demonstrating to both 
selves and others (of varying degrees) what practices are like. 
Participation in both of these forms of ritualized action 
contributes to contemporary experiences of what culture, identity and 
ethnicity are for the actors who engage in them. I hope to avoid the 
                                                
2 Many discussions of heritage focus on the commodification of local cultures for 
tourist consumption, tourists are not at present important interlocutors for the 
Thangmi. The Thangmi areas of Dolakha and Sindhupalchok are not on one of 
Nepal’s touristed trekking routes, and the decade-long civil conflict between Maoist 
insurgents and state forces between 1996–2006 has kept any prospective tourism 
development at bay. Far more important in Nepal are development workers—both 
Nepali and foreign—who visit the Thangmi area regularly. Although Darjeeling 
receives its fair share of tourists, the Thangmi community there has had little interest 
in engaging with them, preferring to focus their cultural performances on attracting 
representatives of the state. 
  87 
pitfall of misrecognizing either practice or performance alone as the 
whole of culture, or at least as the sole signifier of cultural authenticity, 
as seems to happen often in academic, policy and popular contexts.3 I 
argue that practice and performance, as I am defining them, are both 
essential aspects of contemporary cultural production, and as such are 
mutually constitutive. Neither can be substituted or subsumed by the 
other, and both are necessary for groups and individuals to maintain 
the pragmatic and emotional well-being that derives from a sense of 
belonging to a shared sacred identity that is recognized by others 
within the political context of individual nation-states, as well as within 
transnational environments shaped by cross-border movements and 
international discourses of indigeneity and heritage. 
Arjun Guneratne’s work with the Tharu of Nepal’s Tarai provides a 
key ethnographic touchstone for discussing the dynamics of identity 
and consciousness in Nepal. Guneratne distinguishes between two 
“levels of group identity”: 
 
The first, implicit or unselfconscious, associated with the 
traditional, local, endogamous group … In Bourdieu’s terms, it 
exists as doxa or the unreflected upon and ‘naturalized’ process 
                                                
3 Here, I use the term “authenticity” to represent a set of policy statements made by 
both the Indian and Nepali governments regarding the criteria they use to determine 
whether groups should be officially recognized as “tribal” or “marginalized” 
communities respectively; see Middleton and Shneiderman (2008) for details of these 
rubrics. Otherwise, I intentionally avoid using “authenticity” as a key concept, 
although the arguments made in this chapter clearly contribute to ongoing 
anthropological debates over this issue. Rather than using such an abstract, 
unquantifiable concept to define the reality or legitimacy of cultural productions, I 
focus instead on the multiple fields of action through which Thami individuals 
themselves produce the social world in which they live. For discussions of 
“authenticity” as a trope in identity politics and academic production, see Handler 
(1986), Linnekin (1991), and Briggs (1996). 
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of social reproduction of the community (Bourdieu 1977) ... The 
‘natural’ character of social facts, hitherto accepted as part of 
the given order, become subject to critique when an objective 
crisis brings some aspect of doxa—identity—into question. This 
is a necessary precondition for the emergence of the second 
level of identity I wish to distinguish. 
 
This second or more encompassing level of identity is a self-
conscious ... and politically oriented identity that draws together 
various local communities and groups and endows them with an 
imagined coherence (cf. Anderson 1991). It is imagined in the 
sense that the structural linkages ... that help to shape the first 
level of group identity defined above do not exist at this level. 
(1998: 753). 
Guneratne’s two levels of identity are in many ways coterminous with 
the social fields produced by practice and performance as I define 
them. I extend Guneratne’s insights further by suggesting that the two 
fields of identity co-exist and mutually constitute each other. In other 
words, rather than seeing the shift from one level of identity to another 
as a quintessentially modern transformation that moves in only one 
direction—from a state of “identity as doxa” to a state of “identity as 
political imagination”, with the latter eventually eclipsing the former—I 
argue that both forms of identity are simultaneously present and 
influence each other in a multi-directional “feedback loop”. This reality 
comes into focus when we turn our analytical gaze to the actions of 
practice and performance, rather than keeping it trained on the more 
static notion of identity itself. Practice and performance are mutually 
dependent aspects of the overall processes of cultural production and 
social reproduction, a relationship augmented, but not initiated, by the 
politics of recognition within modern nation-states. Take away practice 
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and there is no cultural content for performance to objectify, take away 
performance and there is no means for groups to demonstrate in a 
public forum their “existential presence”—a phrase I adapt from Laura 
Graham’s discussion of the indigenous need for “existential 
recognition” (2005)—as established via practice at the grassroots level. 
 To sum up the argument, then, practices and performances are 
distinguished by the types of discursive space in which they are 
enacted, the objectives with which they are mounted, the audiences for 
whom they are intended, and the respectively different types of results 
that they generate. To borrow from Sherry Ortner, we might say that 
practices “make” culture, while performances “construct” culture (1996: 
1), yet these two domains are mutually dependent. Following Charles 
Briggs, we might also see performances as a type of “meta-discursive 
practice” (1996), which transforms absence into presence by 
objectifying for an external public the group-internal field of practice—
which is already a form of objectified action, as I shall explain below—
to create links with broader domains of action and discourse.4 
 
Ethnicity as Synthetic Action 
Focusing on the interplay between practice and performance 
illuminates contemporary Thangmi ethnicity as a synthetic process in 
which these two fields of action, among others, play key roles. 
Approaching ethnicity as a synthesis of ritualized actions—here 
                                                
4 Briggs draws upon Derrida’s (1976) arguments regarding absence and presence. 
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defined as action conducted in relation to a sacred object and 
intentionally aimed at securing one form of recognition or another—
contributes to Felicia Hughes-Freeland and Mary Crain’s call for 
anthropologists to “consider identity less as being, and more in terms 
of doing” (1998: 15) by looking in detail at the relationship between 
processes of cultural production and those of social reproduction. In a 
similar vein, I build upon G. Carter Bentley’s practice theory of ethnicity 
by engaging in, “the investigation of a given case…broadened in time 
to show how ethnicity contributes to social reproduction, and in space 
to take account of regional and world-scale factors” (1987: 49). 
Indeed, the cross-border Thangmi case shows how practice and 
performance work together to create a “multi-dimensional habitus [in 
which] it is possible for an individual to possess several different 
situationally relevant but nonetheless emotionally authentic identities 
and to symbolize all of them in terms of shared descent” (Bentley 
1987: 35). 
Enacting simultaneous, multiple subjective states that are all 
affectively real requires a degree of self-consciousness and self-
objectification on the part of the ethnic actors who practice and 
perform these identities. I argue that for many Thangmi, this 
consciousness emerges in the subjective space created by the repeated 
process of shifting frame between multiple nation-states as circular 
migrants. For those Thangmi who are settled in one location or 
another, contact with Thangmi circular migrants (whom, after all, share 
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the same name and system of descent) and their worldviews can effect 
different, but comparably intimate, shifts in frame. The self-
consciousness engendered through these regular reframings is evident 
in the agentive manner in which individuals recognize the gap between 
practice and performance, and work to synthesize these disparate 
fields of action into a coherent identity that is both productive, in the 
affective sense of belonging, and constructive, in the political sense of 
rights (cf. Ortner 1996). An action-based approach to ethnicity enables 
us to see how a wide range of different intentions and motivations held 
by as many individuals belonging to a putatively singular ethnic group 
can in fact work in concert to produce a multi-dimensional ethnic 
habitus, of which the recognition of intra-group difference is itself a 
key feature.5 
 
Cross-Border Thangmi Relationships 
Sheela, the General Secretary of the Sikkim branch of the BTWA, 
explained the motivation behind the performatization of Thangmi 
practice that I witnessed in Gangtok: “Thami rituals and traditions are 
so slow and repetitive. That’s OK back in the pahar (N), but here we 
need something different when we show our culture to others so that 
the government will notice us.” Her statement sums up the differences 
between the contemporary Thangmi communities in Nepal and India as 
                                                
5 Although I build upon Bourdieu’s work in particular and practice theory in general, I 
avoid aligning my approach too closely with Bentley’s “practice theory of ethnicity” 
because I want to reserve the word “practice” to describe only one component of the 
range of actions entailed in the production of ethnicity. 
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Sheela saw them. The former group, whom Sheela stereotyped as  
residing in the pahar—a Nepali language term, literally meaning “the 
hills”, but used pejoratively to contrast rural Nepal to relatively urban 
Darjeeling— for the most part continue to speak their own language 
and participate in ritual practices at which Thangmi gurus are the 
primary officiants.6 With rare exceptions, the latter group has 
historically not spoken the Thangmi language or employed Thangmi 
gurus as ritual practitioners in their own daily lives—born and raised in 
India in the post-Independence era, their parents sought to assimilate 
to a pan-Nepali identity, within which ethnic languages and practices 
were intentionally jettisoned. 
 Throughout the longue durée of their efforts to gain first Other 
Backwards Class (OBC) and then Scheduled Tribe (ST) status from the 
Indian state (described in detail in Chapter 5), one of the primary ways 
in which the Thangmi community in India felt they could legitimize 
their claim to being a “tribal” group was to mount cultural 
performances in public domains. Clearly, they were not misguided, 
since in spring 2006, some months after the Gangtok performance for 
the Minister of Tribal Affairs which I observed, similar performances 
were commissioned by the Cultural Research Institute (CRI), the West 
Bengal state agency charged with verifying the authenticity of each ST 
                                                
6 See Hutt (1998) for a discussion of the term pahar in literary representations of 
migration from Nepal to India. 
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applicant group.7 The performance committee of the BTWA also 
presents a set of dances as part of the commercial Darjeeling Carnival 
every year; although not explicitly for government consumption, the 
carnival gives them an opportunity to put their identity on display 
before the general public, hopefully garnering popular support for 
their political goals. 
 As described in Chapter 1, Thangmi everywhere are bound 
together by a shared sense of Thangminess, which is marked primarily, 
although not exclusively, by their shared name. Shaped by often 
disparate life experiences in different nation-states, Thangmi from 
Nepal and India are by turns curious and critical of each other’s ways 
of being Thangmi, and would probably never meet but for the fact that 
Thangmi livelihoods are defined by the ongoing process of circular 
migration (see Chapter 4). Almost every Thangmi household in Nepal 
has one or more members who spend three to six months of the year 
in India doing seasonal wage labor. These migrant workers carry 
cultural knowledge, as well as political consciousness and awareness of 
state policies—what Peggy Levitt (2001) has called “social 
remittances”—back and forth with them as they travel between Nepal 
and India. The Thangmi case differs somewhat from the Dominican 
case that Levitt discusses, in that she suggests that social remittances 
flow in only one direction—from place of migration back to place of 
                                                
7 At the time of writing in May 2008, the Thangmi ST application was still pending, 
with no clear resolution in sight. Thanks to Townsend Middleton for information 
about the CRI verification process. 
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origin—while I wish to suggest that ideas and information flow in both 
directions as part of the feedback loop created by regular circular 
migration. 
 More recently, members of the BTWA have consciously sought to 
develop relationships with Thangmi migrant laborers from Nepal, 
asking them to demonstrate Thangmi cultural practice—in ritual, song 
and dance—and in some cases even following them back to Nepal to 
find the “source” of “original Thangmi culture” (these are all phrases 
commonly used in English) for the purposes of including descriptions 
of it in their ST application. Migrant workers also carry back to Nepal 
with them publications, cassettes, and videos that contain renditions of 
performances staged by the BTWA in Darjeeling. Many of these have 
become popular viewing in Nepal as electricity—and therefore TVs, 
cassette and VCD decks—has spread rapidly throughout many 
Thangmi villages over the last few years. It is in such encounters that 
practice and performance come to articulate with, and mutually 
influence, each other in the overall process of Thangmi identity 
production. 
 
Framing Cross-Border Subjectivities 
It is easy to reify the unit of the nation-state itself, as well as “other 
kinds of groups that spring up in the wake of or in resistance to the 
nation-state”, as primordial “individuals-writ-large … imagined to 
‘possess’ cultural properties that define their personalities and 
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legitimate their right to exist” (Handler forthcoming). Within 
anthropological literature, the modern nation-state has been widely 
recognized as the primary structure shaping processes of ethnicization 
(Williams 1989; Verdery 1994; and Harrell 2002; as well as Levine 
1987; Holmberg 1989; Gellner, Pfaff-Czarnecka and Whelpton 1997; 
Fisher 2001 and Guneratne 2002 regarding Nepal in particular). But 
does this assessment match with the subjective perceptions of those 
who experience ethnicization? Although nation-states may certainly be 
viewed as “individuals-writ-large” by people who live firmly within their 
borders and whose subjectivity is, in a singular manner, defined by 
such a nationalist ethos, the views of border peoples whose 
subjectivities have long been defined by interactions with multiple 
states may be markedly different.8 In the Thangmi context, I argue that 
the long duration of cross-border circular migration and the 
concomitant in-depth experience of multiple frameworks for defining 
national and ethnic identities leads to a different view, in which single 
nation-states are not fixed, self-standing structures which determine 
the rules of ethnicity, but are rather one of many flexible frames within 
which ethnic identity may be produced. The cross-border Thangmi 
experience suggests how nation-states may be seen as flexible 
identity-framing devices, in relation to which individuals and 
collectivities produce meaningful cultural content in each context, 
                                                
8 My use of the terms “border people” and “cross-border community” derive from 
Wilson and Donnan’s (1998) reframing of what they call the “border concept” in 
pragmatic ethnographic terms.  
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rather than absolute identity-determining structures, which in 
themselves dictate that content. 
 This argument leads to an inversion of nationalist perspectives in 
which “the group is imagined as an individual” with a homogeneous 
identity (Handler forthcoming). Instead, in the cross-border Thangmi 
situation, collective identity cannot exist without the manifold 
contributions of heterogeneous individuals, each of whom possesses 
complementary elements of the overall repertoire of ritualized action 
required to establish the existential presence of the group within 
multiple state frames. From the perspectives of those who comprise it, 
the group is not imagined as a coherent “individual”, but rather is 
readily acknowledged as the product of disparate life experiences 
embodied by multiple individuals in as many locations. As Surbir, a 
long-term Darjeeling resident originally from Nepal put it, “We 
Thangmi are like the beads of a broken necklace that have been 
scattered all over the place. And now it’s time to find them and put 
them back together again.” Surbir’s statement shows that this sense of 
fragmentation is not necessarily the desired state of affairs, and many 
Thangmi ethno-activist agendas focus on synthesizing disparate 
Thangmi practices into a coherent whole. The Nepal Thami Samaj 
Second National Convention Report, for instance, echoes Surbir’s 
metaphor with the assertion that the Convention’s main objective was, 
“to integrate the Thamis living in various places … to make [our] 
demands and fundamental identity widespread, and to string together 
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all the Thamis” (NTS 2005: 4).9 Yet the reality remains that it is the 
self-consciousness of this process of mixture itself, the ongoing 
synthesis of disparate experiences, beliefs and ideologies, all held 
together under the name “Thangmi”, as well as “Thami”, which defines 
collective identity at the most fundamental level. 
Viewing ethnicity as a collective project, to which individuals may 
make varying contributions in a laterally differentiated manner, rather 
than as a vertically homogenous “individual” which requires group 
members to articulate belonging in more or less similar ways, 
diminishes the need to wrestle divergent experiences into neat 
arguments about group solidarity or singular authenticity. I suggest 
that the quality of “we-feeling”, which, for instance, the Nepal 
Foundation for the Development of Indigenous Nationalities Act in 
Nepal (NFDIN 2003: 7) lists as one of the defining criteria for 
membership as an Indigenous People’s Organization (IPO), may 
actually be produced through the interactions and communication 
among members of individual groups, across boundaries of class, 
gender, and, perhaps most importantly in the Thangmi context, nation.  
 Mahendra, a Thangmi artist well-known in Darjeeling, explained 
his views on the collective production of Thangminess with an analogy: 
I am an artist, so many people who meet me who have never met 
a Thangmi before think that all Thangmi are artists. Actually, 
they should think instead, ‘If a Thangmi can be an artist, then 
there must also be Thangmi writers, cooks, football players, 
dancers and everything else’. In this manner, each Thangmi 
should be Thangmi in his own way. 
                                                
9 This convention is described in detail in Chapter 5. 
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This perspective brings into focus the manner in which multiple fields 
of action, such as practice and performance, each of which entail 
different processes of objectification (which I will detail below) 
intended for different audiences, can comprise complementary aspects 
of the overall cross-border social field in which ethnicity is produced. 
In the course of conceptualizing ethnicity as a collective process 
enacted through a diverse set of ritualized actions across multiple state 
borders, this argument demands a nuanced analysis of the effects of 
global discourses like indigeneity and heritage, and a concomitantly 
rigorous use of the concept of transnationalism.10 While there is no 
doubt that such concepts exist at the level of international policy, 
promoted in particular by UN agencies like the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Peoples and UNESCO respectively, these terms do not 
necessarily mean the same thing—or anything at all, in some cases—to 
people on the ground in various local contexts. The ways in which such 
concepts are introduced and received by communities in different 
locations has a great deal to do with the specific ways in which 
individual nation-states accept, reject, or otherwise filter such global 
discourses within their own borders. 
For instance, the Government of India rejects the English 
“indigenous” as an operative term in its minority legislation, preferring 
to maintain the colonial “tribal”—and therefore has refused to ratify 
                                                
10 Anna Tsing’s Friction (2005) explores these global-national-local relationships 
effectively in the domain of environmental discourse in Indonesia; I am suggesting 
the need for something similar regarding the discourses of indigeneity and heritage 
in specific sites the world over. 
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international instruments like the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.11 In 
addition, India keeps close tabs on international organizations that it 
allows to work within its borders, with the Indian state itself providing 
the majority of economic and cultural support to minority groups. By 
contrast, Nepal was one of the first Asian countries (second only to the 
Philippines) to ratify the ILO Convention and integrate the term 
“indigenous” into its official language, and, as a relatively weak state, it 
allows a range of international organizations to provide targeted 
development aid to marginalized groups. These national differences in 
accepting and implementing the prerogatives of global discourse as 
propagated by international actors have substantial effects on the 
manner in which groups like the Thangmi envision their own ethnic 
identity within each state (this argument will be developed further in 
Chapter 6). 
In short, globalization theory has often overplayed the extent to 
which Western-influenced ideologies—global discourses—dominate 
local discourse and practice, leading to analytical models which de-
emphasize the ongoing power of individual nation-states to imbue 
identity production with locally specific meanings. In addition, many 
theorists (Appadurai 1990; Basch, Schiller and Blanc 1994; Inda and 
Rosaldo 2002) have suggested that nations become deterritorialized 
due to constant border-crossing movements including labor migration, 
                                                
11 http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm, accessed 27 May 2008. 
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conflict-induced displacement, and cosmopolitan jet-setting, with the 
result that transnational frameworks eventually supersede national 
ones in shaping identities. Contrary to such assumptions, the Thangmi 
case shows how transnational life experiences in fact bring into sharp 
focus the specific properties of individual national frameworks, rather 
than effacing them. 
 I argue that nation-states remain crucial framing devices in the 
production of ethnicity, but that these framing machineries are now 
rarely experienced in isolation, and that they are therefore not taken 
for granted. Instead, nation-states are experienced as multiple but 
simultaneously existing frames, which become visible in the process of 
switching between them. Each such frame demands and facilitates 
different forms of ritualized action, manifested in different contexts to 
produce recognizable identities. In this formulation, nation-states 
continue to exercise sovereignty in very real ways, often in manners 
that attempt to obscure intentionally the locus of their power by 
casting themselves as magical (cf. Coronil 1997) or all-knowing (Scott 
1998). But these state tactics cannot become entirely hegemonic in a 
mobile world where cross-border experiences are increasingly 
common; anyone who moves across borders on a regular basis knows 
that sovereignties do not exist in individual, reified isolation. Instead, 
for people accustomed to dealing with multiple states, the role of 
nation-states as framing devices becomes evident, at the same time 
that their previously presumed absolute power becomes relative. 
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Nonetheless, the ability to control such frameworks in order to 
produce the desired effects within them is a complicated craft, which 
requires great care and ritualized attention to the nuances of practice 
and performance in order to be successful. 
 
Recognizing the Sacred: On Consciousness and Objectification 
The distinction that I am drawing between practice and performance 
may appear to be academic, but it also has an indigenous ontological 
reality. Members of the Thangmi community in both Nepal and India 
differentiate between the aims and efficacy of a practice carried out 
within Thangmi company for a divine audience, and a performance 
carried out in a public environment for broader political purposes. To 
distinguish between the two types of action, Thangmi use the Nepali 
terms sakali and nakali, which respectively translate as “real, true, 
original” (Turner 1997 [1931]: 578) and “copy, imitation” (Turner 1997 
[1931]: 333) to describe practices and performances respectively. 
These are Nepali, not Thangmi, words, and are also used by Nepali 
speakers of other ethnic groups. Thangmi speakers regularly insert 
these Nepali terms into otherwise Thangmi discourse, as they do with 
all sorts of other loan words. I do not suggest that the way in which 
Thangmi use these terms is unique, but I do think that these terms 
articulate particularly well with the sensibility shared by many Thangmi 
which recognizes the differences between, but complementary nature 
of, these two domains. Thangmi individuals talk about how one must 
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get carefully dressed and made-up, nakal parnu parchha—literally “it is 
necessary to copy or imitate”—in order to mount successful 
performances, while practices require no such costuming.  
 While viewing video that I had shot of Thangmi cultural 
performances in Darjeeling, several audience members at a program in 
Kathmandu organized by the Nepal Thami Samaj shouted out 
comments like, “Oh, how nicely they have dressed up [literally 
“imitated”]! They look really great!”12 After the video viewing, one 
elderly man commented to me, “That nakali dance works well to show 
Thangmi culture, but it’s a bit different from the sakali.”13 From his 
perspective, like that of many Thangmi, nakali is not necessarily a 
negative quality in the sense that we might impute from the dictionary 
definition of “copy, imitation”.14 Rather, it can be a positive and 
efficacious quality, which in its very difference from the sakali enables 
an alternative set of objectives to be realized. Through their ostentative 
capacity to “show” and make visible “Thangmi culture” to audiences 
beyond group members and their deities, nakali performances do 
something that sakali practices can not; yet the nakali cannot exist 
without constantly referring to and objectifying the sakali. 
                                                
12 Original Nepali: O ho, kasto ramro nakal pareko! Ekdam ramro dekhinchha! I have 
long used digital video as an ethnographic methodology; in this case, I used it to 
show members of the Thangmi community in one location what practices and 
performances in other locations look like. 
13 Original Nepali: Tyo nakali nach Thangmi sanskriti dekhaunalai ramrai kam 
lagchha, tara sakali banda ali pharak chha. 
14 It also has a differently negative connotation in Nepali youth slang, in which the 
term nakali may be used as a noun to describe a heavily made-up woman in a 
pejorative manner. I am grateful to Anna Stirr for this information. This usage of the 
term was not common among Thangmi I worked with. 
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 The difference between sakali and nakali not only glosses the 
distinction between practice and performance well, but these were 
precisely the constructs offered by Thangmi interlocutors that 
compelled me to appreciate the different techniques of objectification 
that each form of ritualized action entails. At some level, every 
expressive action, every ritual, is fundamentally an act of 
objectification—the simultaneous process of both making visible in 
social space deeply held worldviews and beliefs, and producing those 
worldviews through ritualized action. In the quintessential Durkheimian 
sense, rituals are “the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man 
should comport himself in the presence of…sacred objects” (1995 
[1912]: 56). As a set of rules enacted in the public sphere, rituals are 
by nature objectified forms of social action which articulate human 
relationships to the sacred. 
 My argument therefore is not that practice—the sakali—is 
somehow unobjectified, raw, or pure doxa which is lost in the process 
of objectification that creating the nakali entails, but rather that the 
techniques and intentions of objectification operative in the sakali field 
of practice are different from those operative in the nakali field of 
performance. To put it in Goffman’s terms, primary frameworks are 
still frameworks. Nakali performance objectifies in a new and 
differently efficacious manner the already objectified sakali field of 
practice. Gurus conducting private family ritual practices objectify the 
set of rules that governs their relationship with territorial deities, while 
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Thangmi youth who perform a staged rendition of such shamanic 
practice to a pop music soundtrack re-objectify the gurus’ practice in 
order to themselves objectify the rules that govern their relationship 
with the Indian state. 
 In other words, each field of action entails intentionally different 
strategies of ritualization, implemented with the help of different 
framing devices (of which the nation-state is one) in order to make 
claims upon different community-external entities that will yield 
different results. Yet one field of action does not efface the other, 
rather, sakali practice and nakali performance both continue to exist 
simultaneously and mutually influence each other, and individual 
Thangmi may employ one, the other, or both in making their own 
contributions to the collective production of ethnicity. The types of 
action(s) that individuals choose depend on their experiences and 
citizenship status in one, the other, or both nation-states; their age; 
their gender; their economic and educational status; and other 
idiosyncrasies of their life history and personal outlook. 
 The constant that links these disparate forms of action together 
is the enduring presence of the “sacred object” of ritual attention which 
requires that certain rules of conduct be set out in ritualized form. A 
more nuanced discussion of what, in fact, the “sacred object” is, in the 
context of Thangmi practices and performances, is required here. 
Handler follows Durkheim closely by suggesting that the sacred object 
of heritage performances may be the “social self” (forthcoming). I take 
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this notion a step further by suggesting that in the Thangmi case (and 
perhaps others), the sacred object is identity itself. Ethnicity, then, is 
one set of “rules of conduct” which govern behavior in the presence of 
this sacred object—a synthetic set of ritualized actions produced by 
disparate members of the collectivity, which taken together objectify 
the inalienable but intangible sacred in a manner simultaneously 
recognizable to insiders and outsiders. Chapter 3 substantiates this 
supposition with additional ethnographic description; here I explore its 
theoretical implications. 
 This argument emerges from my reading of Maurice Godelier’s 
exposition of the sacred: 
 
For the sacred—contrary to the views of Durkheim, who made 
too stark a separation between religious and political—always 
has to do with power insofar as the sacred is a certain kind of 
relationship with the origin, and insofar as the origin of 
individuals and of groups has a bearing on the places they 
occupy in a social and cosmic order. It is with reference to the 
origin of each person and each group that the actual relations 
between the individuals and the groups which compose a society 
are compared with the order that should be reigning in the 
universe and in society. The actual state is then judged to be 
legitimate or illegitimate, by right, and therefore acceptable or 
unacceptable. It is therefore not objects which sacralize some or 
all of people’s relations with each other and with the 
surrounding universe, it is the converse. (1999: 169) 
I take Godelier to mean that people’s relations with each other across a 
collectivity—as enacted in moments of practice and performance—
objectify as sacred human connections with their origins, and their 
concomitant position in social, political and cosmic orders. This sacred 
combination of confidence in the knowledge of one’s origins, and 
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positionality vis-à-vis contemporary states, is ethnic identity itself, and 
it is produced through a range of diverse but simultaneously existing 
fields of action maintained by the disparate individuals who comprise 
the collective (see Chapter 3).15 
 
Creating Sacred Objects 
In Godelier’s terms, sacred objects are those which cannot be 
exchanged (as gifts or commodities), “cannot be alienated”, and which 
give people “an identity and root this identity in the Beginning” (1999: 
120-121). For the Baruya, whose society provides the content upon 
which Godelier builds his theory, sacred objects are in fact tangible 
objects as such. These objects act as an inalienable extension of the 
human body itself in their ability to simultaneously contain and 
represent identity. In the Thangmi case, however, such tangible sacred 
objects have historically been almost non-existent. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, there is no easily discernable Thangmi material culture 
which might be objectified as sacred. In the absence of tangible 
signifying items, identity must serve as its own sacred object. This is 
why the objectifying actions of both practice and performance are so 
important for the Thangmi; identity itself must be objectified as sacred 
and presented to the powers-that-be—whether representatives of the 
                                                
15 Chapter 3 explores in depth the relationships between “origin myths” and “myths 
of originality”. 
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divine or the state—since there is little else in the material world that 
can stand in for it. 
 The lack of distinctive material culture is one of the most 
noticeable features of Thangmi life, and is universally noted by the few 
previous researchers who have engaged with the Thangmi (Fürer-
Haimendorf [in 1974 field diaries] as cited in Shneiderman and Turin 
2006, Peet 1978, Stein personal communication).16 Precisely because 
there is nothing to notice in a Thangmi village aside from generic 
features of rural life in hill Nepal, this absence of material culture has 
contributed substantially to the problems of recognition that the 
Thangmi now face at the political level in Nepal and India. Moreover, as 
described in Chapter 1, Thangmi in Nepal for generations intentionally 
retreated from the gaze of the state rather than engaging with it, and 
the Thangmi ethnonym remains largely vacuous of signifying meaning 
to anyone but Thangmi themselves.  
 There is, in fact, an enormous amount of Thangmi cultural 
content, but it is all contained in the intangible aspects of practice that 
are not immediately visible to an outside eye: origin myths (described 
in Chapter 3); propitiation chants to pacify territorial deities (described 
in Chapter 6); the memorial process of reconstructing the body of the 
deceased out of every day foodstuff (described in Chapter 7). Present 
to those who practice it, but absent to outside observers, Thangmi 
                                                
16 The other consistently noted Thangmi cultural feature is a system of parallel 
descent, in which men and women have their own clans. See Chapter 7 for details. 
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identity is indeed a sacred object in Godelier’s sense, “gorged with 
signification … in which man is both present and absent” (1999: 175). 
 The only notable exceptions to the generally true statement that 
the Thangmi have no unique material culture are the guru’s 
implements of drum (T: take) and wooden dagger (T: thurmi ). 
However, these are both pan-Himalayan shamanic implements also 
used by other groups across the region, and as such have little sacred 
power as identity-signifying objects per se. They only become sacred 
when used in the specific context of Thangmi language ritual practice 
by Thangmi guru to marshal the power of exclusively Thangmi 
territorial deities. But as soon as such rituals are over, the take and 
thurmi become generic objects, not particularly Thangmi, or 
particularly sacred. In order to work, take and thurmi must be used by 
a guru who received these ritual implements from his own father, or 
otherwise his own shamanic teacher, suggesting that in the 
appropriate context, such objects may also work as signifiers of shared 
descent—but not in an abstractable manner beyond the guru’s lineage 
itself. 
This is why the BTWA’s use of a thurmi image for their logo, 
along with the more complex diagram of one submitted as part of their 
ST application [see Figures 2.4 and 2.5], are viewed as nakali uses of 
the object by guru who use such items in ritual practice. Recall, 
however, that nakali is not necessarily a negative attribute—rather, it 
implies the re-objectification of the sakali in a new context for a 
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Figure 2.4 Letterhead of the Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Diagram of a thurmi submitted with the Thangmi 
Scheduled Tribe application in India 
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different purpose. As Latte Apa, Darjeeling’s senior Thangmi guru, put 
it: 
I always think it’s strange when I see the thurmi on the BTWA 
certificates. It is not a ‘real’ thurmi. But then I think, the 
government doesn’t know us yet, but we must make them know 
us. If they see the thurmi, they will know, “That is Thangmi”. 
Such statements show how the sacred object of Thangmi identity 
remains constant, although it may be objectified in a diverse range of 
sakali and nakali manners. The nakali use of the thurmi as a logo for 
the Thangmi ethnic organization does not efface its continued sakali 
use by Latte Apa in ritual practice; he acknowledges the value of the 
former yet continues with the latter. The audiences who reaffirm the 
sacrality of the thurmi in each context may be different, but each plays 
a comparable and equally necessary role. 
 Along these lines, Godelier tells us that: 
 
Objects do not need to be different in order to operate in 
different areas … It is not the object which creates the 
differences, it is the different logics governing the areas of social 
life that endow it with different meanings as it moves from one 
domain to the other, changing functions and uses as it goes 
(1999: 108). 
Practices ensure that deities come to know the Thangmi and validate 
their special relationship with territorial deities, whereas 
performances—the full range of nakali strategies of representation—
ensure that state officials and other outsiders come to know the 
Thangmi as a community worthy of recognition. The mechanisms of 
recognition are different, but both realms of ritualized action serve to 
regulate key areas of the social world in which the sacred object of 
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Thangmi identity is reproduced. This is why someone like Latte Apa, 
for instance, may be both a practitioner and a performer without a 
sense of internal contradiction: the sacred object which is the focus of 
ritualized activity does not change, and both fields of ritualized action 
reaffirm its primacy. 
 
Recognition and Self-Consciousness 
A concern with the issue of “recognition” runs throughout Godelier’s 
discussion of the sacred. He asks, “to what extent do humans not 
recognize themselves in their replicas? To what extent do they believe 
in their beliefs …?” (1999: 178), and soon answers, “To be sure he can 
see himself in these sacred objects because he knows the code, but he 
cannot recognize himself in them, cannot recognize himself as their 
author and maker, in short as their origin” (1999: 178-179, italics in 
the original). Although Godelier accords his subjects the power to see 
themselves, he stops short of granting them the ability recognize 
themselves, therefore suggesting that ritual behavior can not be fully 
self-conscious. Handler similarly hedges his bets, suggesting first that 
actors have a certain level of self-consciousness: “Audiences, too, will 
have differing kinds of awareness of the frame and the contents of 
heritage rituals. And of course, both actors and audiences will be more 
or less aware of each others’ interpretations of such issues” 
(forthcoming). Soon after, however, Handler returns to a more classical 
Durkheimian position by suggesting that, “modern social groups 
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worship at the altar of their own identity, but they do not consciously 
realize that the idea of identity itself, like the idea of god, is a social 
production” (forthcoming). 
 Such arguments allude to larger anthropological debates over 
authenticity and the role of objectification in constituting the modern 
“culture concept”. Crediting Cohn (1987), Handler defines “cultural 
objectification” as a quintessentially modern process which is “the 
imaginative embodiment of human realities in terms of a theoretical 
discourse based on the concept of culture” (1984: 56). Along with this 
argument comes the assumption that engaging in the process of 
objectification somehow removes one from the realm of pure, un-self-
conscious, and by implication, non-modern culture. Recall also 
Guneratne’s separation of Tharu identity into two distinct domains—
that of un-selfconscious doxa versus that of self-conscious political 
posturing—a formulation which draws upon Bourdieu’s dichotomous 
separation of the fields of “practice” and “theory” and their respective 
identification with worlds of the “native” and the “analyst” (1990). 
 These arguments entail two paradoxes regarding the self-
consciousness (or lack thereof) of cultural actors. First: on the one 
hand, those who do not engage in objectification—“natives” in whose 
world “rites take place because ... they cannot afford the luxury of 
logical speculation” as Bourdieu puts it (1990: 96), or non-modern 
actors in Handler’s terms—do not see the frames within which their 
social world are produced, instead taking “identity” and “culture” for 
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granted as absolute, sacred realities without self-consciously 
recognizing themselves as the authors of these phenomenon. On the 
other hand, those who do engage in objectification—analysts and 
modern cultural actors—may be able to see the frames within which 
social reality and identity are produced, yet they still perceive the 
resulting cultural objects as real and sacred, without self-consciously 
recognizing the role of their own actions in reifying the frames within 
which such objects are created. 
 Second: any sign of consciousness in the manipulation of 
cultural forms on the part of cultural actors is portrayed negatively as a 
fall from non-objectified, genuine grace (such as the “calculating, 
interested, manipulated belief” that comprises acts of “bad faith” in 
Godelier’s words [1999: 178]); while at the same time, consciousness 
on the part of those who attempt to identify instances of such 
manipulation is seen as positive evidence of social science at work. 
 There are two problems with such arguments. First of all, they 
assume that there is a moment of rupture, an “epistemological break” 
(Bentley 1987: 44, citing Foucault 1977), at which social groups 
(conceived of as coherent, homogeneous individuals) make the 
transition, never to return, from non-objectified to objectified cultural 
action, from identity as doxa to identity as politics, from practice (in 
Bourdieu’s sense of the word, not mine) to theory. Take Guneratne’s 
description of the Tharu’s transition between these two domains as an 
example of this type of argument:  
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While the cultural practices of their elders become in one sense 
marginal to their everyday concerns, in another sense they 
undergo a reification and reappear as an essential aspect of their 
modern identity. It is no longer culture as doxa in Bourdieu’s 
sense but culture as performance, a tale that Tharus tell 
themselves about themselves (1998: 760) 
 Second of all, regardless of how and when that moment of 
rupture occurs, individuals are not portrayed as gaining genuine self-
consciousness through that transition; rather, they simply move from a 
state in which they lack self-consciousness entirely, to a state in which 
total belief in their analytical capacities (belief in the power of 
objectification inherent in the modern culture concept) obscures their 
real inabilities to comprehend their contributions to the production of 
sacred objects like identity. In Handler’s view: 
 
People believe that they are discovering what their culture has 
been and is. They assume that culture is a real-world entity and 
that by analyzing its objective properties they can preserve it. 
But, as I see it, they are neither documenting nor preserving a 
culture which exists independently of them (1984: 62) 
 I would like to revisit this set of assumptions by first asserting 
that the dividing lines between the types of actors discussed above 
(modern/non-modern; native/analyst) be questioned, since all of them 
in fact engage in processes of objectification; second, by suggesting 
that all such actors (rather than none of them), do act with a 
substantial level of self-consciousness; and finally, by arguing that 
there is no moment of rupture when groups shift from one form of 
objectification to another. I propose instead that multiple forms of 
objectifying action, each with different intended audiences and effects, 
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are employed simultaneously by a range of individuals in the 
production of sets of social rules, like ethnicity, within which identity 
itself becomes a sacred object. By refocusing on the entire range of 
things that individuals belonging to a collectivity (defined by name and 
the associated implication of shared descent) actually do to objectify 
various parts of their social world, and the ways in which these 
multiple fields of ritualized action, such as practice and performance, 
co-exist and inform each other, we can see that culture as doxa, or 
practice, does not necessarily give rise, in a unidirectional, evolutionary 
manner, to culture as performance.  
 This argument revisits some of the territory covered by the 
debates over change versus continuity, tradition versus modernity, that 
have dominated much anthropological work on questions of cultural 
objectification and authenticity. Rather than focusing on cultural 
objects themselves, foregrounding instead the diverse forms of 
sacralizing action which people use to produce their cultural world, 
and the constantly shifting interplay between such forms—which are 
not inherently attached to specific chronological conjunctures or 
evolutionary phases—helps move beyond such limiting dichotomies. 
Furthermore, acknowledging that there is a range of simultaneously 
available objectifying actions which people may employ to express 
their relationship with the sacred object of identity allows us to see 
that there is a substantial scope for choice—and therefore self-
consciousness—in the decisions that people make about which forms 
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of action to employ in which circumstances, and thus come to 
recognize themselves as creators of their own social world. 
 I am not suggesting that people make fully rational, strategic 
choices about how they represent their identity for purely expedient 
political and economic reasons. Rather, actors are conscious of, and 
make choices between, various forms of action which articulate 
different aspects of their relationship with the sacred—in the Thangmi 
case, identity itself—to different but equally important audiences. Each 
form of action occasions recognition from a public larger than the 
individual or the ethnic collectivity itself, whether that be the divine 
world or the state, and that experience of recognition leads to a 
powerful affective experience of affirmation of the social self. For 
some, this strong experience of validation might come from material 
evidence that the divine exists and has a special relationship with their 
people: natural wonders, deities speaking in tongues through 
possessed shamans, or other “miracles”. For others, affirmation might 
come from evidence that the government notices and has a special 
relationship with their people: constitutional provisions for special 
treatment, political and educational quotas, or other such policies. The 
objectifying actions necessary to secure each form of recognition and 
its evidence are different, but the affective results are comparable. For 
most contemporary Thangmi, a subjectively complete sense of 
recognition comes from a combination of both types of recognition in 
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different doses, depending upon individual history and personal 
proclivity. 
 The desire to gain either one or both of these forms of 
“existential recognition” (Graham 2005)—cannot exist without a 
minimum sense of self-recognition as a legitimate subject for 
recognition from others. That basic level of self-consciousness, and 
the ensuing confidence that external recognition will at some point be 
forthcoming, is the necessary impetus for individuals to undertake the 
often expensive, as well as mentally and physically arduous, ritual 
tasks of propitiating deities (multi-day Thangmi rituals often require 
participants to go without sleep for close to a week) or submitting 
government applications (a process which often takes years, several 
visits to government offices, and a great deal of personal expense). 
Indeed, 
 
It is because men know that they might not be heard, and that 
their wishes and desires might not be answered, that they are 
often very strict about the performance of their rites. If beings in 
the invisible world are to consent to interrupt what they are 
doing and lend an ear to the please of men, these must be 
formulated in a language and according to procedures that are 
understandable and appropriate. (Godelier 1999: 186) 
Without a minimum level of self-consciousness and confidence, the 
challenges of securing recognition from such beings would be 
insurmountable. Even if such obstacles are overcome, the relatively 
small pragmatic benefits would not in themselves be worth such heroic 
efforts without the concomitant psychological benefits of “existential 
recognition”. 
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On the Politics of Heritage and Cross-Border Frames 
Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett has argued that in the performance of 
heritage, “people become living signs of themselves” (1998: 18). This 
statement resonates with Godelier’s assertions that through ritual 
activity: 
 
People generate duplicate selves … which, once they have split 
off, stand before them as persons who are at once familiar and 
alien. In reality these are not duplicates which stand before them 
as aliens; these are the people themselves who, by splitting, have 
become in part strangers to themselves, subjected, alienated to 
these other beings who are nonetheless part of themselves. 
(1999: 169-170) 
Although Godelier’s “duplicate selves” are supernatural beings, while 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett refers to human performers, the underlying idea 
is similar. In the process of engaging in ritualized action, people 
objectify their own self-consciousness—in a sense alienating 
themselves from themselves—but at the same time, through such self-
replicating, signifying action, they create the potential for a reflective 
awareness through which they can make sense of these processes of 
subjectification and alienation in a manner that allows the “double 
selves” to stand without contradiction. In the end, the sacred self is 
inalienable. Through the process of perfromance, the experience of 
becoming “a living sign”, who is recognized as such by powerful 
others, and/or watching other members of one’s community become 
one—as many Thangmi are now doing—generates a consciousness of 
the different objectifying tools of practice and performance, and their 
different, but equally important, efficacies. In a diverse cross-border 
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community shaped by the historical experience of circular migration 
between multiple nation-states, such consciousness emerges in part 
from intimate knowledge of the differences in paradigms for cultural 
objectification in each country, and the ability to see such national 
ethos as frames within which one’s own action unfolds. 
 During a ritual to protect a Darjeeling household from bad luck, 
Rana Bahadur (no relation to the senior guru Rana Bahadur), a young 
Thangmi from Nepal who had lived in India for several long periods 
described this effect: “The politics here are distinct, the politics there 
are also unique. In each place, culture must be circulated in different 
forms”.17 As a respected guru’s assistant who often played an 
important role during ritual practices, as well as a cultural performer 
who wrote and sang many of the lyrics on a BTWA-sponsored cassette 
of Thangmi language songs, Rana Bahadur was one of many Thangmi 
whose experiences of both India and Nepal as national frames effected 
a conscious recognition of the differences in technique, efficacy and 
audience that defined practice and performance. Within this diversity of 
experiences, the constant is a curiosity about the embodied effects of 
each form of ritualized action, and a sense that the relationship 
between them enables the ethnic collectivity to synthesize a coherent 
presence across borders and disparate life experiences. 
                                                
17 Original Nepali: Yahako rajniti alagai chha, tyahako pani alag chha. Thau thau ma 
pharak ruple sanskriti chalaunu parchha. 
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 In one direction, that curiosity manifests in the desire seasoned 
Thangmi cultural practitioners from Nepal to watch, and in some cases, 
participate in, stage-managed cultural performances like the one in 
Sikkim with which this chapter began. In the other direction, many 
Thangmi in India talk about opportunities to observe cultural practices, 
such as death or wedding rituals, with the same reverence with which 
they might discuss an audience with Sai Baba or the Dalai Lama. The 
increasing exposure of practitioners to performance, and performers to 
practice—through cheaper and easier cross-border travel and the trend 
of home-grown VCD production—has generated a debate within the 
community as a whole about what constitutes Thangmi culture, and 
what elements of it should be “standardized” for future reproduction 
(see Chapter 3). 
 The fact that this debate is actively taking place within the 
community itself, for whom members of which practice itself is still 
very much alive and a key component of identity, sets this case apart 
somewhat from other discussions of the production of heritage in the 
global economy. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett defines heritage as, “the 
transvaluation of the obsolete, the mistaken, the outmoded, the dead, 
and the defunct”, and as, “...a mode of production that has recourse to 
the past,” to “produce the local for export” (1995: 369). In the Thangmi 
case, practice remains very much alive, but it has increasingly come 
into relationship with performance. The two co-exist. Rather than 
fetishizing dead practices, the relatively recent emergence of the desire 
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to demonstrate heritage through performance for political purposes 
within India has in fact encouraged the continuation of practice in 
Nepal, and even the re-rooting of it in India, where it had previously 
disappeared. For most Thangmi, heritage has not yet become entirely 
detached from living practice itself, commodified by outside forces and 
reconstituted for the express purpose of consumption by others. I 
suspect that this is not so unusual, and may also be the case in other 
places and for other groups, but that the analytical obsession with 
dichotomizing authentic and inauthentic, practice and theory, has 
obscured such dynamics. Instead, although oriented towards external 
audiences, performance is produced by Thangmi, for Thangmi 
purposes, in constant conversation with practice itself. 
 
Aesthetics, Affect and Efficacy 
The process of performing heritage sometimes has unexpected effects 
on the performers: many Thangmi in India told me that the experience 
of performance gave them a hint of what practice might be like, and 
encouraged them to seek out practice experiences in the company of 
Thangmi from Nepal, which in turn gave them a different feel (at the 
level of the body) for what it meant to be Thangmi. Such interlinkages 
begin to show how and why ethnic actors themselves view both 
practice and performance as integral to their own identity, within an 
indigenous frame of reference that includes individual states, their 
policies, and the borders between them. 
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 When I asked Laxmi, one of the choreographers of the Sikkim 
performance, how she and her colleagues had put together these 
dances and conceptualized them as particularly Thangmi ones, she 
shrugged her shoulders and said: 
 
We just choose whichever steps look good. We want to create 
something that people will want to watch, and will make them 
remember, ‘those Thangmi, they are good dancers’. That will 
help us. 
When I pushed further to ask what made these dances particularly 
Thangmi, she said, “Well, we have Thangmi from Nepal in the group, 
and they know how to show sakali Thangmi culture, so we just trust 
them.” For her, the very presence of Thangmi from Nepal—who were 
stereotyped as having some experience with practice due to their 
background in rural villages, and their competence in the Thangmi 
language—was enough to provide an aura of authenticity, although she 
admitted that she did not know what constituted it. Clearly, she was 
aware of the aesthetic differences between what she had created as 
performance and Thangmi practice as such—and their concomitant 
differences in efficacy—but she seemed unconcerned with the affective 
differences between them. 
 The dancers from Nepal, on the other hand, knew that they felt 
different performing these choreographed dances on stage than they 
did when they participated in practice conducted by gurus at home. 
The bodily techniques entailed by each form of ritualized action were 
substantially different, as were the intended audiences and objectives: 
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performance required highly stylized, external movements 
recognizable by outside others who could help forward political 
objectives, while practice required an internally-oriented, almost 
meditative focus that appealed to deities who could help forward 
spiritual objectives. 
 The discomfort that the dancers from Nepal felt at the Sikkim 
performance (and presumably at other such events) derived not from 
the dissonance between the two experiences—as mentioned above, 
they were perfectly familiar with the distinction between the two modes 
of cultural production in Nepal as well—but from the sense that for 
some Thangmi in India, performance had eclipsed practice entirely to 
the extent that they did not recognize the value of the relationship 
between the two. Many Thangmi from Nepal, like the young Rana 
Bahadur, feared that the repeated, exclusive engagement with the field 
of performance might cause it to subsume entirely the field of practice; 
in essence, that what the Thangmi in India valued as sakali in the 
practice of Thangmi from Nepal would in the course of time cease to 
exist as it became exclusively appropriated as nakali. 
 Perhaps these concerns were unnecessary, for many Thangmi in 
India were on their own learning curve. The choreographer Laxmi 
confided that she had been overwhelmed by the experience of the 
funerary rituals that Latte Apa had conducted after the recent death of 
her brother Basant, the General Secretary of the BTWA quoted in 
Chapter 1. Basant’s funeral was the first time that Laxmi had 
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participated in a full-blown Thangmi ritual practice conducted by a 
Thangmi guru, since her family had until recently been in the habit of 
using Hindu pandits instead, as had been typical for many Thangmi 
families in India for generations.18 She was surprised by the positive 
effect that participating in the ritual as a practitioner, following the 
guru’s instructions, had on her own fragile emotional state in the wake 
of her brother’s death—very different from the orchestrating role that 
she was used to playing as dance choreographer. She saw these 
serious, complicated practices as an entirely separate domain from the 
upbeat dances that she choreographed, but she was beginning to 
recognize both as important features of Thangmi cultural production 
that deserved to be maintained and mutually supported. 
 In the contemporary national and transnational politico-cultural 
economies that shape Thangmi lives, maintaining the pragmatic 
conditions in which practice can be reproduced necessarily entails 
mounting performances. Those performances, in turn, must be able to 
allude to the ongoing life of practice in order to establish their own 
legitimacy as representations of a culture worthy of recognition. It 
follows that those with the sakali skills of performance cannot advance 
their own projects without collaboration from those with the nakali 
knowledge of practice, and vice versa. The combination of competence 
in both fields of ritualized action in a single individual is extremely 
                                                
18 As David Gellner has noted in the Newar context, “Switching priest, and thereby 
switching the idiom in which the household’s life-cycle rituals were performed, was, 
of course, an old practice, one that the upwardly mobile had always practised” 
(forthcoming a: 5). 
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rare, although that perhaps is changing, as the examples of relatively 
young Thangmi like Rana Bahadur and Laxmi described above show. 
For now, in order to advance their shared goals of reproducing the 
sacred object of Thangmi identity and securing “existential 
recognition” from a range of audiences, Thangmi with a diversity of life 
experiences—in Nepal and India, circular migrants and settled 
residents of both countries, young and old, gurus and activists, 
practitioners and performers—must work together in a synthetic 
manner to maintain the rules of conduct that govern Thangmi 
ethnicity. Mixed into the blend, this text is my part of the production, 
fully costumed in the garb of social scientific authority. 
 
 
 126 
CHAPTER THREE 
Origin Myths and Myths of Originality: 
Gurus, Activists and the Power of Orality 
“I need photos of very ‘original’ Thangmi,” said Paras, as he pushed a 
stack of photocopied documents across the table towards me, 
indicating the terms of our exchange. With his signature plaid cap, 
dark glasses and Nehru vest stretched over an expanding paunch, the 
president of the Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association (BTWA) was the 
picture of a successful Indian civil servant at the height of his career. 
Paras had been at the helm of the BTWA since the early 1990s, but due 
to his posting in the customs office in urban Siliguri, some four hours 
by jeep from Darjeeling bazaar, he was rarely actually present at BTWA 
meetings or events. Although other members of the organization often 
complained about the fact that Paras got credit for successes that he 
had in fact contributed little towards achieving, his status as a well-
educated senior government official lent the organization an air of 
authority that even Paras’ critics admitted was necessary. In much the 
same way, albeit on a different symbolic register, Paras now hoped that 
I could contribute images from my fieldwork across the border in Nepal 
that might lend an air of authority to the BTWA’s application for 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) status—the draft materials of which he had just 
given me on the condition that I would contribute to the final version 
as requested. 
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 “What exactly do you mean by ‘original’?” I asked. “You know,” 
he said,  raising his eyebrows, as if the fact that I even had to ask took 
his assessment of me down a notch,  
‘Natural’ types of Thangmi, with less teeth than we have [he 
gestured to his own mouth], wide porters’ feet with no shoes, 
clothes woven from colorless natural fibers. But what we really 
need is more photos of people like that doing puja (N: rituals), at 
jatra (N: festivals), you know, bore (T: weddings), mumpra (T: 
funerals), all of those things that we can’t ‘videoalize’ so easily 
here.1 
In other words, Paras was locating the “original”—a term whose triple 
entendre of “authentic” (in the literal sense of “original”), “primitive” (in 
the sense of “originary”) and “distinctive” (in the sense of possessing 
“originality”) seemed to suit his purposes well—in the poor economic 
conditions and heavily ritualized lifestyle that he stereotyped as 
characteristic of Thangmi in Nepal. For descendants of migrants who 
had left Nepal to settle in India several generations earlier, like Paras, 
Nepal served as a convenient metonym for an “original” Thangmi 
culture locked in a static past. At the level of personal practice, Paras 
and other relatively elite BTWA leaders sought to distance themselves 
from such markers of “originality”, which is why it was on some level a 
relief to them that these characteristics seemed to be more prevalent in 
Nepal (although reminders of them appeared in Darjeeling every year 
in the form of circular migrants). However, at the level of political 
discourse, the BTWA activists sought to appropriate and package such 
                                       
1 “Videoalize” was the term that BTWA members used to describe the process of 
digital video documentation of key Thangmi cultural events, a project in which they 
were engaged throughout the course of my fieldwork. 
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“primitive traits” and “geographical isolation”—both perceived criteria 
for a successful ST application—in the service of their own agenda, at 
which level it was frustrating to them that such originality was difficult 
to document in Darjeeling itself.2 This is where my photos came in. 
At first, I thought that this obsession with locating the “original” 
in practice and packaging it in discursive terms was exclusive to 
activists in India like Paras, emerging in part from the sense of 
inadequacy that they felt about the fact that they themselves did not 
possess (or control) such “originality”. But upon further reflection and 
analysis of my ethnographic materials from both Nepal and India, I 
began to realize that in some way or another, the set of concepts 
condensed in the root-word “origin” played an important role in 
constituting feelings of Thangminess for almost everyone I had worked 
with, regardless of their citizenship, age, gender, economic status or 
education. Gurus in both Nepal and India used the terms shristi (N: 
creation) and utpatti (N: origin, genesis) to describe the process of 
ethnic emergence as recounted in their paloke, the centerpiece of 
Thangmi ritual practice during which the group’s origin stories are 
told.3 Most Thangmi laypeople were familiar with such stories, which 
will be detailed below, and took strength from them as a positive 
                                       
2 See Chapter 5 on ST politics and Chapter 6 on the problem of indigeneity in this 
context. 
3 Gaenszle notes that in the Mewahang Rai context, “there is evidence that the word 
shristi  ... tends to refer to the Primal Creation, the arising of the First Being, while 
utpatti ... tends to refer to genesis, the physical birth of the species ...” (2000: 230 n. 
305). Although there may be a similar nuance in Thangmi usage, most laypeople 
seem to use the terms interchangeably. 
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statement of originality that helped counter feelings of 
marginalization. 
Thangmi ethnic activists in Nepal also used the concepts of 
“original” and “originality” regularly in their speeches and writings in 
order to emphasize the enduring and distinctive qualities of 
Thangminess, although they typically used the Nepali words maulik 
and maulikta respectively instead of the English ‘original’ as Paras 
had.4 For instance, in a discussion of the challenges that Thangmi face 
in distinguishing themselves from Tamang in the face of academic 
misrepresentations (see Chapter 1), the Jhapa-based activist Megh Raj 
(who is described in more detail in Chapter 5) concludes his argument 
with the statement that, “Thami is a complete ethnicity with its own 
original identity, existence and pride” (Niko 2003: 46).5 In some ways, 
“original”, or maulik, can be seen as a synonym for sakali (as described 
in Chapter 2), although the former term gestures towards the source of 
ethnic origins in a distant past as an important marker of identity in 
the present in a more explicitly historical sense than the latter does.6 
                                       
4 The use of English instead of Nepali terms in Darjeeling reflects broader patterns of 
language usage there, and does not directly indicate the educational status of the 
speaker. 
5 Original Nepali: Thami euta singo ‘jat’ ho jasko maulik pahichan, astitwa, ra san 
chha. Singo connotes “complete” in the holistic sense, with all of its component 
pieces intact. In addition, in a fundraising brochure aimed at establishing a new 
association (which was not successful), Kabiraj (an activist from the village of 
Lapilang, Dolakha) writes, “The main objectives of this association are: to promote 
and preserve the language, art, culture, customs, traditions, religion, costumes, 
rituals, literature, life styles and norms and values, which represent the ethnic 
identity and originality (maulikta) of the backward indigenous Thami across Nepal” 
(TCUAN 2000). 
6 Anna Stirr has translated maulik as “authentic” in her discussions of the popular folk 
music scene in Nepal (personal communication). Additional research that pays careful 
attention to the full range of contexts in which such terms are used in contemporary 
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 In this chapter, I show how diverse invocations of shared origins 
and originalities—in practice, performance and discourse by gurus, 
laypeople and activists—indicate a convergence of varied Thangmi 
worldviews around what we might call the sacred originary, recalling 
Godelier’s statement that, “the sacred is a certain kind of relationship 
with the origin” (1999: 169).7 It is perhaps not shared descent per se, 
but knowledge of a shared myth of it, that works as a universal marker 
of belonging throughout the transnational Thangmi community by 
pointing towards the original as that which imbues the sacred object of 
identity with its power. 
The differences that I observed in relationships to and 
expressions of the original—which I had initially thought indexed 
country-specific responses to the particular politics of recognition 
encountered in India and Nepal respectively—were in fact not 
exclusively determined by political and economic particularities in each 
country, but rather more by educational and generational 
positionalities which entailed different techniques for controlling and 
strategically deploying originary power. That a shared narrative of 
origin constituted the power of Thangminess as a category at the most 
fundamental level was so taken for granted that it was almost never 
stated explicitly, and it therefore took me a long time to understand 
this fact. Rather, the question up for public debate within the Thangmi 
                                                                                                              
Nepal will help shed light on their specific meanings within the context of ethnic 
politics. 
7 See the extended quotation as cited in Chapter 2. 
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community throughout my fieldwork was how to best marshal that 
sacred power in the service of competing agendas, so it was these 
divides which appeared most evident to me. 
Levi-Strauss once suggested that, “In order for a culture to be 
really itself and to produce something, the culture and its members 
must be convinced of their originality” (1979: 20). Thangmi origin 
myths at once work to assert such originality in the functional, 
diachronic sense, in which myth is read as a charter for the group’s 
contemporary identity claims vis-a-vis the broader social world, and to 
reproduce originality in a structural, synchronic manner within the 
realm of Thangmi social relations. Both of these interpretations of 
myth—which resonate loosely with Malinowskian and Levi-Straussian 
theories of myth respectively—are recognized within the Thangmi 
community, but I suggest that in general, activists are more interested 
in the functional properties of myth, while gurus emphasize its 
structural reality. I will return to these assertions shortly. 
 Gurus (and indirectly, their adherents) access originary power by 
propitiating territorial deities through a set of oral recitations that 
recount Thangmi origin myths in a ritual register of the Thangmi 
language. The purposes of these recitations are twofold. The first 
objective is to secure divine recognition of the special relationship 
between the Thangmi and their territory, as articulated in these mythic 
narratives. Such divine recognition is necessary to ensure a range of 
positive pragmatic effects, such as good harvests and the overall 
 
 
 132 
continued survival of the community (see Chapter 6). The second 
objective is to reproduce a form of “mythical thought” (Lévi-Strauss 
1979: 6, 1987 [1973]: 173, 184) which effects an inseparable  link 
between Thangminess and the oral transmission of cultural knowledge. 
Such mythical thought is conceptualized by members of the Thangmi 
community—both gurus and activists—to exist in opposition to 
scientific thought, with its reliance on written transmission.8 The 
efficacy of a guru’s practice depends upon the power of the individual 
himself to recite the correct propitiation chants (primarily in a ritual 
language that others cannot understand) in an embodied manner 
which is defined by its orality. In this mode of practice, lay Thangmi do 
not have direct access to originary power, and instead must rely upon 
their gurus to mediate it for them when necessary. 
 Ethnic activists, on the other hand, seek to access originary 
power directly through “entextualization” (Bauman and Briggs 1990) 
and “scripturalization” (Gaenszle forthcoming), using the technology of 
writing—primarily in Nepali, not Thangmi and certainly not Thangmi 
ritual language—to challenge the orally-mandated authority embodied 
in gurus themselves. Bauman and Briggs define “entextualization” as 
“the process of rendering discourse extractable, of making a stretch of 
linguistic production into a unit—a text—that can be lifted out of its 
                                       
8 Lévi-Strauss suggests that “mythical thought” was the antithetical foil for early 
proponents of “scientific thought” (1979: 6), but that more recently science has come 
to appreciate the value of myth. I suggest that Thangmi views of “science” and “myth” 
are engaged in a similarly dialectical process, which may further illuminate the 
unanswered question of whether myth has also come to appreciate science. 
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interactional setting” (1990: 73).9 “Scripturalization” adds the sense of, 
“a religious use of the writings, sometimes including the use in ritual” 
(Gaenszle forthcoming: 2).10 By writing down myths of origin, as well as 
the details of the ritual practices that unlock their power, activists 
attempt to objectify the original for the purposes of political 
recognition in a manner that bypasses gurus’ oral control of it.11 In this 
formulation, originary power is not fundamentally embedded in the 
embodied practice of the guru, but rather can be extracted and 
redeployed in other contexts (by other agents) in the objectified, 
entextualized form of his knowledge, as well as in the static (and 
silent) symbol of the guru’s body as a living sign of itself.12 For 
example, an image of several gurus dancing is emblazoned on BTWA 
                                       
9 Gaenszle suggests that Mewahang Rai priests, “can be seen as masters of 
entextualization”, and that it is “the ability to use the ritual idiom in a non-
mechanical, active, creative manner, which is at the base of priestly power and 
authority” (2002: 185). 
10 Building upon Sheldon Pollock’s use of the terms “literization” and “literarization”—
the “initial process of inscription” and the process of “turning into literature” 
respectively (Pollock 1998: 41)—Gaenszle suggests that the term “scripturalization” 
adds the additional sense of “formation of a sacred scriptural tradition” (forthcoming: 
2). The tension between oral and written traditions, sometimes cast as “great and 
little traditions” (Redfield 1960) is of course a long-standing theme in anthropology 
and the social sciences in general (see particularly Goody 1986, 2000; Ong 1982). In 
Nepal in particular, see Charles Ramble (1983) on the tensions between oral and 
literate traditions in Mustang; Sherry Ortner (1989, 1995a) on the process of Sherpa 
religious “rationalization”; and William Fisher (2001) on the related process of what 
he calls “codifying” Thakali culture. 
11 Another aspect of this activist agenda has been to search for a “lost” Thangmi 
script which would somehow render the process of entextualization easier, and more 
politically effective (or at least that is the hope). Unlike the Limbu, Rai, and Lepcha 
communities who can claim historical proof of unique scripts as a “symbolic 
resource” within ethnic activist contexts in both Nepal and India (Gaenszle 
forthcoming), Thangmi has never had its own orthography. Some activists seek to 
create a Thangmi alphabet, but there are many practical challenges to this, and 
Devanagari needs only minor modifications to represent Thangmi phonology 
accurately. 
12 Recall the citation from Kirshenblatt-Gimblett presented at the end of Chapter 2.  
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certificates of recognition issued for outstanding contributions to the 
Thangmi activist cause. 
 At the same time, activists seek to transform the mythical 
thought of the gurus into a form of scientific thought. Activist 
publications suggest that Thangmi must “align our footsteps along 
with the movement of scientific changes” (Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 37), 
in order to remedy the fact that, “while the present scientific 
development has reached a climax, the Thami community is still 
backward and voiceless” (Niko 2003: 10). However, the object of such 
ostensibly scientific thinking remains Thangmi myth itself; activists do 
not propose to substitute myth entirely with science at the ontological 
level. Rather they attempt to reevaluate the object of myth, which 
remains consistently at the core of Thangminess, with what they 
believe to be a new set of epistemological tools that will yield improved 
results. In this process, they demonstrate that myth remains the object 
of scientific, as well as mythical thought, and ritual—whether enacted 
as practice or performance—its expression. 
 Since activists are almost never gurus themselves (or vice versa), 
in order to obtain objectified versions of originary knowledge for the 
purposes of scientific analysis, as well as recognizable symbols of that 
knowledge, activists depend upon gurus to maintain their embodied, 
orally transmitted form of practice, which explicitly resists 
entextualization. This is the paradox that keeps contemporary 
Thangmi activists interested in the welfare of gurus, and which 
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provides gurus with the conditions in which to continue their practice 
(often with financial support from activist sources) in a vibrant manner 
even in the face of social transformations which might otherwise 
undercut interest in their power.13 Just as sakali and nakali forms of 
action are mutually constitutive, gurus and activists have come to rely 
on components of each other’s strategies for gaining recognition. 
Despite their semi-private critiques of each other’s agendas and 
techniques, activists often attend rituals and guru sometimes 
participate in political meetings—the respective public forums in which 
each group demonstrates their power.14 Again, the sacred object of 
identity remains shared for the two groups. They differ not over what it 
is, but rather how to access and deploy its power to obtain the most 
effective form of recognition. 
 It is in this attempt to access originary power that activist 
strategies of objectification enacted within the frame of political 
performance (meetings, cultural shows, publications)—often in a 
specialized linguistic register not easily understood by laypeople—
                                       
13 There has been much discussion of the relationship between shamanism and 
literate traditions in the Himalayas and beyond (Berreman 1964; Holmberg 1989; 
Mumford 1989; Samuel 1993; Ortner 1995). Here I take a slightly different approach 
by suggesting that the forces competing for power are shamans and activists within a 
single ritual system, rather than shamans and the representatives of a literate 
tradition such as Hinduism or Buddhism. Yet the modes of power that they each 
group is associated with—oral versus literate—remain the same. The question, 
however, is not whether shamans will disappear or be subsumed by an encroaching 
literate tradition, but rather whether activists will be able to succeed in appropriating 
the shamanic. 
14 The description of Bhume Jatra in Chapter 6 illustrates how both types of power 
may be expressed publicly in a simultaneous fashion, while the description of the 
Second National Thami Convention in Chapter 5 is an example of a situation where 
they were in direct competition. 
 
 
 136 
become ritualized activities. Just as gurus’ strategies of objectification 
are enacted within the frame of practice (life cycle rituals, calendrical 
festivals, deity propitiations) in ritual language, such political 
performances assert power by articulating relationships with the sacred 
originary in ritual forms visible within the social world. In this regard, 
activist publications that “entextualize” oral traditions are indeed 
methods of “scripturalization” in the sense that the resulting texts are 
intended for use in ritual contexts.15 However, the ritual contexts in 
which those activists involved in the process of scripturalization 
imagine their written products will be used are not those orchestrated 
by gurus a for a divine audience (and in fact can not be, since most 
gurus reject scripturalized forms of their knowledge as non-
efficacious), but rather those orchestrated by activist-authors for a 
political audience. 
 
Myth:Science::Rites:Politics 
Here I wish to wade for a moment into sacred anthropological waters 
by reflecting upon two enduring questions within the discipline from 
the particular vantage point of the Thangmi ethnography offered here. 
First, what is the purpose of myth? Second, what is the relationship 
between myth and ritual? 
                                       
15 Bauman and Briggs provide a useful review of the literature on the relationship 
between text and context (1990). 
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 Malinowski and Lévi-Strauss are usually depicted as occupying 
opposite ends of the continuum between functionalist and structuralist 
approaches to myth. I suggest, however, that Thangmi attitudes 
towards myth may present an ethnographic path towards a less 
oppositional imagining of the relationship between these two 
theoretical paradigms. Malinowksi asserted that among the 
Trobrianders with whom he worked, “Myth is not only looked upon as a 
commentary of additional information, but it is a warrant, a charter, and 
often even a practical guide to the activities with which it is connected” 
(1974 [1948]: 107-108]). From this perspective, myth is essentially a 
repository of functional knowledge, which can at any time be activated 
as the basis for behavior within the social world. For Lévi-Strauss, by 
contrast, myths: 
do not seek to depict what is real, but to justify the 
shortcomings of reality, since the extreme positions are only 
imagined in order to show that they are untenable. This step, 
which is fitting for mythical thought, implies an admission (but 
in the veiled language of the myth) that the social facts when 
thus examined are marred by an unsurmountable contradiction... 
This conception of the relation of the myth to reality no doubt 
limits the use of the former as a documentary source. But it 
opens the way for other possibilities; for, in abandoning the 
search for a constantly accurate picture of ethnographic reality in 
the myth, we gain, on occasions, a means of reaching 
unconscious categories. (1987 [1973]: 173). 
From the point of view of many Thangmi activists, myth is interesting 
primarily, “as a documentary source” that can be used to shore up the 
“ethnographic reality” of their own cultural claims, while from the point 
of view of most Thangmi gurus, myth is first and foremost “a means of 
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reaching unconscious categories”. Each group is aware of the others’ 
perspective, however: activists cannot deny the gurus’ capacity to 
generate symbolic power through the manipulation of                     
apparently unconscious, non-rational, categories; and gurus also 
highlight the resonance between myth with reality in certain cases, 
particularly when such links appear to shore up projects of recognition 
in which gurus also have a stake. Since both of these propensities 
towards myth are embedded within the worldviews of the community 
whom I seek to depict ethnographically, my anthropological analysis 
demands a theory of myth which allows both perspectives to stand as 
parts of a complex conceptual totality. 
 Outlining such a theory requires further discussion of the 
relationship between “text” and “context” that first emerged in 
anthropological debates over myth, and continues in discussions of 
ritual and performance today  (Bauman and Briggs 1990). In 
Malinowski’s view, “the text, of course, is extremely important, but 
without the context it remains lifeless” (1974 [1948]: 104). Edmund 
Leach critiques this functionalist emphasis on context in the introduction 
to a volume that explores the utility of Lévi-Straussian structuralism: 
 
Functionalism in anthropology, especially in the form espoused 
by Malinowski, proved a constrictive doctrine, for if everything 
must be seen in context how can one generalize at all? Lévi-
Strauss' ‘structuralism’ is the dialectical reaction to 
‘functionalism’ in this narrow sense. (1967: xvi). 
However, Leach goes on to state that, “So far as myth analysis is 
concerned, he [Lévi-Strauss] largely accepts Malinowski's view that, in 
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any particular cultural context, ‘myth is a charter for social action’” 
(1967: xvii). By the same token, a close reading of Malinowski shows 
that his view of myth as charter does not necessarily preclude what we 
might call a structuralist definition of myth as the unconcscious domain 
of the socially untenable. Malinowski writes, “Myths serve to cover 
certain inconsistencies created by historical events, rather than to 
record these events exactly” (1974[1948]: 125). One of the key 
differences between the two thinkers, then, seems to lie not in their 
choices to emphasize text rather than context, or vice versa, but rather 
in their definition of “context” itself. 
 For Malinowski, context is everything: 
The intellectual nature of a story is exhausted with its text, but 
the functional, cultural, and pragmatic aspect of any native tale 
is manifested as much in its enactment, embodiment, and 
contextual relations as in the text. It is easier to write down the 
story than to observe the diffuse, complex ways in which it 
enters into life ...” (1974[1948]: 111) 
He suggests that simply writing down the story—rendering it textual16—
is a methodologically inadequate manner of analyzing myth, which 
should instead be observed in the context of its ritual enactment. 
However, the one-to-one correlation that Malinowski makes between 
“text” and “context” suggests that the latter is an unchanging domain, a 
                                       
16 Tania Li (following Nikolas Rose) proposes the eerily similar term “rendering 
technical” to describe what the World Bank and other development agencies do with 
empirical ethnographic material: “Rendering technical means to represent the arena 
of intervention ‘as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular 
characteristics . . . whose component parts are linked together in some more or less 
systematic manner by forces, attractions and coexistences’ (Rose 1999:33)” (Li 2005: 
389). We might see this as a process parallel to that of “rendering textual” oral 
traditions, both of which seek to transform unruly, often apparently illogical empirical 
realities into domains comprehensible through orderly, logical scientific thinking. 
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synchronic set of rules which the patient ethnographer must learn in 
order to interpret the former. This formulation does not leave space for 
context itself—the particular mechanisms through which text is enacted 
and embodied—to change, either over time or among different 
members of a community. It is this rigidity that leads Leach to suggest 
that Malinowski’s prerogative to “see everything in context” makes it 
impossible to generalize at all, and to laud structuralism as the antidote 
to this form of narrow functionalism. 
 Indeed, Levi-Strauss’ much critiqued lack of attention to the 
enacted context of myth can in fact be read as liberating the concept of 
“context” from the ahistorical chains with which funtionalism secured 
it. In other words, by focusing solely on the semiotic properties of 
myth, rather than trying to locate its social referents in any particular 
spatio-temporal context, Lévi-Strauss in fact allows, rather than 
circumscribes, the potential for such contexts to vary. As Mary Douglas 
puts it, “From the point of view of anthropology, one of Lévi-Strauss’ 
novel departures is to treat all versions of a myth as equally authentic 
or relevant” (1967: 51). Indeed, Lévi-Strauss suggests that myths 
function at multiple symbolic levels at once, through geographic, 
techno-economic, sociological, and cosmological schemas (1987 
[1973: 158]. These can be variously reinterpreted within a range of 
enacted contexts—some schemas emphasized, others downplayed, at 
particular historical conjunctures—but the myth endures as a total 
symbolic system despite such contingent shifts in context. It is in this 
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manner that Thangmi myths can serve as shared objects of identity for 
both gurus and activists, despite the different contexts—ritual practice 
and political performance—in which each group primarily enacts and 
interprets them. 
 From an anthropological perspective, all such contexts are equally 
worthy of analytical attention—but this is not equally true from all 
Thangmi perspectives. Like Malinowski, Thangmi gurus do not believe 
that text and context can be separated; in their view, ritual enactment is 
the only legitimate manner of expressing the symbolic system of myth. 
Activists, to the contrary, believe that liberating the text from its 
outmoded ritual context is the only way to “preserve” the value of the 
symbolic system itself. Here the tables are turned, and the gurus whom 
I introduced as preoccupied with structural aspects of myth are shown 
to take a functionalist approach when it comes to the relationship 
between text and context, whereas the activists whom I introduced as 
primarily interested in the functional aspects of myth are revealed as 
closet structuralists seeking to decouple the structure of myth from its 
practice context. 
 This apparent contradiction only indicates further the importance 
of an approach which recognizes both aspects of myth as part of the 
whole—just as gurus, activists, and the full range of Thangmi individuals 
in multiple locations are recognized as equally important actors in the 
production of Thangmi identity. Myth remains a powerful resource for 
forwarding a range of Thangm agendas, amidst shifts in context which 
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rearticulate relationships between individual actors, sacred origins, and 
modes of expressing the links between them. The actions through which 
gurus articulate their relationship with myth may be most easily 
comprehensible under the rubric of “ritual”, while those which activists 
employ may be termed “politics”, but I suggest that the epistemological 
boundary between these two categories is fuzzy at best because both 
domains share the ontological referent of the sacred originary. 
Understanding this shared obsession demands an anthropological 
approach which recognizes both mythical thinking and scientific 
thinking, ritual and politics, as mutually dependent component parts of 
a totality that encompasses multiple contexts. 
 Indeed, the majority of Thangmi are neither gurus or activists, 
but most are aware of the different forms of power that each 
represents, as well as the relationships between them. Thangmi 
individuals often express the differences between themselves and 
people they perceive to be more closely associated with the other form 
of power in terms of education—whether one is padhai-lekhai (N)—
literally “capable of reading and writing” or not. Gurus and their 
practice are generally associated with the non-literate, while activists 
and their writing are associated with the literate.17 These paradigms 
and their limitations are discussed further below. 
                                       
17 This is not to suggest that all gurus themselves are illiterate, or that all activists are 
literate. Literacy divides more along generational lines, and to the extent that the 
majority of guru belong to senior generations, many of them are only minimally 
literate. However, this is changing as younger guru who have been to school begin to 
climb up the ritual hierarchy. On the activist side, most of those in leadership 
positions are literate, but again, not all—Shova, for instance, a prominent woman 
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 For now, let us turn to the figure of the guru as an embodiment 
of sacred power, and to the content of Thangmi origin myths. In the 
ensuing discussion, I focus on how origin myths and gurus’ 
interpretations of them establish Thangmi identity as sacred within an 
indigenous classificatory system that valorizes themes of synthesis, 
producing a sense of “originality” that is at once a source of pride due 
to its distinctiveness, and an embarrassment due to its perceived 
divergence from the criteria for recognition within dominant national 
discourses. 
 
A Tale of Two Gurus 
The central figure of Thangmi ritual practice is undoubtedly the guru.18 
Often referred to as guru apa, meaning “guru father”, Thangmi gurus 
indeed play a paternal role within their spheres of influence. Many lay 
Thangmi look to their local guru for guidance when faced with practical 
decisions of cultural importance: whom to marry, how to conduct a 
funeral, or when to make offerings to secure a deity’s good graces.19  
                                                                                                              
leader in the BTWA, is not literate, and many of the older NTS leaders were self-
taught with only basic literacy skills. The issue is therefore not so much whether one 
has literary competence, but whether one views oral or textual modes of knowledge 
reproduction as the most powerful. 
18 Clearly borrowed from Nepali, or perhaps even directly from Sanskrit, the term 
guru has been indigenized to mean shaman, or ritual practitioner, in the Thangmi 
language. 
19 Peet represented Thangmi gurus as explicitly non-political community leaders: “it 
is the jhankris who were and still are important Thami leaders in many non-political 
activities, but especially religious, ritual and social events” (1978: 254). I would beg 
to differ with his definition of “politics”, and suggest that gurus can indeed be highly 
political figures. 
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In theory, the guru who officiate at Thangmi rituals should not 
also act as healers, setting them apart from the popular pan-Nepali 
image of the jhankri  (N), or “faith healer”.20 There are indeed Thangmi 
jhankri who conduct curative rituals, but they are perceived to be in a 
separate category of lower status than the guru who preside over 
marriage and funerary rites.21 In reality, however, these two roles of 
priest and healer are often conflated in one individual, and apparently 
for this reason the roles are differentiated by unique terms of address 
in each context. The title for a guru while conducting mumpra (T), or 
funerary rituals, is lama bonpo (T), a term used exclusively at this 
time.22 Similarly, the title khami (T) is reserved to describe the guru 
during bore (T), or marriage rituals.23 These terms of address highlight 
the priest-like function and status of the guru while presiding over the 
life cycle rituals that are central to producing ethnic identity at the level 
of the group, as distinct from their role as healers conducting curative 
rituals for individuals. Activist publications make much of these unique 
                                       
20 See Hitchcock and Jones (1976) and Miller (1997 [1979]) among many other 
monographs and articles on the broader theme of Himalayan shamanism. 
21 Such a division of labor has been documented for many other Himalayan ethnic 
groups, e.g. the Dumi (van Driem 1993: 22-47) and Mewahang Rai (Gaenszle 2002: 
57-66). Peet also observed it within the Thangmi community: “among jhankris there 
seem to be two different types, the more respected being also the more 
knowledgeable, the others acting mainly as shaman-mediums in diagnosing and 
curing disease” (1978: 271). 
22 In the Tamang tradition, the terms lama and bonpo refer to two distinct categories 
of ritual practitioners. Lama are Buddhist, and largely responsible for death rituals, 
while bonpo are shamanic practitioners who focus primarily on healing and 
propitiating the spirit world (Holmberg 1989). In Thangmi practice, lama bonpo is a 
compound term that refers exclusively to the practitioner of a death ritual while he is 
performing it. 
23 To Nepali speakers, the aspirated khami is entirely distinct from the unaspirated 
kami (the dalit blacksmith caste), but many Thangmi suggest that this is another 
cause for misrecognition of Thangmi as a low-caste group. 
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titles: for instance, Megh Raj describes the khami as one of many, 
“people who organize things at different levels of society”, the 
existence of which are evidence of Thangmi “completeness” as an 
ethnic group (Niko 2003: 45). Many activists take the term lama bonpo 
as evidence of the fact that Thangmi were historically adherents of the 
Bon religion prevalent through much of Tibet and the Himalayas before 
the advent of Buddhism, and use the terms bonpo or bombo to 
connote what they call “ethnic religion” (Niko 2003: 40) or “natural 
religion” (Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 41).24 Both gurus and activists talk 
about their exclusive reliance on guru as a marker of identity that sets 
them apart from other janajati groups in Nepal, such as the Gurung 
and Tamang, whom in addition to their own shamans, employ ritual 
specialists from a literate tradition (either Buddhist lama and/or Hindu 
                                       
24 As of yet, I have been unable to trace in detail the how Thangmi became 
acquainted with this term and decided that it appropriately described their religious 
practice. In the Tibetan context, the term bonpo or bon refers to a specific lineage 
tradition which the Dalai Lama recently recognized as a fifth sect of Buddhism. 
Several villages in Nepal’s Mustang and Dolpo districts identify as bonpo in this 
sense, as does a sub-group of the Tibetan exile community, and several communities 
in eastern Tibetan areas that are now part of China’s Sichuan and Gansu provinces. 
The definition of “Bon” remains a matter of active scholarly debate among 
Buddhologists and Tibetologists. Geoffrey Samuel gives a useful summary: “Bon 
remained a kind of amalgam of early Tibetan religion, contemporary Tibetan folk 
religion, black magic and sorcery, a generic label for all the aspects of Tibetan 
religion which did not fit neatly into Western stereotypes of proper Buddhism. The 
real problem with this approach is that it collapses a very complex historical process, 
in which Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan Bon religion developed side by side, into 
an unhistorical model in which pure Buddhism comes from India and degenerates 
under the influence of the native Bon religion” (1993: 323). He concludes, however, 
that, “the modern Bonpo are to all intents and purposes the followers of a Buddhist 
religious tradition, with certain differences of vocabulary from the other four major 
traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, but no major difference in content” (Samuel 1993: 
326). This definition is substantially different from the one that Thangmi activists 
attach to the term bonpo, and more research on the relationships between these 
different usages is necessary.  
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pandit) to create a multi-leveled ritual system.25 In a rather lyrical 
fashion, Khumbalal (a senior NTS activist described in further detail in 
Chapter 5) demonstrates well how the figure of the guru can be used 
as a symbol of Thangmi originality: 
When a child starts hearing and seeing, he first hears the sound 
of the shamanic drum. He sees the guru apa reciting his mantra. 
From that time onwards, he sees nothing except the drum of the 
guru apa; he sees neither the Brahmin priest playing a conch 
shell and a bell, nor the monk with dark red clothes and a 
pointed cap awho chants, om mani pame hum, nor the priest 
with a cross around his neck, a white shirt and a bible in his 
hand, nor the Muslim with white clothes and a white cap with 
two hands on his ears saying allah ho akbar. He [the Thangmi 
child] sees and hears only the sound of the big drum and the 
natural world, like the moon, sun, land, gods, goddesses, rivers 
and streams, hills and mountaintops. He sees only the guru apa 
conducting rituals for the protection and well-being of all the 
people. (Samudaya 2061 [2056] VS: 39) 
Although this passage overstates the boundedness of Thangmi 
communities—most children will in fact have seen other religious 
practitioners, even if their families do not employ them—its evocation 
of the guru apa as the central figure in Thangmi ritual life is realistic. 
Gurus were therefore key figures in my research, and I developed 
particularly close relationships with two such ritual specialists. Setting 
out as I did to document the components of Thangmi cultural presence 
(see Chapter 1), it is hardly surprising that I began my research by 
focusing on guru and their practice. Only later did I come to know and 
understand the complementary importance of activists as well. In 
                                       
25 See Mumford (1989) on the interface between Gurung Buddhism and shamanism, 
and Holmberg (1989) for a relevant discussion of Tamang religious roles. 
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Nepal, I worked intensively with Rana Bahadur (who was introduced in 
Chapter 1) in the village of Damarang in Suspa-Kshamawati Village 
Development Committee (VDC), Dolakha district. In India, I spent many 
fruitful weeks talking with Man Bahadur, popularly known as Latte Apa, 
in and around his home in the Tungsung area of Darjeeling 
municipality in West Bengal. 
Rana Bahadur was in his late seventies when I first met him in 
1998, and although still respected as the most knowledgeable guru in 
the area, he had largely withdrawn from public ritual and was focused 
on placating his personal deities and preparing himself for death (See 
Figure 3.1).26 I was lucky to spend several months recording his 
renditions of many mythical and ritual schemas, including those 
detailing Thangmi origins and the funerary cycle (see Chapter 7), 
before he passed away in 2003. Latte Apa, who was in his early sixties 
when we first met in 2000, received his nickname from his long latte 
(N), or matted lock of hair, which he claimed held his power (See Figure 
3.2). When not contained by a brightly-colored knit hat, which the guru 
changed daily in an apparent fashion statement, the long lock tumbled 
down from the crown of his head to brush the floor. An impressive 
character fully in command of both practice and performance, Latte 
Apa was the public face of Thangmi life in Darjeeling, both as the chief 
guru conducting marriages, funerals, and other key rituals, and as the 
                                       
26 Rana Bahadur’s nickname was Pilandare, the name by which many older residents 
of Suspa knew him, but for reasons that I do not fully understand he requested that I 
use his legal name when writing about him instead. This was the opposite of Latte 
Apa’s request that I refer to him by his nickname, rather than his legal name. 
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figurehead at the front of many BTWA delegations to cultural programs 
and political events. 
These two senior gurus in many ways led parallel lives, with one 
crucial difference: although both were born in villages in Nepal’s 
Dolakha district and migrated to India in their youth, Rana Bahadur 
eventually returned to his natal village of Damarang, while Latte Apa 
chose to settle in Darjeeling. A brief summary of their life stories 
shows how migration from Nepal to India, and, at least in Rana 
Bahadur’s case, back again, was central to shaping both of their 
worldviews, as well as their individual interpretations of Thangmi 
origins and the power they held. By introducing them together in this 
way, I want to emphasize that national borders do not in themselves 
produce definitively different forms of practice or performance; we 
cannot compare these gurus’ practices play-by-play, ritual move by 
ritual move. Rather, the key ritual practitioners in both countries have 
been influenced by similar personal and historical events that have 
taken them across multiple borders, multiple times, to create 
repertoires of action framed both by political conditions and personal 
circumstances. This is equally the case for many lay Thangmi, but guru 
like Rana Bahadur and Latte Apa have a particularly important role to 
play in the process of circulating ideas about Thangmi identity back 
and forth across borders, since the way in which they enact specific 
practices, as well as their general ethnic ethos, provides a model—and 
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sometimes a foil—for both lay and activist Thangmi living in their 
spheres of influence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Rana Bahadur, Balasode, Suspa, Dolakha District, Nepal, 
January 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Latte Apa reciting his paloke, Jawahar Basti, Darjeeling 
District, West Bengal, India, November 2004 
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Rana Bahadur27 
Rana Bahadur was born around 1920 in the village of Suspa, near 
Dolakha bazaar.28 When he was 12, his mother died in childbirth with a 
younger sibling. His father, Bagdole, was a mizar (N), a local tax 
collector who answered to representatives of the central state in 
Kathmandu. Bagdole’s status meant that the family was relatively well 
off, but that didn’t stop them from migrating to India during the last 
decade of British rule, when Rana Bahadur was about 20 years old. He 
and his father traveled together, picking up menial labor on tea 
plantations in a variety of places, most importantly near Siliguri (in the 
Darjeeling district of contemporary West Bengal state) and Jalpaiguri. 
After they had been in India for about five years, Bagdole died 
unexpectedly after a brief and sudden illness. At the age of 25, Rana 
Bahadur was left alone with the task of conducting his father’s funerary 
rites. As he explained, 
This was very difficult. We were so far from home. There were 
almost no other Thangmi. I looked everywhere to find a guru 
who could do the funerary rites in the correct manner. No one 
knew what I was talking about. I had heard that there was a 
Thangmi guru from Surkhe [a village in Dolakha] living on 
another tea plantation nearby. I went to find him, crying all the 
way. He agreed to come. 
                                       
27 The information in this section is drawn from multiple interviews conducted with 
Rana Bahadur between October 1999 and January 2002. It is supplemented by data 
from interviews with his wife Maili and sons Mangal Bahadur and Sundar Kumar 
conducted between October 1999 and April 2007. All interviews were conducted in 
Damarang, Suspa VDC, Dolakha District, Nepal. 
28 Most older Thangmi do not know their specific birthdates. In rural Nepal, written 
records were not routine until the 1960s at the earliest, and individuals from Rana 
Bahadur’s generation usually know only their approximate age. 
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Over the course of the funerary ritual cycle, which is spread out 
over several weeks, Rana Bahadur was struck by the difficulty of 
conducting the ritual appropriately away from home, and he resolved 
to learn more about Thangmi cultural practice.29 At this point, Rana 
Bahadur had not yet been summoned by the deities who later tutored 
him in shamanic practice; but his interest in learning about the forms 
of Thangmi ritual practice was piqued by the emotionally and 
practically challenging experience of having to conduct his father’s last 
rites far away from home. 
Rana Bahadur considered returning home after his father’s 
death, but he had already begun a relationship with the woman who 
later became his wife and the mother of his six children.30 Maili was a 
Thangmi woman from Nepal’s Sindhupalchok district who had 
migrated to India as a child with her parents. In Nepal, marriages and 
other social alliances between Dolakha and Sindhupalchok Thangmi are 
rare. But in India, finding a Thangmi wife at all, regardless of where she 
was from, was a windfall. Rana Bahadur first lived with Maili’s older 
sister, but when she left him for someone else, he set his sights on the 
17-year old Maili. He was ten years her senior and ready to settle 
                                       
29 The first Thangmi association, the Bhai Larke Thami Samaj (BLTS), was founded in 
1943 in Darjeeling for the express purpose of helping migrant Thangmi conduct 
funerary rites (see Chapter 5 for additional details.) 
30 The distinction between “wife” and “mother of children” is important, since it 
implies the fluidity of Thangmi sexual and marriage norms, which will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 7. Rana Bahadur always spoke proudly of the fact that he had had 
seven other “wives” before settling down with Maili, with whom his marriage was only 
ritually formalized long after the birth of their first child. 
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down, and he made the decision to remain in India in order to court 
Maili and secure her family’s approval. 
In 1947, Rana Bahadur and Maili established their own 
household within the workers’ quarters on the tea plantation, and soon 
had a first daughter. Two sons and two more daughters quickly 
followed, and Rana Bahadur began to think about purchasing his own 
land and building a house back in Nepal. The 1950 political shifts in 
Nepal also affected his thinking; the feudal Rana regime had been 
ousted and King Tribhuvan was promising a more democratic future.31 
With rumors of major land reform in the air, it seemed like an ideal 
time to invest savings earned in India back in his home village in Nepal. 
Still in India, at the age of 32, Rana Bahadur began having visions and 
dreams in which territorial deities from his natal village entreated him 
to return and become a guru. They directed him towards a forested 
area called Balasode, southeast of his natal village of Suspa, which was 
an important location in the Thangmi origin tale, where the Thangmi 
foremother Sunari Ama lost a bracelet on the journey to Rangathali 
where she and her husband Ya’apa finally settled (see Chapter 6 for 
this portion of the story). When Rana Bahadur and his family arrived in 
Dolakha, he learned that a large swathe of jungle was indeed available 
for sale around Balasode, and he snapped it up. He and his wife 
erected a temporary shelter, and then spent the next year clearing 
                                       
31 These events are well documented in Hoftun, Raeper and Whelpton (1999) and 
Whelpton (2005). 
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trees, turning the jungle into farmland, and building a house. His 
youngest son was born soon thereafter—the only one of his six 
children to be born in Nepal. 
Grateful to the deities for guiding him back to Nepal at this 
fortuitous time, and now finally back in a place where he could pursue 
his desire to engage more seriously in Thangmi ritual practice, Rana 
Bahadur apprenticed himself to a senior guru apa. He continued to be 
possessed by deities, and claims to have learned most of what he 
knows about Thangmi ritual, myth and origins in these unsolicited 
encounters. His “formal” shamanic training taught him to control these 
sessions, in order to enter and exit trance willingly, but the content of 
his knowledge was transmitted to him orally by divine beings rather 
than by a human teacher. This direct connection with the deities was 
one element of what made him a powerful guru and garnered the 
respect of many Damarang locals, who had at first been somewhat 
suspicious of this returnee from India. He soon became well-known for 
his ability to propitiate and placate even the most ornery local deities 
with an impressively detailed style of oral recitation. Once distraught 
over his inability to conduct his own father’s mumpra in India, now 
back in Nepal he became Suspa’s most sought after mumpra 
practitioner. 
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Latte Apa32 
Like Rana Bahadur, Latte Apa had an eclectic style as a guru, and in 
fact it seems that both men were popularly perceived as powerful 
gurus due to their charismatic personalities, rather than their 
impeccable knowledge or meticulous technique. Thangmi activists in 
Darjeeling who sought to standardize Thangmi ritual practice through 
scripturalization saw Latte Apa as both a powerful adversary—due to 
his strong advocacy of orality as a defining component of Thangmi 
identity—and as a powerful asset, due to his strikingly original 
presence. With his sonorous voice, unusually tall stature, purposeful 
stride, and powerful lock of hair, Latte Apa counted much of the 
Darjeeling lay Thangmi community as members of his unabashed cult 
of personality. Others, however, found his stranglehold on ritual 
authority distressing—particularly the fact that he emphasized the 
power of ritual language which few others could understand—and 
sought to circumvent that power. 
Born in 1937 in the Thangmi village of Alampu in the most 
remote northern reaches of Nepal’s Dolakha district, Latte Apa was the 
son of the renowned Kote Guru. Throughout his childhood, he followed 
his father from ritual to ritual, where his responsibilities as ritual 
assistant included keeping incense lit, collecting the various types of 
leaves on which offerings were made, and making a range of ritually 
                                       
32 Interviews with Latte Apa were conducted on multiple field trips to Darjeeling 
between March 2000 and October 2006. 
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required breads and effigies out of rice and wheat flour. When he was 
eight, his mother died, and his father remarried. He dates the onset of 
his shamanic visions to this event, and relates the culmination of his 
divine initiation to his father’s death a few years later: 
I was very upset by my mother’s death, and started shaking 
uncontrollably. This was at the time of the new moon, so it was 
very dark. But two fireflies shined in my eyes, and I walked 
everywhere like a ‘zombie’, even up on high ridges. I went 
completely crazy for about six months. I crossed the Tamakosi 
river in monsoon season, even though everyone said I would 
drown. But nothing happened—it was like I was sleep-walking. 
During this time, I started having visions and learning things 
from the ancestors, just like that. My father died some time after 
all this began. On the night of my father’s death, I sat with the 
senior gurus all night. I heard a sound like glass breaking, and 
then everything became clear. From that evening onwards, I 
received ‘training’ every night in my dreams. The deities taught 
me the ritual chants ‘line by line’. I learned most of what I know 
now in the first six months of ‘training’, but continued learning 
every night for three years. 
 As in Rana Bahadur’s experience, Latte Apa’s shamanic 
beginnings were linked to his father’s end. For the former, his father’s 
death was a catalyst that compelled him to consider seriously the 
importance of ritual practice for the first time, while for the latter, it 
precipitated his direct initiation into a lineage of ritual practitioners 
following in his father’s footsteps. 
Also like Rana Bahadur, Latte Apa first traveled to India at the 
age of 20, having already crossed the mountainous Nepal-Tibet 
border—located no more than 10 miles from his village as the crow 
flies—regularly as a teenager to trade grain for salt. As the oldest son 
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of two deceased parents, Latte Apa found himself in a situation all too 
common in Thangmi villages: 
I went to India because I had three generations of debt on my 
shoulders, and there was no way I could pay. I already had to pay 
high taxes [in kind] on the land I worked, as well as paying for 
crop seeds out of my own pocket. The situation was unbearable, 
so I left. 
Latte Apa made the journey from Alampu to Darjeeling in 1957 
in the company of five friends, and upon arrival enlisted in the Indian 
Army as a member of their “support staff” (see Chapter 4). After 
finding himself in several life-threatening circumstances during the 
1962 Sino-Indian conflict, during which he was posted along the 
border in Arunachal Pradesh, he decided to leave the army. He 
returned to Darjeeling, where he began working as a porter, but his 
reputation as an accomplished guru spread quickly enough among 
Darjeeling’s migrant Thangmi community that he could soon make his 
living exclusively from the donations he received in cash and kind in 
exchange for his ritual services. 
Although only 20 when he first went to India, Latte Apa already 
had a wife and two small sons in Alampu. For him, the choice of 
whether to stay in Darjeeling or return to his young family in Nepal was 
a difficult one. There were only a small number of knowledgeable 
Thangmi gurus in Darjeeling at that time, and it was clear to Latte Apa 
that he could establish himself successfully and rise to prominence in a 
way that would be nearly impossible back in the Thangmi cultural 
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stronghold of Alampu, where there were almost too many gurus 
already. But his family was waiting for him, and he could have the best 
of both worlds by joining several of his village friends in the annual 
circular migrations: spending half the year working in Darjeeling, then 
returning to his family in Nepal with cash in hand to pay off debt and 
make the necessary household purchases. After leaving the army and 
spending several months in Darjeeling, he decided to return to Nepal 
once to see how the situation stood. He arrived to find that his wife 
had taken their children and moved in with another man in his 
absence, and that a neighbor had encroached on his land. There was 
no longer any doubt in his mind that Darjeeling held a rosier future, 
and after staying in Alampu for two days, he headed east again. 
That was over 40 years ago, and to date Latte Apa has never 
returned to Nepal. However, his reputation is well-known throughout 
the transnational Thangmi community, and during my fieldwork, he 
often received visits from aspiring Thangmi gurus who had come from 
Nepal to seek guidance. It was a source of great pride to Latte Apa that 
despite the abundance of Thangmi guru in Nepal, young gurus traveled 
all the way to Darjeeling to consult him. Latte Apa counted every such 
visit as a chance to promote his own style of practice, emphasizing to 
his disciples that the power of Thangmi identity is maintained through 
the orally transmitted knowledge of its origin. Latte Apa never missed 
an opportunity to influence young gurus who might add some of Latte 
Apa’s stylistic flourishes to their ritual repertoire. In this way, Latte Apa 
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became a transnational icon of sorts to both gurus and activists, 
embodying much of Thangmi history and culture through his own life 
experience and mastery of the ritual world. Whatever the deities might 
have preferred, his own ego did not resist such objectification, and the 
walls of his small clapboard house were a montage of publications, 
VCD and CD covers, certificates, and photos which demonstrated 
beyond argument his standing as the icon of Thangmi originary power. 
In this way, it was perhaps in the person of Latte Apa that the 
strategies of divine and political recognition most visibly converged. 
 These brief portraits of Rana Bahadur and Latte Apa show how 
both gurus’ lives—like those of most lay Thangmi—have been 
influenced by the experiences of migration and extended residence in 
both Nepal and India, as well as short-term visits to what is now 
China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region. As these gurus move, they take 
their existing knowledge with them, share it with others, and add new 
elements to their repertoires. In this sense, the practices that I describe 
below as constitutive of Thangmi culture are not static structures 
orchestrated in exactly the same way by each guru in each location, 
but rather dynamic processes that are continually transformed by 
individual innovation, as well as through interaction with broader 
cultural, political, and scholarly discourses and practices wherever 
Thangmi live. 
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Guru Paloke: Origin Myths and Ethnic Classification 
The Thangmi origin myth is chanted at the beginning of almost every 
Thangmi cultural occasion. Although each guru recounts it in a 
distinctive style, the basic mythic schemas remain consistent. It is the 
shared recognition of these narrative elements, and their relationship 
to sacred origins, that defines belonging in the Thangmi universe at 
the most fundamental level. The narrative of the world’s creation, and 
the ensuing genesis of the Thangmi as a people emphasizes several 
themes integral to Thangmi identity: their peripheral position vis-à-vis 
other ethnic groups; the synthetic nature of their ethnic subjectivity; 
and their simultaneous attachment to specific territories and 
movement across them. Most Thangmi laypeople—regardless of their 
background or place of residence—can narrate at least the basic 
elements of the origin myth, and knowledge of it is an important 
marker of membership in the Thangmi cultural fold. It is in this sense 
that myth acts both as the anchor for Thangmi originality at the 
subjective level in the context of practice, and as a charter in the 
functional sense in the context of performance. 
 Thangmi origin myths are generally recounted by guru as part of 
a broader form of practice known as paloke (T). This term refers to 
both the full range of propitiation chants (often classed into sub-
categories depending upon the type of deities for which they are 
intended, such as suchi paloke and deva paloke) which contain 
components of the origin myth, the ritual contexts within which these 
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recitations occur, and the ritual language in which they are encoded.33 
Over the course of my research, I found it difficult to understand the 
limits of the concept or the full range of its specific instantiations. 
When I asked gurus directly what paloke meant, I got a range of 
answers, such as, “It is everything gurus say”, “It is the melody (N: 
bhakha) with which we call the deities”,34 “It is the story (N: katha) the 
deities give us to tell our children about where we came from”, “It is 
the particular way (N: lawaj) Thangmi speak”. Activists make their own 
attempts at pinpointing the concept as “the oral history of the Thami” 
(Niko 2003: 46); “ritual language of the gurus” (Reng 1999: 16); “the 
history of the Thangmi” (Niko 2003: 42); and “sayings of the Thangmi 
guru, our famous oral texts” (Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 97). I eventually 
gave up seeking a single, concise definition of the term, but paloke 
seems best explained as an oral tradition encoded in a ritual register of 
the Thangmi language that establishes the basis for a shared sense of 
Thangminess by pointing towards sacred origins. 
Given the multiple ways in which elements of the paloke 
manifested in a range of contexts, it is very difficult to present a 
coherent version as recorded in a single practice event. In addition, 
each guru’s paloke is distinctive in style, and, as described above, this 
                                       
33 Paloke may be compared with the Kirant muddum, which Gaenszle describes as “a 
central and highly complex notion whose meanings … may be glossed as ‘oral 
tradition’, ‘ancestral knowledge’, or – more generally – ‘traditional way of life’” 
(Gaenszle 2002: 31). 
34 According to Turner (1997 [1931]: 473), the term bhakha is derived from the 
Sanskrit bhaka, which can mean either the tune of a song, or a vow made in a god’s 
name. It is also etymologically linked to bhasa, which means “language”. 
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style is part of what constitutes each guru’s individual power. I 
recorded several recitations of the paloke in practice, as well as 
eliciting performances and commentary on it from several gurus in as 
many locations over time.35 Rana Bahadur’s paloke provided perhaps 
the most lengthy and detailed version of the origin myth itself, so I 
have chosen to use it as the basis for what is presented here (parts of 
other gurus’ paloke are presented elsewhere in the dissertation). As we 
will see below, elements of this narrative also resonate with a pan-
Himalayan myth told by several other groups, including the Tamang 
(Holmberg 1989) and Mewahang Rai (Gaenszle 2000).36 An abridged 
version of the first half of Rana Bahadur’s account of the creation of 
the world and its inhabitants is as follows. The second half of the story, 
which deals with migration into contemporary Thangmi territory, is 
presented in Chapter 6. 
 
In the beginning, there was only water. The gods held a meeting 
to decide how to develop this vast expanse. First they created a 
type of small insect, but these insects couldn’t find a place to 
live since there was only water and no solid land. Consequently, 
the gods created fish which could live in the water. The insects 
took to living on the fins of the fish, which stuck far enough out 
of the water to allow the insects to breathe. The insects collected 
river grass and mixed it with mud in order to build dwellings on 
                                       
35 Over the course of my research, I recorded full ritual recitations of the origin myth 
from six gurus in different locations, as well as multiple shorter narrative versions 
offered by gurus, activists, and laypeople. Each of the major Thangmi publications 
also contains its own version, some details of which are presented in this chapter. I 
hope to do a more systematic comparison of several oral renditions alongside 
published versions in the future. 
36 Lévi-Strauss used the term “pan-American myths” to describe those mythic 
schemas shared among multiple neighboring groups (1979:27), and it is in a similar 
sense that I use the term “pan-Himalayan”. 
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the fins of the fish in each of the four directions: south, west, 
north, and east. 
Then a lotus flower arose spontaneously out of the water, 
with the god Vishnu seated in the middle. Out of the four 
directions of the lotus flower came an army of ants. The ants 
killed all of the fish-dwelling insects and destroyed their houses. 
The ants took the mud that the insects had used for their 
dwellings and left, gathering another species of grass as they 
went. They mixed this with the mud to construct new houses. 
Then the snake deities arose. It was still dark, so the sun was 
created. 
Eventually, the gods gathered together and decided to 
create people to populate this vast expanse. Mahadev first tried 
to make a person out of gold, then one out of silver, then one 
out of iron, and finally one out of copper. However, none of 
these metal humans could speak. 
Then Vishnu joined Mahadev in the endeavor, and tried his 
hand at making people. He made 108 piles of wood and burned 
each pile down to ash. Then he mixed each pile of ash together 
with chicken shit, and both gods used this mixture to make a 
new person. Vishnu built the person from the head down to the 
waist, and Mahadev built it from the feet up. 
The two halves were made separately and then joined 
together at the navel. Now the person was ready. The gods called 
out to it, saying, “Hey, human!”. The first people they had 
made—those of metal—couldn’t respond, but this one 
responded. Then the gods commanded the person to go and die, 
so it did. 
A thousand years passed. During this time, the spirit 
roamed the earth. Eventually, it ended up near Mt. Kailash, where 
it entered the womb of a giant sacred cow to be reborn. The cow 
gestated for seven months, during which time she wandered to a 
place called Naroban. After another three months, three divine 
sons were born to the cow: Brahma, Vishnu and Maheshwor.37 
The mother cow then instructed her three sons to eat her 
flesh after she died. She died, and the sons cut her flesh into 
three portions, one for each son. The youngest son, Maheshwor, 
went to wash the intestines in the river. As he was washing the 
entrails, 12 ved (N), or sacred texts, fell out of them. Three of 
the ved were washed away by the river, but Maheshwor managed 
to salvage the other nine. 
                                       
37 Mahadev and Maheshwor are both names for the Hindu deity Shiva. 
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While Maheshwor was away at the river, the two older 
brothers buried their pieces of meat in the ground. They did not 
want to commit the sacrilege of eating their own mother. But 
when Maheshwor returned, they lied to him, saying that they had 
already eaten their portions of meat, and urging him to eat his as 
well. So he ate it. Then the two older brothers revealed their lie 
and accused Maheshwor of eating their sacred mother. 
Maheshwor was so angry that he struck the oldest brother, 
Brahma, with the intestines he was carrying. The intestines 
wound around his neck and back, becoming the sacred thread of 
the Bahun. Brahma stole some of Maheshwor’s ved and went 
south, carrying the stolen goods. He went to a place called Kasi 
[the Indian city of Banaras], and his lineage (N: gotra) became 
Kasi gotra. 
Vishnu ran away to the other side of the ocean and 
became a king. He had no lineage. Carrying the remaining ved, 
Maheshwor went to the north, chanting om mani padme hum. He 
went all the way to Lhasa [the Tibetan capital] and his lineage 
became Lhasa gotra. 
Back in the place where the mother cow’s flesh had been 
hidden, a pond arose. There three groups of people 
spontaneously emerged: the Barosetu, which included the Bahun, 
Chhetri and Lama [ethnically Tibetan peoples, including Sherpa 
and Tamang], who were under the patronage of Brahma; the 
Narosetu, which included the Newar, Magar, and Thangmi, who 
were protected by Maheshwor, and the Karosetu, including the 
Kami, Sarki and Damai, whom Vishnu looked after. 
Then out of the pond arose a god named Bali Raja, who 
was responsible for giving caste/ethnicity [N: jat]and language to 
each of these three groups. He said, “Now I will give you jat,” 
along with which he gave them languages. To the Barosetu, he 
gave the ved, along with om bhasa [N: the language of om], and 
to the Karosetu he gave only an anvil and other tools for working 
with metal. To the Narosetu, from whom the Thangmi are 
descended, Bali Raja gave shamanic implements instead of 
books, language or tools: they received a golden drum, a golden 
ritual dagger, a golden plate, a golden water jug, and a golden 
lamp. These objects arose spontaneously in the hands of the 
Narosetu. 
The Narosetu called on the gods in their three abodes of 
earth, water, and sky, crying, “Give us knowledge! We will always 
worship Narobhumi!” The gods of the four directions gave them 
knowledge and allowed them to stay in each of the four places. 
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The gods also demanded that the Narosetu make offerings to 
them on Buddha Jayanti.38 
Up until this time, none of the people could speak. Bali 
Raja said, “I will divide you into 18 jat, and after I do this, I will 
give you food and language, too”. So they sat in prayer to Bali 
Raja. 
He gave the Barosetu and Karosetu their jat. Then it was 
the Narosetu’s turn. There were three Narosetu brothers. The 
oldest brother then had five sons, who were named and 
associated with different jat as follows: the oldest brother Ya’apa 
became the Thangmi forefather, the next brother Ma’apa became 
the Limbu forefather, then Sa’apa became the Chepang 
forefather, Ka’apa became the Dhami forefather and Kanch’apa 
became the Rai forefather. 
Then Bali Raja gave language to the 18 jat. He first gave 
language to the other 17 groups and by the time he got to the 
Thangmi forefather Ya’apa, there was nothing left. So Ya’apa had 
to pick up the leftover bits and pieces of all of the languages that 
the other groups had already received. 
No one had any suffering or pain then. Everyone was 
happy. Then Bali Raja decided to give seeds to all of the 18 
groups. Each group brought different kinds of containers to 
collect the seeds. The Sherpa came with a leather bag, the Bahun 
came with a cloth bag, and the Thangmi came last with a 
bamboo basket, but there was almost nothing left for them. This 
is how divisions were made between the receiving and non-
receiving jat. The Thangmi fell in the non-receiving category.39 
Eventually, Narosetu came to Thimi.40 There he worshipped 
Bhume. Until then, Bichi Raj (an incarnation of Vishnu) had been 
King of Thimi. There were kings in all of the directions, but Bichi 
Raj was in the middle. One night, Bichi Raj’s queen had a dream. 
She dreamt that Bichi Raj cut down seven banana trees at the 
base. Bichi Raj interpreted her dream to mean that he would win 
over seven kingdoms. So he tied the queen up so she couldn’t 
sleep again and possibly have a conflicting dream. Bichi Raj did 
indeed win seven kingdoms, one of which was Thimi. In the 
process, he fought with Narosetu as well, and Narosetu was 
                                       
38 The festival commemorating Buddha’s birth, and also the date on which Bhume 
Jatra is always held—the most important Thangmi calendrical ritual which honors the 
earth deity, Bhume, and its component animistic deities (see Chapter 6). 
39 Here, the Nepali terms paune and napaune are literally translated as “receiving” and 
“non-receiving”, but in the contemporary context it seems that “included” and 
“excluded” might be a more appropriate gloss. 
40 A Newar town located in the Kathmandu Valley, on the eastern outskirts of the 
contemporary city. 
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killed. Narosetu’s five sons ran away. Ma’apa, Ka’apa and Sa’apa 
fled to the West, while Ya’apa and Kanch’apa fled together to the 
East. 
Although the first sections of the myth necessarily describe the 
beginning of the world and the origins of human beings as a general 
category, the characters quickly become ethnicized. The narrative does 
not take for granted that the Thangmi are at the center of the world; to 
the contrary, it assumes that the Thangmi are peripheral, at the edge 
of every system of ethnic classification with which they are associated. 
Gurus such as Rana Bahadur and Latte Apa are acutely aware that their 
myth is one not of primeval emergence from a blank slate as “the 
people”, but rather a tale of fissure from existing groups, 
reconstituting themselves as a coherent entity, and then defining 
themselves in relation to others. With an origin myth that articulates 
such a relational view of ethnicity (Barth 1969), it is hardly surprising 
that Thangmi are concerned with seeking recognition—whether divine 
or political—of their claims to a very marginal and ill-defined niche. 
The tale is largely preoccupied with asserting a Thangmi view of the 
Himalayan ethnic field, which recognizes the importance of the two 
major cultural blocs that define it—what have often been 
problematically termed the Indic and the Tibetan (the limitations of 
which will be discussed below)—yet stakes out an alternate position 
affiliated with neither.  
Several elements of Rana Bahadur’s narrative and a Tamang myth 
of “caste origins” that Holmberg describes (2005 [1989]: 34-36) are 
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similar: a set of brothers who represent different ethnic groups eat the 
meat of their divine bovine mother; one brother throws the bovine 
entrails at the Bahun brother to create his sacred thread; somehow 
sacred texts emerge from the mother cow’s stomach; and the Bahun 
brother steals his texts from the Kami brother. These aspects of the 
story give voice to a widespread distaste for the behavior of high caste 
Hindus among many of Nepal’s ethnic groups, who feel oppressed by 
the rigid strictures of Hindu caste hierarchy, and maintain their own 
social orders external to it. Holmberg suggests that: 
Although this Tamang mythic account of caste origins plays on 
Hindu constructions of order ... Tamang translate this material 
into a different idiom ... Tamang not only form a religious 
society that is their own but one that is ... governed by a 
symbology that runs counter to rationalized theories of much of 
the Hindu-Buddhist world (Holmberg 2005 [1989]: 37) 
Much the same may be said of the Thangmi myth, which is 
clearly recounted as a demotic parody of trickery and exploitation at 
the hands of Bahuns, which many Thangmi feel they have suffered 
from over time. In fact, the Thangmi slang term for Bahun is dong (T), 
which means “intestines”, a word often invoked to comic effect by 
Thangmi in front of Bahuns who do not understand what is being said. 
Yet there is one crucial difference between the Tamang and 
Thangmi myths: the two narratives classify the ethnic affiliation of the 
brothers and their descendants differently. In the Tamang myth that 
Holmberg recounts, “When the sacred texts are divided, the 
Lama/Tamang receive an equal and separate corpus” [2005 [1989]: 
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37], and the Tamang constitute an entirely distinct group, structurally 
separate from the Bahun or Kami. In the Thangmi narrative, however, 
the Tamang are classed in the same category as the Bahun, Chhetri, 
and other peoples of Tibetan origin, precisely because they all receive 
religious texts, while the Thangmi are in an entirely separate category 
because they receive only shamanic implements, and have no textual 
tradition. 
A three-line mythic joke, often told by both gurus and laypeople 
as a self-deprecating variation on the theme of origins, offers an 
additional commentary on the Thangmi lack of a literary tradition: 
 
The Kami received their ved written on iron tools 
The Bahun and Chhetri had no ved, but stole them from the 
unwitting Kami 
The Thangmi ate their ved, so now we have only oral traditions! 
 
In this saying, which never fails to provoke a laugh when told in 
Thangmi company, the Thangmi do indeed receive ved from the deities 
in addition to their shamanic implements, but because they are too late 
to get food from the gods, they later eat these religious texts to satisfy 
their hunger. Having ingested the ved, the Thangmi internalize all of 
their religious knowledge and are bound to maintaining it through oral 
transmission. 
From the Thangmi perspective, then, the Buddhist Tamang are in 
an entirely different category, closer in affinity to the high-caste Hindu 
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Bahun and Chhetri than to themselves.41 As Latte Apa once described 
the genetic position of the Thangmi in this ethnic family tree, in which 
groups are distinguished by their allegiance to textual versus oral 
authority, “We are the descendants of shamans”.42 This sense of 
belonging to a lineage that derives its authority exclusively from the 
power of orally-transmitted practices, rather than from a textual 
canon, has constituted an essential component of Thangmi identity 
over time. 
The theme of ingesting or otherwise losing one’s texts appears 
to be a common trope in origin myths across the Himalayas, and into 
Burma, Cambodia and Tibet. Citing Michael Oppitz’s comparative study 
of such myths (2006),43 Gaenszle explains that, “there are various 
reasons why the script and the scriptures got lost: in some cases they 
were burnt, in others accidentally eaten, or they were lost in a gamble” 
(forthcoming: 8).44 Gaenszle continues to surmise that, “This myth 
seems to point at a widespread feeling of embarrassment among oral 
cultures about not having a scriptural tradition (forthcoming: 8)”. Some 
                                       
41 Thangmi individuals often invoke this part of the myth as evidence to prove that 
they are ethnically unrelated to the Tamang in the face of common misconceptions 
that the Thangmi are a Tamang sub-group. See discussion in Chapter 1. 
42 Original Nepali: Hami jhankriko santan hau. 
43 I have not been able to access the original Oppitz article. 
44 See also Deliege (1993) on dalit origin tales, and Samten Karmay’s account of a 
similar Tibetan tale regarding the link between religious texts and consumption: “It is 
said that in the tenth century three errant Nepalese wanderers found Bon-po texts in 
bSam-yas by accident, and as they were not interested in them exchanged them for 
food” (1998: 123). There are other apparent resonances between Thangmi ritual 
practice and the so-called Bon tradition, but there is not enough historical evidence 
to draw any conclusions about historical links between them. See note 20 above for 
more details. 
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Thangmi also describe their oral traditions as thutur ved (N), literally 
“oral texts” (Niko 2003: 41), using a term Gaenszle also notes as 
prevalent among the Mewahang Rai. However, in Gaenszle’s 
formulation, “the thutur bed [= ved] of the Rai has only one weakness: 
being an oral tradition, it is more vulnerable than the others, more 
susceptible to loss of memory … the apparent superiority of the Great 
Traditions’ literacy makes these increasingly attractive” (2002: 34).45 
Here, I question the assumption that such myths can indicate only 
embarrassment or weakness. Although this is certainly part of the 
picture, such analyses tend to overlook the ways that agency may arise 
out of ambivalent circumstances (see Chapter 8), in the Thangmi case 
transforming the heightened awareness of exclusion from the so-
called “great traditions” into a positive assertion of identity, the power 
of which is only questioned by those whose claim to it is tenuous. I 
suggest that for the Thangmi, orality has historically been viewed as a 
sign of originality, and therefore a as strength rather than as a 
weakness. While the Thangmi activists who now seek to scripturalize 
oral practices may share the desire for literacy that Gaenszle notes 
among the Mewahang, such activists face the paradox that 
                                       
45 Transnational links between India and Nepal have been important for the Kirant 
communities whom Gaenszle describes, much as they have been for the Thangmi. 
Much of the early ethnic activism and scripturalization upon which contemporary 
Kirant activists in Nepal draw upon actually took place in Darjeeling in the colonial 
era (Gaenszle forthcoming: 10). This raises the question of whether the notions of 
“embarrassment” and “weakness” that he describes in relation to oral traditions 
emerged first in India, as they seem to have for the Thangmi. See Chapter 5. 
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scripturalization undermines the very basis from which their traditions 
derive their power as originally Thangmi. 
The figure of the guru himself therefore remains important, even 
within activist representations that seek to appropriate his power. As 
explained at the beginning of this chapter, the singular reliance on 
guru for all ritual purposes, without deference to additional ritual 
specialists who represent the textual traditions of either Hinduism or 
Buddhism (both of whom would be readily available in most of the 
places that Thangmi live), set the Thangmi apart from other Himalayan 
ethnic groups—such as the Tamang—with whom they otherwise share 
a great deal. Holmberg suggests that, “multiple specialists are an 
integral part of all the religious systems of Tibeto-Burman speaking 
groups in the Himalayas” (2005 [1989]: 4, n. 3), providing a long list of 
ethnographic works that document the role of multiple specialists in 
the religious systems of Magar, Chantel, Gurung, Sunuwar, Sherpa, 
Tamang, Limbu, Rai, Newar, Lepcha, and Tibetan groups. The Thangmi 
are an exception to this rule, and Thangmi evoke this difference in a 
range of contexts to assert their uniqueness. This is not to say that 
Thangmi ritual practice makes no reference to Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions—such references are in fact integral to the synthetic nature 
of Thangmi religion—but that these elements are appropriated by 
Thangmi guru, who act as the agents of synthesis on their own oral 
terms, to create Thangmi dharma (N: religion) as a distinct entity that 
stands apart from either of the two literate traditions which dominate 
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both lay and academic conceptions of religion in the Himalayas. As 
Megh Raj puts it, “According to the paloke, the oral history of the 
Thami, guru apas are authorized religious personalities who can clearly 
differentiate between what is tradition and what was introduced later” 
(Niko 2003: 42). Indeed, as both gurus and activists argue, the 
Thangmi possess their own “total ritual system”, (Holmberg 
2005[1989]: 6)—legitimated by the figure of the guru and his paloke—
which despite lacking multiple ritual specialists, can be compared with 
other such systems in the Himalayas and beyond.46 
 
Oral and Textual Modes of Practice as Classifying Markers 
The segment of the origin myth presented above suggests an 
indigenous classification system in which people are categorized 
according to whether or not they maintain a textual tradition, offering 
an intriguing variation on the commonly used themes for classifying 
Himalayan groups. The narrative also provides some clues as to why 
the Thangmi have had trouble conforming to such classificatory 
                                       
46 Some Thangmi activist factions, particularly in Nepal, have made a move to link 
“Thangmi dharma” to the category of “Kirant dharma”, which appeared as an official 
category in the 2001 Nepal census for the first time. Such activists argue that 
acceding to this category would give them stronger political standing, without 
requiring them to assimilate to one of the “great traditions” of Hinduism or 
Buddhism. Although “Kirant dharma” is still a broader category that is not specifically 
Thangmi, it does denote a primarily oral tradition. In response, some Kirant activists 
attempted to claim the Thangmi as part of their population within the ongoing 
politics of the census (Rai 1997, Rai 2041 VS), a turn of events which fomented a 
guru-led popular resistance within the Thangmi community in opposition to activist 
demands for lay people to identify themselves as practicing Kirant dharma. See 
additional details in Chapter 5. 
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regimes, with the result that they have evaded description and 
remained largely absent from scholarly and political discourses. 
Both states and scholars have struggled to develop terminology 
at once clear and complex enough to cope with the vast cultural 
diversity of the Himalayan region. As described in Chapter 1, the 1854 
Nepali legal code, or Muluki Ain, codified the position of many of the 
country’s groups, incorporating them within the Hindu caste 
framework, while Indian colonial classification projects by contrast set 
up a clear dichotomy between caste and tribe. Early scholarly works 
promised to move beyond such distinctions, but that task has proven 
difficult. The 1978 edited volume Himalayan Anthropology: The Indo-
Tibetan Interface, which contained a collection of essays by Western 
social scientists working in the region, proposed what became a 
remarkably enduring model for defining the Himalayan region as an 
“interface” between the two “great civilizations” of India and Tibet. 
Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf summarized this model in the 
Foreword to the volume: 
In the Valleys of this great mountain range Indo-Aryan and 
Tibeto-Burman languages dovetail and overlap, populations of 
Caucasian racial features characteristic of North India met and 
merged with Mongoloid ethnic groups, and the two great Asian 
religions Hinduism and Buddhism coexist there and interact in 
various ways. In neither of these spheres are boundaries clear-
cut, nor are the sequences of events which brought about the 
present kaleidoscopic pattern easily discernible. While 
chronological data relating to developments within the great 
historic civilizations of the area are fairly well established, very 
little is known about the history of the many preliterate tribal 
societies which for long filled the interstices between the 
domains of more advanced cultures…for centuries [this area] has 
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been a meeting point of distinct races and two of the great 
civilizations of Asia. (1978: ix-xii) 
This model posits two Himalayan ideal types: the Indic, characterized 
as linguistically Indo-Aryan, racially Caucasian and religiously Hindu; 
and the Tibetan, characterized as linguistically Tibeto-Burman, racially 
Mongoloid and religiously Buddhist. The problem is how to classify all 
of the people who fit into neither category, inhabiting the “interstices” 
between them, which James Fisher describes with several colorful 
spatial metaphors in his introduction to the same volume: “fringe 
region”, “neither fish-nor-fowl contact zone” (1978: 1), and perhaps 
most intriguingly, a “zipper which stitches together these two densely 
textured cultural fabrics” (1978: 2). We are left to wonder whether 
there is any room left for those caught between the zipper’s teeth to 
forge their own sense of cultural distinctiveness using the “preliterate” 
tools at their disposal. In particular, it remains unclear how languages, 
races and religions might in fact blend to create paradigms for 
belonging, which although defined in relation to the Indic and the 
Tibetan types, do not aspire to be part of either one.47 
 Despite the shortcomings of these classificatory rubrics, both 
activist and state discourses have appropriated such scholarly 
                                       
47 Further attempts to provide more nuanced classificatory terminology include 
Höfer’s “Tibetanid” and “Tibetanoid” to describe respectively peoples outside of 
historical/political Tibet whose linguistic and cultural practices are similar to those 
found inside Tibet, and those with higher levels of “Hinduization” but who still speak 
Tibeto-Burman languages (2004 [1979]: 43); Charles Ramble’s food-based 
“tshampa-eater” versus “rice-eater” to describe the Tibetan and Indic cultural 
paradigms (1993); and journalist C.K. Lal’s linguistically-defined “Hindu Aryan Nepali 
Speakers” or HANS to describe the dominant group in contrast to the rest. 
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descriptions in developing their own definitions of Himalayan 
populations, often drawing even sharper oppositions between the Indic 
and Tibetan paradigms than scholars originally did. In most cases, 
religion is taken as the key symbol in the set of oppositions, with 
janajati groups in Nepal and tribal groups in India defined foremost by 
their ostensibly non-Hindu character. For instance, the Nepal 
Federation for Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) defines a janajati group 
as: 
that community who has its own mother tongue and traditional 
culture and yet does not fall under the conventional fourfold 
VARNA of the HINDU VARNA system or the Hindu hierarchical 
caste structure.48 
In India, although the nation’s secular constitution discourages 
definitions of difference on a religious basis, a tribal identity is 
presumed to be a non-Hindu one.49 Some activists in Nepal, such as 
the members of the Mongoloid National Organization in Nepal 
described by Susan Hangen (2005a), seek to accord race primary 
symbolic value over religion. This approach has the benefit of 
acknowledging that while some groups may have altered their religious 
practices in response to what has been called Sanskritization (Srinivas 
1989) or Hinduization (Fisher 2001), their racial characteristics 
continue to mark difference in a normative manner that religious 
                                       
48As found on the NEFIN website, accessed on November 4, 2008. 
http://www.nefin.org.np/component/content/article/115-information/347-
indigenous-nationalities-of-nepal. 
49 See Middleton and Shneiderman (2008) for details. 
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practice no longer does.50 Despite their divergence on this issue, both 
activist approaches to classification link the three characteristics of 
Tibeto-Burman language, Mongoloid race, and non-Hindu religion to 
define subaltern identities in a static manner vis-à-vis the supposedly 
dominant and oppressive Indo-Aryan linguistic, Caucasian racial and 
Hindu religious identity.51 
Such categories are problematic for several reasons. At the 
linguistic level, the terms “Indo-Aryan” and “Tibeto-Burman” refer to 
language families, rather than contemporary spoken languages. 
Although most of Nepal’s over 100 languages are members of those 
two language families, one cannot be an Indo-Aryan or Tibeto-Burman 
speaker (Turin 2006b). In addition, speaking a language belonging to 
one or the other of these families does not on its own define racial, 
religious or ethnic identity: for example, many mother tongue Nepali 
speakers are Buddhists from Mongoloid racial backgrounds. At the 
level of race, although the Himalayas have indeed historically been the 
meeting ground for Caucasian populations originating in the south and 
                                       
50 Discussions of Tibetanization (Samuel 1993, Huber 1999a) emerge from a very 
different perspective, which I have discussed in Shneiderman (2006). 
51 David Gellner suggests that: “There is a bitter irony in the fact … that just when a 
scholarly and anthropological consensus is emerging that a Hindu-tribe dichotomy 
was hopelessly flawed as a tool for understanding Nepalese society, Nepalese 
intellectuals themselves should begin to take it up with a vengeance (1997: 22)”. 
However, I would argue that this was hardly ironic, but instead represented a 
consciously strategic move to gain concrete results from the state, which a decade 
later can be seen to have paid off (at least from activist perspectives) in the promises 
of ethnic autonomy, which were unimaginable in 1997 when Gellner wrote. 
54 According the Gaenszle, the Mewahang Rai also use these terms, although they 
make a  “highly inconsistent distinction between Lhasa gotra and Kasi gotra groups” 
(2000: 356). 
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Mongoloid populations originating in the north, the contemporary 
ethnic groups that populate Nepal, as well as Indian Himalayan areas 
such as Darjeeling, are largely composites. In many cases, racial 
mixture is in fact the reality, even among elite families fixated on 
purity, as historian John Whelpton has recently shown for Nepal’s now-
deposed Shah kings (2005). Finally, at the level of religion, the 
boundaries between Hindu and Buddhist practice are rarely clear-cut. 
One often finds iconography belonging to both religious complexes in 
single temples, and individuals from a wide range of ethnic groups 
count themselves as devotees of both faiths, or engage in practices 
identified with both traditions. In short, while most Himalayan people 
can identify with some of the linguistic, racial and/or religious 
characteristics enshrined in the putative Indic and Tibetan paradigms, 
those characteristics do not always line up neatly in one column. 
Such mixture is certainly part of the Thangmi story. In the 
portion of the myth recounted above, the Thangmi forefather does 
eventually receive language from Bali Raja, but it is not “pure”, being 
instead a mixture of the other 17 languages. Linguistic research tells 
us that the Thangmi tongue is indeed a link between the Newar 
language and a group of Kiranti languages; like Newar, it is a Tibeto-
Burman language with long-standing Indo-Aryan influences (Turin 
2004a, 2006a). People who identify themselves as Thangmi possess a 
wide range of physical features ranging from stereotypically 
“Mongoloid” to stereotypically “Aryan” and everything in between. The 
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origin myth alludes to this racial diversity with its mention of Lhasa 
and Kasi gotra, two super-clans which are linked to these important 
cities to the north and the south respectively, and which are perceived 
as the source of Mongoloid and Aryan features.54 (I have often heard 
Thangmi friends joke with each other about who belongs to Lhasa 
gotra and who belongs to Kasi gotra based on the shape of their nose.) 
These cities also metonymize the Hindu and Buddhist complexes from 
which many aspects of Thangmi dharma are appropriated: Brahma 
steals the ved, a Hindu text, and goes south to Kasi, while Maheswor 
heads north to Lhasa chanting om mani padme hum, a mantra of 
Buddhist origin.  
The Thangmi myth offers an alternative to the hackneyed 
categories for classifying Himalayan groups described above: why not 
instead classify groups according to whether they emphasize an oral or 
textual mode of religious authority? Such a classificatory schema shifts 
attention away from essentialized notions of linguistic, racial, or 
religious content, and refocuses rather on what people actually do—
identity as expressed in action. From this perspective, the historically 
exclusive Thangmi reliance on an orally transmitted shamanic tradition 
sets them apart from groups who adhere to either Hindu or Buddhist 
textually legitimated traditions, and aligns them with others for whom 
oral traditions remain primary, such as the Limbu, Chepang, and Rai, 
who are identified as the closest ethnic “brothers” of the Thangmi in 
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the myth.55 Of course, there are aspects of both Hindu and Buddhist 
tradition that emphasize oral transmission as well as, or in some cases, 
instead of, textual authority, and a nuanced application of the 
classificatory schema outlined in the origin tale would have to locate 
practitioners of Hindu and Buddhist oral traditions in the same 
category as the Thangmi themselves. When I have raised this issue, 
most Thangmi guru consider it carefully, and then repeat that people 
must be classified according to what they actually do (N: gareko 
anusar). Such statements are made not only by gurus, but also by lay 
Thangmi. One man from Nepal who had worked extensively in India 
told me that he was perpetually frustrated when people asked, “Who 
[i.e. what other groups) are the Thangmi close to?” rather than “What 
do Thangmi do?”56 He continued to tell me that it was impossible to 
explain Thangmi identity with reference to other groups, and that he 
wished he could instead “show” (he used the English word) his 
interlocutors what Thangmi ritual practice looked like.57 These 
discussions highlight the importance of practice in defining identity 
from a Thangmi ontological perspective. 
 
                                       
55 When asked which other Himalayan peoples they share the most with, most 
Thangmi assert a close connection to Rai groups. However, the Thangmi do not eat 
pork, while consumption of pork is a major identity marker for most Rai (and pig-
raising is an important source of income). 
56 Original Nepali: Thangmi ko sanga milchha? versus Thangmile ke garchha? 
57 This is in fact an increasingly popular use of publications and videos—Thangmi 
living or working in multi-ethnic contexts use them to “show” others what Thangmi 
life is ostensibly like.  
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Synthetic Subjectivities and Inferior Complexities 
How can the Thangmi origin tale assert that the Thangmi are somehow 
fundamentally different from groups that identify themselves as Hindu 
or Buddhist, when Thangmi practice itself incorporates elements of 
both Hindu and Buddhist practice? The emphasis on practice and the 
resultant flexibility regarding ethnic and religious boundaries that I 
have described above helps solve this riddle. Thangmi self-definitions 
that openly acknowledge mixture—at linguistic, racial and religious 
levels—advance a critique of the standard Indic and Tibetan categories. 
As Gopilal, a prominent Dolakha Thangmi in his sixties who had been 
both an activist and an important ritual lineage holder (see Chapter 8), 
once commented with a wry laugh before launching into an informal 
rendition of the origin myth, “We are a hybrid (N: thimbar) group, from 
the moment of genesis onwards, that is how we became Thangmi”.58 
The Nepali term thimbar is derived from thimaha, which connotes 
hybridity in the biological sense and is used in agricultural contexts to 
describe the results of plant breeding.59 Many Thangmi with whom I 
worked in Nepal had become familiar with the term through 
agricultural trainings sponsored by development organizations, and 
had adopted it to describe themselves, often in statements like 
Gopilal’s that demonstrated a self-reflexive sense of humor. 
                                       
58 Original Nepali: “Hami thimbar jat ho, utpatti dekhi tyasari Thangmi bhaeko”. 
59 Sharma (2057 VS: 562). 
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Such self-conscious descriptions of mixture attest to a “synthetic 
subjectivity”: a conscious recognition of the synthesis of diverse 
linguistic, religious, racial and cultural elements that comprise 
Thangmi identity at the most fundamental, originary level.60 This is not 
to say that Thangmi are in any way more hybrid or synthetic than any 
other group—Himalayan or otherwise—in empirical terms, but rather 
that they consciously recognize this mixture as part of what makes 
them who they are, rather than trying to submerge it in a narrative of 
ethnic purity as is more common. By vesting ritual authority in their 
guru, who do not claim to act as officiants of either pure Hinduism or 
Buddhism, but instead articulate Thangmi origins as explicitly 
synthetic, Thangmi historically located themselves outside the 
normative line of vision of state discourses which have relied upon 
clear religious identities as definitive markers of ethnic distinctiveness. 
 This emphasis on synthesis is one of the reasons why the 
Thangmi for so long remained invisible at the political level. Many 
contemporary Thangmi in both Nepal and India who would like to 
make claims on their respective states through the idiom of ethnic 
activism find the lack of definitional clarity that they encounter in their 
own myths of origin deeply disconcerting. The problem is not that such 
                                       
60 In earlier formulations of this argument, I used the term “syncretic” rather than 
“synthetic”. I have opted for the latter since it denotes mixture in a much broader set 
of domains than the former, which is generally understood to reference only the 
religious. In addition, the concept of syncretism carries too much baggage to unpack 
effectively here. However, I wish to note that Shaw and Stewart’s definition of 
syncretism as “the politics of religious synthesis” (1994: 4) suggests a close 
articulation between the two, and I hope to explore the relationship between these 
terms in future work. 
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activists no longer possess synthetic subjectivity; to the contrary, they 
have become increasingly aware of it as they have sought to locate 
themselves within state discourses of recognition, often grappling 
intimately with the disjunctures they feel between their subjective 
awareness of synthesis as a key feature of Thangmi ethnicity, and the 
perceived political requirements for racial, religious, cultural and 
linguistic purity. In a sense, they desire a purely functional relationship 
with their origin myth as a straightforward, scientifically and 
historically logical charter, but instead they are constantly confronted 
with the messy, somewhat illogical nature of its symbolic schemas. 
Indeed, for political purposes as well as personal peace of mind, many 
Thangmi activists would like to find and put on display an “original” 
Thangmi prototype, clearly categorizable as a “Hindu” or “Buddhist” 
religious practitioner, an Indo-Aryan or Tibeto-Burman language 
speaker.61 But even they must ultimately acknowledge that, “After 
careful study we find that the Thami rites are a combination of 
                                       
61 Since Thangmi religion and language do in fact incorporate elements of both the 
Indic and Tibetan paradigms, and people who identify as Thangmi are physically 
heterogeneous, small but vocal activist factions have advocated assimilation to each 
of these paradigms in various times and places. Some of these historical moments 
are described in Chapter 5. Since 1990, both the janajati and tribal movements in 
Nepal and India respectively have defined themselves as explicitly non-Hindu, so that 
as Thangmi became increasingly invested in these paradigms they sought to 
downplay Hindu aspects of their synthetic practice. Some of these dynamics are 
described within the context of marriage and funerary rituals in Chapter 7. Since, 
however, the dominant activist paradigm for asserting Thangminess during my 
research was that of valorizing and appropriating the power of Thangmi guru 
themselves, I have not presented these alternative arguments in detail here. Tracing 
out the patterns of “Hinduization” / “Sanskritization” and “Buddhicization” / 
“Tibetanization” within the Thangmi community over time may be a direction for 
future research, but here I focus on the form of hyper-“Thangmification” that has 
emerged as the primary activist goal over the last decade. 
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Hinduism and Buddhism … integrated in the guru system” (Reng 1999: 
18). Synthetic subjectivity is not always an easy mental state to live 
with, and even those who might wish it otherwise must find ways to 
work with it. As Pnina Werbner has suggested, “intentional hybrids 
create an ironic double consciousness … [which] are internally 
dialogical, fusing the unfusable” (1997: 5) in a manner that can be 
both productive and debilitating.62 
Paras, whom we met at the beginning of this chapter, once 
explained to me in English, “We Thangmi have an inferior complexity.” 
Indeed, this slip of the tongue—Paras later explained that he meant 
“inferiority complex”, which was a term that he and other Thangmi 
activists used regularly in their writing and conversation—pinpoints the 
problem precisely.63 Thangmi racial origins and linguistic and cultural 
practices, along with their resultant synthetic subjective state, are too 
complex to fit easily within common Himalayan and South Asian 
rubrics for classifying caste and ethnicity. This sense of not fitting in 
leads many Thangmi to feel at once inferior, and proud of their 
complexity. The balance between the two depends on the individual 
                                       
62 A quotation from Stan Mumford suggests just how psychologically challenging 
maintaining synthetic subjectivity might be within the Himalayan social context: 
“most Tibetans … thought that my dual project of receiving enlightenment from the 
lamas and also learning from the Gurung shamans would result in confusion or even 
insanity. The lamas thought me in danger of acquiring a divided mind…” (1989: 5). 
63 As Paras wrote in Niko Bachinte, “Our members will have these questions: who are 
the Thami, where did they come from, and so forth? Those who are smart enough to 
respond will have an answer for the questioner, but those who aren’t will be left 
without a reply and some of them will even suffer from an inferiority complex” (Niko 
2003: 9). Similarly Rajen once explained to me that migrant Thangmi in Darjeeling 
did not participate in the BTWA’s activities because they had an “inferiority complex”. 
 
 
 183 
and his or her personal experiences of the range of practices, 
performances, policies and places that shape Thangmi subjectivities. 
 
Struggles for Power: Between Orality and Literacy 
On one of my most recent trips to Dolakha, I watched a group of 
children who were playing in the dirt perk up their ears and listen in 
rapt attention as Silipitik, a respected village elder in his 70s (whose 
life story is told in Chapter 4), recounted the Thangmi origin myth. For 
individuals like Silipitik, both old and young, who are engaged in 
Thangmi linguistic and cultural practice on a day-to-day basis, the 
iterative process of telling and listening to the mythic narrative 
provides a powerful framework within which to interpret their own 
lives. In particular, the myth’s “sociological schema” (Lévi-Strauss 1987 
[1973]) inculcates a sense of pride in the racial, linguistic and cultural 
complexity that defines Thangminess by positing it as the basis for 
Thangmi “originality”. 
 However, the very oral, embodied nature of originary power 
limits access to it for those who cannot understand the Thangmi 
language in which the myth is embedded, or who are not familiar with 
the ritual contexts in which it has historically been transmitted. For 
such individuals, the origin myth loses much of its interpretive power 
unless it can be entextualized in a manner that at once grants them 
access to, and control over, it. Access is achieved by decontextualizing 
the myth from the embodied ritual practice of the gurus’ paloke, 
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translating it into Nepali or English, and encoding it in the written 
word. Control is then asserted by recontextualizing the narrative in a 
written form that very few guru have the literacy skills to understand or 
utilize. This desire to wield originary power is much of what compels 
activists like Paras to engage in the political production of identity with 
what can only be called religious fervor, even if they are not—or 
especially if they are not—involved in ritual practice in the traditional 
sense. For such activists, gaining recognition from the states in which 
they live becomes an existential battle in order to assuage their own 
sense of inferior complexity, which is exacerbated by their personal 
incompetence in the Thangmi linguistic and ritual domains within 
which the sacred power of identity has historically been produced. 
After recounting the origin myth to his young audience, Silipitik 
turned to me to complain about the recent proliferation of Thangmi 
activist publications that he could not read, and to make the case for 
the importance of maintaining the oral transmission of Thangmi 
practice: “From the beginning, our ethnic group has not had writing 
and reading.”64 His phrasing, which was echoed by many others of his 
generation, suggests that writing and reading are tangible items that a 
group or an individual can possess, and as such, from his perspective, 
are simply not part of the Thangmi cultural inventory. This assertion 
illustrates how the tension between guru and activist worldviews is one 
of a broader set of social differences within the Thangmi community 
                                       
64 Original Nepali: Aghi pahile dekhi lekhai padhai chhaina hamro jat. 
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which are indexed by notions of orality and literacy. As Laura Ahearn 
has suggested, “literacy is not a neutral, unidimensional technology 
but rather a set of lived experiences that will differ from community to 
community” (2001: 7). Understanding how these dynamics work 
therefore requires a very brief history of education within the Thangmi 
context, which is expanded upon in Chapter 5. 
 There were no educational institutions in the areas of Nepal 
where Thangmi lived until the late 1940s, when the first primary school 
was built in what is now Suspa-Kshamawati VDC.65 Although I do not 
have access to statistics from that era, based on oral histories it is fair 
to presume that most of students in this era were from Bahun, Chhetri 
or Newar families, and that very few Thangmi children were enrolled in 
school. I heard several stories about how Thangmi children were 
actively prevented from enrolling in school by high-caste teachers 
whose families acted as moneylenders to Thangmi families and saw the 
prospect of Thangmi literacy as a potential challenge to their 
domination in the area.66 More information about what is often called 
the “semi-feudal” tenancy system in the area is provided in Chapter 4. 
Here, the point is that since non-literate Thangmi were exposed to 
writing primarily through the loan documents that were often used to 
appropriate their land, they tended to view writing as a technology of 
exploitation which “belonged” to high castes. For this reason, even 
                                       
65 This school was founded by Nanda Prasad Prasain, a Nepali Congress activist 
(Dinesh Prasain, personal communication). 
66 Dipesh Kharel (2006) mentions similar stories in his Master’s thesis on Alampu. 
 
 
 186 
when underground communist activists who began working in the 
Thangmi area in the late 1970s worked to dismantle some of these 
barriers to education and provide opportunities for them to gain 
literacy, many Thangmi were skeptical about whether learning this skill 
which they associated with oppression would genuinely benefit them. 
In an interview with me, Amrit Kumar Bohara, a prominent UML activist 
from the majority Thangmi village of Piskar (although not Thangmi 
himself) described the situation he encountered in Thangmi villages in 
the late 1970s: 
Since by now there was a primary school in the village, we would 
call the Thangmi children to come to school. We had to plead 
with them to come to school. Otherwise they would not come, 
saying that they were Thangmi children and they had no use of 
education as it was meant for the rich ... They would say that 
they had to go work in the fields and there was no use learning 
to read and write.67 
Such resistance to formal education eventually dissipated as 
more schools were built and the potential benefits of education 
became clearer, and increasing numbers of Thangmi children began 
attending school in the 1980s. Those individuals became part of the 
broader project of nationalist education in Nepal during the panchayat 
era, during which ethnic difference was cast as evidence of 
backwardness (Pigg 1992, Onta 1996c), while development was framed 
in terms of nationalist assimilation to the dominant Nepali-speaking, 
Hindu path to modernity (Pigg 1992, Ahearn 2001, Tamang 2002). A 
                                       
67 See additional details on Bohara’s influence in the area in Chapter 5. 
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government report shows that well into the first decade of Nepal’s 
democracy only around 56% of Thangmi children were ever enrolled in 
school (HMG 1996: 23), with high drop out rates (especially for girls) 
with the result that only a very small number of Thangmi made it 
beyond primary school (HMG 1996: 42).68 
Formal education levels for Thangmi in Nepal remain low today. 
The increasing numbers who have been to school at once gain tools to 
painstakingly climb the status ladder in mainstream Nepali society, and 
to critique Thangmi linguistic and cultural practice from an 
evolutionary perspective which casts oral traditions—particularly in any 
language other than Nepali—as “backwards” and incommensurable 
with a literate Nepali modernity. Although the situation is changing, 
Thangmi activists now in leadership positions were educated in the 
1980s and 1990s. Many of them viewed the very orality of Thangmi 
practice as a problem, since it fostered erratic inconsistencies in 
contrast to what they perceived as the standardized nature of the 
textually-based great traditions. Although many of these individuals 
had grown up in Thangmi-speaking environments in which gurus were 
the preeminent community leaders, they felt that advancing 
educationally and economically within the Nepali national frame 
required a conscious move away from Thangmi linguistic and ritual 
practice. As Tek Raj, a youth leader within NTS told me, “The fact that 
                                       
68 In this report, the Thangmi are always lumped together with the Chepang and Jirel 
as one category (“Thami/Chepang/Jirel”). It is never explained why they are grouped 
together or how the data might be disaggregated. 
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we have only oral traditions is very embarrassing to us, and we want to 
change that for future generations”. Another young writer from 
Dolakha, Ram Kaji, suggested that, “To solve all of our problems, we 
must write a book … on the practices of the Thami which will be 
acceptable to Thamis scattered all over the world so that they can 
follow the same tradition” (Samudaya 2061 [2056] VS: 26). 
 These ideas converged with those of Darjeeling-based Thangmi 
activists, who had been educated in the post-colonial secular Indian 
context in which Nepali itself was a minority language, and ritualized 
practices were seen as anti-modern. In Darjeeling, education was much 
more accessible than in Nepal, and the Thangmi organization even 
opened its own primary school in 1945 (see Chapter 5 for details). 
Unlike their counterparts in Nepal, however, most Thangmi activists in 
India had little personal experience of the Thangmi language or ritual 
practice. Although they were eager to collect and understand Thangmi 
origin myths and ritual knowledge, they were frustrated to find that 
these existed only in oral forms embedded in the practice of gurus, 
who resisted the scripturalization of their knowledge—a problem which 
activists in Nepal also encountered. 
 There were several reasons for this resistance. First, the senior 
gurus were from an older generation to whom writing signified 
exploitative power, and second, very few of them were literate 
themselves, and thus may have felt threatened by this unfamiliar 
technique of objectification which could challenge their own ritual one. 
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There are also younger gurus, however, many of whom have completed 
primary school and do not share the older generation’s visceral fear of 
writing, yet such young gurus still feel strongly that their paloke 
should not be written down or standardized in a single book. This is 
because, most importantly, from a guru’s perspective—regardless of 
his age—the oral recitation and transmission of the paloke is what 
makes these chants distinctively Thangmi, and therefore gives them 
originary power. The essential orality of their practice is viewed as the 
immutable outcome of the actions of the Thangmi ancestors, who due 
to extreme hunger swallowed the religious texts granted to them by 
the deities at the point of creation. As Guru Maila of Suspa once 
explained, “Having swallowed our texts, we must practice our 
traditions from our man (N)”.69 The concept of man is a complicated 
one, but here the implication is of an internal, non-intellectual, non-
discursive embodied essence, in which the stuff of Thangminess 
resides.70 Once the texts were consumed, they became indelibly 
imprinted on the collective Thangmi man, and contemporary Thangmi 
guru are bound to live out that fate by maintaining the oral, embodied 
nature of Thangmi practice. 
For this reason, Thangmi guru are unable to extract what first 
appeared to me as the discursive aspect of their paloke from the 
embodied expression of it. Early in my fieldwork, I would ask guru to 
                                       
69 Original Nepali: Ved nilepachi hamro man bata chalan chalnuparchha. 
70 See Kohrt and Harper (2008), as well as McHugh (2001) and Desjarlais (2003) for 
more detailed descriptions of how the concept of man is conceptualized across Nepal 
and the Himalayas. 
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simply narrate the content of their chants without going into trance or 
engaging in other aspects of the complete practice, but these requests 
were met with disdain and the response that the words and the bodily 
practice—text and context, in other words—were inseparable, mutually 
dependent parts of a whole. Rana Bahadur’s assertions that if I wanted 
to record any of his knowledge, I had to be willing to document all of it 
(as described in Chapter 1), were evidence of the same sort of 
totalizing mythical thinking. Several gurus with whom I developed 
close relationships were eventually willing to “stage” their paloke in the 
sense that they could perform them in non-practice contexts outside 
the framework of the life cycle, calendrical, or curative rituals in which 
they would usually be enacted (for instance in my living room in 
Kathmandu), but such performances still required all of the usual ritual 
offerings, and the guru still went into trance. None of the gurus with 
whom I worked with could recite just a single component of the paloke 
without chanting the entire “line”, nor could they recite this without 
going into trance, nor switch back and forth between recitation and 
explanatory commentary.71 The paloke really were embedded in the 
consciousness of gurus as a totality, and were not meant to be read by 
others as “texts” in the hermeneutical sense. The content of the paloke 
therefore could not be extracted in easily entextualizable pieces, either 
by me or by Thangmi activists. 
                                       
71 This fact encouraged me to use video as an ethnographic method, where I could 
first record a guru in practice, and later elicit commentary on his actions. 
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 To many activists, however, the total control that this gave guru 
over originary power itself was unacceptable. Activist objectives were 
two-fold: to write down the components of myth and practice so that 
they could be made easily accessible in written form both to interested 
Thangmi and to the political authorities involved in the processes of 
official recognition, and, through the techniques of scientific thinking, 
to standardize the diversity of individual gurus’ practice into a single, 
authoritative and canonical text. Their ongoing attempts to meet these 
goals resulted in a power struggle, which Paras alluded obliquely to 
with the assertion that: 
The demand that the ethnicity’s pure identity should be recorded 
in writing has been in place for a long time, as it is not sufficient 
to have it in the verbal form alone. However, due to time and 
circumstances, this demand has not been implemented. (Niko 
2003: 8). 
This was not entirely true, since by the time that Paras wrote, Thangmi 
activists based in Nepal had already published three volumes (Nan Ni 
Patuko, Dolakha Reng, and Thami Samudaya), all of which contained 
some information about guru and their paloke. However, the Nepal-
based activists had apparently encountered the same difficulties in 
entextualizing gurus’ knowledge, as demonstrated by Khumbalal’s 
allegations that gurus were hoarding power and leading the Thangmi 
down an erroneous path: 
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Our guru apa recite spiritual mantras which they make up, but 
these are not written.72 The same mantra is passed to his 
followers in oral, not written form … In order to preserve his 
power, the guru never teaches his mantra to others. Since the 
beginning, our community’s gurus have taken their mantra with 
them when they die. Now, how many mantras have these gurus 
have taken with them from ancient times until the present? Since 
they are not written, the modern generation is forced to suffer to 
obtain their various practices and mantras…As the practices are 
done differently by each guru apa, it seems that their traditional 
practices cannot be correct…. We have no way of knowing if the 
so-called “guru” in his state of intoxication is pronouncing his 
mantra correctly or not, or whether he is just making up the 
sentences, which he has actually forgotten. We don’t have 
written ved to prove it. If we did have them [ved] we could 
correct [the guru], saying, “Here is a mistake, here you have left 
it unfinished.” Not all gurus are like this, but some have hoarded 
power and tried to dominate our community. 
To solve these problems, the gurus, the intellectuals, and 
experienced members of the community should sit together and 
correct our practices. These must be published in a book, with 
which gurus should train students, and just like other pandit, 
monks, priest or mullah, they should try to produce many gurus. 
(Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 41-42) 
This damning indictment of gurus themselves comes from the same 
writer who, as cited earlier in this chapter, eulogized the guru as the 
symbol of Thangmi originality—the only religious practitioner that 
Thangmi children should know. Khumbalal considered himself one of 
the intellectuals invoked at the end of the paragraph, and for him the 
real problem was that despite his highly educated and advanced 
economic status (he held an Indian college degree and ran a successful 
restaurant franchise in Kathmandu), he still had “no way of knowing” 
what was really at the root of Thangmi originary power, embedded as it 
                                       
72 Here Khumbalal appears to be using the term “mantra” as a more familiar (to non-
Thangmi speakers) synonym for paloke. 
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was in the bewildering complexity of oral practice controlled by guru. 
Through the technology of writing, he and others like him sought to 
bring their access to ritual power into line with their already 
established claims to economic and social power. 
For self-proclaimed “intellectuals” like Khumbalal, this was a 
highly emotive issue, because despite all of the promises of a better 
future through education made in both Nepali and Indian nationalist 
discourses, in the end, being padhai-lekhai (educated, in the sense of 
being able to read and write) did not in itself grant access to power 
within the Thangmi community, or to the authority to define Thangmi 
identity through discursive representation. Being educated in Nepali, 
Hindi, and/or English did indeed allow one to attain higher status 
outside of the Thangmi community, which was certainly one of the 
necessary tools in campaigns for recognition, and a role that 
individuals like Paras and Khumbalal played well. But education on its 
own did not establish authority within the Thangmi community itself, 
where status was judged not by the quantitative terms of educational 
and economic success alone, but also by the qualitative terms of one’s 
relationship with the sacred originary. Both, in fact, were important, 
but in many people’s eyes, educational and economic success were 
relatively meaningless in terms of establishing status as a Thangmi if 
one did not also have a strong relationship with the sacred originary. 
The concept of padhai-lekhai was not so much a literal 
assessment of one’s educational or class status, then, but rather a 
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symbolic statement of which kind of power one chose to prioritize. 
When Sher Bahadur, a middle-aged man in Dolakha who was literate 
and extensively involved in community-based development projects 
said, “Those educated Thangmi don’t care about other Thangmi, after 
they’ve reached the top they don’t come back here”,73 it was both a 
way of distancing himself from this category of people whom he 
accused of taking advantage of others, and discrediting their particular 
form of power by suggesting that once one leaves the village for 
educational or economic advancement, one is no longer fully Thangmi. 
In a similar way, the Darjeeling activist Nathu’s statement that, “Those 
who are educated don’t respect the ‘cultural’”74 was a way of 
contrasting the two approaches towards power, and situating himself 
somewhere in the middle, as someone with no formal education, who 
nonetheless held a government job and was economically successful, 
but who sided with the gurus in arguing against scripturalization. 
Speaking from the other side of the fence, as someone who prided 
himself on his education and felt personally affronted by Latte Apa’s 
hold on power, the BTWA general secretary Rajen told me that, “There 
are two ‘standards’ [of Thangmi]: the ‘low-level’ type and the type with 
‘education’. As of yet, we’ve been unable to unify the two”. Rajen 
squarely placed the blame for this divide on the shoulders of those he 
called ‘low-level’—by which he meant circular migrants from Nepal—
                                       
73 Original Nepali: Padhai-lekhai Thangmi harule Thangmi lai wasta gardaina, mathi 
gaera yata tira aundaina. 
74 Original Nepali: Padhai-lekhai harule ‘cultural’ mandaina. 
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although these were precisely the people from whom he solicited 
cultural information for BTWA publications and performances, as well 
as linguistic data for the dictionary of the Thangmi language that he 
compiled. 
Demonstrating that these power struggles remain a potent 
dynamic, Bhaba, the former general secretary of NTS, sent an email 
just as I was finishing this dissertation, in which he bitterly lamented 
the fact that, “a few so called Buddhijibee Thamis … planned to 
sideline the genuine Thamis” (October 23, 2008) in order to control the 
future direction of the NTS. The term buddhijibi means “intellectual”, 
and the irony here is that although Bhaba himself is one of the most 
highly educated Thangmi anywhere, having attended the prestigious 
Buddhanilkantha School and completed his secondary education in 
England, he aligns himself with the “genuine Thamis” in opposition to 
the “intellectuals”. From his statements in several other interviews and 
conversations, it is clear to me that this is because Bhaba is himself a 
speaker of Thangmi who continues to view guru as primary ritual 
practitioners, and therefore he does not prioritize scripturalization as 
an activist goal, choosing to focus instead on the basic development 
needs of the community.75 This suggests that buddhijibi, like padhai-
lekhai, does not index educational status alone, but rather a broader 
                                       
75 The ensuing content of the email suggests that Bhaba defines “genuine” by 
residence in a rural village in Sindhupalchok, Ramechhap, or Dolakha—where he 
himself was born and his parents still live—despite the fact that he has lived in 
Kathmandu since he was a third-grader in boarding school, and that several of the 
so-called intellectuals that he critiques share that background. 
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worldview about what it means to be Thangmi. These terms are in fact 
used derogatorily by those who do not identify with them to call into 
question the authenticity of others’ Thangminess—often precisely 
those who are most engaged in establishing that Thangminess at a 
political level through the power of publication and performance. The 
implication is that activists who must rely on such literate strategies of 
representation alone (often because education has distanced them 
from Thangmi linguistic and cultural practice) cannot be fully Thangmi 
because they do not recognize the essentially oral nature of Thangmi 
originary power. 
 Even those who do identify themselves proudly as “intellectuals” 
acknowledge that they cannot carry the Thangmi banner alone. Despite 
his strong critique of gurus, Khumbalal’s statement still calls for them 
to work with the “intellectuals” and “experienced members of society” 
in order to ensure the community’s future. From the other side, Latte 
Apa still goes to the BTWA office in Darjeeling bazaar every few days to 
find out if there is any news of the Thangmi Scheduled Tribe 
application, or upcoming cultural events to squeeze into his busy ritual 
schedule. In short, neither mode of power is genuine to the exclusion 
of others; the sense of recognition that activists receive in response to 
the textual power that they wield is no less real than that which gurus 
(and those who employ them) receive in response to the oral power 
that they embody. Both forms of power derive from mutually 
constitutive processes of objectification—sakali and nakali—which 
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articulate relationships with the originary for some members of the 
Thangmi ethnic totality. 
 
Radio and VCD as Unifying Forces? 
Gaenszle suggests that the emergence of non-literate technologies for 
recording oral traditions, such as cassettes, video, CDs and VCDs, has 
among Kiranti communities “led the younger generation … to 
increasingly revalue the oral forms” (forthcoming: 17). In the Thangmi 
context as well, such forms of entextualization that do not rely upon 
the written word seem poised to mediate between the oral and literate 
worldviews that I have described here. For instance, guru in both 
Darjeeling and Nepal who resisted having their paloke written down 
not only allowed themselves to be videotaped by me (or “videoalized” 
by Thangmi activists), but in fact often sought me out to request that I 
document a particular ritual event. They were then very pleased when I 
gave VCD versions of these recordings back to them, and these discs 
became regular viewing on neighborhood video decks. Similarly, Latte 
Apa gave his permission to BTWA activists to sell copies of a 4-CD set 
of his paloke in order to raise funds, but he still refused to give them 
permission to transcribe its contents. Audio and video recordings 
seemed to facilitate a compromise between the two groups’ agendas: 
they allowed guru to maintain their power since there could be no 
recording without their practice, but they simultaneously allowed that 
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power to be circulated among a broader public—including government 
agencies—without requiring the guru to actually be present. 
Another medium with potentially similar effects is that of radio, 
which is rapidly coming to play an important role for Thangmi in 
Nepal.76 Since 2007, NTS members have received funding from NFDIN 
for a Thangmi language radio show called Thangmi Wakhe—“Thangmi 
Talk”—which has been broadcast on several community radio 
stations.77 The host is Tek Raj, the young activist-journalist who had 
told me that he found the exclusive orality of Thangmi traditions 
“embarrassing”. Guests include activists, gurus and other Thangmi 
individuals, all of whom are invited to express their views on matters of 
interest to the community. I had the opportunity to listen to several 
broadcasts in the company of Thangmi friends, and was struck by their 
emotional response to, “hearing the radio speak in our own language”, 
as one of them put it. 
I accepted the invitation when Tek Raj invited me for an interview 
on the program, and after our brief on-air conversation we sat down 
for a cup of tea in the back room of the studio. He had a whole list of 
questions for me, which were much more contentious than the fairly 
innocuous ones he had asked during our formal interview. In 
particular, he wanted to know what I thought about the relative value 
of what he called maukhik (N) and likhit (N)—oral and textual—forms 
                                       
76 See Onta (2006) on the remarkable success of community radio in Nepal in general. 
77 There is also a Thangmi language radio program run by the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Maoist) in Dolakha district. I have not had the opportunity to listen to its 
broadcasts yet. 
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of knowledge production—what I have described as the modes of 
power used by gurus and activists respectively to establish their 
relationships with the sacred originary. He was clearly personally 
troubled by the tensions he felt between these competing forms of 
power within the community. This discomfort was hardly surprising, 
since he was an ambitious man in his mid-twenties who had grown up 
speaking Thangmi fluently in a Dolakha village that fell within the 
sphere of influence of a popular guru, but held a BA in journalism and 
was now employed by a mainstream media house in Kathmandu. The 
Thangmi language radio show which he produced in his free time was 
obviously his passion, but still he was concerned that somehow the 
oral form that it took was somehow worth less than the printed articles 
he wrote in Nepali for his day job. “It’s not ‘long-lasting’,” he said to 
me of the radio broadcasts, “I put so much time into it and then it’s 
gone.” I suggested that this ephemeral quality might be part of what 
gave a live broadcast its power, just as a guru’s power was embedded 
in his actual practice. 
A light bulb seemed to go off in Tek Raj’s head as he jumped out 
of his chair. “Are you saying that my radio show is like a guru’s paloke, 
powerful precisely because it is oral?” I nodded. He continued, talking a 
mile a minute, “And that in fact this orality is our Thangmi 
originality?”78 “I think so,” I said, “But that doesn’t mean it’s true”. In 
                                       
78 Original Nepali: “Sachai yastai maukhik kura hamro Thangmi maulikta ho?” Robert 
Desjarlais (2003) provides a useful explanation of the very flexible Nepali term kura, 
which although often translated as “things”, also has the implication of “traditions” or 
“cultural possessions”. 
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that moment, Tek Raj seemed to grasp the contours of the totality that 
bound him—a well-educated and proudly modern young Thangmi—
together with the largely non-literate gurus whose practices he had 
once termed embarassing, along with every other Thangmi individual. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Circular Lives: Histories and Economies of 
Belonging in the Transnational Thangmi Village 
 
Kumaiko ghumai, Chhetriko jal, Newarko lekhai, Thangmiko kal. 
“The Kumai’s treachery, the Chhetri’s trap, the Newar’s forgery, the 
Thangmi’s scalp”. 
- Proverb heard in Thangmi areas of Nepal1 
 
Chiyako botma sun phulchha. 
“Gold blooms on the tea bush”. 
- Popular Nepali saying about Darjeeling 
 
The Missing Bampa 
“I think you are ready to visit Khaldo Hotel,” Rana Bahadur said to me 
conspiratorially one day in 2004 at the very end of my first extended 
stay in Darjeeling. Over the past several months, my eyes had often 
rested on the seemingly endless hotel signboards that dotted the 
bazaar’s steep lanes. There were the colonial curlicues of the 
Windamere at the top of Observatory Hill, the fruity-colored hues of 
the Amba Palace down in the center of town, and the Lunar Hotel’s 
long, narrow sign atop a high Clubside building, pointing skyward 
towards its namesake. But Khaldo Hotel did not sound familiar. “What’s 
that?” I asked. “You know, you keep asking where the Thangmi 
laborers who come every year from Nepal stay. I’m trying to tell you 
that they stay at Khaldo Hotel.” This revelation provoked both curiosity 
and frustration in me. In spite of the congenial roadside friendships I 
                                                
1 I am grateful to Tanka Subba for suggesting this particular English translation of the 
Nepali. A more literal translation might read: “The Kumai’s run around, the Chhetri’s 
net, the Newar’s writing, the Thangmi’s death”. 
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had struck up with many of the migrant Thangmi porters who spent 
their days outside looking for work, I had not yet been invited to their 
homes—an experience that diverged sharply from what I had come to 
expect from my work with other groups of Thangmi in both Nepal and 
India—and I had been unable to solve the mystery of where they all 
went at night. So I swallowed my irritation and followed Rana Bahadur 
down the hill. 
 As we came to a busy intersection that I had walked through 
many times before, he crossed the road and ducked under a low metal 
archway that appeared to lead into a standard concrete multiplex 
building. But instead of heading up the stairs straight ahead of us, he 
ducked again into an opening so low that I had trouble getting through 
the entry way with my large backpack. We entered a tunnel-like 
passageway of the same height. As my eyes adjusted to the darkness, I 
shivered—it was several degrees colder in here, and very moist—and 
focused on the point of light coming from Rana Bahadur’s cigarette 
lighter. After turning a few corners, I started to hear voices, and soon 
we came upon a family of four sitting in front of a wood-burning 
fireplace etched into the concrete floor. The woman was making tea 
and nursing a baby, while the man arranged some bags stuffed into a 
corner. An older child darted back and forth between his two parents. I 
was relieved when Rana Bahadur sat down by the fire and indicated to 
me to do the same, since the ceiling was not more than four feet above 
the floor and I was uncomfortably hunched over. “Welcome to Khaldo 
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Hotel,” Rana Bahadur said with a smile, and introduced me to the 
couple. “They are the proprietors here, you see. They rent this whole 
place every year”—he gestured further into the darkness—“and rent 
out rooms to the rest of them for fifty rupees a month”. With the smile 
fading into a wry grin, he continued, “It’s a ‘full-service hotel’, you see, 
with meals, laundry, and any other facilities you need included”. 
I quickly realized that khaldo (N) meant “hole in the ground”, and 
that the appropriately named “hotel” was in fact a subterranean warren 
of rooms in a defunct portion of Darjeeling’s colonial sewer system.2 A 
corrupt government official managed to collect rent on the whole place 
from the Thangmi couple with whom we now sat. They were, in turn, 
somewhere in the middle of the pyramid scheme, collecting rent from 
approximately 150 Thangmi of all ages who spent the cold winter 
months living underground in a windowless cave where they could 
hardly stand up. Nonetheless, upon their return to Nepal, these tenants 
talked up the joys of Khaldo Hotel to would-be migrants back home. 
This year’s residents were promised a free meal next year for every 
new renter they brought in. 
Could the meager take-home earnings really be worth the 
privations of half a year, every year, spent in Khaldo Hotel? Why did so 
many migrants continue to stay here every year rather than finding 
more pleasant, permanent places to settle in Darjeeling, as small but 
                                                
2 Turner defines khaldo as “hollow, hole, pit, depression; ravine” (1997 [1931]: 121). 
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significant numbers of Thangmi had been doing since the late 19th 
century? Was there a more complex dynamic of exploitation and 
aspiration, social exclusion and belonging, attachment to territory and 
desire to leave it, at play? I recalled the images of sweatshop labor and 
social mobility that characterized Ellis Island-era America and other 
well-trodden migrant routes all over the world, and my image of 
Darjeeling as a land of opportunity where Thangmi came from Nepal 
for easy economic benefit took a turn towards the more complicated. 
Khaldo Hotel’s dingy concrete walls could not be more different 
from the Thangmi houses of stone, mud, wood, thatch, and the 
occasional corrugated aluminum roof dotted across the rugged green 
hills of Nepal’s Dolakha and Sindhupalchok districts [see Figures 4.1 
and 4.2]. As one of the country’s poorest and most socially excluded 
groups by any standard,3 most Thangmi survive on small pieces of 
property which yield barely enough grain to feed families for less than 
half the year. Despite their limited resources, Thangmi villagers tend to 
take pride in their houses, seeing them as the embodiment of their 
attachment to the territory on which they live. Houses are the physical 
manifestation of their inhabitants’ clan lineages; clan identification is 
often defined in terms of household, rather than individual, 
membership (see Chapter 7 for details of the clan system). In this 
                                                
3 The new Nepal Inclusion Index (Bennett and Parajuli 2008) locates the Thangmi 
close to the bottom of every indicator out of 78 caste/ethnic groupings analyzed in 
Nepal. 
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sense, houses are an essential anchor of identity, demarcating the 
exclusively Thangmi domestic space of human action that determines 
both the quality of every day life, and the tenor of Thangmi 
relationships with the divine world of clan and territorial deities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Porters’ loads waiting to be picked up in Darjeeling bazaar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Thangmi houses in Suspa, Dolakha, Nepal 
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In Nepal’s oldest Thangmi houses, some of whose residents can 
trace their family lineages back over a century—to the era when regular 
migrations to Darjeeling began—the hearth is marked by the bampa, a 
large piece of flat rock rammed vertically into the floor [see Figure 4.3]. 
The bampa’s primary present-day function seems to be as a windbreak 
to protect against the drafts that blow through rough-hewn doors left 
open in even the most inclement weather, but conjecturing about the 
bampa’s erstwhile ritual purpose is a favorite past-time while seated 
around the fire. Many Thangmi are eager to recover (or reinvent) the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Bampa in a Thangmi household, Lapilang, Dolakha, Nepal 
(Photo courtesy of Tek Bahadur Thami) 
long-forgotten significance of this single distinctive feature of 
Thangmi domestic design, from which one of the female clan names 
also derives. One popular explanation in contemporary Thangmi 
activist circles is that the solid, heavy stone is a symbol of both 
Thangmi resilience in the face of oppression, and of their attachment 
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to the land on which their houses stand. As we sat on the cold floor 
around the Khaldo Hotel fire, Rana Bahadur invoked these multiple 
meanings with a terse but revealing statement: “It’s just like a Thangmi 
house, isn’t it? Only the bampa is missing.” 
His words helped me understand the complex mixture of social, 
economic and personal motivations that every year compel so many 
Thangmi to leave their homes in Nepal, where “the air and water are 
clean”—a stock phrase offered immediately by many Thangmi migrants 
when asked what they like most about their home village—to travel for 
days, cross the border into India, live for several months in the airless, 
waterless, underground urban squalor of a place like Khaldo Hotel, and 
carry back-breaking loads up and down the bazaar’s sloping roads. At 
the end of the season, these migrants return to Nepal for several 
months (which are often punctuated with short trips across Nepal’s 
northern border to China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region) before 
starting the whole process all over again. As a symbol of the twin 
experiences of oppression and attachment to territory that 
characterize Thangmi identities in Nepal, the bampa’s absence in 
migrant abodes like Khaldo Hotel highlights the “push” and “pull” 
factors that contribute to Thangmi desires both to travel away from, 
and then return to, Nepal. In Darjeeling, there has historically been a 
lower incidence of land-based economic exploitation, and social 
oppression is comparatively minimal, creating stronger prospects for 
belonging in one regard, but the property ownership and territorial 
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attachment—both economic and spiritual—which underpin another 
important aspect of Thangmi belonging in Nepal have also been 
absent. 
 
The Pragmatics of Cross-Border Migration 
This chapter explores the pragmatics of Thangmi cross-border circular 
migration, locating its historical roots in the twin experiences of 
economic exploitation and social exclusion. The history and ongoing 
circumstances of Thangmi circular migration provide a window into the 
transnational aspects of belonging in the Himalayas over time. Current 
migrations from Nepal to Indian city centers, the Middle East, the 
United States and beyond are now receiving substantial academic 
attention (Seddon, Adhikari and Gurung 2001, 2002; Graner and 
Gurung 2003; Thieme 2006), but the causes and effects of these more 
recent routes of migration can be better understood when 
contextualized within the long history of trans-Himalayan migration 
between Nepal and adjoining border regions of India and China that 
Thangmi experiences exemplify. The history and literature of the 
Nepali “diasporic” experience in northeast India is also well-
documented (Onta 1996a, 1996b, 1999; Hutt 1997, 1998; Chalmers 
2003; Sinha and Subba 2003), but the same cannot be said of the 
contemporary cross-border connections between people of Nepali 
heritage in India and Nepal. This chapter takes an initial step towards 
filling these gaps by tracing the history of what we might call the 
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“translocal” (Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Anthias 2006), “periphery-to-
periphery” migration that results in Thangmi “transnational social 
formations” (Guarnizo and Smith 1998: 27) built in corners of Nepal, 
India and China, far from any of those countries’ political or economic 
centers. At the same time, I hope to broaden the parameters of the 
discussion of “transnationalism”, which has largely focused on 
migrations from so-called “peripheral” locations to cosmopolitan 
centers.4 
In this discussion, I borrow the term “transnational village” from 
Peggy Levitt (2001) to emphasize the intertwined political economies 
and kinship networks that characterize Thangmi experiences of cross-
border circular migration. The Thangmi situation is not an exclusively 
“diasporic” one, in which migrants leave home to permanently settle 
elsewhere, but rather one in which the social and economic parameters 
of home villages are simultaneously augmented and maintained by the 
experience of migration.5 I suggest that although Thangmi migration 
initially began in response to economic and social pressures, the 
persistence of Thangmi circular migration has often become a lifestyle 
choice for contemporary individuals.6 Such choices suggest that 
                                                
4 My work also contributes to Luis Guarnizo and Michael Smith’s call for studies 
“comparing the practices of the same group in different localities, whether it is a 
migrant group or a participating component of a transnational social movement, to 
determine the effect of localities” (1998: 28). 
5 Other issues surrounding the use of the term “diaspora” in the Thangmi context will 
be discussed in Chapter 6. 
6 Alpa Shah (2006) makes a related argument about the social and cultural aspects of 
internal labor migration from Jharkhand to the brick kilns of other states in India. 
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“Thangminess” has become grounded in a transnational economy of 
belonging in which experiences of, or at the very least, knowledge of, 
the particularities of multiple locations makes one’s identity complete. 
Put simply (and of course there is a great diversity of individual 
experiences), Thangmi are “richer” in Nepal than in India in terms of 
property ownership and cultural resources, but “poorer” in terms of 
social inclusion and political resources, to which Thangmi in India have 
far greater access. Time spent in the TAR adds another dimension, 
which although typically short (for most not more than one month at a 
time due to Chinese regulations), provides a reflective vantage point 
from which many Thangmi consider their long-term options in the 
other two countries. Acknowledging the contingent national histories 
that have led to different experiences in each location illuminates how 
both social and economic imperatives influence the pragmatics of 
cross-border migration, pushing and pulling in different directions to 
create the circular lives that many Thangmi choose. By continuing to 
move between Nepal, India, and the TAR, circular migrants make the 
best of three different but equally challenging worlds. 
The experience of moving between these worlds, as well as the 
interaction with multiple states that such movement entails, become in 
themselves paradigmatic features of Thangmi identity in action, both 
for those who move and those who have chosen to stay put in one 
country or another. Kinship and community networks bring settled and 
migrant Thangmi into regular contact, and in the bazaars of Darjeeling 
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and Dram (the TAR border town which adjoins Nepal, also known as 
Khasa), “Thangmi” is often used as a generic term to refer to migrant 
porters, just as the term “Sherpa” has come to mean “mountaineer”. 
For instance, a 1997 short story in Nepali entitled “Thamini Kanchi” 
(Adhikari 1997) uses the term “Thamini”—a feminized form of 
“Thami”—to describe a downtrodden woman working as a porter in 
Darjeeling bazaar, although several details of her description do not 
match those of most of the Thangmi women who do indeed work as 
wage laborers in Darjeeling bazaar (see Figure 4.4).7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Thangmi women working as porters in Darjeeling bazaar 
                                                
7 In particular, Thamini Kanchi is described as being disgusted by the fact that 
foreigners eat beef, and concerned that her son may “lose his caste” by associating 
with them. However, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, eating beef has long been a 
Thangmi consumption practice, which is not only not stigmatized, but in fact a 
marker of identity. In addition, the character Thamini Kanchi is upset by a foreign 
couple’s public display of affection. As does the concern with beef-eating, this 
concern also seems to reflect the high caste Hindu mores of the author more than it 
does those of Thangmi women. Since the short story is a work of fiction this is hardly 
grounds for criticism of the piece itself; rather my point is to show how the terms 
“Thami” and “Thamini” are popularly used as generic terms to describe porters in 
Darjeeling regardless of their ethnic particularity. 
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To their distress, relatively well-educated Thangmi born in Darjeeling 
who have never carried a heavy load find they are often assumed to be 
circular migrants from Nepal simply because of their name. In this way, 
the fact of circular wage migration impinges on the identities of all 
Thangmi, regardless of their individual economic or social positions. 
In the transnational Thangmi village, notions of belonging as a 
whole are premised upon the simultaneously occurring experiences of 
property ownership and land-based exploitation in Nepal, and the 
social mobility made possible by the comparative lack of private 
property and rigid land-based social hierarchies in Darjeeling. In other 
words, important aspects of Thangmi belonging are produced on both 
sides of the border, but neither set of experiences is complete without 
the other. I am not suggesting that all Thangmi experience both worlds 
equally; but rather that, as outlined in Chapter 2, “Thangminess” is 
produced in a synthetic process through which diverse individuals, 
with as many life experiences in as many places, enact different pieces 
of the transnational puzzle to create an overarching framework of 
belonging which allows each individual to make sense of their 
particular piece. 
 
Belonging in a Translocational World 
Attempting to understand the rationale for Thangmi circular migration 
and its resultant effects on identity by looking at either economic or 
social factors in isolation would miss the complexity that I have tried to 
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describe above. So would an approach which assumes that migrants 
primarily seek upward social mobility in a unidirectional manner; as 
would one that assumes that transnational migration to another 
country inherently entails a dislocation from one’s place of origin 
and/or an erasure of national boundaries. 
Rather, using the rubric of “belonging”, with its focus on the 
“intersectionality” of different interests in a “translocational” world 
(Anthias 2006; Yuval-Davis, Kannabiran and Vieten 2006), helps to 
clarify the interplay of forces at work in the Thangmi context. Moving 
beyond what they see as the fundamentally static nature of concepts 
like “diasporic identity” and “hybridity”—which despite recognizing 
multiple identities, still compartmentalize those identities into 
separate, building block-like components—theorists have used the 
notion of “belonging” to emphasize instead the processual 
intersectionality of people’s experiences in different locations at 
different times. Belonging adds an emotive and experiential 
component to the rights-based notion of citizenship, and an individual 
aspect to the group-based notion of ethnicity. 
Furthermore, “Belonging and social inclusion … are closely 
connected … It is through practices and experiences of social inclusion 
that a sense of a stake and acceptance in a society is created and 
maintained” (Anthias 2006: 21). “Social inclusion” has recently become 
a buzz word within development discourses in South Asia, which tend 
to conflate the noble goal of such inclusion with the process of 
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realizing it. The importance of measurable indicators at the national 
level are frequently over-emphasized, while the continued prevalence 
of deeply ingrained, localized practices of exclusion are glossed over. 
By adding an experiential, emotive aspect to the indicator-driven 
discussion of inclusion, adapting the concept of “belonging” to the 
South Asian setting encourages a necessary critical engagement with 
such discourses. 
In the European context, the “the politics of belonging” has 
largely been used to describe the forms of exclusion and inclusion that 
permanent immigrants who have left their home countries experience 
in the multi-cultural states which are their adopted homes. Applied to 
the Himalayan and South Asian contexts in which Thangmi migration 
takes place, the concept can usefully encapsulate the forms of 
inclusion and exclusion that people experience in their home 
countries, and the migrations that such experiences may compel them 
to undertake. At the same time, the Thangmi case contributes to 
ongoing attempts to balance on the one hand the importance of single 
nation-states as frameworks within which belonging is defined, and on 
the other hand, the forceful ways in which such frameworks are 
unsettled for those who move across national borders on a regular 
basis (Basch, Glick-Schiller, and Szanton-Blanc 1994, Guarnizo and 
Smith 1998, Levitt 2001). 
In an effort to develop a set of analytical tools that can cope with 
such “multiplex realities”, Anthias proposes the concept of 
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“translocational positionality” (2006: 26-28). In her formulation, 
“translocational” goes a step further than “transnational” in 
acknowledging the nuanced range of boundaries and hierarchies that 
produce feelings of belonging in a range of specific locales, some of 
which may be primarily defined by their geographical location within 
one nation-state or another, while others may be defined more 
strongly by local hierarchies or networks. As a concept, 
“translocationality” does not assume that the nation-state is the only 
frame in which positionalities are produced, instead shifting the 
emphasis to local social structures and relative levels of inclusion.8 
“Positionality” is “the space at the intersection of structure (social 
position/social effects) and agency (social positioning/meaning and 
practice)” (Anthias 2001: 635), and is “about the lived practices in 
which identification is practised/performed” (Anthias 2006: 27). 
Thangmi live along a continuum of translocational 
positionalities—from those who have never left Nepal or India to those 
who are constantly on the move, and everything in between—which are 
shaped by specific histories of exploitation and exclusion, territorial 
attachment and movement, at individual, familial, and communal 
levels. Each of these positionalities is framed both by nation-state 
                                                
8 While Anthias’ “translocationality” is a noun, a quality that individuals enact, 
Guarnizo and Smith use the related adjective “translocal” to describe the set of 
relations that creates the conditions for “translocationality”: “Translocal relations are 
constituted within historically and geographically specific points of origin and 
migration established by transmigrants. Such relations are dynamic, mutable, and 
dialectical. They form a triadic connection that links transmigrants, the localities to 
which they migrate, and their locality of origin” (1998: 13). 
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boundaries and the ever available prospect of moving across them. In 
the Thangmi context, discussions of belonging must be carefully 
calibrated to the different social locations that frame positionality at 
different moments: the nation-state, the village, the hamlet, the city, 
the bazaar, the tea plantation, the ethnic organization office, the 
district magistrate’s office, and so on. If belonging is understood to be 
only the practice and experience of social inclusion at the political level 
of the nation-state, then many Thangmi have historically not felt that 
they “belong” in Nepal. Despite the fact that most hold Nepali 
citizenship, until very recently, few Thangmi believed that they had the 
capacity to transform the political landscape Nepal in ways that might 
grant them a greater sense of belonging. It was this sense of rigidity, 
the lack of potential for change at the national level—no prospect of 
belonging—which compelled many older Thangmi to first make the 
journey to India. Yet recalling the figure of the bampa as a symbol of 
both resilience and rootedness, these same people felt very strongly 
that they belonged in their territory, in their villages, in localized 
places where they had long defined their own terms of belonging in 
relationship and resistance to local inter-ethnic status hierarchies (see 
Chapter 8). 
Upon arrival in India, Thangmi have not immediately experienced 
a greater sense of inclusion at the national level. In fact, their Nepali 
citizenship and typically low economic status has marked them even 
more strongly as outsiders, but the lack of rigid status hierarchies in 
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Darjeeling has long afforded them an opportunity to craft their own 
sense of belonging through community organizations and political 
action, creating the potential to secure recognition at the national 
level. For instance, as will be described in Chapter 5, the first Thangmi 
ethnic association in Darjeeling was registered in 1943, while the first 
such organization in Nepal was founded only 45 years later. As 
Rhoderick Chalmers has noted, in comparison to Nepal, “within India ... 
there was more potential for the founding of associations with implicit 
or explicit political aims, or at least social/religious reformist 
intentions” (2003: 207). It was in large part this potential for future 
belonging, the hope that their children would not have to fight so hard 
for social inclusion, that kept and continues to keep Thangmi coming 
back to India. This sense of potential political belonging at the national 
level in India (which until very recently was lacking in Nepal) paired 
with the strong sense of security in local, territorially-based belonging 
in Nepal (which continues to be weak in India), creates a powerful 
recipe for a “transnational social formation” of belonging. The 
reproduction of this formation, this transnational village, with all of its 
social, economic and cultural prerogatives, depends upon the 
continuation of circular migration. As Creighton Peet noted in his 1978 
study of migration, culture and community in Dolakha, “… migration 
has in part served as a mechanism for culture maintenance for the 
Thamis” (1978: 461). 
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Situated Histories of Exploitation and Exclusion in Nepal 
The epigraph with which this chapter began is a well-known Thangmi 
saying which paints a stark picture of the exploitation that many 
Thangmi feel characterizes their historical position within Nepal’s 
inter-ethnic socio-economic order. What does it actually mean, and 
how does it relate to available historical and contemporary information 
about Thangmi property ownership, incomes and inclusion—the 
empirical indicators of belonging? Written records for the Thangmi in 
particular, and the Dolakha region in general are sparse before 1950, 
but works by Mahesh Chandra Regmi (1980, 1981), Dhanavajra 
Vajracharya and Tek Bahadur Shrestha (2031 VS), and Mary Shepherd 
Slusser (1982) provide the basic historical contours regarding 
settlement patterns, land-holding, and Thangmi relationships with 
other ethnic groups and the emerging modern Nepali state. Drawing 
primarily on these written sources, as well as oral histories, in this 
section I offer a sketch of early Thangmi economic history in Nepal. 
The following section links this information to census data from India 
and oral histories about early experiences of cross-border migration. 
Kumaiko ghumai, Chhetriko jal…The term Kumai designates a 
Bahun sub-caste, members of whom were some of the earliest high-
caste settlers in historically Thangmi-populated areas of what are now 
Nepal’s Dolakha and Sindhupalchok districts. Along with several 
Chhetri families, the Kumai began to arrive in the 19th century as the 
Shah dynasty expanded its eminent domain over different parts of 
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previously quasi-independent hill Nepal.9  In the proverb, Kumai and 
Chhetri are both caricatured as slippery characters who exploit their 
Thangmi tenant farmers by giving them the run-around (ghumai) or 
entrapping them in a net (jal). 
…Newarko lekhai …The Newar community of Dolakha bazaar 
has historically occupied a position of economic and social dominance 
in the area. As an important entrepôt on the Kathmandu to Lhasa trade 
route, Slusser suggests that the town of Dolakha was most likely first 
developed as a Licchavi settlement (1982: 85), and then became an 
independent principality ruled by the ancestors of today’s Dolakha 
Newar population.10An inscription located inside the Bhimeshwor 
temple complex in Dolakha dated 688 in the Newar calendar of Nepal 
Sambat (AD 1568) includes a list of three social groups within the 
community at the time: praja, saja and thami. Vajracharya and Shrestha 
(2031 VS: 98) suggest that praja refers to the Newar population, saja 
describes the ethnically Tibetan inhabitants of the higher villages of 
Dolakha, such as the Sherpa and Tamang, and thami refers to the 
Thangmi. This inscription singles out the Thangmi as the only group 
                                                
9 In nationalist histories, Prithvi Narayan Shah’s 1769 “unification” of Nepal is cited as 
the moment of the modern nation’s birth. However, in ethnic and regional activist 
tellings of Nepali history, “domination” often replaces “unification”, and the latter is 
debunked as a “myth”. 
10 The earliest written record from the area dates to 1324 AD, in which the town is 
mentioned as the refuge destination for a deposed Mithila prince who died en route 
(Slusser 1982: 259). By 1453 AD, Dolakha was under the control of King Kirti Simha 
(Regmi 1980: 136). He and his descendants used the term dolakhadipati to designate 
themselves as rulers independent from the powers of the Kathmandu Valley. Indra 
Simha Deva demonstrated his kingdom’s economic power beyond a doubt by minting 
the first coin within Nepal’s borders in approximately 1546 AD (Regmi 1980: 171). 
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that must pay taxes to the Newar rulers on demand, suggesting that a 
Thangmi community has resided in the villages surrounding the 
market town of Dolakha since at least the 16th century, and that they 
were compelled to pay taxes to Dolakha’s Newar rulers. This 
potentially exploitative relationship was codified in writing (lekhai).11 
  …Thangmiko kal…Thangmi narratives suggest that before they 
became subject to Bahun, Chhetri, and Newar domination, they held 
large swathes of kipat (N), ancestral property, which they started to 
lose only over the last 150 years as high-caste families originating 
from regions further west migrated to Dolakha and appropriated 
Thangmi holdings (see Chapter 6 for further discussion of kipat and its 
implications). The Thangmi, in turn, moved east to Darjeeling and 
beyond. Buddha Laxmi, one of the oldest Thangmi women in Dolakha’s 
Suspa-Kshamawati VDC, explained: 
 
When I was a small child there were only ten houses in total 
between Pashelung and Ramedanda [two hamlets about one mile 
apart], and now there are 96. There were three houses in 
Gumphung [another hamlet], now there are 19. There was only one 
Budathoki [Chhetri] house then, now there are six…Those people 
came later. They started to come in my grandfather’s time, more 
came to give us trouble during my father’s time. He had to go to 
court to defend his land. There were no positive relations between 
the Bahun-Chhetri and Thangmi, only fights.12 
                                                
11 The historical and ritual relationships between the Thangmi and Dolakha Newar are 
further discussed in Chapters 6 and 8, while the power embedded in the act of 
writing is discussed in Chapter 3. 
12 Thangmi often use the hyphenated phrase Bahun-Chhetri to refer to anyone from 
either of those groups, but this usage fails to recognize the real differences in 
cultural practice and economic status between the two. The Nepal Inclusion Index 
(Bennett and Parajuli 2008) shows these disparities clearly, with Chhetris 
substantially less well-off than Bahuns nationwide. 
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This increase in population density and shift in land ownership was in 
part the result of shifting relationships between Dolakha and the 
central Nepali state. By the middle of the 18th century, although 
Dolakha remained nominally independent, the area’s villagers came 
under the jurisdiction of King Jagajjaya Malla’s tax collectors. 
Documents show that several villagers registered complaints of 
harassment against his tax collecting officials (Regmi 1981: 12-13). 
During the same time period, the tradition of awarding military 
officials and civil servants land tracts as jagir (N) in lieu of cash 
payment began. After Prithvi Narayan Shah annexed Dolakha, this 
practice became commonplace, with army officials receiving payments 
in land that had previously been farmed by Thangmi inhabitants of the 
area. The redistribution of land accelerated under the rule of prime 
minister Bhimsen Thapa, when in 1862 VS (1805-1806 AD) he 
confiscated 82 khet (N), or 8,200 muri (N), of rice land in Dolakha as 
jagir for the army (Regmi 1981: 15).13  
After first settling in the area on such jagir tracts, many of the 
less scrupulous new migrants began appropriating further lands by 
acting as moneylenders to their Thangmi neighbors. Charging high 
interest rates of up to 60% per annum, such moneylenders made it very 
difficult for Thangmi farmers to pay back their loans, and when a 
                                                
13 Khet means simply “wet cultivated field”, while muri is a specific measurement of a 
field’s yield, equaling approximately 160 pounds of harvested grain. 
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borrower defaulted, the lender would foreclose on his land. Man 
Bahadur, a village elder in Chokati, Sindhupalcok, described the 
situation of diminishing trust as follows: 
 
Originally there were only Thangmi in this area. Eventually, the 
Bahun-Chhetri came and stole our land. In the old days, Thangmi 
would count their days of work by making marks on a piece of 
wood or making knots in a string. This habit was based on trust of 
each other, and trust between employers and employed. This trust 
was destroyed by the Bahuns…What used to cost Rs. 2 (for land) 
now costs Rs. 20,000, so even a debt that sounds small of a few 
rupees was actually big. People had to work off their debt to the 
Bahuns by working on their land, and if they couldn’t pay their 
debts in cash, they had to pay by giving up pieces of their land. 
In this way, many Thangmi either went deeply into debt, and/or 
became tenant sharecroppers on portions of the land that they had 
previously owned. However, most families were able to hold on to 
enough arable land to feed themselves for several months of the year. 
With insufficient land to survive, but too much to abandon, the 
economic scenario in Nepal’s Thangmi villages at the end of the 19th 
century encouraged circular migration as a means of maintaining 
traditional lands, while augmenting their agrarian yield with cash 
income.14 
 
The Beginnings of Migration to Darjeeling and Beyond 
…Chiyako botma sun phulcha…At roughly the same historical moment 
that the appropriation of Thangmi land accelerated in the mid-19th 
                                                
14 See also K. Pradhan (1991) for a general description of these historical dynamics in 
eastern Nepal. 
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century, new income-generating opportunities began to emerge in 
Darjeeling. In 1835, the British took control of this virtually 
uninhabited tract of forested land, which had earlier changed hands 
several times between the ruling powers of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. 
Darjeeling’s strategically situated ridgeline, which overlooked the 
plains of Bengal to the south and the mountains of Sikkim to the north, 
was to become a bustling hill station for holidaying colonial 
administrators—known as the “Queen of the Hills”—and the center of 
colonial tea production (Kennedy 1996, Q. Pradhan 2007). When the 
British first surveyed the area in 1835, they recorded a total population 
of only 100 (Samanta 2000: 21), and these were largely indigenous 
semi-nomadic members of the Lepcha ethnic group. Building 
infrastructure required workers, and the tea industry founded in the 
mid-1850s called for especially vast human resources. This is where 
the Thangmi and other Nepalis came in.15 
Many of the earliest Thangmi migrants came to work on tea 
estates. First one or two men from a single village would establish 
themselves as trusted workers, and might eventually be promoted to 
the role of overseer and recruiter.16 Traveling back to Nepal every few 
                                                
15 Migration from the hills of Nepal to Darjeeling was by no means an exclusively 
Thangmi phenomenon. Members of virtually every one of Nepal’s caste and ethnic 
groups made their way to Darjeeling and other parts of India during the same 
historical period. What remains unique about the Thangmi situation, however, is the 
ongoing prevalence of cross-border migration, a practice engaged in only minimally 
by other groups. 
16 I write “men” intentionally. Although one of the intriguing features of contemporary 
tea plantation life is that men and women are employed in a roughly egalitarian 
manner, oral histories suggest that in the early days, British managers preferred men 
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years, they would return to the plantations with fresh new labor 
procured through their kinship networks. The tea plantation of 
Tumsong (often pronounced Tamsang) is a case in point, where the 
first Thangmi overseer arrived from Dolakha’s Lapilang village in the 
late 1800s. He was one of the first Thangmi to settle in the area, and 
many Darjeeling Thangmi can trace their ancestry back to him. 
Tumsong tea plantation maintains a majority Thangmi labor force to 
this day, due to the rules of tenure and inheritance that have governed 
tea plantation jobs and accommodation since the colonial era.17 
Another important feature of Darjeeling’s colonial tea economy 
was that almost all large tracts of land were owned either by 
government or private tea companies, with small allotments granted to 
plantation workers on which they had temporary rights, but could not 
own. This meant that there was no prospect of property ownership for 
Thangmi migrants, who encountered for the first time a mode of 
economic production different from the agrarian, subsistence farming 
economy they had known in Nepal.18 As the protagonist in Lainsing 
                                                                                                                                       
coming alone for seasonal labor to do the initial work of clearing forest to plant tea. 
Only several years later, after it became clear that the tea crop would be successful 
and year-round labor was needed were men encouraged to bring their families to 
settle. Thereafter women were also employed, and they continue to constitute a 
substantial portion of the tea plantation workforce today. See Chatterjee (2001) for 
an analysis of gender on contemporary tea plantations. 
17 See Chatterjee (2001) for details of this system. 
18 Some families from Nepal who became close to British colonial administrators were 
granted property in the area as rewards for their good service, most notably the 
Newar Pradhans. Although they farmed cash crops, such as oranges and cardamom, 
providing additional opportunities for Thangmi and other wage laborers from Nepal, 
such farms were part of a larger cash economy, and Nepal’s land-based status 
hierarchies were never replicated. 
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Bangdel’s Nepali-language novel, Muluk Bahira (“Outside the Country”) 
describes the situation he encountered in India upon emigrating from 
Nepal, “Although there was no land or kipat [ancestral land exempt 
from taxes] in Mugalan [India], one could earn enough to feed one’s 
stomach” (as cited in Hutt 1998: 203).19 
Besides tea, Darjeeling’s other major attraction was the British 
army recruitment center which opened in Darjeeling in 1857. 
Enlistment in the Gurkhas became a prize objective for many young 
men from Nepal’s so-called “martial races”, a group from which the 
Thangmi were excluded (recall that the recruitment officers Northey 
and Morris dismissed them as “coarse in appearance, and the inferior 
of the other races in social and religious matters, they do not merit 
further description” [1928: 260]).20 But this did not stop some Thangmi 
from joining up under assumed names and living a double life as Rai, 
Gurung or Magar. 
The British preference for certain “races” did not seem to apply 
to non-enlisted men responsible for road building and other support 
services, and many Thangmi were contracted by the army and paid a 
daily wage for their work. Substantial numbers of Thangmi worked in 
Darjeeling, Sikkim, Assam, and as far as Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh 
                                                
19 Tanka Subba (1989) provides an overview of economic relations in Darjeeling. 
Chapter 6 of this dissertation discusses the historical and contemporary meanings of 
kipat. 
20 Again, these employment opportunities in the army were only open to men. Later 
on, men who had served in the army might bring their families to settle and/or to do 
seasonal labor in the hospitality sector once Darjeeling resorts began to boom. 
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in road building gangs, which for many defined their migrant 
experience. When asked where they worked, many older Thangmi said 
simply, “We went to the road”.21 Often, they do not know the names of 
the specific places in which they worked, and the English term “road” is 
used to denote transient road-building sites which were a focal point 
of their experience. 
The rapid development of Darjeeling and its environs, through 
the powerful combination of tea, resorts, roads and a strategic border 
to defend, led to astronomical population growth in the area. 
According to Kennedy, Darjeeling “experienced the most rapid rate of 
growth on record for nineteenth-century Bengal” (1996: 184). By 1881, 
88,000 residents of Darjeeling had been born district, comprising over 
60% of the total district population (Samanta 2000: 22).  
It is hard to know how many of these were Thangmi. The 1872 
Census of India lists 13 Thangmi language speakers in Darjeeling, a 
number which had risen to 319 by 1901 (Grierson 1909: 280). 
However, these numbers are just the beginning of the contentious 
politics of the census for Thangmi in both India and Nepal, and must 
be taken with a grain of salt. Due to self-misrepresentation of 
themselves as members of other groups (largely for army recruitment 
purposes) and the preference for the Nepali language as a lingua 
franca in Darjeeling’s multi-ethnic context, it is likely that these 
                                                
21 Original Nepali: Hami ‘road’ ma gayo. 
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census figures, which are intriguingly based on language rather than 
ethnicity, substantially under-represent the real numbers of Thangmi. 
“We spoke Thangmi secretly”, explained a senior Thangmi resident of 
Darjeeling about language use there during the early part of the 
century. Thangmi were as eager as the rest to be including in the pan-
Nepali political identity that was emerging in Darjeeling at the time, 
with the Nepali language as its cornerstone, so speaking Thangmi in 
public was not a popular practice. 
 
Pre-1950 Narratives of Migration: Seeking Employment and Inclusion 
In this section I present excerpts from interviews with several older 
Thangmi who migrated from Nepal to Darjeeling before 1950. Some 
immediately settled in India, others went back and forth between the 
two countries seasonally for several years and then settled in India at a 
much later date, while still others traveled between the two countries 
seasonally for several years but ultimately settled in Nepal. 
Each of these narratives emphasizes different particular life 
experiences that led to migration, but all have in common a desire to 
leave the challenging economic situation of land pressure and debt in 
Nepal, and the social exclusion and oppression that accompanied it. 
They highlight the relatively unstructured, unhierarchical nature of 
Darjeeling society at the time, at least when compared to Nepal, where 
regardless of ethnic identity or class, one could get ahead by working 
hard. In addition, since everyone in Darjeeling was a migrant—the area 
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was virtually unpopulated until 1835, and private property ownership 
was highly restricted due to the dominance of the tea estates—the 
opportunities for land-based exploitation endemic in Nepal’s agrarian 
setting were reduced in Darjeeling’s emerging cash economy. 
 Bir Bahadur, who was born in Dolakha’s Lapilang village and 
engaged in circular migration for many years before finally settling in 
Darjeeling, explained: 
 
My father had a loan. I came back here [to Darjeeling] after 
paying it off. In one month, it accrued Rs. 10 interest on Rs. 100. 
It was a loan from Lapilang’s maila [N: middle-brother] 
headman. In those days, they really oppressed us. Because they 
were rich and we were poor, they had us harnessed to the plow 
like oxen. It’s not like that here [in Darjeeling]. 
Bir Bahadur’s pride at being able to pay back his father’s loan after a 
few seasons of work in Darjeeling was evident, and demonstrates one 
of the economic imperatives which initially made circular migration an 
attractive strategy for many Thangmi from Nepal. By earning cash in 
Darjeeling, where migrants could keep costs low by staying in cheap 
accommodation like Khaldo Hotel and then using it to pay off debts 
back in Nepal, Thangmi could ensure that their ancestral property was 
not appropriated by creditors. “We were able keep our bampa”22—that 
hearth-side stony icon of resilience and territorial attachment—as 
another migrant who paid off debts with Darjeeling-earned cash put it. 
However, most earned just enough to pay off their debts and maintain 
                                                
22 Original Nepali: Bampa rakhna payo. 
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the status quo, but not to actually transform the socio-economic 
order. As Creighton Peet observed, “For the majority of Thamis … 
circular migration has brought just enough income to pay off debts 
and regain some economic independence from the moneylenders and 
large landowners. Much of their earnings go, in fact, into the hands of 
their wealthy Bahun-Chhetri patrons and thus help to support this 
latter group’s dominant position in the community” (1978: 461). 
Harka Bahadur, a senior stalwart of the Thangmi community in 
Darjeeling, who became known as “Amrikan” because he had worked 
with American soldiers in the Burma theater of World War II in an army 
support role, described a different scenario. His parents’ relatively 
substantial property holding in Nepal became inadequate due to a 
surfeit of sons, leading him to test the greener pastures of Darjeeling’s 
cash economy. As the youngest of six brothers, Amrikan knew that he 
would have little chance of inheriting an adequate piece of ancestral 
property. Birth order and family size were important factors in shaping 
who would migrate and when within each individual family. Based on 
his research in Nepal, Peet concluded that these two factors were not 
in themselves predictive of who might migrate (1978: 386), but my 
research in Darjeeling shows that men like Amrikan were very 
conscious of their particular constellation of family size, sibling order, 
and land inheritance as they made choices for ongoing circular 
migration or permanent settlement in Darjeeling. It was not that 
Amrikan’s position at the bottom of a big family’s age-status order led 
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him inevitably to migrate to Darjeeling and ultimately settle there; for 
many other migrants, superficially similar backgrounds led to different 
choices, like those of the man who decided to settle in Darjeeling 
because “my youngest brother ‘ate’ all of our land”.23 Rather, each 
individual’s family situation strongly conditioned the range of options 
that they might choose. 
Amrikan described his first impressions of Darjeeling as follows: 
 
When I first came here, while I was looking for work, I could tell 
Thangmi from their faces, and I would also ask, “Are you Thangmi?” 
and when they said, “We are Thangmi” I would ask, “Where are you 
from?” and when they said “We are from Dolakha Dui Number”, then 
we knew each other.24 That was a good time. Ethnicity was not that 
important, it was only much later that there was any competition. At 
that time, you could earn one or two anna [N: coin = 1/16 of a 
rupee] a day, putting it all together in a week you’d have 10 or 15 
anna. In this place full of money, we were all equal. 
Amrikan’s description, although perhaps unrealistically utopian, 
suggests that in Darjeeling, social exclusion was not a major problem 
for Thangmi in the way it had been in Nepal. The fixed hierarchies that 
Thangmi migrants had known in their village homes came unmoored in 
this “place of money”, where everyone had an “equal” chance. 
 Silipitik, a senior figure in Dolakha’s Pashelung village, who 
engaged in circular migration for most of his life, but eventually settled 
in Nepal, described his contrasting experiences in the two countries as 
follows: 
                                                
23 Original Nepali: Bhaile hamro sabai jaga khai diyo. 
24 Dui Number “Number Two” was the Nepali administrative zone within Dolakha 
district fell before the country’s reorganization into 75 districts. 
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Over there, no one talked about caste or ethnicity unless you were 
in the army. Here, everyone is always harping on about it, who is 
high and who is low, who is big and who is small. There everyone 
just worked hard. I remember a speech I heard once in Judge Bazaar 
[one of Darjeeling’s central public squares], where a man said, 
“Here, there is no caste and no ethnicity, no high and no low. Here, 
there are only two categories we need to know about, male and 
female. There are no other divisions in our society.”25 I liked what he 
said so much, I never forgot it. There, it really was that way, here it 
never will be. I only came back because I had no brothers and had 
to care for my mother and our land when she got old, otherwise I 
would have stayed in that place where people could make speeches 
like that. 
Silipitik’s nostalgic reminiscences of this speech, which he repeated to 
me on several occasions, seemed to encapsulate a powerful moment in 
the development of his own awareness of the different frames that 
Nepal and India respectively offered for the articulation of belonging. 
Both in listening to the speech and reflecting on it years later, he 
became aware of the ways in which his own life was marked by the 
hierarchies and structures of each location and nation-state that he 
had experienced in his life of circular migration, and the choices he 
had ultimately made between them.  
Silipitik, like most Thangmi migrants, had been to Tibet several 
times before ever going to Darjeeling. Although they would travel 
north from their Himalayan border homes to the towns of Dram/Khasa 
and Nyalam/Kuti (as the towns were called in Tibetan and Nepali 
respectively) to trade their grain for salt several times a year, the 
Thangmi never developed trading conglomerates like those well-
                                                
25 Silipitik could not identify the speaker or the political context of this event. 
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documented among the Sherpa, Newar, Thakali, and Manangi 
communities (von Fürer-Haimendorf 1975, J. Fisher 1986,  Lewis 1993, 
Vinding 1998, Watkins 1996). Instead, they would travel alone or in 
small groups on the rough mountain trail that, in just a few long days 
of walking, brought them directly over the mountains to Khasa and 
Kuti. 
Dhanbir, a Thangmi man from Dolakha who had been to Tibet 
17 times before the border closed, described his most enduring 
memories of the place as follows: 
 
The Tibetans called us Rongsha or Rongba. They didn’t think we 
Thangmi were different from other Nepalis. Everyone from this area 
traveled up there: Thangmi, Newar, Tamang, even Bahun and 
Chhetri. The Tibetans were friendly and didn’t seem to differentiate 
between different ethnic groups, either within their own community 
or among Nepalis. 
From an outsider’s perspective at least, in Tibet, as in Darjeeling, the 
particulars of ethnicity did not seem to matter in the same way as they 
did back in Nepal.26 Certainly, Thangmi were different from Tibetans, 
but they were not immediately placed in a low status category, nor 
were they taken advantage of. Thangmi joked about how Tibetans 
could not differentiate between Newar and Thangmi, who often 
traveled up from Dolakha at the same time. Some Thangmi had 
Tibetan mit—a fictive kin relation created between trading partners 
from different ethnic groups—a fact often recounted to me to 
                                                
26 Tibetan societies have their own social hierarchies, which may not have been 
evident to Thangmi within the relatively short and superficial context of trading 
relationships. See Fjeld (2008). 
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emphasize the relatively non-hierarchical nature of Thangmi 
relationships with Tibetans. In these ways, the local status hierarchies 
which structured Thangmi lives in Nepal were unsettled by their 
contrasting experiences in Tibet, as well as in India. 
The proximity of many Thangmi villages to Khasa and Kuti 
meant that until the Sino-Nepali border was closed in the 1950s, most 
immediate trading needs were taken care of in these Tibetan towns. 
Between these trading trips to the north and wage labor done in 
Darjeeling, there was little need for Thangmi to go to Kathmandu. Few 
Thangmi visited the city until much later (and the settled population in 
Nepal’s capital is still extremely small compared to that of other 
groups—with under 400 Thangmi permanently residing in the city in 
2006), a fact which suggests that the Nepali nation-state, with 
Kathmandu at its political center, was not the most prominent frame of 
reference in which Thangmi defined their sense of belonging. Rather, 
they had a trans-Himalayan sense of belonging, grounded in particular 
localities of Dolakha, Sindhupalchok, Darjeeling, Sikkim, Khasa, Kuti 
and beyond. As argued above, maintaining this translocational 
positionality—and the economic strategies that supported it—
depended upon regular movement across borders, rather than upon 
strong legal or emotional ties to any single nation-state. 
With the pattern of permanent settlement in Darjeeling so strong 
among other ethnic groups of Nepali heritage, why did so many 
Thangmi continue to practice circular migration instead of severing 
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ties with Nepal and settling permanently in India?27 Guarnizo and Smith 
pose a similar question in more general terms: 
 
A critical unanswered question raised by scholars of 
transnational migration is whether transnational practices and 
relations are merely an evanescent phenomenon which will not 
last beyond first generation migrants. Or, by contrast, are 
transnational social practices becoming an enduring structural 
characteristic of global social organization? (1998: 15) 
The Thangmi experience in Darjeeling suggests that the answer to this 
question is particular to each group and their historical, social and 
economic situation. With apparently so much in common with other 
migrants from Nepal to Darjeeling—many of whom also experienced 
economic exploitation and social exclusion—one wonders why the 
Thangmi relationship to the place followed a somewhat different 
trajectory. Several factors seem to have been at play. First of all, the 
Thangmi population numbers in Darjeeling were tiny compared to 
those of other groups. For example, the 1872 Census which 
enumerated 13 Thangmi speakers listed 6,754 Rai, 6,567 Tamang, and 
1,120 Newar. With so many more members, the other ethnic groups 
were better situated to recreate their communities in full in a new 
location, while many Thangmi may have felt uncomfortable settling 
permanently in a place where they were so few in number and it was 
difficult to create social networks and maintain cultural practices. 
Second of all, although one tea estate did have a majority Thangmi 
                                                
27 Hutt cites a 1974 survey in which out of 411 ethnically Nepali residents of 
Darjeeling tea estates, 48% had never traveled outside the district and only 13% had 
ever visited Nepal (1997: 123). 
 
 
 235 
work force as described above, this was an exception rather than the 
norm. In general, most Thangmi survived on short-term wage labor 
and did not receive the right to settle on tea estate property. Combined 
with lack of easy access to lucrative army jobs (unless one lied about 
one’s identity), these factors meant that compared to the other groups, 
Thangmi existence in Darjeeling was relatively insecure from a long-
term perspective, although the short-term earnings could be 
substantial. 
Ultimately, although the structures of social exclusion so 
prevalent in Nepal were substantially softened in Darjeeling, the reality 
was far from Amrikan or Silipitik’s nostalgic descriptions of an 
egalitarian utopia. While “those entering Darjeeling … were free from 
the Muluki Ain promulgated in Nepal” (Pradhan 2004: 11)—free from 
the structures of oppression as legislated by the Nepali state—they 
were not necessarily free from the practices of oppression that traveled 
with migrant Nepalis to Darjeeling. Such hierarchies did not disappear 
overnight, and despite the potential for economic mobility, socially 
speaking the Thangmi continued to be treated as low men on the 
social totem pole. As the Nepali community in Darjeeling began to 
fashion a self-consciously modern ethnic identity within India in the 
early 20th century, its scions sought to excise evidence of 
“backwardness”, of which poor migrant laborers from Nepal, like most 
Thangmi, were constant reminders. Rhoderick Chalmers suggests that, 
“An inevitable concomitant of the emergence of a more concrete and 
 
 
 236 
precisely defined conception of Nepaliness was the parallel 
development of new paradigms of exclusion” (2003: 172). The 
historical details of how Thangmi experienced this exclusion, and how 
they set about rectifying it, will be discussed in the next chapter. In 
this kind of environment—where Thangmi were not so badly exploited 
and excluded as they were in Nepal, but were not exactly included 
either—perhaps it made good sense to maintain their claim to the only 
place they knew that they belonged: the small pieces of property in 
Nepal on which their sense of territorial identity was premised. 
 
Nation-States on the Rise and the Making of Dual Citizens 
Three historical events around 1950 radically altered the political 
contexts that framed Thangmi transnational social formations: Indian 
independence in 1947, and the ensuing Indo-Nepal Friendship Treaty 
of 1950; Nepal’s first period of democracy in 1950-1951; and China’s 
occupation of Tibet from 1950 onwards, which led to the closure of 
Nepal’s northern border for the better part of a decade. Each of these 
events marked for its respective country the transition to a modern 
nation-state. Both ideas of citizenship and of national boundaries were 
redefined, affecting the ways in which Thangmi circular lives were 
structured. 
The 1950 Indo-Nepali Friendship Treaty for the first time 
defined the notion of citizenship in a way that mattered for Thangmi 
circular migrants. Article 7 of the treaty created trouble for all Indian 
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citizens of Nepali heritage, since, “According to the treaty every 
Nepali-speaking person in India is a temporary citizen of the country” 
(Timsina 1992: 51), and, “those who are Indian nationals cannot easily 
prove their citizenship when the Treaty makes no distinction between 
them and Nepalese nationals” (Hutt 1997: 124). For Thangmi moving 
back and forth between Nepal and India, the concept of a singular 
citizenship in one nation-state was new; as was the very idea of a 
clearly bounded nation-state which accorded citizens “rights” in 
exchange for exclusive allegiance. As Yuval-Davis et al. put it, 
following Cohen, “citizenship has not always been related to a nation-
state” (2006: 2).28 
Latte Apa, Darjeeling’s senior Thangmi guru originally from the 
village of Alampu in Dolakha, explained: 
 
When we first came, we did not say ‘this is Nepal’ and ‘this is 
India’. We had to walk for 10 or 12 days through the hills, and 
one day was no different from the next. It was only when we saw 
the train that we said, ‘This must be India’. We knew that there 
was no train in Nepal. And then there were the saheb [the 
British]. They did not come to Nepal. Only after they left was 
there trouble. Then people said “Are you Indian?” and we had to 
think about it. 
Many Thangmi described the early 1950s as a challenging time to be in 
India. Questions of national allegiance were on the table, and given the 
fact that many Thangmi were indeed only “temporary citizens” of India, 
those who wanted to stay felt particularly hard-pressed to demonstrate 
                                                
28 Hutt’s summary of the Nepali language literature of migration confirms this point: 
“There are very few references in these texts to the political entities of Nepal and 
India: the émigrés move between Pahar and Mugalan” (1998: 202). 
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their Indianness. It was at this historical moment that some Darjeeling 
Thangmi, such as the family of the Tumsong tea plantation overseer, 
intentionally attempted to sever their ties with their brethren in Nepal 
in order to assimilate their linguistic and cultural practices to the 
Indian mainstream. As Tumsong’s current patriarch explained to me, 
“My father said, ‘Our family has been here for generations. You are not 
to talk with those from Nepal. We do not need the Thangmi language 
or shamans, those are for the pahar, not for India.’” Other Thangmi 
took the opposite approach, such as the guru Rana Bahadur, as 
described in Chapter 3, who decided that this was the moment to 
return permanently to Nepal, with the promise of democracy and land 
reform there suggesting that the social order might become more 
flexible. Such returnees took with them all that they had learned from 
their experiences in India, and in many cases remained both socially 
and economically linked to Darjeeling, sending their children to work 
there later (they could always contact an uncle or friend who had 
settled in India) while slowly expanding their property base in Nepal 
with the money they had earned. 
For the vast majority, however, these changes were only a 
temporary disturbance until they came to understand the new 
system(s) and realized that they could procure at least some of the 
documents of citizenship in both locations. Such documents did not 
change others’ attitudes towards them—in India they would always be 
stereotyped as Nepali, and in Nepal those born in India would be 
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stereotyped as outsiders—but these papers did provide legal 
instruments with which to maintain property ownership in Nepal while 
simultaneously working in India. 
Neither Nepal nor India grants citizenship automatically at birth. 
Rather, in Nepal it must be “made” (N: nagarikta banaunu), while in 
India, people speak of “registering” themselves as citizens (N: darta 
garnu). Although it has been legitimately argued that these processes 
can make it difficult for deserving citizens to obtain papers, from 
another perspective, the intentionality required (Nepali or Indian 
citizenship does not just happen to you) accords a certain level of 
agency to prospective citizens to choose which combination of 
documents they want. Since holding papers from both countries is 
technically illegal, I have not been able to conduct ethnographic 
fieldwork about the specific processes through which people obtained 
either or both. However, many Thangmi alluded to the fact that 
obtaining some Indian documents—particularly voter registration 
cards—was not difficult, since from the first post-Independence 
elections onwards, local politicians in Darjeeling had viewed circular 
migrants as a secret weapon with which to boost their voter base, and 
were therefore eager to register them as voters. Although the ration 
card was supposed to precede the voter card, with the latter issued on 
the basis of the former, many Thangmi apparently went the other way 
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around, obtaining a ration card by showing their voter card and 
complaining that they had not received or had lost the former.29 
In Nepal, the nagarikta citizenship document must be applied for 
after the age of 16 on the basis of one’s father’s citizenship document 
in the locality in which he is, or was, registered. As long as the father 
holds citizenship, the son is entitled to it in that locality regardless of 
whether he was born there or has ever lived there.30 For many 
Darjeeling Thangmi families, keeping the inheritance of nagarikta alive 
became an important strategy to maintain landholdings in Nepal, since 
non-Nepali citizens may not own land. Many young Thangmi men born 
in Darjeeling described their first trip to Nepal as a rite of passage at 
the age of 16 or soon thereafter to “make” their citizenship and visit 
their family’s ancestral land holdings. This practice has clearly been 
ongoing for generations, since several of the men who told me such 
stories had fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers born in 
Darjeeling—but all still held Nepali nagarikta. Most recently, Nepali 
citizenship has become a much sought after commodity for Thangmi 
from India who wish to work abroad in the Middle East or beyond, 
since popular wisdom has it that it is much easier to get a visa as a 
Nepali than as an Indian (I do not know whether this is true, and if so, 
                                                
29 Although some individuals were able to procure ration cards in this manner, many 
also complained that it was difficult, and although they did have voter registration 
cards, they did not have ration cards, which were the mark of full citizenship. 
30 Nepal’s citizenship laws have only very recently changed (in 2006) to allow women 
to pass on citizenship to their children as well. 
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why). In all of these ways, holding at least partial dual citizenship 
papers has become the norm, rather than the exception, for many 
Thangmi. Few people I interviewed seemed to feel conflict over their 
obligations to more than one nation-state. Rather, they felt that given 
their level of social exclusion at the national level in Nepal, and their 
lack of property ownership in India, both states in a way owed them 
the opportunity to also belong to the other. 
While notions of citizenship and national borders were being 
defined between India and Nepal, the Chinese occupation of Tibet led 
to the closure of the northern border across which Thangmi had long 
traveled. The opening of a newly redefined border in 1960 radically 
altered Thangmi sensibilities of their national positionality, as this 
quotation from Dhanbir illustrates: 
 
In those days, Kuti [Nyalam] was closer and easier to reach than 
Kathmandu. We did most of our business in Kuti. We did not 
think of Kuti as a very different country, although it was high up 
in the mountains and people spoke a different language, like 
they did in Dolakha and Sailung [where Newar and Tamang were 
respectively spoken]. There was no ‘border’ or ‘checking’. You 
had to store your khukuri [N: large curved knife] with local 
headmen when you arrived and pay tax to them when you left. 
But suddenly the border closed and everything changed. We 
heard that the Chinese had come and now Kuti was theirs. We 
could not go. From then on we had to go to Kathmandu, before 
that there was no reason to go there. 
Political changes in a neighboring nation-state contributed towards 
reorienting Thangmi relationships with their own; with Kuti 
inaccessible, Thangmi began traveling to Kathmandu more regularly to 
procure basic goods, and concomitantly began to conceptualize 
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themselves as citizens within Nepal’s national framework. However, 
there were no roads from the Thangmi region to Kathmandu until the 
mid-1960s (the Arniko Highway from Kathmandu to Lhasa, which runs 
through Sindhupalchok, was completed in 1966, and the linked Jiri 
road from Khadichaur to Dolakha was completed only in 1985), and 
walking to Kathmandu from Thangmi villages still took up to a week—
not much less than going all the way to Darjeeling. Moreover, there 
were few immediate opportunities for work in Kathmandu, since the 
labor jobs that Thangmi would have been qualified for were already 
filled by others (largely by low-caste Jyapu Newar and Tamang from 
villages closer to the city). This meant that although Kathmandu 
became the desired destination for short-term trading, the closure of 
the Tibetan border did not have much effect on established patterns of 
circular migration to Darjeeling. 
 The changes in Tibet, however, did present one other option to a 
very small sub-group of Thangmi who lived at the northernmost fringe 
of the region, right up against what was to become the Sino-Nepali 
border in the Lapchi area. In 1960, China and Nepal entered into a 
series of boundary agreements and treaties, which included a strategic 
trade of two villages previously in Nepal for two villages previously in 
Tibet.31 Although they were a minority in these predominantly Sherpa 
villages, a small number of Thangmi families were affected by these 
                                                
31 For details see http://bordernepal.wordpress.com/2007/01/19/nepal-china-
border-demarcation/. Accessed September 8, 2008. 
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events. Along with the rest of the villagers, they were given the option 
of staying in their homes and becoming Chinese citizens (with no easy 
option for dual citizenship, since China enforced borders and 
paperwork rigorously), or moving away to remain Nepali citizens. A 
small number of Thangmi chose to become Chinese, but in doing so 
they essentially gave up their ethnic identity and assimilated to the 
dominant Sherpa group in the area, who were listed as an ethnic 
population by the national classification projects of Chinese ethnology 
in the 1950s. Many other Thangmi derided the choices of these 
individuals at the time, but they were forced to reconsider later when 
China leapt ahead of Nepal economically. During my fieldwork in the 
TAR in 2005, I documented a small number of Thangmi from Nepal 
who were attempting to claim Chinese citizenship in Nyalam and Dram 
through certification as Chinese Sherpa, usually by marriage to bona 
fide Chinese citizens, but occasionally through protracted residence on 
temporary labor permits. Those trying to claim Chinese citizenship 
were only a very small percentage of the much larger numbers of 
Thangmi who spent one month at a time in this Sino-Tibetan-Nepali 
border zone, taking advantage of China’s economic strength to boost 
their earnings from Darjeeling and other emerging locations closer to 
home. More importantly, as described in the introduction to this 
dissertation, those who sought to claim Chinese citizenship disclaimed 
their Thangmi identity, and therefore are not discussed further here. 
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The Future of Circular Migration and Thangmi Belonging 
Although there have been many important historical events since 1960 
in all of the nation-states in which Thangmi spend time (each of which 
could make a chapter in itself), I now jump to the present and 
speculate about the future of both Thangmi circular migration and 
notions of belonging. Despite the particularities of the last several 
decades of history, there is no question that since the 1950s, ideals of 
national identity have become ever clearer in all three countries in 
question, as constitutions have been propagated, national languages 
promoted, and the symbolic repertoire of national hegemony 
solidified. The reality, however, is that for the most part, until recently 
Thangmi have remained only peripherally engaged by these domains 
of national belonging, preferring to define belonging in reference to 
the multiple localities of their transnational village. 
 At the time that I conducted fieldwork in Darjeeling in 2004-
2005, circular migration was alive and well, and in fact both the 
numbers of Thangmi migrants in India and the duration of their stays 
had increased due to the Maoist-state conflict in Nepal (during 
Darjeeling’s Gorkhaland agitation in the late 1980s, the opposite had 
occurred). Yet Nepal’s civil conflict, along with other local, national, 
and international dynamics of development and migration, has also 
brought about a new set of opportunities for Thangmi in Nepal. These 
dynamics have combined to create a substantial out-migration of 
high-caste individuals and families from Dolakha and Sindhupalchok. 
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Some have gone to Kathmandu, while others have moved to Charikot 
(Dolakha’s district headquarters) or Bahrabise, both emergent regional 
centers, to start businesses or work in government or development. 
Still others have joined the growing number of international Nepali 
migrants going to study or work in white collar jobs in urban India, the 
Middle East, the US, or elsewhere. All of these lifestyle transformations 
require substantial amounts of capital—to buy land in Kathmandu, 
invest in a business in a regional town, or finance a ticket abroad—so 
over the last decade, many of the high-caste land-owners of the 
region have divested themselves of substantial portions of their 
property. In response, in an example of what Tania Li has called 
“indigenous microcapitalism” (forthcoming), Thangmi have begun 
buying pieces of land vacated by those who once used it as a tool of 
exploitation against them.  
Where has the money for such purchases come from? In part 
from newly emerging sites of wage labor closer to home—a Thangmi-
owned slate mine in Alampu,32 chicken farms and furniture factories in 
Charikot, hydroelectric plants in Sindhupalchok, and local road 
construction projects, to name a few—which allow workers to keep 
more of their hard earned wages by living and eating at home. Some 
individuals have also taken out low-interest loans from micro-credit 
institutions like the Agricultural Development Bank in order to finance 
                                                
32 See Dipesh Kharel’s award-winning film A Life with Slate and his accompanying MA 
thesis (2006). 
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such purchases, which they are then able to pay back over time with 
money saved from being able to live off their own land. 
As Bir Bahadur, one of the early migrants, said about the 
changed situation in Nepal from his vantage point in Darjeeling, “Now 
they can’t oppress us, the Thangmi have won and the Chhetri have all 
gone to Kathmandu.” He had heard about these shifts from his 
nephews, who continued to travel back and forth between Nepal and 
India. Why were they still doing so if the environment was indeed now 
more favorable in Nepal? “It’s fun to travel with my friends and see how 
things are done in other places. Also I don’t have to eat off of my 
parents’ land” said one young migrant. Another older man added, “It’s 
how we Thangmi enjoy ourselves.” 
Recalling that choices for circular migration were historically 
diversified across families throughout the entire transnational social 
formation, a range of options continue to be available and desirable in 
specific circumstances. Even for families who have recently expanded 
their land-holdings in Nepal, an actual increase in grain yield may take 
several years to realize, and in the meantime it’s helpful if young, 
able-bodied members live away from home and feed themselves for 
several months of the year.33 Moreover, the trends of “micro-
capitalism” and economic development closer to home are new enough 
that they have yet to benefit substantial numbers of Thangmi. Finally, 
                                                
33 The Nepal Inclusion Index shows that Thangmi indicators for nutrition and 
education have indeed recently improved (Bennett and Parajuli 2008). 
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although Nepal’s civil conflict created opportunities for some, the 
uncertainties and pressures that came along with it made others want, 
or need, to leave. For all of these reasons, circular migration has 
continued to be practiced by many Thangmi, as a way to “enjoy” (N: 
ramaunu) an otherwise difficult life by seeing other parts of the world, 
and perhaps most importantly, other parts of one’s own community. 
As the choice of such expressions indicates, some component of 
belonging may be found in the camaraderie of migration itself. 
Turning from the economic to the social, prospects for national 
belonging in Nepal—“social inclusion”—have improved substantially 
with the political transformations of the last several years, and many 
Thangmi have sought to capitalize on these opportunities by engaging 
in political activism within the frameworks of both ethnic and party 
politics, as will be discussed in the next chapter. But again, such 
activities are part of a larger transnational social formation, and many 
of those Thangmi individuals most involved in politics in Nepal trace 
their activist interests to experiences of social inclusion and political 
activism that they had in India, where the potential for such practices 
of belonging were visible far earlier. As the former general secretary of 
the Nepal Thami Samaj explained: 
 
It was only when I went to visit my relatives in Darjeeling and 
Sikkim in the late 1990s that I understood that we had rights 
which we could demand from the state. At first I wanted to stay 
there, it was so exciting. But then I thought, “We can do this in 
Nepal too, slowly such things will become possible”. 
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He, like an increasing number of travelers in both directions, did not 
go to India for wage labor, but for what we might call “belonging 
tourism” in which they went to see how the other half lived. In the 
other direction, Thangmi born and bred in India also began visiting 
Nepal regularly in the late 1990s as transportation improved and they 
became interested in cultural heritage for the purposes of their 
Scheduled Tribe application to the Indian state. 
One of the things that Thangmi from India are usually most 
eager to see on visits to Nepal are old Thangmi houses with the bampa 
intact. Recently, a group of politically active Nepali Thangmi, many of 
whom are also part of the buy-back-the-land trend, have developed a 
proposal to make one of the oldest houses in Dolakha with its 
prominent bampa a museum and “cultural heritage site” [as the 
proposal calls it in English] for Thangmi everywhere. Funding has been 
sought from local, national and international organizations in both 
Nepal and India. For Thangmi from India, this idea would fulfill their 
desires for a link to ethnic territory and ancestral property, as well as 
being a recognizable cultural heritage site. For Nepali Thangmi, it 
would signify resilience, their slow but sure progress towards ending 
land-based exploitation and achieving social inclusion. For those who 
continue to move back and forth, this particular house and bampa 
would mark just one point of belonging among many. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Organizing Ethnicity: 
Thangmi Associations, National Histories and Local Developments 
 
“These days, the organization is only concerned with making history, it 
doesn’t do ‘social welfare’”.1 
- Nathu, former treasurer of the BTWA 
 
We Thami people are in the darkness 
Let us now move towards light 
Let’s educate our children 
Let us develop the language and the culture of our ethnicity 
Rather than only hunting in the forest and 
Searching for underground fruits 
Let us use the Thami hands in development 
Let us Thami come together 
And join efforts in the development of our country 
Even though we are backward today 
We can go forward tomorrow. 
 
- Excerpt from a poem entitled “We Must Open the Eyes of Our Soul” by 
Buddhi Maya Thami, which appears in a compilation of poetry in 
Nepal’s “national languages” (Kaila and Yonzon 2056 VS: 43)2 
 
A faded black-and-white photograph, reproduced in various sepia 
shades, and in so many sizes and densities. Sometimes it is affixed to 
a wall, large and fully laminated against thick plyboard. At other times, 
it is pulled out of a wallet, paper thin, small and scrunched up among 
the detritus of daily life. On still other occasions, it is a smooth glossy 
print, carefully filed in an extra-long legal folder tied with string, 
sharing space with neatly typed documents or photocopies, which like 
the photograph seem to take on authority simply by virtue of repeated 
                                                
1 Original Nepali: Ajkal samajle khali itihas banaune bhaneko, ‘social welfare’ 
gardaina. 
2 The original publication includes both a Thangmi language version of the poem, 
entitled “Manko Mise Khulaisa” and a Nepali version, “Manko Akha Kholnu Parchha”. 
  250 
reproduction and respectful storage. The photograph is always 
presented with pride: an open right palm pointing respectfully, 
fingertips gingerly grasping the photograph’s edges, a magnifying 
glass rummaged out of an old wooden cabinet or a mirrored steel 
almirah for effect [see Figure 5.1]. 
Whose faces can we make out there [see Figure 5.2]? Seated on 
the ascending levels of what appears to be a terraced field, 20 or so 
small children are in the front row, girls in pigtails, boys in grown-up 
lapeled jackets. Behind them stand four rows of adults, perhaps 30 in 
total—mostly men wearing topi (N) caps and the telltale flower 
necklaces of a formal event,3 but also several women with heavy nose-
rings and shawls draped over their heads—some smiling, even 
laughing (how different from the sober poses that characterize 
Thangmi portraiture today). In the center, one man holds a madal (N), 
the oblong drum whose rhythms mark most important events in 
Thangmi life.4 In the upper right-hand corner, a man brings his hands 
together, offering the namaste greeting to the camera. 
                                                
3 The topi is a cotton cap worn by men, and generally recognized as a symbol of 
Nepali identity (both as a national identity in Nepal, and an ethnic identity in India). 
4 As described in Chapter 2, the madal drum is also commonly played by people from 
many other groups of Nepali heritage. 
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Figure 5.1 BTWA member Shova displaying the 1943 photo of the Bhai 
Larke Thami Samaj, Darjeeling, November 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Close up of the 1943 Bhai Larke Thami Samaj photo 
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Figure 5.3 1936 photo of Mahakal, Darjeeling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 1945 photo of Jyoti Thami School, as reproduced in 
Niko Bachinte (2003: 13) 
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It is 1943 in Darjeeling, at the first formal meeting of the Bhai 
Larke Thami Samaj (BLTS), the Thangmi organization which would 
evolve into the Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association half a century 
later. Or so I am told, again and again, by the Thangmi men and 
women in Darjeeling who rush to show me this photo—whatever 
particular form their own copy takes—when I come calling with 
questions about Thangmi history. Could the man pictured here have 
imagined that six decades later his namaste would greet a researcher 
like me—or any number of bureaucrats, activists, and curious Thangmi 
themselves—proffered as black-and-white evidence of a certain kind 
of Thangmi history? Not just a history of migrant labor, but one of 
social organization, cultural practice, communal industriousness, and 
associational capacity. 
In some interviews, this 1943 photo was presented as one 
among several in a family collection. The earliest of such photos shows 
a much larger group of similarly attired people splayed out across a 
hillside, with the penciled notation Mahakal 1936 now affixed as an 
integral part of the photo itself [see Figure 5.3]. Here too, a man in the 
upper right-hand corner gestures namaste towards the camera. The 
latest such photo shows a smaller group of subjects against the 
backdrop of a wood-paneled interior, seated on chairs behind a black 
signboard with white letters spelling out Jyoti Thami Pry-School 1945. 
Both the children and adults are more formally dressed than in the 
other two photos, and the latter are adorned with katha (Tib), white 
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offering scarves in the Tibetan style. Although this photo is harder to 
make out than the others, it appears that bowler hats and knit caps 
have taken the place of topi for most of the men, while many of the 
women have uncovered heads. This time it is a woman, seated near the 
center, who offers namaste. 
The Mahakal 1936 photo, I am told, shows the first public 
Thangmi gathering in Darjeeling, although several people from other 
groups were present as well. The group has assembled for the Bhadau 
Purnima festival in August/September, celebrated as an annual 
shamanic festival across hill Nepal, and as Kalinchok Jatra by Thangmi 
in particular.5 The photo shows the gathering at the inauguration of a 
new shrine at the Mahakal temple on top of Darjeeling’s Observatory 
Hill, for which several community organizations have donated temple 
bells. One such bell has been sponsored by this group of Thangmi, 
although their organization does not yet have a name. At present, at 
the beginning of the 21st century, so many thousands of bells are 
tangled across the ever-expanding Mahakal temple complex that no 
one can find this first Thangmi bell when I ask to see it, not even Latte 
Apa, who knows the hillside’s labyrinth of worship sites well.6 That the 
object cannot be located does not seem to matter, particularly in the 
Thangmi context, in which oral traditions must often stand in for  
                                                
5 See Tautscher (2007) for details of this festival in Nepal, and Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation for a discussion of its relevance to contemporary Thangmi identity. 
6 In an interview published in Niko Bachinte, 83 year-old Nar Bahadur Thami claimed 
that this original bell had been stolen (Niko 2003: 53). A later bell donated in 1947 
was by all accounts visible until several years ago, at which time it was replaced with 
a new bell donated by the BTWA. 
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tangible cultural objects (see Chapters 2 and 3). The act of pouring 
hard-earned wages into a cast bronze bell takes on the status of origin 
myth for many contemporary Thangmi activists in India, who locate 
some of the earliest evidence of Thangmi ethnic solidarity—or should 
we say evidence of their “existential presence” (cf. Chapter 2)—in this 
moment. 
The 1943 image is complemented by an incontrovertible piece of 
evidence indicating that a named and registered organization existed 
by that year: a still-extant rubber stamp kept in a lock-box in the 
BTWA office in Darjeeling bazaar bears the year 1943, along with the 
Bhai Larke Thami Samaj name and logo. I am told that this photo 
shows, for the first time, an exclusively Thangmi group, which we can 
imagine has just anointed its members with flower necklaces to mark 
their organization’s registration as a legal entity. Clearly pleased with 
their accomplishment, the assembly still looks somewhat rag-tag and 
rustic, squatting on their haunches on an anonymous hillside. By the 
1945 photo, they are seated on chairs inside their own school, where 
the Nepali language and other standard subjects were taught for 
several years before it was closed due to lack of funds in the early 
1960s. The very fact that the Thangmi school existed, however briefly, 
tells us that there must be more than meets the eye in the historical 
narrative of a pan-Nepali national identity created through Nepali 
language literary production in Darjeeling during this era (Onta 1996a, 
1996b, 1999; Hutt 1997, 1998; Chalmers 2003). 
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 Taken together, these photos reveal something of the origins of 
Thangmi ethnic organizing.7 They also serve as an inverted lens 
through which contemporary Thangmi activists view themselves and 
their history, refracting the multiple meanings of activism through half 
a century of Indian and Nepali nation-making. When Nathu, a self-
made paragon of the Darjeeling Thangmi community who served as 
the BTWA’s treasuer for many years, showed me the 1943 and 1945 
photos with the typical pride and care described above, yet dismissed 
the present-day BTWA with the accusation that its leadership were only 
interested in “making history”, what could he possibly mean? 
 
Associational Histories 
This chapter looks at the historical trajectories and current dynamics of 
two Thangmi ethnic associations: what is now the Bharatiya Thami 
Welfare Association in India (BTWA), and the Nepal Thami Samaj (NTS) 
in Nepal.8 At the outset, I want to clarify that these organizations and 
their discursive products are not equivalent to the whole of “Thangmi 
ethnicity”, “Thangmi identity”, or “the Thangmi community” in India or 
                                                
7 Chalmers concludes his thesis on the construction of Nepali national identity with a 
description of two photos from the 1920s, one from Kathmandu which shows a 
display of state power, and one from Darjeeling which shows a “small band of social 
activists ... organising the first Nepali Sarasvait puja”. Chalmers suggests that the 
latter photo shows, “a public that, in its voluntary, cooperative institutionalisation of 
social values, was representing itself to itself” (2003: 290-291). Perhaps they were 
representing a pan-Nepali national identity to themselves, while the Thangmi of the 
photos I describe were representing a Thangmi ethnic identity to themselves. 
8 Both organizations have gone through several name changes. Except when 
discussing specific historical moments in which alternative names were used, I will 
use the abbreviations BTWA and NTS to refer to the two groups. 
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Nepal respectively, nor can we presume that the two organizations 
taken together demonstrate “Thangminess” in its entirety. As one 
Thangmi resident of Darjeeling who was disillusioned with the BTWA 
cautioned me, “While doing your research you must not focus 
exclusively on the association”. Activist discourses and performances 
enacted within the frame of an organization do not represent the 
whole of cultural practice or ethnic subjectivity in metonymic fashion. 
Rather, ethno-political activism is one of the many parallel and 
mutually constitutive fields of action within which Thangmi ethnicity 
has been produced over time, and one arena in which belonging has 
been asserted. In keeping with the synthetic theory of ethnicity-in-
action outlined in earlier chapters, here I seek to demonstrate how 
participation (as well as non-participation) in such organizations can 
be a form of ritual action constitutive of social difference, the patterns 
of which must be analyzed in relation to the other forms of action in 
which Thangmi engage. 
In describing the forces which have conditioned each 
organization’s historical trajectory, present shape, and status within 
both the Thangmi community as well as within local, national and 
global activist networks, I consider the specific effects of the 
consciousness-shaping political projects embedded in each country’s 
broader nation-making process. Ethnic associations, political 
organizations and other membership-based interest groups—all of 
which have been classed under the general rubric of “civil society” in 
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the academic and policy discourses of South Asia9—often serve as 
mediators between modern nation-states and their citizens. As such, 
ethnic organizations are particularly useful sites within which to 
observe the relationships between state policy and ethnic subjectivity, 
or in other words, the process of ethnicization. Relationships between 
states and individuals are often mediated by organizations, yet such 
relationships are not limited by the associational frame. It is in fact 
often in the disjunctures between organizational diktat and broader 
community sentiment that the dynamics of ethnicization become 
starkly evident, as we shall see below. 
In the cross-border Thangmi context, the ways in which the 
imperatives of state policy are interpreted and internalized by 
community members may be observed—both by researchers and by 
Thangmi activists themselves—in particularly clear fashion since the 
case of the other country, as distilled in the structures and practices of 
the other organization, is always available for comparison. The shifting 
relationships between the BTWA and the NTS over time , and between 
diverse Thangmi individuals and each organization—sometimes 
supportive and mutually productive, at other times fraught with 
competition and frustration at perceived inequities and biases—
                                                
9 After providing a critique of the term’s often vague use, Gellner provides the 
following concise definition of ‘civil society’: “associative (self-chosen) action that is 
neither part of the state nor undertaken for economic reasons” (forthcoming b). 
Other critical discussions of the concept in South Asia are provided by Kaviraj and 
Khilnani (2001) and Fuller and Bénéï (2001). 
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demonstrate the complex processes through which ethnicity is 
synthesized. 
Through their cross-border communication with each other, 
Thangmi activists in both countries become aware of the varying 
prospects that their counterparts on the other side may have for 
promoting social welfare and moral reform, achieving community 
progress and economic development, and seeking political recognition 
(framed both in terms of rights and inclusion). I suggest that these five 
objectives have shaped the orientations of Thangmi ethnic 
organizations at different junctures of time and place. Furthermore, 
each of these objectives has entailed different conceptualizations of 
what Thangmi “culture” and “history” are and should be, and 
concomitantly varied approaches to harnessing ethnicity in the service 
of social change. 
The five objectives listed above loosely reference the Nepali 
language discourses of unnati (improvement), utthan (upliftment), 
pragati (progress), vikas (development), adhikar (rights) and 
samavesikaran (inclusion).10 Thangmi organizations have crystallized 
around each of these aspirational terms at various places and times, 
with each term signifying a slightly different ideological paradigm for 
realizing the consistent objective of forward movement towards an 
ideal society. These paradigms have been broadly construed within the 
overarching Nepali public sphere, and as such are not particularly 
                                                
10 See Chalmers’ (2003: 121, n. 139) for definitions of the terms listed here. 
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Thangmi, yet the ways in which Thangmi organizations have 
interpreted and implemented them have been shaped by the individual 
and communal Thangmi positionalities. As we shall see below, ideas 
about what constituted forward movement have shifted between time 
and place, sometimes dramatically, with attitudes towards culture and 
history repeatedly revised to keep pace. Yet all of these ideas have 
been quintessentially Nepali in their conceptualization and 
implementation. While certainly influenced by international discourses 
of modernity, communism, development, indigeneity and so forth, 
here I argue that experiences of ethnicization in both Nepal and 
Nepali-speaking India are the results of historical trajectories 
grounded in the broader processes of political consciousness 
formation specific to each nation-state, yet dependent upon circulation 
between them in the transnational Nepali public sphere. 
 
Discourses and Practices of a Nepali Public Sphere 
Rhoderick Chalmers has convincingly shown that for those involved in 
the literary production of a Nepali identity in the first half of the 20th 
century, the Nepali public sphere, and the tools for achieving social 
transformation within it, were inherently transnational. 11 Taking an 
Andersonian approach that emphasizes the importance of print-
capitalism, Chalmers shows how crucial ideas about the nature 
                                                
11 Writing in 1934, Parasmani Pradhan eloquently summed up this fact, “As long as 
other Nepalis do not find out about what is done by Nepalis living in one corner our 
unnati shall not be achieved (Pradhan 1934: 34-35, as cited in Chalmers 2003: 111). 
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ofNepaliness emerged in both Nepal and India during the period from 
1914-1940. Public expression was conditioned by the specific political 
and social environments of each country, yet the vehicle of literary 
journals enabled a transnational public to engage collaboratively in the 
discursive production of Nepaliness as a cultural entity which 
transcended the territorial borders of the Nepali nation-state. 
Beyond simply recognizing the analogy between the transnational 
production of Nepaliness that Chalmers describes and the 
transnational production of Thangminess which is the focus of this 
dissertation, I wish to suggest that both have occurred within the same 
public sphere, and as such, demonstrate different aspects of a shared 
historical process. It is in the Nepali public sphere that notions such as 
welfare, progress, development, and inclusion have emerged, 
accumulated multiple layers of meaning, and circulated across borders 
over time, influencing the particular ways in which Thangmi individuals 
and organizations have conceptualized themselves as agents of 
change. 
In other words, we should not assume that ethnic identities often 
thought of as “Nepali” are bounded by Nepal’s political borders (or 
even more extremely, are defined entirely by a single region or village). 
Instead, analytically locating the production of such identities within an 
overarching, transnational Nepali public sphere allows us to see how 
the vagaries of identity politics and minority legislation in other 
countries—particularly in India and China, but increasingly elsewhere 
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as well—have come to bear significantly upon groups whose majority 
populations may be based in Nepal.12 Although several anthropological 
works mention in passing the contributions that people influenced by 
experiences in Darjeeling made to ethnic projects in Nepal—take, for 
example, Ortner’s description of the Sherpa lama who returned to 
Khumbu to found a monastery after making his money in Darjeeling 
(Ortner 1989)13—the ways in which forms of public expression 
anchored in Darjeeling have influenced the process of ethnicization 
inside Nepal have not been systematically addressed in either 
academic work or the political discourse of Nepal’s janajati 
movement.14 I suggest that just as Nepali nationalism was initially 
produced in large part in India, so too were ideas about ethnicity and 
how to use it to make claims on the state. This was not a one way 
street, however—in later periods, such ideas were internalized and 
reimagined inside Nepal in relation to the Nepali state, and then re-
exported to communities of Nepali heritage in Darjeeling. Such 
processes, repeated again and again, comprise the multi-layered 
                                                
12 The politics and policies of India of course impinge upon Nepali citizens in multiple 
ways through the strategic geopolitical relationship between the two countries; here I 
allude specifically to the ways in which Indian conceptualizations of ethnicity and 
ethnic activism have influenced such formations in Nepal. 
13 See also Macdonald’s (1975: 129) and Des Chene’s (1996) descriptions of Tamang 
and Gurung writings from Darjeeling in discussions that otherwise focus on these 
ethnic identities in Nepal. Guneratne (2002) and Krauskopff (2003) both discuss the 
cross-border influences from India on early Tharu organizing inside Nepal. A 
thorough reading of the ethnography of “Nepal” for such references would be a 
worthwhile project as part of a larger effort to more accurately historicize the links 
between ethnic activism in Nepal and India. 
14 Makito Minami’s article on Magar ethnic organizations is rare in explicitly 
recognizing the importance of such transnational connections: “... it seems that 
ethnic movements in Nepal originated in Darjeeling” (2007: 490). 
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feedback loop through which contemporary Thangmi ethnicity is 
produced. The persistence of Thangmi circular migration makes such 
cross-border relationships more pronounced than they are for many 
other groups, therefore providing a compelling case study of what may 
well be a more general set of dynamics. 
At the same time, understanding the ways in which individual 
ethnic identities for groups of Nepali heritage have been produced 
over time in Darjeeling, Sikkim, and beyond, helps complicate the 
narrative of Nepali national identity production in India. Bringing into 
focus the experiences of individual groups of Nepali heritage in India 
within the broader formation of a pan-Nepali identity requires a 
conceptual expansion of the public sphere to include not only the 
discursive production of literary journals, but also the ritual practices, 
cultural performances, and other sorts of identity-producing public 
actions in which individuals have long engaged. Although Chalmers’ 
critique of anthropology for neglecting written sources in Nepali is 
well-taken (2003: 295-296), 15 the reality remains that in order to 
understand what the “subaltern counterpublics” (Chalmers 2003: 290, 
citing Fraser 1992) of Darjeeling’s literary heyday may have been 
thinking, we must move beyond the realm of the written word to 
                                                
15 My work still falls short of the mark Chalmers sets, since I use only limited Nepali 
language sources, primarily those produced by Thangmi ethnic organizations. Few 
scholars are able to bring all methodological approaches to bear in a single study; my 
hope is that this work may be read in conjunction with those of Chalmers, Onta and 
Hutt to add an anthropological perspective to their well-argued descriptions of 
Darjeeling’s literature and history, in the same way that their textually-based work 
has provided an important corrective to the previously strong ethnographic bias in 
considering the formation of ethnic identities in Nepal. 
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examine what members of groups like the Thangmi, who are rarely 
represented in writing, were actually doing. 
In its early days, the Thangmi corner of the Nepali public sphere 
was created not through the circulation of publications, but rather 
through the circulation of people and their practices, although clearly 
these were articulated in relation to the discursively produced ideas 
that were accessible through the public speeches and gatherings of 
Darjeeling’s intelligentsia. Through the spoken word (recall, for 
instance Silipitik’s strong reaction to the speech he heard in Darjeeling, 
as described in Chapter 4), the highlights of literary discourse were 
communicated to those who could not read, and ideas of social welfare 
and moral improvement prompted slow but steady shifts in practice 
across the transnational Thangmi social formation. 
It was only half a century later, in the 1990s, that substantial 
numbers of Thangmi themselves began to engage in literary 
production, as some began to question their own commitment to 
orality (see Chapter 3) and discovered the political power of print.16 
Between 1997-2004, four book-length collections of writing by 
Thangmi about themselves were produced (three in Nepal and one in 
India), along with three dictionaries (two in Nepal and one in India). By 
                                                
16 Karna Thami, a leading member of the Darjeeling Nepali Sahitya Sammelan (Nepali 
Literary Council), is an exception to this chronology. Born in the 1940s, he has been 
active in the Darjeeling literary scene since the 1960s, as a writer of poetry and 
fiction. However, his writing did not explicitly address Thangmi identity or culture 
until 1999, when he published an article entitled “Thami Sanskritiko Kehi Ilak” (“Some 
Foundations of Thami Culture”) in the journal Nirman. I am grateful to Rhoderick 
Chalmers for providing a digital copy of this article. 
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this time, other technologically-mediated forms of discursive 
representation that did not depend on literacy were also available, and 
the proliferation of audio (cassettes, CDs and radio) and video (VCD 
and DVD) has tempered the trend towards more extensive Thangmi 
literary production.17 Regardless, all of these discursive products 
represent the sakali in different nakali modes with varying effects, each 
of which enable Thangmi to at once align themselves with broader 
discourses of social transformation while also (re)producing culture 
and (re)making history in the desired idiom of the moment. 
In the sections that follow, the trajectories of Thangmi activism 
over time lead us back and forth across borders; through the 
discourses of social welfare, moral improvement, economic 
development, rights and inclusion; the media of speech, print, audio 
and video; and a range of attitudes towards culture, history and 
ethnicity. I conclude that in the ethnographic present of this work 
(1998-2008), culture and history were in the process of being 
reconceptualized as sacred objects within the politics of recognition, 
which came to represent the core object of identity itself. The day-to-
day work of activism carried on within the presence of these objects 
(meetings, fundraising drives, preparing applications, and so forth) 
often took on the character of ritual action. Yet at key moments, 
                                                
17 One new form of literary production began in early 2008, taking advantage of the 
new “Naya Nepal” pull-out section of the Nepali state’s official Gorkhapatra 
newspaper: a series of articles in the Thangmi language about Thangmi issues has 
appeared on a monthly basis, with about ten installments already published at the 
time of writing. Unfortunately I have not been able to include a thorough analysis of 
these writings in the present work. 
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certain individuals—often those most heavily invested in earlier 
paradigms for forward progress, like Nathu (who is cited in the 
epigraph to this chapter)—resist the reformulation of relationships 
between culture, history and activism that adopting new paradigms of 
progress entails. Such disparate voices from different corners of the 
transnational Thangmi social formation show how activist renditions of 
culture and history at any given place and time represent important, 
but in themselves incomplete, strands of Thangmi identity production, 
the full meanings of which only become evident when viewed as part of 
the whole. 
 
Associational Histories in Darjeeling 
As demonstrated by the photos with which this chapter began, the 
history of Thangmi ethnic organizing begins in Darjeeling, where the 
Bhai Larke Thami Samaj was the first and only Thangmi organization 
anywhere for almost 40 years. This fact turns the logic of Nepal as the 
originary fount of Thangmi culture on its head (cf. Chapter 3), since if 
we view ethnic organizations as a site of cultural production it 
becomes clear that India is indubitably the “original source” of this 
strand of Thangmi culture. It was this aspect of Thangmi history that 
Nathu and other Darjeeling Thangmi took pride in as they showed me 
their photographs; these black-and-white images were their evidence 
of a long-standing, distinctive cultural reality, much as ritual practice 
and origin stories were for Thangmi in Nepal. 
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The fact that Thangmi organizations had their origin in India was 
in large part due to the fact that associational life was not a realistic 
option in Nepal before 1950, since the Rana state did not allow such 
“civil society” activities.18 As Chalmers explains: 
 
Institutions that took root in India enabled Nepalis to 
conceptualise and constitute themselves as a united community 
that could find expression through cultural and political 
organisation more or less independent of government. Here 
there is a major difference from the situation within Nepal, where 
comparable developments … were primarily an expression of 
governmental will. (2003: 72) 
It was this comparative openness that Thangmi migrants experienced 
in India which encouraged many of them to stay, or spend a large 
portion of their time in Darjeeling. As described in Chapter 4, the 
opportunity to form an organization to pursue their particular needs 
and interests created a sense of potential belonging which many 
Thangmi migrants quickly came to appreciate. 
Identity-based organizing in Darjeeling dates to as early as 
1907, when an informal organization submitted a memorandum to the 
Bengal Government demanding the creation of a “separate 
administrative set-up” in Darjeeling. Formalized as the Hillmen’s 
Association sometime between 1917 and 1919 (Subba 1992: 78-79), 
these early activists aimed to advance the social position of the 
multiple groups that were already beginning to identify themselves as 
                                                
18 This is not to say that there were no forms of local organization in Nepal; village 
councils and other forms of community support organizations such as the Thakali 
dhikur are well-documented (W. Fisher 2001: 90-104). However, these were intended 
to regulate group-internal social affairs, not to mediate relationships between groups 
and the state in the sense that “civil society” connotes.  
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a unified “hill” community (Subba 1992: 78-79, Chalmers 2003: 208). 
Defining themselves as distinct from the Bengali “plains” community 
who had previously mediated most of Darjeeling’s interactions with the 
seat of power in colonial Calcutta, this group included members of the 
Nepali, Bhutia, and Lepcha communities, who put aside individual 
cultural differences to form an alliance based on their shared concerns 
as “hill” people.19 
The demands of these early groups were couched in the rhetoric 
of social improvement (unnati), rather than political aspiration, leading 
Chalmers to term the “nascent Nepali public sphere … decidedly 
apolitical” (2003: 204). Yet at the same time, Chalmers suggests that 
the focus on “status, livelihoods, or general well-being of established 
Indian Nepali communities … can be interpreted as a political aspect of 
the urge for jati improvement” (2003: 203). He goes on to state that 
this transformation from concern for social welfare to political 
aspiration culminated in the founding of the All-India Gorkha League 
(AIGL) in Dehradun in 1923. This organization quickly established 
branches all over India and beyond (reaching as far as Bhutan, Burma 
and Fiji), and published several Nepali-language journals that worked 
                                                
19 Chalmers makes the important point that even at this early stage the term ‘Nepali’ 
was used to designate the full range of groups of Nepali heritage, while the Bhutia 
and Lepcha were considered to be in a separate category, as indigenous inhabitants 
of the Darjeeling/Sikkim area. It is intriguing that Tibeto-Burman language-speaking, 
beef-eating groups of Nepali heritage such as the Tamang, Gurung, Magar, Rai, 
Limbu and Thangmi were included under the rubric ‘Nepali’, rather than classed with 
the Bhutia and Lepcha, which suggests that a sense of Nepali national identity already 
trumped particular cultural identities as criteria for self-identification in colonial 
Darjeeling.  
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to link, “specifically Nepali political concerns to the Indian freedom 
movement” (Chalmers 2003: 214). But the heyday of the AIGL lasted 
only a decade, and by 1933 it had stopped publishing and remained 
defunct until it was revived in Darjeeling in 1943. 
That was also the year in which the Bhai Larke Thami Samaj 
(BLTS) was founded.20 In the intervening years, Darjeeling citizens had 
begun to articulate their concerns in increasingly public forums, 
making the transition from a discourse of improvement (unnati) in a 
moral sense, through the education and gentrification of individuals, to 
the more political discourse of social transformation through the 
upliftment (utthan) of an entire community within the framework of the 
emerging Indian state. The Hillmen’s Association had suffered from 
internal tensions between the Nepali, Bhutia and Lepcha member 
groups (Subba 1992: 81). In an effort to resolve these issues and adopt 
a more populist agenda, the Hill-People’s Social Union (HPSU) was 
founded in 1934 under the leadership of S.W. Laden La “by a large 
public convention attended by some six hundred representatives of 
different communities from across the Darjeeling district, including 
from villages and tea estates” (Chalmers 2003: 211, citing Nebula 1(1): 
10). HPSU lauched the journal Nebula (the initials of which stood for 
Nepali, Bhutia and Lepcha) in 1935, which for the first time brought 
discussions of identity issues explicitly into the public sphere and 
                                                
20 In his Niko Bachinte interview, 83 year-old Nar Bahadur explicitly states that the 
BLTS and AIGL were founded at around the same time (2003: 53). 
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linked them to broader political concerns regarding the place of 
Darjeeling within both the colonial administration and a future India.21 
During the same period, various efforts to improve social welfare 
at the local level in Darjeeling culminated with the founding of the 
Gorkha Duhkha Nivarak Sammelan (GDNS) in 1932. With the explicit 
intention of linking “cultural promotion to social welfare” (Chalmers 
2003: 202), GDNS founder Dhanvir Mukhiya built a public hall which 
“became the undisputed centre for Nepali theatrical productions while 
pursuing a mission to the poorer members of society by … carrying 
out funeral rites for destitutes” (Chalmers 2003: 202). GDNS founder 
Mukhiya and HPSU founder Laden La did not get along, and Chalmers 
(2003: 202, 211) indicates that there was a sense of competition 
between these two early civil society organizations and their chosen 
modes of promoting social transformation: GDNS through “welfare”, or 
what we might now call “community-based” or “livelihood-based” 
activism, and HPSU through more overtly political, or “rights-based” 
activism that aimed to make claims on the emerging Indian state. 
 
 
                                                
21 As Chalmers, Subba and others have noted, despite the pro-freedom position of 
the earlier Dehradun-based AIGL, the Darjeeling community was in a tricky position 
regarding the emerging Indian independence movement. They tried to leverage their 
ongoing demonstrations of loyalty to the imperial government in exchange for 
administrative independence from Bengal, but this strategy was not successful, 
leaving Darjeeling citizens with the worst of both worlds: no administrative 
autonomy, and a constant question mark over their loyalty to independent India, due 
to both their Nepaliness and their attempts to curry favor with the British. These are 
the historical underpinnings of the political turmoil Darjeeling continues to 
experience today. 
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Bhai Larke Thami Samaj: Social Welfare for the Thangmi “Family” 
Despite the tensions at the leadership level of these two organizations, 
both were important influences in determining the shape of the Bhai 
Larke Thami Samaj. From Thangmi descriptions of the organization’s 
founding, however, we can see that its objectives were originally 
conceptualized along the lines of the GDNS model of social welfare, 
while its subsequent efforts to fundraise for the Jyoti Thami Primary 
School benefited from HPSU’s direct tutelage in how to approach the 
state. 
Amrikan, whose story of migration was recounted in Chapter 4, 
explained that the initial objectives of the BLTS were to raise funds and 
provide an adequate number of participants for migrant Thangmi to 
conduct life cycle rituals, particularly for births and deaths: 
 
At that time, we started the brother’s group… Even though we 
were not educated, we were able to run it well enough… 
However many brothers we were, in someone’s house there 
would be a birth ritual, or some other event, and all of the 
Thangmi would together contribute 50 rupees for a ‘rotating’ [in 
English] loan, and whoever’s turn it was would be called larke, in 
that way it became Bhai Larke Samaj.22 Man Bahadur Thami from 
Kusipa, near Khopa [both villages in Dolakha], said, “let’s get the 
Thangmi organized and start a group”. And then there were 60 
or 70 of us, then it was not so hard to do our death rituals. 
Recalling Rana Bahadur’s narrative about the difficulty of conducting 
his father’s funerary rites (quoted in Chapter 3) in India, it is clear that 
meeting both the financial and social demands of such elaborate ritual 
                                                
22 The origin of the term larke is murky. The literal meaning in Nepali appears to be 
“follower” or “subservient individual” (see Sharma 2057 VS: 1163), although here 
perhaps the BLTS founders intended it to mean something akin to “member”. Another 
possible interpretation is that it derives from the Hindi ladke, meaning “youth”. 
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practices was a major hardship for migrant Thangmi. In most cases, 
migrants to Darjeeling were far away from their own families, who 
would have provided both the human and material resources to 
conduct the mumpra (T: funerary rituals) at home (see Chapter 7 for 
details on this ritual cycle). In several interviews, I was told that before 
the establishment of the BLTS, many migrant Thangmi were unable to 
conduct death rituals at all, either leaving Darjeeling to return home 
when momentous personal events took place, or simply carrying on 
with their routine of daily labour and failing to conduct such rituals at 
all. One further option was to approach GDNS to help with the conduct 
of life cycle rituals, which some did, but the problem with this course 
of action was that there was no scope for conducting a Thangmi ritual 
per se within GDNS’s walls; rather, the organization prescribed the 
ritual format and called its own in-house Hindu pandit to officiate.23 
None of these options were really satisfactory, particularly 
because there were in fact several Thangmi guru working as wage 
laborers in Darjeeling who could have been called upon to conduct 
funerary and other rites. With the exception of the few families who 
had consciously chosen the path of assimilation to the Hindu 
                                                
23 As Chalmers explains, for unnati proponents, “The “proper” approach to 
celebrating religious festivals was also a focus of moral concern, one which gained 
more attention as public celebrations of particular pujas became a highly visible form 
of community cultural representation” (2003: 154). In addition, ““Active participation 
in Nepali civil society was not necessarily open to all those who might think of 
themselves as Nepali. The flagship projects of the civic-minded … could best be 
supported by those who could contribute intellectually or financially: while the poor 
and destitute were to benefit from the GDNS, it was largely the great and good who 
managed it” (2003: 215). 
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mainstream (such as the Tumsong tea plantation overseer’s family 
described in Chapter 4), these guru would have been the preferred 
ritual officiants for most Thangmi. However, gurus who, like everyone 
else, were struggling to make ends meet, were unwilling to lose their 
wages from a day of work unless the sponsoring family could 
compensate them for their time. Back in Nepal, both gurus and 
laypeople alike were part of the same informal economy where labor 
was compensated in kind, rather than in cash. Without the resources of 
a kinship network to provide both the required cash and the necessary 
clan and out-clan members participants to fill their respective ritual 
roles, conducting Thangmi rituals seemed like an impossibility. 
In this context, drawing upon GDNS’s social welfare model, but 
moving out of its pan-Nepali Hindu ritual sphere, the founders of the 
BLTS established a fictive kin network that enabled both the financial 
and social needs of migrant Thangmi to be met. The overarching idiom 
in which BLTS members conceptualized their participation in the 
organization was that of kinship, as the emphasis on bhai—brothers—
in the organization’s title underscored. However, their preferred family 
was an exclusively Thangmi one, not the pan-Nepali “family” invoked 
in the parallel kinship metaphors of HPSU and various Nepali writers.24 
                                                
24 Chalmers (2003: 255-256) describes how kinship metaphors, particularly of 
“brothers” and “sisters” were pervasively used to describe the Nepali community in 
the first phase of identity building from approximately 1914-1920. However, he 
suggests that such language fell out of common usage by the 1930s: “Later Indian 
Nepali journals were generally content with social and ethnic interpretations of 
Nepaliness which did not need to be supported by the language of brotherhood” 
(2003: 56). This analysis lends credence to the assertion that the Thangmi choice of 
kinship terminology to name their organization in 1943 was not just a mimetic use of 
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Basant, the BTWA general secretary from 1997-2003, explained that 
although his father had been raised by the GDNS orphanage since its 
first year of operation, GDNS could not replace a Thangmi ‘family’: 
 
My father lost his parents when he was five. GDNS gave him a 
place to live, and he was the caretaker of the hall until he died. I 
grew up there too, and look, my sister and her family still live 
there. We owe everything to that organization. They would say, 
“We are all one family, one jati. If any one of our members 
succeeds, we all succeed.” They taught my father how to be 
Nepali, but not how to be Thangmi. For that we needed the Bhai 
Samaj. 
Although this description is filtered through a generation of social and 
political experience and should not be taken to represent verbatim the 
views of Basant’s father, such sentiments were echoed by several older 
Thangmi in interviews: although social welfare could be conceptualized 
in broad, pan-Nepali terms, cultural welfare required an exclusively 
Thangmi organization. Drawing upon the GDNS model, which 
functioned at the level of the Nepali social sphere, BLTS brought the 
notion of welfare to bear at the cultural level at which ethnic identities 
were still created through ritual practice in the company of kin—those 
bound together by shared descent, if not exactly immediate family—
not through the discourse of pan-Nepali ethnic unity alone. 
Once supported by the organizational framework of the BLTS, 
culture quickly became a source of social and economic capital as the 
BLTS considered how to parlay their successful scheme of rotating 
                                                                                                                                       
terms used by other organizations, but rather a clear statement that despite the 
rhetoric of pan-Nepali unity, real kinship was still to be found in the company of 
one’s ethnic compatriots. 
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loans for ritual practice into something more broad-reaching. In his 
description of the Thangmi encounter with the HPSU, Amrikan alludes 
to the class dynamics which belied the umbrella organization’s 
populist image, as well as to the first deployments of cultural 
performance as a political tool: 
 
Nebula came along later, and the thulo manche (N: big people) 
we knew found out about it. Our secretary went to ask them for 
help in approaching the government to ask for money since we 
didn’t have enough to run the school…They told us to show our 
dances and songs, and play deusi.25 We asked the ministers for 
help, that’s how we ran the school. They gave us 500-600 
rupees a month to run it … but for that we had to go dance and 
sing. At that time the three jat [presumably Nepali, Bhutia, 
Lepcha] would be called and we were also included. Since the 
Bhotes could only perform dangdangdungdung [a disparaging 
imitation of Bhutia cultural practice], we were asked to perform 
the maruni dance and play the madal, and for that they gave us 
money to run our organization. 
Like many Thangmi, Amrikan referred to the HPSU as Nebula, 
conflating the name of the organization with the name of the journal it 
published, in what appears to have been fairly common usage (Subba 
1992: 83).26 His assertion that Nebula/HPSU was founded after the 
BLTS, a claim seconded by Nar Bahadur’s published statement that, 
“even before that organization [NeBuLa], our ethnic organization 
existed” (2003: 53), appears to be historically questionable.27 Even if 
                                                
25 Turner explains: “A festival which begins on the fifth day of the tiwar festival (= 
diwali). On this day children and others come round to give blessings and receive 
alms: the leader says something or other ... the others cry in chorus deusi” (1997 
[1931: 317). In both modern Nepal and Nepali-speaking areas of India, deusi 
performances are commonly used to raise funds for social welfare organizations. 
26 The same conflation appears in Niko Bachinte, where Rajen refers to the 
organization as NeBuLa in his interview with Nar Bahadur (Niko 2003: 53). See also 
Bagahi and Danda (1982). 
27 Nar Bahadur claims to have been a member of both HPSU and BLTS. 
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we accept that the 1936 Mahakal photo shows a Thangmi meeting, this 
is still two years after the HPSU public convention was held. However, it 
may well be the case that there was already an informal Thangmi 
network in existence at the time that the Thangmi came to know about 
HPSU, regardless of when the latter was actually founded. Amrikan’s 
statement that it was the thulo manche—those of higher status, in this 
case, probably referring to those with higher education—who first 
learned about HPSU’s existence suggests that the organization may not 
have been accessible to many Thangmi wage labourers. Moreover, an 
examination of the membership of HPSU’s executive committee and 
governing bodies, as well as of the editorial board for Nebula (as 
reproduced in Subba 1992: 81-83), shows Bhutia, Lepcha, Gurung, 
Brahmin, Chhetri, Rai, Newar, Limbu, and perhaps Magar names,28 but 
there are no Thangmi names mentioned. While this is hardly surprising 
given the very small Thangmi population numbers, it still helps explain 
why the Thangmi may have felt that HPSU could not fully represent 
their political aspirations, just as GDNS could not cater to all of their 
cultural needs. 
 As described by Amrikan above, the BLTS secretary first 
approached the HPSU leadership in order to ask how to request 
financial help from the government. However, HPSU did not 
recommend that the Thangmi approach the government with an 
                                                
28 The name “Thapa”, held by several members, can designate either Chhetri or 
Magar. 
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explicitly political agenda, rather suggesting that they use their 
cultural resources to secure financial support. In Amrikan’s account, 
Thangmi culture was seen as a particularly marketable brand of the 
pan-Nepali performance genre. Perhaps due to its lively madal 
drumbeats, Thangmi cultural performance was viewed as a cultural 
resource for the Darjeeling community as a whole (in contrast to Bhutia 
cultural forms, which according to Amrikan did not appeal to outside 
audiences so easily). In exchange for performing at cultural events, 
Thangmi received funding for their school, first from the HPSU, and 
later through a municipal grant.29 
At a time when there were apparently few other active 
organizations representing individual ethnic groups of Nepali 
heritage,30 it is difficult to imagine how the Thangmi, with their tiny 
population numbers and relatively low economic status, could have 
maintained an active association without the direct support of a more 
                                                
29 A 1955 letter from Man Bahadur, the BLTS secretary, to T. Wangdi, the Deputy 
Minister of Tribal Welfare for West Bengal, states, “We are getting Darjeeling 
Municipal grant-in-aid of Rs. 74 monthly” and provides additional details about 
itemized costs, but asks for additional funding since this is not adequate. 
30 Historical information about individual ethnic organizations in Darjeeling is hard to 
come by without doing detailed primary research in the privately held archives of 
those organizations and their successors. At present, I have only been able to do this 
for the Thangmi. Citing sources published in Japan and Sikkim that I have not seen, 
Makito Minami suggests that several other organizations were founded during the 
same period: “Ethnic movements among Nepali migrants to Darjeeling began in the 
years between 1920 and 1940, when the Kirantis, Newars, Damais, Viswakarmas 
(Kamis), and Tamangs, all formed their own ethnic/caste associations. According to 
Kano (2001: 247), the Sherpa Buddha Association was established in Darjeeling in 
1924, while a Limbu association called Yakthung Hang Chumlung was founded in 
Kalimpong in 1925 (Subba 2002: 9). The Mangars also formed the Mangar Samaj 
Darjeeling (Mangar Society Darjeeling) a little later in 1939” (2007: 490). Martin 
Gaenszle also mentions several Rai organizations founded in the 1920s and 1930s 
(forthcoming). Comprehensive histories of such ethnic organizations in Darjeeling are 
important topics for future research. 
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experienced and well-resourced organization. Viewed as a non-
political, cultural organization, which could contribute cultural 
resources to overall pan-Nepali political goals, the BLTS was perceived 
as an additional resource for, rather than a threat to, pan-Nepali 
hegemony. 
Moreover, the flagship school project of the BLTS promoted the 
ideals of unnati by providing education to poor Thangmi children—in 
Nepali and English, but notably not in Thangmi. In line with the pan-
Nepali ideologies in ascendance at the time, rather than teaching the 
Thangmi language as a subject in itself, the organization strove to 
create Thangmi children assimilated to the Nepali-speaking 
mainstream. As Basant explained in the pages of Niko Bachinte, the 
school, which had up to 80 students at its height, was founded “with a 
view towards minimizing the backwardness of the Thami community” 
(2003: 11).31 This statement echoes a 1955 letter to T. Wangdi, Deputy 
Minister of Tribal Welfare for the state of West Bengal, signed by Man 
Bahadur, the BLTS founder and secretary, in which he appealed for 
additional funding for the school on the basis that, “We Thamis are 
backward in our Nepali community”. 
In this sense, although BLTS membership was based on 
belonging to a particular ethnic group which felt itself to be somewhat 
marginalized within the broader Nepali community, the organization 
                                                
31 See Chalmers (2003: 130) on the discourse of backwardness in the Nepali public 
sphere as a whole, Galanter (1984: 121) on the legal definition of it in India, and 
Jenkins on its more recent interpretations (2003: 145-147). 
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did not promote ethno-political agendas in the contemporary sense. 
The primary objective was to improve the welfare of the migrant 
Thangmi family through community-based projects, and the 
organization was not encouraged to develop its own direct relationship 
with political powers beyond the local level. This relationship remained 
mediated by non-Thangmi, through the figure of a man known as 
“King Kong” (ostensibly due to his large size), who helped the BLTS 
keep accounts and manage their correspondence since few of their 
members were educated. King Kong seems to have acted as a liasion 
between the Thangmi and other organizations active at the time, 
charged with the dual responsibilities of ensuring that the BLTS 
remained active and its members available to provide cultural 
performances, and keeping an eye on the BLTS membership to make 
sure that they did not develop an independent political agenda that 
might challenge the emerging political dominance of a united Nepali 
identity and its representative organizations. 
It was within this historical context that many contemporary 
Thangmi activists claim that their predecessors turned down the 
opportunity to be listed as a Scheduled Tribe in the early 1950s, during 
the first post-independence phase of classification carried out by the 
Indian state.32 As one Thangmi who claimed to have been involved in 
BLTS discussions over this issue at the time put it: 
                                                
32 Galanter (1984: 149) explains that: “In 1950, the President promulgated the list of 
Scheduled Areas and a list of Scheduled Tribes, apparently by making some additions 
to the 1935 list of Backward Tribes.” The Bhutia, Lepcha, and Tibetan populations of 
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When the idea of Scheduled Tribes first arose, the government 
asked if we wanted to be listed. But the Tamang had refused, 
saying that they were too important to be seen as a backwards 
group, and we Thangmi followed suit. We wanted to be seen as 
Indian citizens with Nepali heritage, not some little tribe.33 
With this decision, the Thangmi chose to cast their lot with the Nepali 
community as a whole, rather than with the Bhutia and Lepcha, both of 
whom were indeed classified as Scheduled Tribes in 1950. Desiring to 
be identified as full-fledged, modern Indian citizens of Nepali heritage, 
Thangmi sought to distance themselves from the connotations of 
backwardness that the tribal designation carried at the time. 
“Who could have guessed that this would turn out to be a 
mistake?” continued the same speaker cited above. By the 1990s, 
classification as a Scheduled Tribe had become the primary objective 
for Thangmi political activists in India. With the death of BLTS founder 
Man Bahadur Thami in the mid-1960s, the first wave of Thangmi 
ethnic organizing ended. The BLTS fell into disarray and the school 
closed, suggesting that Man Bahadur’s charismatic leadership was an 
essential ingredient in the Thangmi organization’s early success. The 
association was only fully resuscitated in the early 1990s in the form of 
the Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association, which despite its name, was 
                                                                                                                                       
Darjeeling were included in the 1950 list. I have not been able to locate documentary 
evidence that the Thangmi were actually offered this status. 
33 Nar Bahadur (Niko 2003: 53) suggests that the Thangmi in fact asked for 
recognition from the state of India as a janajati group in 1955. However, this usage 
of the term janajati in the context appears anachronistic, and demonstrates the 
influence of ethnic discourse from Nepal within India. Even if he meant that they 
asked for “tribal” status, Nar Bahadur’s assertion appears contentious in light of the 
claims of several of his contemporaries that they did not want to be included in the 
tribal category at that time. 
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no longer primarily interested in familial and communal “welfare”. In 
the mean time, Thangmi aspirational ideologies had changed, bringing 
into focus newfound desires for recognition and rights at the national 
and transnational levels, along with new techniques for making history. 
 
Marxist Notions of Progress in Nepal34 
Had notions of social transformation and ideologies of aspiration 
changed so radically during the intervening half century for Thangmi 
participants in all corners of the Nepali public sphere? Answering this 
question requires a journey back across the border to Nepal for an 
examination of the origins of Thangmi organizing there. 
Chalmers suggests that in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the transnational nature of the early Nepali public sphere 
began to give way to increasingly localized political formations: 
 
Ironically, this can be attributed to the rapid expansion of 
popular involvement in politics both in India and Nepal which is 
evident from the mid-1930s: while in one sense this represented 
the consummation of the public sphere as it finally allowed the 
fulfilment of aspirations fanned by the new potentials of print-
capitalism, it also marked its downfall as diverse political goals 
in separate arenas necessarily overshadowed earlier shared 
cultural endeavours. (2003: 21) 
At least until the end of Rana rule with King Tribhuvan’s 1951 return to 
Nepal’s throne, and the ensuing advent of democracy, political 
agendas continued to be crafted in India by expatriate activists before 
                                                
34 This section draws substantially upon Shneiderman (2003). Here I can only sketch 
the broad contours of the relationship between Thangmi ethnic consciousness and a 
broader, largely communist political consciousness, but the details will be fleshed out 
in two forthcoming publications. 
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being tried on the ground in Nepal. This was very much the case for 
communism, which made its first appearance in the Nepali public 
sphere in 1949 when Pushpa Lal Shrestha founded the Communist 
Party of Nepal (CPN) in Calcutta.35 Pushpa Lal and his supporters 
returned to Nepal in 1951 after the fall of the Ranas, but were quickly 
banned in 1952 for their violent activities. They operated underground 
for four years between 1952 and 1956, during which time they focused 
primarily on class issues, such as redistribution of land, tenancy rights, 
and the abolition of compulsory unpaid labour (Hachhethu, 2002: 34-
5). The CPN was legalized again in the late 1950s, and stood in the 
1959 elections, before King Mahendra terminated Nepal’s first 
experiment with democracy in 1960 and introduced the partyless 
panchayat system. All political parties were once again banned, and 
the CPN and NC alike went underground. Mahendra’s panchayat 
ideology emphasized a hegemonic vision of nationalist development, 
framed in terms of vikas,36 which intersected with the rapidly 
increasing presence of international development organizations in 
Nepal. But in the decade during which Pushpa Lal’s CPN had been 
active before the panchayat curtain fell, the communist notion of 
progress, or pragati—in the sense of class struggle within the Marxist 
framework of historical materialism—had already left its mark on much 
of rural Nepal. This Marxist notion of forward social movement was the 
                                                
35 The Nepali Congress (NC) party had been founded in 1947 in Banaras. 
36 See Pigg (1992, 1993) on the ideological impact of development discourse and 
practice in Nepal. 
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one which most prominently shaped the first Thangmi organizations in 
Nepal. 
 In what might at first appear to be an anomaly, one of the first 
formally constituted Thangmi organizations was located not in Dolakha 
or Sindhupalchok, where the majority of Nepal’s Thangmi population 
resided, but in Jhapa, the eastern Tarai district that borders West 
Bengal, where the Thangmi population at the time could not have been 
more than 300.37 Named Niko Pragatisil Thami Samuha (NPTS)—Our 
Progressive Thami Group—it was founded in 1981, although one of its 
publications claims that members had been meeting informally since 
1968 (Patuko 2054 VS: 87).38 Shortly thereafter, between 1971 to 
1973, Nepal’s Jhapeli activists (who were consolidated into the 
Marxist-Leninist, or ML, branch of the CPN in 1978) began their 
campaign of attacks on large landlords in the name of class struggle, 
taking their ideological cues from the radical Naxalite movement then 
in full swing just across the border in West Bengal (Hachhethu 2002). 
The small but significant Jhapa Thangmi community (as well as 
Thangmi resident in the neighboring Tarai districts of Udayapur and 
Sunsari) fell within the sphere of Jhapeli/Naxalite political influence, 
and NPTS was formed with the clear agenda of harnessing Thangmi 
                                                
37 The 1999 Dolakhareng publication estimates the Jhapa Thangmi population to be 
300 based on a 1997-1998 survey (Reng 1999: 38). 
38 Niko means “our” in Thangmi, equivalent to the Nepali hamro. It is often used in 
Thangmi organization and publication titles that are otherwise in Nepali, apparently 
as a symbolic marker of Thangminess. 
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concerns about basic subsistence to a larger communist agenda 
(Patuko 2054 VS).39 
 Jhapa was an important intermediate point in the routes of 
circular migration between Thangmi villages in Nepal and Darjeeling. 
With several Thangmi settlements located very close to the main 
international border crossing along the highway at Kankarvitta (in 
Nepal)/Raniganj (in India), Thangmi moving in both directions often 
spent a night or two with relatives in Jhapa.40 The Nepali government’s 
malaria eradication program in the 1950s (funded in part by USAID) 
included land and cash incentives for families to settle in previously 
uninhabitable Tarai areas like Jhapa, and several Thangmi families had 
taken up this offer. Most of these settlers were from the village of 
Lapilang in Dolakha, and had long participated in circular migration 
themselves. Intriguingly, even a few families that had been settled in 
                                                
39 This stands in contrast to other early ethnic associations in Nepal, which were 
founded on a social welfare model more akin to the BLTS and other such groups in 
India. William Fisher explains, “The first formal Thakali organization was the Thakali 
Samaj Sudhar Sangh founded in Pokhara in 1954… Before 1990 formal ethnic 
associations were not common in Nepal. The few that were organized—for example, 
the Tharu Kalyan Karini Sabha, which was first registered in 1950; the Nepal Tamang 
Ghedung, which was first formed in 1956; the Newar associations; the Nepal Bhasha 
Manka Kala, organized in June 1979; and the Nepal Magar Langali Sangh, formed in 
1982—had to demonstrate the social nature of their activities and establish that they 
were not political or communal organizations” (2001: 139). See also Hangen: “Many 
organizations that have played a key role in the post-1990 ethnic movement were 
formed between 1951 and 1960 … These organizations promoted social cohesion 
within single ethnic groups and the preservation of a group’s cultural practices… 
These organizations sought to reform their own communities rather than the state” 
(2007: 15). 
40 Later, a second road link was built further north at Pashupatinagar in Ilam district, 
and Thangmi also transited through that point. Although crossing at Pashupatinagar 
cut down on travel time, the roads were far inferior to those further south, and many 
Thangmi continued using the route through Jhapa. I was never able to cross at 
Pashupatinagar myself since foreign passport holders were not allowed through that 
border checkpoint. 
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Darjeeling for several generations (including a branch of the Tumsong 
tea plantation family, who were also originally from Lapilang) were 
attracted by the offer of free land inside Nepal, and they made use of 
the Nepali citizenship papers that they had maintained in order to 
return to Nepal (as described in Chapter 4), albeit to the Tarai rather 
than to their ancestral villages in the hills. All of this meant that from 
its earliest days, despite its small size, the Jhapa Thangmi community 
played a key role in the feedback loop of cross-border Thangmi 
communication due to strong kinship links with both Dolakha and 
Darjeeling. 
 It should come as no surprise, then, that in 1981, the same year 
that the NPTS was founded in Jhapa, another Thangmi organization 
was founded in the village of Lapilang, calling itself Lapilang Gaun Ekai 
Samiti (LGES)—United Lapilang Village Committee. Although the 
organization’s name does not mark it as explicitly Thangmi, the 
present-day Nepal Thami Samaj claims LGES as the first Thangmi 
organization established in Dolakha (NTS Organizational Profile).41 
Lapilang village has a majority Thangmi population (ICDM 1999), and 
unlike in Jhapa where the Thangmi were a tiny minority, in Lapilang it 
may have seemed unnecessary, and perhaps overly provocative, to 
include the name of the ethnic group in the organization’s name. In 
addition, although the individuals that the LGES sought to mobilize 
                                                
41 Available online at <http://www.geocities.com/thamisociety/gatibidhi.html>. 
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shared a Thangmi identity, their rallying cry was that of class struggle, 
not ethnic inclusion. 
 By 1981, in addition to hearing about the activities of the Jhapeli 
branch of the CPN-ML through their extended kin network in Jhapa, 
the Thangmi of Lapilang had come under the direct influence of CPN-
ML cadres working underground in their area.42 The Thangmi village of 
Piskar—located just to the west of the present-day boundary between 
Dolakha and Sindhupalchok, but at the time in the same administrative 
region (East 2)—had been chosen as a prospective base area by CPN-
ML operatives soon after the party’s formal establishment in 1978.43 
Amrit Kumar Bohara, CPN-ML leader for of the Bagmati zone,44 was 
originally from Piskar himself, and chose it as a model “village of the 
masses” for his party’s activites. Bohara, along with Asta Laxmi Shakya 
(who later became his wife), and a third cadre, Madhav Paudel, based 
their activities in Piskar’s Thangmi households, but also traveled widely 
in the area to other Thangmi villages such as Lapilang, Alampu, Suspa 
and beyond. 
The communist rhetoric that these political activists introduced 
resonated well with existing Thangmi concerns about exploitation and 
                                                
42 In 1991 the CPN-ML merged with the CPN (Marxist) to become the CPN (Unified 
Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML). 
43 Hangen explains that in 1979, “Leading up to a referendum to determine whether 
the people of Nepal wanted to continue the panchayat system or institute a multi-
party system, the state allowed political parties and organizations to be openly 
active” (2007: 15). 
44 Bohara became a central government minister in 1994-1995, and Acting General 
Secretary of the CPN-UML for a short period after the Constituent Assembly elections 
in 2008. 
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oppression at the hands of local landlords. When Bohara returned to 
his home village in 1978, he found that there was already what a CPN-
ML publication called a “smoldering class hatred” (HPP 1984: 7) among 
the Thangmi farmers, which could be usefully aligned with the broader 
purposes of the nascent communist movement. As the narratives of 
migration presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated, Thangmi villagers had 
long been aware of their exploitation at the hands of landowners, and 
many had decided to settle in Darjeeling, or at least spend much of 
their time there, in order to escape such oppression. Many older 
Thangmi who had remained in Nepal told me how they were involved 
in small-scale acts of resistance against their landlords long before 
they had ever heard of communism. However, their frustrations had 
not previously been linked to a clear ideological agenda that extended 
beyond local power structures, or provided an organizational 
framework within which to conceptualize themselves as agents of 
change. 
The fact that communism was the primary catalyst through 
which many Thangmi in Nepal began to develop political 
consciousness vis-à-vis the nation-state had important long-term 
implications for the group’s ability to organize along ethnic lines, as 
well as for their attitudes towards culture and history as political 
categories.45 At the highest level of abstraction, the CPN has always 
                                                
45 This may well be the case for other groups in Nepal as well, but here I only have 
evidence for the Thangmi case. Additional research on such historical relationships 
between ethnic and class identities would help illuminate current political dynamics 
in Nepal. 
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espoused an orthodox communist line when it comes to the 
evolutionary model of historical materialism, which suggests that 
ethnic, gender and other group identities are simply artifacts of class 
hierarchy, which will disappear naturally as a consequence of class 
struggle.46 The practical application of this ideology on the ground 
meant that CPN-ML cadres like Bohara, Shakya and Paudel—a Chhetri, 
Newar and Bahun respectively—engaged in discourses and practices of 
domestication towards the Thangmi, whom they saw as wild and 
unsocialized. The objective was to cultivate loyal rural cadres who had 
direct lived experience of class oppression, while at the same time 
subjugating the particularities of their Thangmi ethnic identity to meet 
the demands of an emerging socialist modernity in which culture took 
a distinctly secondary role. 
In a 2004 interview with me, Shakya described her early 
experiences of living with the Thangmi as follows: 
 
They never took a bath. They did not know that the pot they 
cooked food in should be cleaned. After they cooked the food 
they would keep it just like that and there would be flies all over 
the pot the whole day. In the evening they would pour water in it, 
cook and eat. I would stay inside and clean the pots. They would 
go to the fields to work, and to collect fodder for the animals. 
When they came home in the evenings they would see everything 
clean … That’s how they learned. I combed their hair and they 
learned that hair should be combed ... There was no soap to 
wash clothes. I taught them how to wash clothes. I did not teach 
                                                
46 See Connor (1984) for an overview of these issues in Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
Mukta Tamang has raised these issues in an analysis of the CPN’s policy documents 
on caste and ethnic issues over time, arguing that, “despite the policy formulation 
during the formative periods, the issue of caste and ethnicity remained marginal in 
the party discourse and practice in the whole history of the communist political 
movement until 1990” (2004: 2). 
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only about politics because there was a need to change the 
economic situation, the social situation, their ideas, and their 
lifestyle ... They ate beef and we taught them that they should 
not eat it. 
Shakya’s social work appears to have been well intentioned, arising out 
of a genuine concern for the welfare of the people she encountered. 
But there was also an element of ethnic prejudice in it that saw most 
Thangmi traditions and habits as unclean and unacceptable, rather 
than as fundamental aspects of Thangmi life. This is most evident in 
Shakya’s pride in teaching Thangmi villagers not to eat beef. While the 
consumption of beef was and remains an important marker of 
Thangmi identity, it had no place within a communist nationalism 
shaped by dominant Hindu ideals. 
Coupled with the general communist belief that class ultimately 
trumped ethnicity, such specific prejudices led to a situation in which 
many Thangmi in Nepal came to feel that cultural practices with which 
they were familiar in sakali forms were incommensurable with effective 
political participation at the national level. This did not mean that 
culture should be stamped out in its entirety—it could in fact be 
instrumentalized in a range of nakali performances as an effective tool 
in the service of particular ideological agendas, and in this sense was 
worth maintaining as a resource—but rather that practice per se was 
best bracketed off as a local field of action separate from the national 
field of politics. Everyone participated in cultural practice in some way 
without even trying, in the sense that most Thangmi in Nepal 
continued to speak their own language and most called upon guru as 
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primary ritual practitioners, but not everyone participated actively in 
politically-oriented representational performance. Only some Thangmi 
became explicitly involved in political activism, and until the 1990s, 
those individuals tended to de-emphasize their ethnic affiliation and 
cultural particularity in the context of national party politics. 
Jagat Man, a Thangmi man from Lapilang who was involved in 
founding the LGES, and remains both a CPN-UML and NTS member 
today, explained: 
 
Through communism we learned that although we Thangmi were 
poor, we were not poor because we were Thangmi. We were poor 
because we lived in a feudal system where the rich exploited us 
to consolidate their wealth. So we had to challenge them on the 
basis of class. Anyway, this was the only way during the 
panchayat time, when you could not talk about ethnic cultures or 
languages. At that point, these were not part of our political 
agenda. But Thangmi felt ashamed to talk to people from other 
groups, and could talk more easily to each other, so it was 
logical for us to form a Thangmi organization even though our 
goal was the advancement of the party, not the ethnicity. 
In this way, the earliest Thangmi organizations in Nepal were 
influenced by a particularly socialist view of how to achieve forward 
progress. Making use of Thangmi kinship and community networks 
was good strategy in the name of achieving pragati—“progress”, in the 
evolutionary sense of historical materialism—but ultimately ethnicity 
was only a strategic entry point into larger issues of class. 
 For many Thangmi, such logic was forever unsettled through the 
momentous events of the Piskar Massacre in January 1984. For others, 
the killing of two Thangmi villagers by government forces at a local 
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festival in Piskar simply hardened their commitment to the communist 
cause.47 Over the next several months, over 300 villagers were arrested 
for their alleged participation in this event, with some held in custody 
for up to three years without trial. That the government’s excuse for 
the police action was the fact that Thangmi villagers were singing 
revolutionary songs at the annual Maghe Sangkranti festival at 
Mahadevsthan, a local temple, shows how the framework of a Thangmi 
cultural event had been deployed in the service of a particular political 
agenda, with devastating effects.48 
On the one hand, this experiential linkage between cultural 
performance and political violence led to a hardening of Thangmi 
ethnic consciousness as an oppressed group vis-à-vis both the state 
and the CPN-ML party, whom some Thangmi felt had used them as 
sacrificial scapegoats (Bohara, Shakya and Paudel were unharmed in 
the massacre). On the other hand, the Piskar incident compelled a 
more cautious separation of the domain of culture from that of politics 
thereafter. Many Thangmi came to fear that participation in the public 
events at which much cultural practice unfolded—territorial deity 
festivals, funerary rites, wedding parties—constituted a serious risk to 
themselves and their families, both because “Thangmi culture” had 
now been equated with subversive politics in the eyes of the state, and 
because simply gathering in a large group in public could draw 
                                                
47 I have described this event and its aftermath in detail in Shneiderman (2003). 
48 See human rights reports about the event from Amnesty International (1987) and 
INSEC (1995). 
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unwanted attention.49 Cultural practice took a turn towards the more 
insular, with the reactivation of many long-standing strategies to avoid 
recognition (described in Chapter 1), particularly by those who were 
not deeply invested in communist ideology already. For many of those 
already involved with communism, the Piskar Massacre confirmed their 
commitment to the Marxist path towards progress and provided an 
entrée onto the national political stage, but only at the cost of 
downplaying their Thangminess. The CPN-ML eulogized Ile and Bir 
Bahadur as communist, rather than Thangmi martyrs, and little was 
done to actually compensate their families or ensure the welfare of 
Thangmi as a group, despite repeated requests to the government.50 
The cumulative effect of the 1984 events in Piskar was the 
dissolution of the first Thangmi organizations in Nepal, and an 
irrevocable polarization of the community into a number of camps, 
each of which had its own views on the relationship between culture, 
politics and progress. This post-1984 factionalization, and the 
ambivalence towards cultural practices and performances that it 
engendered (were they resources to be deployed in the quest for 
progress? were they forms of resistance against a violent state? or were 
they just what people did because they were Thangmi, in a domain 
entirely separate from that of politics?) meant that it would be more 
than a decade until some Thangmi began to consider seriously the 
                                                
49 Such fears re-emerged in new forms during the civil conflict between the Maoists 
and state forces from 1996-2006. 
50 These grievances are described in detail in Dolakhareng (Reng 1999: 65-68).  
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prospect of crossing political lines in order to organize around 
ethnicity.51 
 
Converging on Culture: A New Political Strategy 
1990 marked a watershed year for the future of Thangmi ethnic 
politics in both Nepal and India, albeit for different reasons.52 In Nepal, 
the first Jana Andolan (People’s Movement) brought about the end of 
absolute monarchy, with King Birendra lifting the ban on political 
parties and accepting a new constitition. The formal end of the 
panchayat system permitted social inequities to be expressed in an 
explicitly ethnic idiom in a manner that had previously been impossible 
(although restrictions had gradually loosened over the course of the 
1980s).53 Ethnic activists soon formed what is now known as the Nepal 
Janajati Adivasi Mahasangh (Nepal Federation of Indigenous 
Nationalities, or NEFIN, in English), which was registered in 1990 as an 
umbrella organization to bring together a range of associations 
                                                
51 These questions, and numerous variations on them, were raised repeatedly in a 
range of interviews and conversations conducted with Thangmi activists and 
laypeople. I also heard them expressed in formal speeches at several events. Here in 
the interest of space I have just summarized the main themes; the point is that the 
idea of making claims on the state through the idiom of ethnicity was in no way a 
natural form for Thangmi political consciousness to take, and in fact only arose long 
after Thangmi had begun making claims through the idiom of class.  
52 It could be suggested that the timing of these transformations was not 
coincidental, but rather an effect of much larger global discourses of multiculturalism 
and indigeneity (linked perhaps to neoliberal developmentalist economics), but 
substantiating such assertions is beyond the scope of my work here. 
53 As Susan Hangen explains, “Suggesting that ethnic inequality existed was 
considered politically contentious throughout the authoritarian panchayat era (1962-
90) and most of the 1990s” (2007: 3). 
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representing individual ethnic groups.54 NEFIN played a role in advising 
the framers of the 1990 Constitution, and for the first time, Nepal was 
explicitly recognized as a multicultural, multilingual state. 
In 1990 in India, the government announced a plan to extend 
reservations to the Other Backwards Classes (OBCs) as recommended 
by the 1980 Mandal Commission Report, which had been left 
unimplemented until a newly sympathetic government came to power 
(Jenkins 2003: 147). Although the concept of “backward classes” had 
existed in a vaguely defined form since the colonial era (Galanter 1984: 
154-5), the specific groups that fell under this rubric had never been 
clearly listed, nor had the designation previously carried reservation 
benefits like those that had been attached to the categories of 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) and Scheduled Caste (SC) since 1950. Now, up to 
52% of India’s population stood to receive some form of state support 
if they could demonstrate their membership in the category of Other 
Backwards Classes (Jenkins 2003: 145). Moreover, it seemed that the 
government was willing to entertain new applications for ST and SC 
status for the first time in several decades. 
These political shifts in Nepal and India had the common effect 
of powerfully countering class and nation as primary identities by 
resituating ethnicity as both an essential marker of social difference, 
                                                
54 At its founding, the organization was called simply the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh, 
or Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN). “Adivasi” and “indigenous” were added 
only in 2004 (Hangen 2007: 20). The group had eight member organizations at its 
founding, which had grown to 54 by 2007 (Hangen 2007: 24), and there are several 
additional groups currently seeking membership (Mukta Tamang, personal 
communication.) 
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and a politically salient category through which to make claims on the 
state.55 In addition, the changes of 1990 in both countries led to a new 
preoccupation with ethnic classification—on the part of both the states 
and the citizens who sought recognition—in order to determine who 
was a legitimate member of a janajati or OBC group. A 1996 task force 
of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal for the “Establishment of the 
Foundation for the Upliftment of Indigenous Nationalities” defined 
janajati groups as having the following characteristics: 
 
a distinct collective identity; own language, tradition, culture and 
civilisation; own traditional egalitarian social structure; 
traditional homeland or geographical area; written or oral 
history; having ‘we-feeling’; has had no decisive role in the 
politics and government of modern Nepal; who are the 
indigenous or native peoples of Nepal; and who declares itself as 
‘janajati’ (NFDIN 2003: 6-7)56 
In determining who qualified as OBC, the Government of India settled 
on a definition which emphasized social and cultural, as well as 
economic attributes: 
 
‘class’ means a homogeneous section of the people grouped 
together because of certain likenesses or common traits, and 
who are identifiable by some common attributes such as status, 
rank, occupation, residence in a locality, race, religion and the 
like (Supreme Court of India, as cited in Jenkins 2003: 145). 
                                                
55 In Nepal, such claims were made in a primarily oppositional fashion, in the sense 
that NEFIN was and remains a non-governmental entity pushing the state for 
increasing commitments to inclusion. In India, these claims were made within the 
existing framework of the welfare state, since groups did not need to ask the state to 
institute a system of reservations; rather, they needed to strategically manipulate the 
existing system in order to gain the best possible situation for themselves. 
56 This definition is particularly interesting for its emphasis on exclusion from politics 
and governance, as well as on what we might call “self-declaration”. Much more can 
be said about these details, particularly in the current context of calls for ethnic 
federalism, but that is beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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Although the terminology is different, the description of an ideal OBC 
group shared a great deal with the long-standing definition of “tribe”, 
as articulated by the 1965 Lokur Committee report: “indication of 
primitive traits, distinctive culture, geographical isolation, shyness of 
contact with the community at large, and backwardness” (Galanter 
1984: 152). The overlap between OBC and ST definitions, particularly 
in their shared emphasis on the amorphous category of backwardness, 
later came to bear significantly on the way that Thangmi in India 
conceptualized their political projects: their first application to the 
government for special status in 1992 requested recognition as “Other 
Backwards Class/Scheduled Tribe”, as if there was little difference 
between the two. 
Here, the important point is that this renewed interest in 
classifying marginalized populations along ethnic lines prompted 
members of the Thangmi community in both locations to think about 
how they might organize effectively to align themselves with the 
emerging ethnic movement in Nepal, and take advantage of the 
reservation benefits in the offing in India. Prior to 1990, the cross-
border Thangmi community as a whole had been influenced by various 
discourses of social change—from unnati to pragati—which had 
compelled Thangmi ethnic identity to be conceptualized as secondary 
to primary nationalist identities. In India, the pan-Nepali identity that 
was already in the making when the BLTS came into existence in 1943 
had reached its political height in the late 1980s with the violent 
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movement for the separate state of Gorkhaland.57 During what is 
commonly referred to in Darjeeling as “the agitation”, there was no 
active Thangmi organization, both since public affiliation with any 
identity other than a ‘Gorkhali’ nationalist one was risky, and because 
the socio-economic upheaval of the time made other potential 
movements pragmatically impossible. Similarly in Nepal, the latter half 
of the 1980s was devoid of Thangmi ethnic organizations, first 
because the concerns around which they might have formed had been 
cast as those of a class-based peasant identity within the rhetoric of 
the communist movement, and later due to the risks associated with 
any form of public protest in the wake of the Piskar Massacre. In both 
cases, cultural particularities had been submerged by dominant 
discourses of resistance that emphasized other aspects of 
marginalization. 
The newly refigured post-1990 political landscapes created 
space for Thangmi—many of whom had been involved in one way or 
another in the political projects described above—to consider how the 
domain of culture might be productively reunited with that of politics 
within the rapidly emerging paradigms for ethnic activism in both India 
and Nepal. This is not to say that in the meantime cultural practice had 
ceased to exist. For many Thangmi in India, it had undergone radical 
transformation since the era of early migration, as more and more 
families turned to Hindu pandits or Buddhist lamas for ritual services 
                                                
57 See Subba (1992). 
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after the dissolution of the BLTS in the mid-1960s, and younger 
generations ceased speaking the Thangmi language. In Nepal, from the 
perspective of many politically active Thangmi, culture remained 
embodied in practice for personal purposes at the level of the 
community (i.e. politically engaged Thangmi still spoke Thangmi and 
participated in ritual life dominated by gurus), but it was not described 
in discourse for political purposes at the level of the nation. From the 
perspective of those who had stayed clear of previous political 
engagement, such as many older gurus and laypeople, particularly 
women, culture was simply what one did every day—so taken for 
granted that one could forget it existed (see Chapter 1)—and was best 
left that way to avoid unwanted attention. All of these perspectives in 
their own way had previously precluded the instrumentalization of 
Thangmi culture for expressly ethnic political purposes at the level of 
the nation.58 
Now, in the early 1990s, the objectification of a particularly 
Thangmi ethnic culture seemed to hold one of the keys to increased 
participation in a slowly democratizing Nepali nation that was more 
willing to entertain ethnic agendas than radical communist ones,59 as 
well as to new benefits from an Indian welfare state more amenable to 
                                                
58 The early BLTS cultural performances had been mounted in the service of what we 
might call welfare, rather than ethno-political, objectives. 
59 The CPN-UML departed from their radical communist roots to join the Nepali 
Congress in the fight for democracy in 1990. This marked the beginning of their 
long-term shift towards the political center, a move which seems to have provided a 
key condition for the later Maoist movement’s success, since the latter was able to 
take advantage of the disillusionment experienced by UML cadres who felt deserted 
by the party, including many in Piskar (see Shneiderman 2003). 
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granting reservations to individual ethnic groups with small population 
numbers than granting a separate state to a more threatening Nepali 
nationalist bloc. The first step towards developing a cultural narrative 
that would be recognizable within the terms of either the Nepali or 
Indian nation was revisiting history to determine what aspects of the 
disparate, synthetic matrix of Thangmi cultural practice on the ground 
could be held up as examples of shared “tradition”.60 The earlier 
political movements in which Thangmi had taken part had promoted 
versions of history which had little room for Thangmi or other ethnic 
particularities. Proponents of both historical materialism in the sense 
of pragati, and proponents of jati improvement in the sense of unnati, 
saw society in an evolutionary frame within which ‘backwards’ 
practices and traditions needed to be reformed, if not entirely 
discarded, in the process of moving forward towards utopian futures.61 
Now, however, a distinctive history based on those very practices—a 
history of cultural particularity which highlighted the differences 
between individual groups rather than their commonalities within a 
grand historical narrative—was a necessary attribute to be considered 
janajati or tribal. 
 
 
                                                
60 See Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), Anderson (1991) and Trouillot (1995) for 
definitive discussions of the role of history in creating contemporary ethno-
nationalist identities. 
61 I am grateful to Rhoderick Chalmers for pointing out the similarities between the 
unnati and pragati discourses in their treatment of history (personal communication, 
October 2008). 
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Seeking Unitary Histories, Finding Fractured Politics 
Thangmi activists in India were the first to recognize the necessity of a 
coherent, standardized history as they began the process of compiling 
their application for OBC status to the state of West Bengal in 1990. 
Intriguingly, the 1980 Mandal Commission report had listed a group 
called “Thami” as an OBC in the state of Madhya Pradesh.62 This 
realization prompted the Darjeeling-based Thami organization to 
rename itself the All India Thami Association in an effort to link 
themselves to the group with the same name in this central Indian 
state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association office in Darjeeling 
                                                
62 OBC, ST and SC classification begins at the state level: groups must apply to 
relevant ministry on a state-by-state basis first, and only after the group in question 
has received the designation in at least one state can they be considered for the 
designation at the national level. The different contexts surrounding OBC and ST 
classification in Sikkim and West Bengal have played an important role in the micro-
politics between communities of Nepali heritage in both states, but the details of this 
issue are beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
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A delegation of Darjeeling Thangmi traveled to Madhya Pradesh with 
the objective of finding their long-lost brethren to ask how they had 
gained OBC status in their state, but as Nathu (who had been part of 
the delegation) explained, “We did not know where to start, we had no 
‘contact’. Maybe the Thami there were entirely different from us, but 
they had the same name. We tried, but we could not find them”. 
Their next strategy was to travel to Nepal, where they hoped to 
collect information about Thangmi history, culture and language—all 
required subject headings on the OBC application form—which they 
felt inadequately equipped to address on their own. The relatively well-
educated, middle-class male leaders of the organization in 1992 were 
all from families that had been settled in Darjeeling for at least two 
generations, some much longer.63 Several of them held government 
jobs, and many had been involved in pan-Nepali political projects. 
None of them spoke Thangmi, and in interviews they all stated that 
they had few, if any, recollections of particularly Thangmi cultural 
practices in their households or communities during their childhood. In 
short, they were quintessential post-colonial Indian citizens of Nepali 
heritage, with little sense of a particularly Thangmi identity apart from 
their name (and the persistent sense of “backwardness” that it carried) 
and the seasonal presence of migrant Thangmi laborers from Nepal in 
their town every year—some of whom were their kinsmen. 
                                                
63 Their names are listed on the cover page of the OBC application; I was able to 
interview four out of the seven association officials from 1992. 
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It was these laborers to whom they now turned for “contact”, in 
order to ensure that their first trip to Nepal was not in vain as the 
journey to Madhya Pradesh had been. Although some members of the 
Thangmi community in India had maintained relationships with 
Thangmi from Nepal who appeared in Darjeeling every year, for the 
most part these were more patron-client than kinship relations, with 
economically marginal migrant laborers from Nepal requesting 
temporary places to sleep or donations of food from Thangmi families 
well-established in India. The latter generally acquiesced, but more out 
of a sense of pity and obligation than out of familial warmth. 
According to one circular migrant who had been spending part of every 
year in Darjeeling since the early 1980s, “Before all of this OBC talk, 
they never wanted to recognize us. Maybe they threw us scraps or 
chose to employ us instead of others when they needed a load carried, 
but otherwise they didn’t want to be reminded that we were also 
Thangmi.” Or as Rajen, General Secretary of BTWA from 2003-2005 
put it more bluntly, “There are two ‘standards’ [of Thangmi]: the ‘low-
level’ type and the type with ‘education’. As of yet, we’ve been unable 
to unify the two.” Joining together to create a coherent ethnic identity 
with a shared historical narrative across borders, class and educational 
experience was not at all a natural, or un-selfconscious, process for 
many of those involved. Rather, it entailed a conscious decision-
making process, initiated by Thangmi in India, and later reframed by 
Thangmi in Nepal for their own purposes as well, to collude in 
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producing a shared set of historical and cultural objects that were 
useful to all of them. 
When the BTWA Thangmi leadership arrived in Kathmandu on 
their first official trip (some of them had been for personal reasons 
before), they used the contacts provided by circular migrants to seek 
out what they imagined would be a single, coherent Thangmi 
organization. They were overwhelmed by the proliferation of politically 
factionalized entities that they instead encountered. By 1991, there 
were five registered Thangmi organizations in Nepal: Niko Thami Seva 
Samiti Nepal and Nepal Thami Bhume Sangh in Dolakha; Nepal 
Pragatisil Thami Samuha in Udayapur; Niko Thami Utthan Manch Nepal 
in Jhapa; and Niko Thami Sangh Nepal in Ramechhap (NTS 
organizational profile). Although none of these were official wings of 
the various mainstream parties they were close to (in the manner that 
the UML Thami Loktantrik Sangh and the Maoist Thami Mukti Morcha 
would be a decade later), the political fault lines between them were 
clear. Dolakha had one UML-leaning organization (Niko Thami Seva 
Samiti Nepal) and one Nepali Congress-leaning organization (Nepal 
Thami Bhume Sangh). Udayapur’s single organization was staunchly 
communist, in fact much farther left than the UML party line, while 
Jhapa’s organization was Congress-affiliated, and Ramechap’s was 
again aligned with the UML. Overall, three out of the five were leftist 
organizations which espoused varyingly radical degrees of communist 
ideology, while two leaned towards the center-right. None of the 
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leaders deigned to speak with one another, and those who broadly 
shared the communist label were even less interested in collaborating 
with their ideologically close counterparts than they were in talking 
with those in the Congress camp.64 All of this meant that the prospects 
for creating a unified Thangmi ethnic movement—which could 
overcome the political differences in which potential activists were 
already deeply invested—were challenging at best. 
Most of the BTWA activists in leadership positions in the early 
1990s had steered clear of explicit political affiliation during the 
Gorkhaland agitation, instead focusing on their government jobs and 
informal social welfare style activities. For Thangmi from India, the 
passionate maintenance of political boundaries in which Thangmi 
activists in Nepal engaged was bewildering. So was the geographical 
dispersion of Thangmi organizations in Nepal, since none of the 
organizations were nationally registered in Kathmandu, rather only at 
the district level. In their pamphlets and publications, all of these 
organizations portrayed their localized set of concerns as those 
affecting all Thangmi, yet none of these groups had members from 
beyond the district where they were registered. Their priorities, as 
reflected in their names, varied from seva (social service) to bhume 
(earth; in this case a reference to Thangmi territory) to utthan 
(upliftment) and pragati (progress). Although each claimed authority to 
                                                
64 This reflects a broader pattern in Nepali politics, in which parties who are 
ideologically closer to each other (i.e. UML and Maoist) are unable to overcome the 
small differences and personal power politics between them to collaborate effectively. 
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speak for all Thangmi, none of them had mobilized that voice at the 
national level. Moreover, in this transitional period in the immediate 
wake of the return to democracy in Nepal when ethnic organizations 
were finding their feet, culture and history of the sort that Thangmi in 
India were seeking—those objectifiable as sacred—were still in the 
early phases of articulation in Nepal, remaining heavily in the shadow 
of class. 
Niko Thami Seva Samiti (NTSS), the organization most closely 
aligned with the first incarnation of NEFEN, put out a two page “appeal” 
in September 1990, which appears to be the first post-Jana Andolan 
publication by a Thangmi organization.65 I found copies of the thin 
paper document filed in the BTWA archives, along with other draft 
materials that eventually made their way into the West Bengal OBC 
application—hand-written notes for a Thangmi glossary, descriptions 
of a “birth ceremony” and “Bhumee puja”—suggesting that the BTWA 
activists picked it up on their information gathering trip to Nepal.66 The 
‘appeal’ invokes the discourses of vikas (development) and adhikar 
(rights) to suggest that: 
 
it is important that we Thamis unite in order to access our rights, 
to preserve our culture, language, social values and good 
traditions and to develop in every sector, including the political, 
financial, religious and cultural. 
                                                
65 This organization began its operations in Dolakha, registering a branch in 
Kathmandu in 1995—the first Thangmi organization to be registered in the capital. 
66 The document was also on file at the NTS office in Kathmandu, and several 
individuals referred to it when describing the first wave of post-1990 organizing in 
Nepal. 
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However, the pamphlet places the blame for the fragmented nature of 
the Thangmi world (social, cultural, political) squarely on the shoulders 
of “feudalists”, and the hopes for future Thangmi unity are placed in 
class solidarity, not shared cultural practice: 
 
We should clearly understand the feudal practice that is creating 
various illusions about us Thami people. If we don’t uproot the 
feudal system, which has been involved in the practice of 
injustice and atrocities against us, it will once again succeed in 
creating various illusions and keeping us under its control…We 
must take caution, and until and unless the feudal system is 
completely uprooted from our society, feudal practices which 
split and exploit us in order to rule the country will continue to 
exist…. as soon as they hear that we are organised, feudalists 
will become restless … Then they will panic and try to fragment 
our organisation. 
The appeal then picks up the discourse of domestication that had been 
introduced by communist cadres like Bohara and Shakya (as described 
above), suggesting that Thangmi must shed the “wild” (N: jangali) 
image that the nation holds of them in order to become modern 
citizens of Nepal. This task is to be achieved by giving up wild crafts, 
clothing and foods, a theme echoed in the poem that serves as this 
chapter’s second epigraph, in which “hunting in the forests for 
underground fruits” is dualistically opposed to “using Thami hands for 
development”. 
The appeal concludes with a 13-point set of demands, the final 
and most substantive of which is a call for reservations, Indian style: 
“Depending on their eligibility, unconditional places should be 
reserved for the backward Thamis in civil service, army, police, 
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teaching and in any other government institution”. The Indian 
government had indicated their intention to implement the 
recommendations of the Mandal Commission report only a month 
before the NTSS appeal was issued; but as Nathu explained, he and 
several other Thangmi had been postering the Darjeeling bazaar with 
an appeal for OBC status since 1987 (against the wishes of several 
Thangmi involved with the Gorkhaland movement at the time). Such 
posters would have made this a visible issue for several years 
preceding 1990, and apparently news traveled fast through the cross-
border Thangmi community once the prospect for getting recognized 
as OBC became more realistic. As Gopal, one of the primary authors of 
the appeal, explained, “We heard what was going on in India, and we 
thought it was also time to demand the same facilities here. After all, 
we are all Thangmi, why should they get something different from 
us?”67 The BTWA leadership only made its first visit to Nepal several 
months later, and it would be several years still until Thangmi activists 
in Nepal could put aside their political and personal differences to 
create a united organization which recognized culture as a political 
resource to be cultivated, rather than as a hindrance to development 
best discarded. 
 
                                                
67 The appeal also states, “the feudal regime … forced us to go to mugalan (India)”. 
Here it sounds as if migrating to India is an entirely negative experience, which in an 
ideal world of class equality would not be necessary; yet at the same time Gopal 
clearly saw the benefits that Thangmi could avail themselves of in India as a positive 
result of settling there. See Hutt (1998) for a discussion of the term mugalan. 
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OBC: na jat, na bhat 
In the meantime, the “Thami” were officially gazzetted as an OBC 
group in West Bengal in 1995. The process had been exhausting for 
those most intimately involved, with an in-depth correspondence 
between the then-BTWA secretary, Basant, and both the state and 
central governments, and several trips to Calcutta and Delhi just to 
ensure that the application had reached the correct offices.68 In 
addition, the BTWA was required to defend the statements it had made 
on the application in front of a commission which visited Darjeeling in 
early 1995, a task which caused the leadership some consternation. In 
the application they had made several normative statements (“It is well 
established fact with positive proof that …”) about the nature of 
Thangmi culture, history and society, which the BTWA leadership 
themselves could not substantiate. For instance, they had described 
the Thangmi as “poor and illiterate”, “daily wage labourers”, while they 
themselves were all relatively well-off, well-educated civil servants. 
Under “religion”, the Thangmi were said to “worship Bhume, who is the 
personification of the land”, with their own “primitive shaman culture”, 
but most of the BTWA leadership had grown up in a predominantly 
Hindu ritual sphere.69 Under the heading of “dialect”, Thangmi were 
said to have “their own tribal language or dialect”, which none of the 
                                                
68 See Middleton and Shneiderman (2008) for additional details of the administrative 
machinery through which such applications are processed. 
69 Intriguingly, this section makes comparisons to both Kiranti culture “similar to 
Rais” and pre-Buddhist Tibetan traditions “Bonbo-culture of Tibet”, both allusions 
worth discussing in further detail elsewhere. 
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BTWA leadership spoke. In short, instead of describing themselves, the 
authors of the application had described the Thangmi from Nepal 
whom they had encountered as wage laborers in Darjeeling. 
When it came time to defend their application in front of the 
state commission, the BTWA leadership had to look both to the upper 
echelons of the Thangmi community for individuals who spoke the 
best English and Bengali in order to communicate with the state 
officials, and to the lower rungs in order to find those who spoke 
Thangmi fluently (the BTWA officers themselves were most comfortable 
in Nepali). “We had to go all together, with both the most educated and 
the porters”, explained Nathu.70 Paras, the BTWA president, 
represented the “educated” (padhai-lekhai, as discussed in Chapter 3), 
and several wage laborers were hired for the day to stand by to answer 
questions about culture and language. By virtue of their incomplete 
citizen status, these individuals were not included in the population 
statistics included in the OBC application (which showed 4288 
Thangmi throughout West Bengal), and would not stand to benefit 
directly from any special status that might be attained.71 
                                                
70 Nathu was perhaps the BTWA leader who was best able to negotiate between these 
two worlds, for reasons that will be described in more detail below. Although he 
shared the born-and-bred in Darjeeling background of the other leaders, his family 
had stayed in relatively close contact with kin in Nepal, and Nathu made a 
conscientious effort to treat migrant laborers like family in a manner that differed 
from the others’ attitude of derision. He was ousted from BTWA leadership soon after 
OBC status was attained, in large part because his identification with migrant labor 
was perceived to challenge the Thangmi claim to indigeneity. 
71 Although some of these circular migrants probably had some of the trappings of 
Indian citizenship, as described in Chapter 4, the official BTWA membership list 
included only those whose fathers or grandfathers were already citizens as of 1950 
so as to avoid charges of being a non-Indian population of migrants from Nepal. This 
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At the same time that they had asserted “positive proof” of a 
distinctive culture, in other parts of the application its authors 
betrayed their ambivalence about the entire undertaking by stating 
repeatedly that they they had none (or perhaps they were just echoing 
the refusal to objectify cultural practice that they, like me, had received 
when they first posed the question “What is Thangmi culture?” to 
Thangmi gurus in Nepal). For instance, the application included the 
statements: “‘THAMI’ community have no distinct religion of their 
own”, and, “THAMI has got no particular festival of their own”, as well 
as two paragraphs that attempted to explain why many Thangmi could 
no longer speak their own language. At least the authors of the 
application were being honest when they described their “dress” as 
“nothing special”, stated that their forebears had migrated from Tibet, 
Burma and Nepal (although they fixed the dates of migration between 
1815-1835),72 and acknowledged that they observed Hindu festivals in 
addition to their own shamanic ones. It was these statements, which in 
fact described Thangmi in India most accurately, that the BTWA later 
felt they needed to do away with in order to climb the ladder to the 
pinnacle of ST status. 
 But why was their hard-won OBC status inadequate? Why did the 
BTWA decide to take their quest for recognition a step further by 
demanding ST status less than ten years after receiving recognition as 
                                                                                                                                       
meant that only “established” Indian Thangmi families known to the BTWA leadership 
were included. 
72 A small number of Thangmi families had settled first in Burma after leaving Nepal, 
making their way to India only much later. 
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an OBC? The first part of the answer is that, as described above, 
neither the BTWA leadership nor lay Thangmi in India had understood 
the nuanced differences in benefits between OBC and ST at the time 
they made their first application. In their minds, any recognition from 
the state as a marginalized group worthy of assistance would be an 
accomplishment. But after the OBC label had been applied to them, 
disillusionment quickly set in. It turned out that OBC status only 
qualified a group for reservations in state and central government jobs 
and education, but not the direct economic subsidies and territorial 
provisions that ST status afforded. 
By the time I first visited Darjeeling in 2000, the phrase na jat na 
bhat (N: neither caste nor rice) was already a popular complaint about 
the OBC designation: it was perceived to carry neither the social 
authority nor the economic benefits of SC or ST status. Moreover, so 
many other groups had been officially recognized as OBC at around 
the same time as the Thangmi that the value of the category was 
perceived to have diminished, since it no longer set those who held it 
apart from others. This was especially the case in Darjeeling, where 
nearly all of the groups of Nepali heritage were now in the same 
category, with the exception of Bahun and Chhetri.73 
Another part of the problem was the administrative complexity 
of actually getting certified as an individual member of an OBC group. 
                                                
73 Eight other groups of Nepali heritage were listed alongside the Thangmi in the 
1995 gazette: Bhujel, Newar, Mangar (known as Magar in Nepal), Nembang, 
Sampang, Bunghheng, Jogi and Dhimal. 
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First one had to submit a personal application to the District 
Magistrate’s office, including a recommendation letter from the 
registered representative body of the ethnic group in question, along 
with letters from two paternal relatives from the same ethnic group. 
These two provisions proved complicated for many. The first 
requirement was challenging for those who were not politically 
involved with the organization already, and who might be at odds with 
its leadership for a range of personal or political reasons (including 
many of the more recently migrated, less well-off families). The 
second requirement proved challenging for those who might trace 
their membership in the group through their mother, and so could not 
provide the necessary letters.74 Then, each applicant had to appear in 
person at a hearing and answer a range of often invasive questions. 
The upshot was that as of 2004, by which time the Thangmi had held 
OBC status for almost a decade, only about 160 individuals had 
actually received their certificates within Darjeeling municipality.75 
These individual administrative hurdles were the same for groups 
holding ST status, yet somehow the grass seemed greener on the other 
side. In addition, two of the most prominent groups, the Tamang and 
Limbu, had already moved on to demand ST status, and Thangmi 
feared that if groups with such comparatively large populations 
                                                
74 These issues are worthy of substantial discussion, which I hope to take up in a 
future article on kinship, gender, and Indian policies of recognition. 
75 This figure was provided to me by a municipality secretary who collated records 
from every year since 1995 for me. It only includes those resident within Darjeeling 
municipality, not Thangmi in other areas of the district. 
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received that designation, they themselves would no longer have any 
hope of competing for civil service and educational positions. OBC 
began to seem like a stepping stone on the way to ST status—an 
important intermediate point along the way, but by no means the 
destination itself.  
The primary differences between the definition of a Scheduled 
Tribe and a Backwards Class are in the requirements of “primitive 
traits” and “geographical isolation” for the former. In Darjeeling 
layman’s terms, these two criteria for the tribal designation were 
interpreted to mean “non-Hindu” and “indigenous” respectively. 
Whether the Government of India actually intended them to be read in 
this way is a subject of great debate, but many Thangmi activists 
interpreted these terms to mean that any Hindu-inflected aspect of 
religious or cultural practice, or any mention of migration from outside 
of India, would provide grounds for disqualification. If they were to be 
taken seriously as legitimate aspirants to the ST title, a much more 
rigorously bounded notion of Thangmi culture and history would be 
necessary than that contained in either the OBC application’s 
paradoxical statements, or the state-supported developmentalist 
discourse of 1990s Nepal that sought to mold “primitive” practices into 
modern (i.e. Hinduized) models. 
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Unifying as an Ethnic Group: the Nepal Thami Samaj 
In 1999, the Nepal Thami Samaj (NTS) was formed with the intention of 
unifiying the existing array of Thangmi organizations in Nepal under a 
central, apolitical aegis registered in Kathmandu to work under the 
umbrella of what was then NEFEN to advance janajati activist agendas 
at the national level. The organization’s first objective, as stated in its 
constitution, was to overcome the politicized past of Thangmi activism: 
“NTS shall not be operated through directive principles of any political 
party, but it shall be a common social organisation for all the Thamis 
across the nation” (NTS 2000 constitution, article 2.5.a). Although the 
organization was to be registered in Nepal to agitate for Thangmi 
concerns vis-à-vis the Nepali state, the authors of its constitution 
articulated an explicitly transnational vision of what constituted 
membership in the “Thangmi society”, broadly conceived, from which 
this particular organization took its name: “‘Thami Society’ refers to all 
the Thamis attached to the cultural, social and religious norms and 
values of the Thamis from inside or outside of Nepal, who can or 
cannot speak the Thami language” (NTS 2000 constitution, article 
1.2.b). 
The careful statement that even those from “outside Nepal” who 
might not speak the language could belong was clearly designed to 
include the Thangmi from India with whom Thangmi activists in Nepal 
had come into increasing contact over the past several years. Despite 
the fact that the linguistic incompetence and cultural differences of 
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Thangmi in India prompted many lay Thangmi in Nepal to dismiss the 
claims of the former to belong to “Thangmi society”, the NTS 
leadership was impressed by their organizational abilities and their 
political success in gaining OBC status, and thought the BTWA 
leadership might have something to contribute as NTS began to 
consider their options for recognition in Nepal. Thangmi in India were 
certainly “attached” to cultural, social and religious norms, albeit in 
different ways than most Thangmi in Nepal were. Yet despite the 
broadly inclusive statement of who belonged to “Thangmi society”, 
membership of the organization was in fact restricted to, “Any Nepali 
Thami citizen who has completed 16 years of age” (NTS 2000 
constitution 3.9.a). As one member of the committee involved in 
drafting the constitution explained, “We wanted to learn from them 
[Thangmi from India] but we did not want them to ‘dominate’ us as the 
educated have for so long done to villagers”.76 So a compromise had 
been struck: Thangmi from India could be involved in the organization 
in an advisory capacity, but only those who held Nepali citizenship 
could be voting members. In reality, this created a substantial 
loophole, since as described in Chapter 4, many Thangmi who were 
Indian citizens of Nepali heritage did in fact hold Nepali citizenship 
papers as well. This would have substantial implications for the 
organization’s direction just a few years down the line. 
                                                
76 Some informants framed this even more bluntly in terms of a tit-for-tat with the 
BTWA for excluding from their census migrant laborers who could not demonstrate 
their families had been settled since before 1950. 
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Members of the Jhapa branch of the Thangmi community were 
once again instrumental in envisioning this new Thangmi organization, 
just as they had been during the first wave of Thangmi association 
formation in the 1970s and 80s. In particular, a young man named 
Megh Raj had taken the initiative to call for the unification of the 
Thangmi associations under the single heading of NTS. Since the mid-
1990s, he had been running an organization based in Jhapa called the 
Thami Bhasa Tatha Sanskriti Utthan Kendra (TBTSUK)—the Thami 
Language and Cultural Upliftment Center.77 Its goal was utthan, but 
here the concept of upliftment was deployed in a novel way, referring 
to the objects of Thangmi language and culture themselves, not the 
destitute masses of rural Thangmi. 
In Megh Raj’s view, as articulated throughout the 1999 
publication Dolakhareng, Thangmi villagers in rural areas had allowed 
their vast cultural resources to degenerate due to their lack of 
education, and it was the responsibility of educated Thangmi, 
hopefully with the support of the Nepali state, to retrieve these 
valuable objects from their incompetent guardians: “No one can deny 
the fact that the historical facts kept so far in the possession of this 
ethnic group might be lost forever unless serious concern is shown …” 
(Reng 1999: 4). Such concern was vital to the Thangmi community’s 
potential to organize around the unifying discourse of ethnicity, since 
                                                
77 The organization was formally registered as Niko Thami Utthan Manch Nepal, but 
on all of its published materials the name Thami Bhasa Tatha Sanskriti Utthan Kendra 
appears instead; based on Megh Raj’s preferences I have used the latter here. 
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creating an ethnic identity recognizable at the national level would 
require clearly objectified notions of culture and history. In reaching 
these conclusions, Megh Raj was heavily influenced by the BTWA 
campaigns for OBC and then ST status—his own parents had returned 
to settle in Jhapa after growing up in Darjeeling, and for him Darjeeling 
was the closest cultural center, not Kathmandu. Having completed his 
BA degree, he was also educationally and economically closer to the 
BTWA leadership than most of the NTS activists who had grown up in 
the villages of Dolakha and Sindhupalchok and who rarely possessed 
any secondary education. Megh Raj sought to use his intermediate 
position as a Jhapa Thangmi to bring the two activist groups closer 
together.  
Megh Raj acknowledged that the inability to instrumentalize 
culture for productive political purposes up until this time was not 
entirely the fault of rural Thangmi themselves, for: 
 
There may be quite a few reasons for their backwardness and 
they include: lack of education, poverty, wild attitude, orthodox 
traditions, following die-hard conservatism, outdated mentality, 
lack of self-motivation, disorganised society, decentralisation on 
the basis of profession, impenetrable geographic condition, lack 
of contact with with outsiders, unawareness, unscientific method 
of performance, internal strife, prodigal custom, local 
exploitation, oppression, torture and lack of government policy 
based on the amelioration of the condition of people. Such 
deterioration may not only destroy the national identity of 
Thamis but also their physical existence. It has become 
imperative for all conscious people of the country to do their 
best for the overall development of this ethnic group and for 
Thamis themselves to be self-motivated towards it. (Reng 1999: 
23). 
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There was no time to waste in working towards incremental economic 
development in the hope that these “backwards” yet “original” Thangmi 
would come to consciousness in a manner conducive to forwarding the 
political goals that Megh Raj envisioned. Instead, it was the 
responsibility of already “conscious” Thangmi like himself to rescue 
their shared cultural history in order to create the basis for an ethnic 
movement within Nepal that might have any hopes of achieving what 
its Indian counterpart had. Some of the ways in which Megh Raj hoped 
to do this was through the creation of ‘culture heroes’ in the form of 
the Thangmi ancestors Ya’apa and Sunari Ama (whose story is 
described in detail in Chapter 6), creation of a Thangmi alphabet, and 
standardization of ritual practice in singular written forms. His vision 
of Thangmi culture, history and language as objects to be valorized for 
their very primitiveness, and reappropriated by an educated ethnic 
leadership, was quite different from the desire for modernity through 
developmentalist transformation expressed in the 1990 NTSS appeal 
described above, and owed much more to the Indian discourse of 
reservations on the basis of distinctive socio-cultural features, than to 
the discourses of socialism and development in Nepal on which 
Thangmi activists from Dolakha and Sindhupalchok had cut their teeth. 
It was with these goals in mind that Megh Raj worked to bring 
the leadership of the five extant Thangmi organizations together for a 
national convention in 1999, the result of which was NTS, whose 
constitution was finalized in 2000. The new organization’s logo was 
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adapted from the one already in use by Megh Raj’s TBTSUK, which 
appeared on the cover of Dolakhareng (see Figure 5.6). It combined 
several elements that referenced Thangmi ritual and cultural practice, 
as well as their claim to autochthony in the shadow of the 
Gaurishankar massif that dominates Dolakha’s skyline. As the NTS 
constitution states: 
 
The organisation’s logo shall contain the following components: 
a guru’s drum... a portion of the earth, with a two-leaf nettle 
plant on it; a baldaneko kosa [T: flower used in Thangmi rituals] 
on both sides, crossing each other at a common base; in the 
foothills of the Gaurishankar Himal, a flute and a madal at the 
centre, resting on a bow-string. On top of the drum’s are two 
gaja [N: steeple found on top of Hindu temples]; between the 
gaja and the drum are three-leaf titepati plants [N: wormwood 
leaf, used as incense in Thangmi rituals]. The two open ends of 
the gaja are hanging from the side of the drum, underneath 
which is a yellow flag, carrying the organisation’s name, and the 
figures “2056” written on the yellow flag at the top.  
For the first time, a Thangmi ethnic association in Nepal was 
representing itself with ritual objects extracted from their practice 
context and objectified as evidence of a distinctively Thangmi ethnic 
identity. However, true to Thangmi form, it was really only the 
combination of them in this particular constellation which might be 
seen as particularly Thangmi, since all of the individual elements were 
also used by other ethnic groups in Nepal, as well as other groups of 
Nepali heritage in India.78
                                                
78 See Chapter 2 for a related discussion of the BTWA’s logo. 
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Figure 5.6 Nepal Thami Samaj logo 
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Class and Social Welfare Die Hard: Dissent in Nepal and India 
NTS had taken up the call of ethnic politics just as Nepal’s Maoist 
movement was beginning to gain ground. I have discussed the 
dynamics of the insurgency in the Thangmi area of Nepal at length 
elsewhere, so I will not repeat those details.79 My point here is that the 
prospects for NTS to emerge as a unified political front that felt 
genuinely inclusive to all Thangmi were already weak, given the 
factionalized histories and economic and educational disparities within 
the community, and the emergence of a violent far-left movement 
provided yet another obstacle. The Maoist version of the long-familiar 
trope of class warfare was more attractive to many Thangmi who 
remained subsistence farmers in rural villages than the culturally-
based vision of ethnic politics promoted by Megh Raj and his 
supporters in NTS.80 Some rural Thangmi who held communist visions 
of forward progress accused the NTS leadership of being bourgeois 
intellectuals who sought to steal the cultural possessions of 
impoverished Thangmi to gain stature for themselves: “They’re seeking 
to make themselves big on the basis of our name, language and 
traditions, but they don’t care about our poverty”,81 was a common 
                                                
79 See Shneiderman (2003) and Shneiderman and Turin (2004). 
80 An additional effect of the conflict was for circular migrants to spend longer 
periods of time in Darjeeling, just at the time that ST politics were accelerating, 
thereby circulating more information about this agenda back to Nepal. 
81 Original Nepali: Hamro nam, bhasa, riti-riwaj chalaera yiniharule aphulai thulo 
huna khojchha, tara hami garib harulai wasta gardainan. 
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complaint about the NTS leadership heard throughout Dolakha and 
Sindhupalchok in the early 2000s.82 
As described in Chapters 2 and 3, it was particularly rare to find 
guru or others deeply involved in ritual practice who felt comfortable 
with what they perceived as the activist appropriation of such practice 
for political purposes. This was made patently clear during a 2001 NTS 
conference held at Bhume Jatra in Dolakha, during which activists 
invited gurus from across the Thangmi world were called to recite their 
paloke.83 The NTS leadership were intent on recording and transcribing 
each guru’s version with an eye towards standardizing them, but they 
met with two forms of resistance. First, the guru did not see the point 
of such standardization, preferring to locate power in orality itself. 
Second, they were wary of efforts to represent Thangmi religion as part 
of a broader “Kirant dharma”. This agenda was motivated by both the 
then-ongoing 2001 census, which listed “Kirant dharma” as a potential 
category of identification for the first time, as well as the desires of 
Thangmi in India to disassociate themselves from Hindu-inflected 
ritual practices due to the perceived prerogatives of ST classification. 
As one young Thangmi who served as a guru’s assistant and was 
himself resistant to NTS’s strategies recounted: 
 
                                                
82 A small but influential number of Thangmi cast their lot with the Maoist People’s 
Liberation Army, and the first Thangmi member of national government is a Maoist 
Constituent Assembly member, Chun Bahadur, elected from Dolakha in April 2008. 
83 See Chapter 3 for a description of the power dynamic between gurus and activists, 
and Chapter 6 for further details of this particular Bhume Jatra event. 
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At the Suspa conference, those from Jhapa made an appeal to 
follow the Kirant dharma, and to learn and receive training from 
the Kirats. The senior gurus rejected this, saying, “Why do we 
have to join with them, we have our own religion: Bhume 
dharma. We should continue to practice this. 
This sense of disjuncture between culture and religion as practiced in 
Thangmi villages, and their objectification as expedient political 
objects by those based in Kathmandu, Jhapa, and Darjeeling, was 
exacerbated by the 2002 election of Khumbalal, a relative of Megh 
Raj’s, as NTS chairman. Born and educated in Darjeeling, he had 
settled in Kathmandu to start a restaurant business, the success of 
which had enabled him to build a large house on the outskirts of the 
city by 2002, when he was in his early 50s. Megh Raj hoped that 
Khumbalal’s age and economic stature would lend an aura of authority 
to NTS’s agenda, since he was aware of the organization’s unpopularity 
in certain quarters. The first project under Khumbalal’s tenure was to 
produce a new publication, for which Khumbalal served as editor, 
funded by the new National Foundation for the Development of 
Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN), which had been established in the 
same year. 
The book entitled Thami Samudayako Aitihasik Chinari ra 
Sanskar Sanskriti —The Thami Community’s Historic Symbols and 
Ritual Culture—claimed to be an improvement on all of the Thangmi 
publications which had preceded it, since those were based only on, 
“little truth and big imagination” rather than “historical fact” as this 
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publication claimed to be (Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 3).84 The primary 
intended audience of this publication appeared to be not the Thangmi 
public of rural Nepal, but rather the Thangmi public of urban 
Darjeeling and Sikkim, and through them the Indian state, to which the 
BTWA was preparing to submit their application for tribal status. Rin 
the book’s opening lines, the editor addressed the, “brothers and 
sisters who have been living far from their own ancestors and fighting 
for identity”, suggesting that, “although we are living apart 
geographically, we have common thought and blood flowing in our 
veins” (Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 3). 
I first saw this publication in Darjeeling, where several hundred 
copies had been sent before they were distributed widely in 
Kathmandu or Thangmi villages in Nepal. Once news reached Dolakha 
and Sindhupalchok that the publication had been delivered in India 
before it had been sent to Thangmi villages in Nepal, the district-level 
members of the NTS could not contain their outrage. One of them told 
me: 
That Khumbalal is just an Indian chamcha [N: spoon, idiomatic 
expression meaning sycophant], he is spending all of the money 
contributed by NFDIN in our name to write a big book that 
spreads lies about us so that his relatives in India mithai khanna 
paunchha [N: get to eat sweets, referring to the rewards of 
prospective ST benefits]. And here we still don’t have even basic 
facilities – that money should be going to our development 
instead. 
                                                
84 Although the book’s imprint shows that it was published in 2056 VS, it was actually 
only printed and distributed in 2061 VS. 
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For such Thangmi in Nepal who had rallied to the call for a unified 
ethnic association, the primary motivation for participating in this sort 
of ethnic politics was the promise of securing better basic living 
standards—“welfare”, in the most fundamental sense—but in their 
view, such objectives were being hijacked by cultural politics in an 
unsatisfactory manner. 
This divide between those who wanted the Thangmi ethnic 
associations to focus on basic welfare within the community and those 
who wanted it to engage in cultural politics in order to make claims on 
the state(s) did not map neatly onto the national borders of Nepal and 
India, but had more to do with educational and economic status, 
generation, and the particularities of personal outlook. Some of the 
NTS activists working most closely with Khumbalal and Megh Raj at the 
central level were young Thangmi originally from villages in Dolakha 
and Sindhupalchok, who were relatively highly educated (having 
passed SLC and in some cases attained an IA or BA degree), and 
sought to distance themselves from their roots by taking up the call to 
cultural politics. At the same time, some of the older BTWA activists 
embarked upon their own transnational social welfare projects in order 
to register their dissent from the direction the BTWA had taken, while 
simultaneously revisiting their roots in a different manner. 
For instance, in the late 1990s, Nathu’s family began an initiative 
to raise funds from Darjeeling Thangmi to support a primary school in 
the Dolakha village of Alampu. The idea was proposed by Nathu’s 
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brother-in-law, who had migrated to Darjeeling from Alampu as a 
teenager himself. As participants in this project explained, they wanted 
to use their comparatively high levels of education and economic 
status—which they saw as the lucky product of their forebears’ 
decision to settle in India, rather than as evidence of their superiority 
or fundamental difference—to improve the welfare of their Thangmi 
brethren in Nepal. The focus of their visits to Nepal were very different 
to the culture-seeking journeys of the BTWA leadership. Back in 
Darjeeling, the two groups came into conflict over a range of issues, 
but the tension focused on their different attitudes towards 
acknowledging their own history of migration—the former by 
maintaining and in fact expanding existing ties with Thangmi in Nepal, 
the latter disavowing their direct links with the people, while 
appropriating their culture and language as sacred objects within their 
own form of associationally-based ritual activity. This dispute 
eventually led to Nathu’s dismissal from BTWA membership. Other 
BTWA members would soon experience similar exclusion for their 
unwillingness to give up Hindu-influenced cultural practices or adhere 
to new versions of Thangmi history that did not acknowledge 
migration from Nepal. This is what Nathu meant when he contrasted 
the agenda of “social welfare” with that of “making history”. 
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Militant Mouse Eaters 
Two seminal events occurred for the BTWA in 2003. At the beginning 
of the year, the Tamang and Limbu were granted ST status in Sikkim, 
and soon thereafter at the national level. At the end of the year, 
Basant, the General Secretary who had been largely responsible for 
shepherding the OBC application through, died suddenly at the age of 
38 from an apparent stroke or aneurysm. The first event raised the 
Thangmi desire for ST status to a feverish pitch, while the second 
event made it much less clear how they would go about achieving it. 
Basant was a municipal official with intellectual interests who read 
widely and had compiled a substantial dossier of published materials 
about the Thangmi (much of which was reproduced in the 2003 Niko 
Bachinte publication of which he was general editor), and the 
combination of his knowledge about the Indian administrative system 
and his insatiable appetite for learning about things Thangmi was a 
powerful force without which the organization was at a loss.85 
Into the void stepped Rajen, a young BTWA member whom up 
until this time had been best known for his seemingly academic 
interest in compiling a Thangmi dictionary, based on words collected 
by informants throughout Darjeeling bazaar from both settled and 
seasonal migrant Thangmi.86 It became clear that beneath Rajen’s thick 
                                                
85 He was replaced on the BTWA executive board, as well as in his government job, by 
his widow, Kala, who turned out to be an excellent administrator, but did not share 
her late husband’s charisma or knowledge of cultural issues. 
86 Two other Thangmi dictionaries appeared in Nepal at roughly the same time. One 
was published by Gopal Thami of Suspa, Dolakha, while the other was published by 
Mark Turin with Bir Bahadur Thami (2004). 
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glasses and lengthy word lists lived a militant ethnic activist, whose 
offer to fill Basant’s shoes as BTWA General Secretary carried with it an 
agenda of historical revisionism and cultural manipulation of an 
intensity that the organization had not yet experienced. In order to 
meet the perceived criteria of “primitive traits” for ST status,87 Rajen 
initiated several campaigns to manipulate the day-to-day cultural 
practice of Thangmi in India in order to demonstrate these qualities.88 
 One of the most extreme examples of this dynamic emerged in 
the form of a debate about consuming mouse meat (T: uyuko cici; N: 
musako masu).89 Rajen remembered an apocryphal tale told by his 
grandparents, which held that Thangmi used to eat mouse meat as a 
staple food in Nepal. Although Thangmi in Nepal may have 
occasionally eaten mouse meat, any consumption of it was due to 
poverty (and is a desperate measure taken by members of other ethnic 
groups as well in hill Nepal), rather than because eating mouse is a 
marker of Thangmi cultural identity.90 Any Thangmi family who has 
other food sources stays conspicuously away from mouse meat, while 
many Thangmi in Nepal continue to eat beef, a consumption practice 
that is undoubtedly an act of resistance within the until recently 
                                                
87 In BTWA publications, posters and invitations to events, this is usually glossed as 
anautho chalan in Nepali. The literal translation of this is “unusual” or “extraordinary” 
“traditions” in the folkloric sense. 
88 Rajen’s attempts to demonstrate indigeneity in India are discussed in Chapter 6. 
89 Literally this should be translated as “rodent meat”, since it can include all types of 
rats and mice, but for simplicity and to match the BTWA’s English term of choice I 
have chosen to stick with “mouse meat”. 
90 I have seen it cooked only once in my ten years of experience in Thangmi villages. 
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officially Hindu nation-state of Nepal.91 Thangmi have no problem 
maintaining unpopular consumption practices if they choose to: eating 
mouse meat is not an identity marker, whereas eating beef is an 
expression of an alternative, non-Hindu identity. Despite all this, Rajen 
began a crusade to convince Darjeeling Thangmi to “return” to eating 
mouse meat as a means of expressing their tribal identity. Moreover, 
having a distinctive food item—which Thangmi in India did not 
otherwise have, in large part because beef-eating is not taboo in 
Darjeeling, preventing it from being the distinctive marker it is in 
Nepal—would allow the group to participate in an annual government-
sponsored ethnic food festival, giving them an opportunity 
demonstrate their primitive traits in a high-profile forum. 
The directive to begin eating mouse meat angered many in India, 
both from settled families and the migrant population from Nepal, but 
for different reasons. The former group could not see the point of 
doing something they had never done before in the name of “culture”, 
particularly since nowhere did the Government of India clearly state 
that having a distinctive or primitive cuisine was a necessary 
prerequisite to being listed as a Scheduled Tribe. The latter group, who 
might have eaten mouse or other undesirable foods back in their home 
villages during periods of food scarcity, found the idea insulting 
because it reminded them of the abject poverty they had left behind 
                                                
91 See Ogura (2007: 452, 473) for a related discussion of beef-eating among the 
Kham Magar, a practice appropriated by the Maoists. 
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and undercut the upward economic and social mobility to which they 
aspired in Darjeeling. 
In addition, Rajen sent a circular to the entire BTWA membership 
stating that Hindu practices were to be discontinued, and that anyone 
who did not comply risked expulsion from the organization. The 
implication was that members of the organization would lose their 
prospect of getting an individual ST certificate when the time came, 
since they would not be able to get the necessary recommendation 
letter from the organization. He received several letters in response 
from individuals who stated that they did not agree with this agenda, 
and would risk losing their membership. One was from the Tumsong 
tea plantation family, who had up until this time been one of the 
primary financial contributors to the organization, and they now 
explicitly canceled their support on the basis that they had long taken 
pride in their employment of a Hindu pandit, whose life contract they 
were not about to terminate now.92 The BTWA, like the NTS, was now 
confronted with serious dissent from within its membership on a range 
of issues. In order to recapture the semblance of ethnic unity 
necessary to maintain a functioning ethnic organization on both sides 
of the border, a change of leadership and focus was necessary. 
 
 
                                                
92 They had in fact supported several generations of the same Bahun family from a 
village in eastern Nepal, the incumbent of which continued to live in their compound 
during my fieldwork. 
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Turning Towards Development 
In 2004, Khumbalal was ousted from the leadership of the NTS, and 
replaced by Bhaba Bahadur, a young man in his twenties from the 
village of Suspa who had received a scholarship to study at 
Buddhanilkantha, one of Nepal’s premier English medium schools. He 
brought together in a single person the attributes of both a village 
Thangmi who spoke his own language, maintained Thangmi ritual 
practices, and had been skeptical of earlier NTS agendas, and those of 
a buddhijibi, or highly educated “intellectual”. In Darjeeling, Rajen 
stepped down and this time the executive committee decided to work 
as a group, rather than electing a General Secretary, in the interest of 
maintaining a diverse set of opinions at the central level.93 
In part due to Bhaba’s own interest in pursuing a basic 
development agenda, and in part due to broader trends in Nepal that 
brought international development dollars to ethnic organizations, the 
NTS departed from Khumbalal’s cultural politics to adopt what they 
called a “livelihood-based development strategy” as a primary goal.94 
In 2004, NEFIN received a grant of 1.52 million pounds sterling from 
                                                
93 Some members of the Darjeeling Thangmi community claim that the reason no one 
was elected was because the executive committee was unable to call a General 
Meeting due to financial irregularities. However, the executive committee members 
told me that they had been dissatisfied with what many perceived as Rajen’s militant 
leadership style, and that by maintaining leadership as a group instead of vesting it 
in one individual they were more likely to have a balanced and well-functioning 
organization. 
94 At around the same time, NFDIN changed its name in Nepali from Adivasi Janajati 
Utthan Kendra to Adivasi Janajati Vikas Pratisthan, signaling a broader shift from the 
ideals of “upliftment” (utthan) to those of “development” (vikas) at the level of 
national ethnic discourse. 
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the Enabling State Program of the British government’s Department for 
Foreign Development (DFiD) to set up the new Janajati Empowerment 
Project (JEP). As the representative body of one of the 24 of its 59 
member groups that NEFIN had classified as “highly marginalized 
janajati”,95 NTS received several hundred thousand rupees through the 
JEP to set up the similarly named Thami Empowerment Project (TEP), 
the objectives of which were collecting baseline information about 
Thangmi livelihoods and implementing district-level projects for their 
improvement. The project leader of TEP was none other than Megh Raj, 
who was later accused of using a bait and switch approach to entice 
rural Thangmi into participation with the promise of economic 
development, which quickly transformed into the familiar but less 
desirable (to rural Thangmi) discourse of rights to be achieved through 
the manipulation of culture. At the same time, the initiation of TEP 
provoked jealousy among the BTWA membership, who saw the 
potential for funding from international development donors as 
something that Thangmi had access to only in Nepal, since there were 
few, if any, comparable organizations operating in Darjeeling. As Rajen 
put it, “In Nepal they can get real money for development from all of 
those private donors. We have nothing like that, we have to squeeze 
every last bit out of the state. That is why ST is so important”. 
                                                
95 In 2004, NEFIN published a five-tier classification of all of its member groups. 
Relying primarily on economic indicators, each group was listed in one of the 
following categories: “endangered”, “highly marginalized”, “marginalized”, 
“disadvantaged” and “advantaged”. See Gellner (2007), Hangen (2007) and Middleton 
and Shneiderman (2008) for additional details. 
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  TEP was very short-lived, with only a 3-month window of actual 
operation.96 However, it presaged the type of projects to come, and 
highlighted the necessity of parsing out the differences as well as 
potential points of pragmatic collaboration, between Thangmi 
individuals who believed in “livelihood-based” versus “rights-based” 
approaches to progress, as well as the very real structural differences 
between the types of resources available to Thangmi in Nepal and India 
respectively. These debates continue to dominate Thangmi 
associational politics today. 
 
Cross-Border Conventions: Ritualizing Political Practice 
In May 2005, such issues and the fault lines they indicated within the 
Thangmi community as a whole were addressed in public at the 
national level for the first time at the Second National Thami 
Convention in Kathmandu (the first had been in 1999, when NTS was 
formed). Approximately 250 Thangmi from five districts of Nepal were 
present, as well as six from the BTWA executive committee, who joked 
that the event should have been called the “First International Thami 
Convention”. One other important Thangmi event was to occur at 
exactly the same time—the annual Bhume Jatra festival in Suspa (as 
described in Chapter 6). 
                                                
96 This was apparently due to administrative complications at NEFIN, which meant 
that the funds were only disbursed to NTS three months before the end of the fiscal 
year during which they had to be spent. Unfortunately, this was not well-understood 
at the grassroots level, and contributed to the critique of TEP despite the fact that 
these problems were not the fault of NTS. 
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 The national convention was advertised as a milestone in 
Thangmi efforts to come together as an ethnic group in its entirety to 
develop shared goals across national, economic, educational, and 
other divides. The fact that the Thangmi activist leadership could plan 
it at a time that conflicted with the ritual event which all of their 
publications claimed was most central to their ethnic identity—thereby 
precluding any gurus or other community members committed to 
ritual practice from participating—demonstrated that the activists had 
in fact constructed a parallel universe for the ritual construction of 
ethnicity through political action. In this arena, culture, religion, and 
history were divorced from their lived contexts and remade as sacred 
objects in themselves. 
While the convention, held in Kathmandu, took place without the 
participation of any guru (since they were all busy at Bhume Jatra in 
Dolakha), it constantly referenced them. In their public speeches, the 
activists represented themselves as having sacrificed the opportunity 
to participate in important rituals in order to work for forward progress 
in the political domain. However, when I asked in private whether the 
date had been chosen intentionally or simply through poor scheduling, 
I received several whispered answers that “everyone” involved with 
planning the convention felt that achieving their goals—which included 
discussing how the NTS could help the BTWA achieve ST status by 
contributing cultural documentation, as well as mounting a movement 
to demand similar reservations in Nepal on the basis of their “highly 
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marginalized” status—would simply be easier this time without gurus 
and their followers there.97 The participation of gurus at previous 
meetings, such as the 2001 gathering in Suspa described above, had 
only complicated matters for the activists. Their goal now was not to 
do away with or conceal Thangmi ritual practice, but rather to mould it 
into a new kind of standardized, nakali sacred object detached from 
the bodies of those who practiced its sakali forms. But such nakali 
objects could not exist without the continued parallel existence of the 
sakali, and throughout the conference public speeches conjured 
glorious images of the gurus engaged in their Bhume Jatra festivities, 
which were given visual substance in a photo montage on the 
conference hall wall (some of which I had contributed). Although in 
day-to-day life the choices were rarely so clear-cut, on this particular 
weekend, Thangmi individuals had to make a choice between 
participating in one or the other domain of ritualized action: culture or 
politics. 
The conference began with a moment of silence in memory of 
the deceased—in particular Basant and Dalaman (a former district-level 
NTS leader in Dolakha who had been killed just a few days earlier, 
apparently by Maoists), as well as Ile and Bir Bahadur, the Piskar 
martyrs of 1984. Several other prominent Thangmi gurus had died 
since the last convention, but only certain politically active individuals 
                                                
97 As of this writing the Thangmi have not yet received ST status in either West Bengal 
or Sikkim. 
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were propitiated as ancestors suitable to the transnational Thangmi 
political cosmos. In between speeches made by well-known janajati 
activists such as Krishna Bhattachan and Pasang Sherpa in support of 
the Thangmi association, a cultural performance troupe from Dolakha 
performed a set of “wedding dances” (also mentioned in Chapter 2).  
The initial impetus for such objectifications of culture had come 
from India, where the state unashamedly set the stage for such 
manipulations through the legal attachment of benefits to the 
demonstration of cultural difference. However, such paradigms were 
now well on their way to becoming naturalized within the Nepali 
national context as well. This process had been encouraged by the 
emergence of a Kathmandu-based ethno-political nexus (comprised of 
the state, NGOs like NEFIN, and INGOs like DFiD) which viewed culture 
with much the same essentialist worldview that the Indian state did, 
and linked financial support to the capacity to demonstrate janajati 
traits. It remains to be seen how these paradigm shifts will play out for 
the next generation of Thangmi, as Nepal moves towards federal 
restructuring (potentially along ethnic lines), and Darjeeling fights for 
Gorkhaland once again. 
 
Coda: The Anthropologist’s Dilemma 
“How can we develop the backward Thangmi community, how can we 
best use and preserve our culture?” Tek Raj asks me at the end of our 
radio interview in Kathmandu in spring 2008. As the presenter for the 
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first-ever Thangmi language radio program to be broadcast in Nepal, 
his unaffected self-confidence and obvious passion for speaking his 
own language is refreshing, perhaps a sign of good things to come in 
the world of Thangmi ethnic politics. Still we end up here, however, at 
the assertion of backwardness and the same kind of question that 
Thangmi always want to ask of me, as a symbol of Western modernity, 
I think, more than as an anthropologist knowledgeable about their 
“culture and history”, as I am always introduced. Considering my 
options, I choose the past of least provocation. “Look at how you have 
made your own history,” I answer, “This is not a question for me—only 
young Thangmi like you, wherever you live, know the answer”. The live 
broadcast only reaches a very small portion of Thangmi—there is no 
chance of picking it up in the further reaches of Dolakha, let alone 
Darjeeling. Tek Raj smiles, and I wonder what Nathu—or the Thangmi 
of 1943, whom I know only through their faded black-and-white 
namaste—would think. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Transcendent Territory: Local Deities, 
National Borders and the Problem of Indigeneity 
 
Niko nai guru niko nai barmi niko nai bubu kul deva 
Niko nai dharma niko nai karma niko nai nemko mul deva ... 
Niko nai riti niko nai thiti harakai niye tortasa 
 
Our guru and his assistants, our brothers, our clan deity 
Our religion, our destiny, the chief deity of our territory ... 
Why should we give up our traditions and customs? 
 
- Refrain of the Thangmi language song “Niko Nai Jati”—“Our 
Ethnicity”, written by Maina and Lal Thami from the Nepali village of 
Alampu, and recorded in Darjeeling under the auspices of the BTWA on 
the cassette Amako Ashis—Mother’s Blessings 
 
In June 2008, I sat in a Kathmandu conference room watching as a set 
of increasingly detailed maps were projected on a screen. First Nepal 
as a whole, then the central Bagmati zone, then Dolakha and 
Sindhupalchok districts, and finally a set of hand-drawn maps 
representing the proposed contours of a Thangmi autonomous region 
within a federally restructured Nepal [see Figures 6.1 and 6.2].1 Tek 
Bahadur pointed to the scribbled names of Thangmi villages—Alampu, 
Lapilang, Suspa, Chokati, Piskar, Dhuskun—and spoke passionately 
about the need for a clearly delineated Thangmi territory that was 
separate from the Tamang autonomous region, which encompassed 
the putative Thangmi region on most proposed maps of a federal 
                                       
1 I cannot describe further how the governance and cultural mores of such a Thangmi 
region were envisioned; here the focus is on how its territorial boundaries were 
defined. However, this topic is well worth further discussion in the future, especially 
as the still emerging plans for restructuring the Nepali state become more concrete. 
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Nepal.2 This Thangmi activist from Lapilang was in his mid-20s, and, in 
addition to being an active NTS member, he had been employed at 
NEFIN as the personal assistant to the general secretary for several 
years since he first came to Kathmandu as a teenager. Now, he was the 
Field Coordinator for the Janajati Social and Economic Empowerment 
Project (JANSEEP), which had organized the day’s workshop on the 
place of “highly marginalized janajatis” in federal restructuring.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Tek Bahadur showing the proposed Thangmi region, 
Kathmandu, June 2008 
 
                                       
2 Both Rimal (2007) and Sharma (2007) provide maps showing several different 
proposals for Nepal’s federal structure. 
3 A joint project of NEFIN and CARE-Nepal, JANSEEP was funded by a 1 million Euro 
grant from the European Commission in Kathmandu, and began in June 2007. It was 
one of several new projects initiated by large-scale development organizations at 
around the same time that focused on “cultural preservation” and “identity 
strengthening” for individual groups targeted for their “highly marginalized” status. 
In addition to the Thangmi, JANSEEP focused on the Dhanuk and Surel, two much 
smaller groups. I intend to do future research on this project’s intentions and results. 
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Figure 6.2 Hand-drawn map of Thangmi villages, showing the 
proposed autonomous area, Kathmandu, June 2008 
After Tek Bahadur finished his speech to resounding applause 
from the audience of ethnic activists and development workers, Jagat 
Man took the floor. This older man (also from Lapilang), who had been 
a communist cadre, as well as one of the core leaders in the early days 
of Thangmi ethnic activism in Nepal (see Chapter 5), seconded Tek 
Bahadur’s argument, and then began to review the various types of 
evidence that supported Thangmi claims to the particular piece of 
territory shown on the maps. After describing the stone inscription at 
the Dolakha Bhimsen temple which dates the Thangmi presence in the 
area to at least 1568 AD,4 and mentioning the 2001 Nepal census 
figures that showed the majority of the country’s Thangmi population 
                                       
4 See Chapters 4 and 8 for additional details. 
 341 
concentrated in several VDCs in Dolakha and Sindhupalchok, he 
launched into a detailed narration of the portion of the Thangmi origin 
myth which describes how the group came to settle in the areas where 
they now primarily live. As Jagat Man spoke, he closed his eyes, and his 
words began to shift from Nepali to Thangmi and take on the cadence 
of a guru’s paloke. Bir Bahadur, who was present at the event in his 
dual roles of Thangmi community organizer and research assistant, 
leaned over and whispered to me that Jagat Man had in fact trained as 
a guru in his youth, but had given up that vocation as he became 
increasingly involved in politics. I was impressed by Jagat Man’s 
knowledge, but also increasingly aware of the discomfort on the faces 
of the development workers and activists from other ethnic groups, 
who began to shift restlessly in their chairs as Jagat Man droned on. 
Jagat Man’s ritualized recitation of the origin story as evidence 
for a political claim to Thangmi territory within a “new Nepal” was a 
clear example of the activist appropriation of originary power for 
political purposes. To the assembled audience, however, it was a 
jarring out-of-frame experience, since Jagat Man’s recitation came 
across as a practice effected for soteriological purposes, rather than as 
a performance enacted for political purposes. The first reason for this 
was that Jagat Man was speaking mostly in Thangmi, rather than 
Nepali. The second, perhaps more serious, problem was that his 
recitation did not delineate Thangmi territory in the political terms of 
maps and borders, but rather laid claim to it in the ritual terms of 
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territorial deities, and the special Thangmi relationship with them. The 
origin myth, which when chanted as a guru’s paloke within the 
Thangmi-internal frame of practice, worked to inculcate a subjective 
sense of belonging to a certain territory, did not automatically work 
within the Thangmi-external frame of the workshop to transpose this 
sense of ethnic belonging into the political terms of the nation. 
Effecting this sort of transposition was not impossible, and in fact had 
been accomplished successfully by several other Himalayan groups, 
such as the Gurung (Pettigrew 1999) and Mewahang Rai (Gaenszle 
2000), who had long based their political claims to rights over certain 
pieces of land on their shamans’ ability to propitiate the territorial 
deities of those places.5 However, the Thangmi activists had not yet 
fully attended to the work of translation that would make their ritual 
claims to territory recognizable within the political terms of the state. 
One of the workshop facilitators, a Gurung activist who had been 
involved with a similar process of translation within his own 
community, began to interrupt Jagat Man brusquely, asking Jagat Man 
to repeat each place name he had mentioned so that the facilitator 
could plot the locations on the map.  
This anecdote shows that while it is not uncommon for an 
individual, or for that matter, an ethnic collectivity, to simultaneously 
                                       
5 Such efforts to use the content of ritual or cultural practice to legitimize land claims 
has been a primary strategy of indigenous movements all over the world, and as such 
are well-documented in the anthropological literature on Australia (Myers 2002; 
Povinelli 2002), Latin America (Warren and Jackson 2002; Graham 2005; Hale 2006), 
Southeast Asia (Li 2000), and beyond. 
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possess ritually produced feelings of territorial belonging, as well as 
politically produced desires for legal rights to those territories, the two 
types of relationship to territory do not always interface smoothly. In 
this chapter, I explore the ways in which the idea of a “Thangmi 
territory”—as a transcendent ethnic object that is not limited by the 
pragmatic realities of the national borders within which it is physically 
located—has been produced by Thangmi individuals through a range 
of ritualized practices and performances at various places and times. 
These activities are often conditioned by the particular sociopolitical 
frameworks of the state(s) in which Thangmi live, as well as by the 
specific ways in which each national framework mediates individuals’ 
relationships to the global discursive framework of “indigeneity”, but 
the territory-as-object that is ultimately produced is not inherently 
embedded within any single one of these frameworks. 
I first show how the Thangmi origin myth itself asserts territorial 
claims, and then demonstrate how these are ritually maintained 
through the regular propitiation of territorial deities. I then consider 
how the political position of Thangmi in Nepal versus that of Thangmi 
in India—in particular the different types of marginality that they face 
in each location—has generated different relationships to the idea of 
Thangmi territory. Finally, I show that although these divergent 
attitudes towards territory have introduced political tensions that have 
exacerbated the challenge of synthesizing a transnationally 
recognizable, singular Thangmi identity, such tensions have been in 
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part resolved through ritual action which bridges political difference by 
defining Thangmi territory in a manner that transcends any specific 
location. 
Throughout this discussion, I suggest that Thangmi attitudes 
towards place contain both an element of primordial attachment and 
an emphasis on the importance of migration as an identity marker. 
Using tropes of both territorial belonging and migration as identity-
defining paradigms is not unique to the Thangmi, nor does the 
combination present a paradox until groups encounter state-mandated 
classificatory schemes which are perceived to put indigeneity, 
understood as an embodied link to a specific place of origin, and 
migration—movement of the body away from that place of origin—at 
odds. This is the difficult juncture at which the Thangmi in India in 
particular find themselves, with the territorial complexities of their 
situation as Indian citizens of Nepali heritage making it impossible to 
construct the “homeland” as a sacred object of identity in the manner 
that diasporic populations elsewhere have widely been documented as 
doing (Anderson 1991, Axel 2001). For this reason, I argue that the 
transnational production of Thangmi identity—and probably those of 
most other groups of Nepali heritage in India—complicates the “place 
of origin thesis” which Brian Axel has proposed is definitive of diaspora 
populations: “the common denominator exemplifying a diaspora is its 
vital relation to a place of origin that is elsewhere” (2001: 8). Although 
clearly what I have earlier termed “originary power” (see Chapter 3) is 
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vitally related to the territory in Nepal which Thangmi ritually claim as 
their own, the political exigencies of life as modern Indian citizens 
compel Thangmi in that context to subvert the relationship between 
originary power and their territorial place of origin. This subjective 
displacement leads to fraught relationships both with themselves as 
diasporic subjects—another aspect of the “inferior complexity” 
described in Chapter 3—and with Thangmi in Nepal, creating tensions 
which can only be overcome through ritual techniques that call upon 
originary power itself to at once embody and transcend Thangmi 
territory. 
 As we shall see, the process of circular migration is itself a set 
of ritualized movements which mimics some of these techniques. The 
annually repeated steps of leaving home in Nepal, making the journey 
to India, setting up a temporary residence, earning money, and 
heading home again enables those who undertake such movements to 
experience the particularities of, but ultimately transcend the limits of, 
single localities. To Thangmi born and raised in India, circular migrants 
from Nepal become symbols of a deep ambivalence about the 
“original” (as described in Chapter 3), at once embodying the territory 
that they seek to distance themselves from, and carrying knowledge of 
its practices that they desire to possess. 
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Moving into Thangmi Territory 
First we return to the Thangmi origin myth, picking up where we left 
off in Chapter 3. The second half of the myth, as recited by Jagat Man 
at the event described above, focuses on the migratory movements of 
the Thangmi forefather and foremother, and the process through 
which they stake out the area which remains the area that Thangmi in 
Nepal claim as their territory today. This episode portrays Ya’apa 
(pronounced as a single word with a glottal stop in the middle) and 
Sunari Ama, the Thangmi forefather and foremother, as an itinerant 
couple living a nomadic lifestyle deep in the forest.6 Through their 
clever resistance of a Newar king’s attempts at domination, this 
ancestral couple establish the Thangmi claim to a broad swathe of 
territory in central-eastern Nepal. The episode also introduces the 
parallel descent clan system, a major marker of Thangmi identity which 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. The version presented here 
was recounted by Rana Bahadur, and is continuous with the earlier 
portion of the narrative that appears in Chapter 3.7 
 
Starting from Simraungadh, Ya’apa [also known as Yapati Chuku] 
and Kanch’apa headed northeast. They followed the Indrawati 
Khola [N: small river] from the point where it meets the Bhote 
                                       
6 Ya’apa and Sunari Ama are alternately known as Yapati Chuku and Sunari Aji. The 
former set of terms identifies them as “father” and “mother”, while the latter set of 
terms identifies them as “father-in-law” and “mother-in-law”. Given the incestuous 
nature of their children’s marriages, it is indeed the case that they would have been 
both father and mother, and father-in-law and mother-in-law to all of their children. 
See Chapter 7 for further discussion of this issue and how different activist 
publications have dealt with it. 
7 An abridged versions of this episode is published in Shneiderman and Turin (2006). 
Each of the Thangmi publications includes its own version, which I draw upon in my 
analysis. 
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Kosi [N: large river] above Dolalghat. Until they reached 
Kiratichap, the two brothers traveled together. Near Nuru 
Pokhari, the two brothers met two sisters named Sunari Ama 
[also known as Sunari Aji] and Runu Ama. They were both the 
daughters of a nag (N), a snake spirit. The two brothers and two 
sisters traveled along together. As they walked, Sunari Ama 
worked on an arou (T), a spindle especially for spinning thread 
from the Himalayan nettle. 
When the four travelers came to the confluence of the 
Sunkosi and Indrawati rivers, they met a fisherman who ferried 
them across the river in his boat. Near the confluence of the 
Tama Kosi river they crossed again. They continued walking up 
the Tama Kosi until they had to cross yet again, but this time 
only the two brothers and Runu Ama (the younger sister) could 
fit in the boat, so Sunari Ama (the older sister) was left alone on 
the other side. They all continued walking up the Tama Kosi, but 
on opposite sides of the river. 
At the confluence of the Charange Khola, the brothers split 
up. Kanch’apa and Runu Ama walked up the Charange Khola, 
while Ya’apa and Sunari Ama continued along the Tama Kosi. 
Kanch’apa became the forefather of the Rai peoples living to the 
east of the Thangmi. 
Finally, after walking on opposite sides of the river for 
many days, Sunari Ama and Ya’apa came to a place called 
Nagdaha. This place still has the same name today and is just 
visible from here.8 Sunari Ama had been spinning on her arou 
the whole way, and by this time she had enough thread to weave 
a long rope. She threw the rope across to her husband, and he 
threw a length back to her to make a doubled-up rope bridge. 
Sunari finally crossed to the other side to rejoin her husband. 
They continued their journey together again, and reached 
Timure. There they met a black nag, and after promising to 
worship him, they stayed for some time. Then they continued up 
the Dukujor Khola [just behind the ridge where our house sits.] 
But there was no place to stay there, just jungle. Then they 
arrived in Balasode, the area where our house now stands. The 
place got its name because Sunari Ama wore a gold bracelet [N: 
sunko bala] which she lost here. 
Then they moved on again, towards Kuteli Khola. They 
came to Alamdol where they planted a flag. Then they moved on 
to Dong Dong Aphug, which is in the jungle above Suspa. They 
stayed in the cave there, and came to a place called Gaura where 
                                       
8 Rana Bahadur added this commentary as he pointed to Nagdaha from our vantage 
point at his home in Balasode, Suspa VDC, Dolakha. 
 348 
there is a nice pond to bathe and wash. They stayed in this area 
for two or three years. 
Then they moved back down the hillside again, to a lower 
area called Rangathali [also known as Rang Rang Thali]. There 
they made a hut out of wormwood leaves. They cleared jungle to 
make arable fields.  
In Rangathali they had seven sons and seven daughters. 
But there was no one for these sons and daughters to marry, 
except each other, which was impossible since they were brother 
and sister. So Ya’apa and Sunari sat down to discuss the 
situation. They decided to assign each of the children separate 
clans, after which they could marry each other. They gave arrows 
to their sons and held a shooting event. Wherever each son’s 
arrow landed, that place or thing would become his clan name.9 
Then they went to see what kind of work each daughter was 
doing, and that became her clan name. 
When the brothers went to reclaim their arrows, they found 
a female child in the woods. She was the daughter of a wild man 
(T: apan; N: ban manche). They took her back with them and she 
joined the family, becoming the eighth sister. 
The family lived happily in Rangathali. One day, some of 
the wood they cut floated down the river. The court fisherman of 
the Newar king of Dolakha found the pieces floating down the 
river and was very curious. The fisherman reported to the king 
every day, and on that day he showed the king the wood pieces. 
The king wondered who was living in his territory without 
his knowledge, and sent his army out to look for the settlers. 
The army first went up to Surunge Danda to search, and there 
they met the deity Surung Mahadev. The army made offerings to 
him. They continued on to Tari Khola, and then to the top of the 
ridge, where they met the deity Sundrawati Dev. 
They returned to Dolakha without finding any people, so 
the king sent them out again. This time, they went in the 
direction of the Nagparang ridge. They returned again, empty-
handed. 
Then they went out again to Khokhosang Khola, and finally 
to Rangathali, where they found the Thangmi settlers. They 
reported to the king, who told them to bring the settlers to him. 
So the army apprehended Ya’apa, and brought him to Dolakha. 
Ya’apa carried with him a wild pheasant to offer to the king. 
                                       
9 The clan system and names are discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
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Instead of appreciating this gift, the king reprimanded 
Ya’apa for killing game in the royal woods without his 
permission. He told Ya’apa to return again and fixed a date. 
Ya’apa returned, this time bringing with him a deer. The 
king told him to return yet again, and he did, carrying a 
mountain goat. Each time Ya’apa presented himself before the 
king, he was scolded for killing game. Finally, the king told 
Ya’apa that he would be executed on the following day. 
Ya’apa returned home, and told Sunari Ama of his fate. 
Until then, she hadn’t accompanied him to meet the king, but 
she promised to go with him on the day of his execution. 
So they went together the next day. Sunari Ama wore her 
hair in a bun. When they arrived, her bun loosened and a golden 
plate fell out of her hair. Then a golden deer fell out. She offered 
both of these objects to the king. These offerings made him so 
happy that he relented and did not kill Ya’apa. 
Instead, he asked them how much land they wanted, and 
Sunari Ama and Ya’apa replied: “No more than the size of a 
buffalo skin”. The king urged them to accept more, but they 
refused. They requested only that a dried buffalo skin be 
brought so that they could show the king the exact size. The 
skin was brought and Ya’apa cut it into long, thin strips, which 
he staked out with a set of wooden nails in the shape of a huge 
square, encircling much of the kingdom. He demanded that the 
king honor his offer and let them have a piece of land that size. 
The king was so impressed with the wit and ingenuity of the 
Thangmi couple that he granted their request. They returned 
home as the rightful owners of a large piece of land stretching 
from Alampu in the north, to the Sun Kosi river in the west [the 
southern and eastern borders are not clearly named].10 
Ya’apa then told his seven sons and daughters [who were 
now married to each other] to migrate to different parts of this 
area. In order to decide where they would each go, the seven 
brothers climbed to the top of Kiji Topar [“Black Summit”, the 
Thangmi name for Kalinchok], where they held a second archery 
                                       
10 Megh Raj explains that, “ ... there are various versions of the offer and acceptance 
of land. A few maintain that they were offered land as much as they could cover in a 
walk of seven days. Thus the offer covered land from the base of Dolakha to the base 
of the Himalaya (having a length of 15 kosh /30 miles) extending up to Tamakoshi in 
the east and Surke in the west. Another version has it that when Sonari [sic] loosened 
her hair, it covered an area extending from Lebangkhu to Ubhare, Rukubigu to 
Dolakha which was immediately granted them by the king. Yet another version is that 
they were offered as much land as they could clear” (Reng 1999: 6). The use of a 
buffalo skin cut into strips to mark territory also appears in the story of founding of 
the Boudhanath stupa (Slusser 1982). 
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contest. Each brother followed his arrow and went to live with his 
wife wherever it landed. The places were as follows, by 
descending order of the age of the sons who settled there): 
Surkhe, Suspa, Dumkot, Lapilang, Kusati, Alampu, and 
Kuthisyang. Through the kipat system, the Dolakha king officially 
recognized the borders of the Thangmi land as encompassing all 
of these areas, and so it was. 11 
The Dolakha king levied a tax that the Thangmi had to pay 
once a year for their rights to stay on his territory. After this had 
been established, Biche Raj, who was the king of Thimi, declared 
war on the Dolakha king. Biche Raj sent a formal declaration of 
war to Dolakha in a letter. The Dolakha king was so afraid that 
he surrendered to Biche Raj before the war had even begun, and 
fled from Dolakha. The Thangmi were afraid, because they had 
already won favor with the Dolakha king, but they didn’t know 
how they would fare under the new king from Thimi. As they 
feared, Biche Raj (who was a reincarnation of Vishnu, the patron 
deity of the Chhetri) gave the administrative posts and important 
jobs to the Newar, while he gave the Thangmi hard physical 
work. This division is still so today. 
 
Staking a Claim 
References to Simraungadh crop up in almost every Thangmi response 
to questions about their origins. Over the course of my fieldwork, a 
wide range of individuals in as many locations made variations of the 
statement, “We came from Simraungadh [sometimes pronounced 
Simanghat]”. Despite the certainty with which this is stated, none of the 
origin myths, paloke, or other practices make any more detailed 
reference to this place, and there is no symbolic imagery associated 
with its status as the source of Thangmi origins. 
                                       
11 Kipat is most concisely glossed as the “customary system of land tenure” (Forbes 
1999: 115). See also Caplan 2000 [1970] and Regmi (1976). However, its full 
meaning in the contemporary context of ethnic politics in Nepal is much more 
complex than this. In short, it has come to be used as a shorthand for “indigenous 
territory”, through a serious of ideological and symbolic moves which will be 
discussed in further detail below. 
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Simraungadh is the name of an ancient settlement in the Tarai, 
of which there are now only archaeological remains.12 According to 
Vajracharya and Shrestha (2031 VS), as reaffirmed by Miller 
(1997[1979]) and Slusser (1982), it is possible that there was a link 
between an early Mithila king, Hari Simha Deva, and the Dolakha 
region. When his kingdom “straddling the Bihar-Tarai border” (Slusser 
1982: 55) was conquered by Muslim forces in 1324-25 AD, King Hari 
Simha Deva fled towards Dolakha, but died en route. His sons and 
entourage apparently did reach their destination, but were imprisoned 
by Dolakha’s rulers. It is possible that it was Hari Simha Deva’s Tarai 
principality that the Thangmi refer to as Simraungadh, and that some 
part of Thangmi ancestry may be traced to that location. Several of the 
Thangmi publications attempt to pursue this supposition in more 
depth, but with the limited historical sources at their disposal (which 
are for the most part the same as those to which I have access), it is 
difficult to come up with the conclusive evidence of their own roots 
that they seek. For instance, Megh Raj bemoans the fact that, “the 
conflicting versions [of the story of Thangmi settlement] make it all the 
more difficult to verify the truth” (Reng 1999: 3). 
Regardless of their specific point of origin, as they travel along 
Nepal’s elaborate network of rivers, Yapati and Sunari are clearly 
migrants from elsewhere, entering a domain already under the control 
of another ethnic entity—the antecedents of the contemporary Dolakha 
                                       
12 For details of Simraungadh as an archaeological site, see Ballinger (1973). 
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Newar.13 The Thangmi presence at first challenges the Newar king’s 
authority, but when they show themselves as willing and capable 
cultivators of the wild expanse beyond his direct administration, he 
relents and allows them to settle. As mentioned briefly above and in 
Chapter 4, the earliest known evidence of a Thangmi presence in 
Dolakha is an inscription at the Dolakha Bhimsen temple dating to 
1568 AD, which establishes that the Thangmi were by that time tax-
paying subjects of Newar rulers. Despite their apparent subjugation, 
the myth suggests that there was still perhaps room for the expression 
of Thangmi agency within a Newar domain (a theme explored in depth 
in Chapter 8), and when the Newar king is defeated, the Thangmi are 
concerned for their future as subjects of a Chhetri king. 
The broader context of economic relationships between the 
Thangmi, Newar and caste Hindus is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4, and the overarching sociopolitical framework is described in 
Chapter 8. Here, suffice it to say that this part of the paloke continues 
situating the Thangmi vis-à-vis other ethnic groups by including the 
following list of the kings and queens of each ethnic group as an 
essential part of the chant, and thereby the Thangmi frame of 
reference: 
                                       
13 There are no substantive ethnographic sources on the Dolakha Newar. Carol 
Genetti (1994) has published a descriptive and historical account of their dialect of 
the Newar language, but little has been written (particularly in English) about their 
cultural history. For this reason, it is difficult to provide a more nuanced description 
of the people that Thangmi settlers encountered. Calling them “Newar” may be 
anachronistic, since they may not have conceptualized themselves in such terms in 
the 16th century, but for lack of a more accurate, historicized term, I use “Newar” to 
refer both to the contemporary inhabitants of Dolakha bazaar, and their ancestors. 
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syu syu raja syu syu rani (Thangmi) 
hai hai raja hai hai rani (Kirant) 
golma raja golma rani (Tamang) 
khando raja khando rani (Newar) 
These four pairs of apocryphal kings’ (N: raja) and queens’ (N: 
rani) names comprise a lilting refrain in every propitiation chant, and 
with some minor variation, Thangmi informants always identify these 
kings with the ethnic groups listed in parentheses above. Gurus 
explain that Syu Syu Raja and Rani are alternative titles of address for 
Yapati and Sunari, the Thangmi ancestors, and as such they are always 
ritually invoked in relation to the ancestors of the three other 
ostensibly indigenous ethnic entities (i.e. non-caste Hindu) with whom 
the Thangmi come in contact. Even within the territory that Thangmi 
consider their own, then, they are never represented in isolation, but 
always situated in relation to ethnic others, some of whose presence 
predated Thangmi settlement in the area. 
When the Dolakha king withdraws his threat of execution and 
instead asks Yapati and Sunari how much land they would like, they 
demarcate their desired territory by staking out strips of dry buffalo 
skin with a set of wooden nails (T: thurmi; N: kila ; Tib: phurba). These 
nails, which were described in more detail in Chapter 2, remain one of 
the most important objects within the Thangmi ritual inventory. In 
contemporary practice, they continue to be an important motif in 
establishing claims to Thangmi territory, for instance during Bhume 
Jatra as discussed below, and in the funerary rituals discussed in 
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Chapter 7. Rather conveniently, the domain that Yapati and Sunari 
claim for the Thangmi more or less maps on to the reality of 
contemporary Thangmi settlement. A large area on either side of the 
high Kalinchok ridge—what is now the eastern edge of Sindhupalcok 
district and the western edge of Dolakha district—is deeded in myth to 
the Thangmi ancestors. 
Having established their own settlement in Rangathali (still a 
place name in contemporary Suspa-Kshamawati VDC) at the far south-
east corner of this domain, Yapati and Sunari must then find a way to 
assert their influence across the broad swathe of territory they are 
granted. Through the archery contest held at the top of Kalinchok, they 
direct each of their sons to settle in seven primary villages throughout 
the domain. Although the list of villages varies in each rendition of the 
tale, they are always areas that have Thangmi majorities or substantial 
minorities in the present. 
 
Kipat, Identity and Indigeneity in Nepal 
The quest for historical evidence of Thangmi territorial rights under the 
system of customary land tenure known as kipat plays a central role in 
contemporary Thangmi activist projects in Nepal. This is hardly 
surprising, since the history of kipat has been closely linked to the 
notion of indigeneity in Nepal, as the latter concept has entered 
popular discourse over the last several decades. 
As Regmi explains: 
 355 
 
rights under Kipat tenure emerged not because of a royal grant, 
but because the owner, as a member of a particular ethnic 
community, was in customary occupation of lands situated in a 
particular geographical area. (1976: 87) 
Beginning in 1774, a series of royal decrees issued by Nepal’s Shah 
kings formalized these rights for a range of groups who now call 
themselves janajati, including the Thangmi.14 With domain over 
territory for specific groups “confirmed only on the ground that 
possession had been continuous ‘from the time of your ancestors’” 
(Regmi 1976: 89, citing early government documents), the fledgling 
Nepali state reified in legal terms what was until then a circumstantial 
link between ethnicity and ancestral territory. Over time, however, as 
the state sought both to exploit the vast natural resources embedded 
in kipat lands, and to bring individual ethnic populations under tighter 
rein, kipat rights were gradually undermined through a series of 
localized land confiscations. For the Thangmi, such events appear to 
have occurred in 1836 (Regmi 1976: 99)15 and in the early 1900s (Peet 
1978: 231),16 which contributed to the initial impetus for migration to 
Darjeeling, as described in Chapter 4. After the end of Rana rule in 
1951, kipat rights were gradually diminished through a series of 
legislative acts, and by 1968, all legal distinctions between kipat and 
                                       
14 Regmi lists the Rai, Majhiya, Bhote, Yakha, Tamang, Hayu, Chepang, Baramu, 
Danuwar, Sunuwar, Kumhal, Pahari, Thami, Sherpa, Majhi, and Lepcha (1976: 88). 
15 “Make allotments from the Kipat lands of Hayus, Danuwars, Paharis, Chepangs, and 
Thamis at the prescribed rates, and confiscate the surplus area” (Regmi 1976: 99). In 
the main text, Regmi lists the year as 1936, but the footnote in which the 
government directive is reproduced lists the year as 1836. The broader context of 
Regmi’s writing confirms that the former must be a typo, and the event must have 
occurred in 1836.  
16 Peet (1978) in fact claims that the kipat system was abolished at this time. 
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the generic form of state landholding (known as raikar in Nepali) had 
disappeared. However, kipat was not comprehensively abolished until 
the cadastral survey of 1994, “which legally ended the kipat system, 
practically and symbolically mark[ing] the government’s victory in this 
200-year struggle” (Forbes 1999: 116). 
Perhaps it is only a coincidence that this is the same year in 
which the then Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) inserted the 
term “indigenous” in its name, to become the Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) (R. Pradhan 2007: 17). Regardless, this 
temporal convergence highlights how the diminishing recognition of a 
legal relationship between ethnic individuals and their territory, as 
defined within the national framework of the Nepali state through the 
concept of kipat, was paralleled by an increasing recognition of an 
embodied relationship between ethnic individuals and their territory, as 
defined within the international framework of development discourse 
and the UN through the concept of indigeneity. As Rajendra Pradhan 
explains, the adoption of the term “indigenous” by ethnic activists in 
Nepal as a term to describe themselves followed quickly on the heels 
of the UN Declaration of the Year of Indigenous Peoples in 1993 and 
the ensuing 1994 Declaration of the Decade of Indigenous Peoples 
(1997: 16). In the documents of the UN and associated agencies, 
indigeneity was conceptualized as an essential quality that inheres in 
one’s body (Kuper 2003)—expressed in Nepal as “we are indigenous”, 
rather than “we have kipat”—and which depends on conscious self-
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recognition in order to work as a category. As the ILO Convention on 
the rights of indigenous peoples states, “Self-identification as 
indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention 
apply.”17 The now widespread use of the term “indigenous” in political 
discourse,18 as well as in legislation,19 in Nepal has had the effect of 
inscribing the relationship between ethnicity and territory in the bodies 
of “indigenous” individuals themselves,20 putting the onus on them to 
develop a new set of techniques to objectify that relationship and make 
it recognizable to others, in the absence of state policies which 
objectify that relationship in legal terms in the manner that kipat once 
did. 
                                       
17 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm, accessed November 19, 2008. 
18 Others are doing the important work of understanding how this concept has come 
to be naturalized in Nepal since 1994 (see especially Tamang 2008). For broader 
anthropological discussions of the problematics inherent in the category of 
“indigenous” see Beteille (1998), Kuper (2003), de la Cadena and Starn (2007) and 
Shah (2007). 
19 In 2002 the NFDIN Act was passed, recognizing “indigenous peoples” as a legal 
category for the first time, and in 2007 Nepal’s government ratified the ILO’s 
Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples, becoming only the second 
Asian country to do so after the Philippines. In the text of that document, indigenous 
peoples are defined as, “Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as 
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of 
conquest or colonization or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, 
cultural and political institutions” http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm, 
accessed November 19, 2008. 
20 André Beteille (1998) and Adam Kuper (2003) have both remarked upon the 
essentialist aspects of the concept of indigeneity, suggesting that to varying degrees, 
the concept reinscribes the “crude anthropological association of race and culture” 
(Beteille 1998: 190). Kaushik Ghosh also contends that, “a discourse of essential 
indigeneity severely limits the creativity of adivasi politics” (2006: 504). 
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This is where Jagat Man’s recitation at the workshop with which 
this chapter began fell short of the mark, and why Thangmi activists, 
along with ethnic activists from many other groups in Nepal, were 
obsessed with finding “proof” of their indigeneity. Evidence of their 
former status as kipat holders was perceived to be a powerful form of 
proof, since legal legitimation of ethnic territory in the past could be 
conceptualized as historical precedent for new policies. Within this 
context, Thangmi activists in Nepal attempted to emphasize the 
tenuous evidence for their historical rights to kipat, while downplaying 
the aspects of their origin myth which suggest that their ancestors 
were migrants who traveled the length and breadth of the Himalayas 
before they carved out a piece of territory to call their own.21 As Megh 
Raj writes in his article entitled, “At the Crossroads of Proof and 
Conjecture”: 
 
It is a common belief among Thamis that in the past, Newar 
kings used to rule in Dolakha and that the primogenitors of 
Thamis were awarded kipat land from the Newar kings...We can 
safely assume that there must have been some proof and 
witness when a portion of the kingdom changed hands ... it can 
be presumed that the bestower of kipat as well as the beneficiary 
must have in their possession certain written documents or 
stone inscriptions signifying the exchange ... A few cases of such 
documents are still in possession of some of the Dolakha 
                                       
21 Origin myths that focus on migrations to areas which only later became thought of 
kipat are typical among Himalayan groups (see especially Gaenszle 2000). For those 
groups whose origin stories tell of migration from Tibet (for instance the Sherpa, 
Tamang, Gurung), historical links to this predominantly non-Hindu region to the 
north have been deployed as a positive marker of identity within the context of the 
self-proclaimed “non-Hindu” janajati movement (McHugh 2006). However, for the 
Thangmi, whose story locates their origins in Simraugadh, somewhere along the 
present-day Nepal-India border, no such valorization is possible within the frame of 
janajati politics, and activists focus instead on the historicity of kipat. 
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Newars. In the real sense, the logic of elders deserve 
consideration. Hopefully a few of those documents may be in the 
Thami script. (Reng 1999: 16) 
In the age of indigeneity, the concept of kipat itself has thus become 
refigured as a short-hand for evidence of ancestral rights to certain 
territories. Although the legal system no longer exists, use of the term 
kipat now expresses the historical consciousness of having once had it, 
as in the simple Nepali phrase, Yo hamro kipat ho—“This is our kipat”, 
which I heard often from Thangmi in Dolakha in reference to the area 
in which they lived. However, consciousness in itself does not secure 
legal rights, and it is for this reason that activists seek written proof 
(which, if found in the non-existent Thangmi script, would be the holy 
grail of Thangmi ethnic activism in Nepal) to show the government that 
it had once legally recognized the link between ethnicity and territory 
and could not forever evade demands to do so once again. 
The few shreds of historical record and mythical narrative that 
Thangmi can draw upon in their claims to indigeneity are complicated 
by their constant references to the Newar population of Dolakha. It is 
fairly clear that the ancestors of the contemporary Newar were already 
in the area when the Thangmi began to settle there, and that the 
Thangmi were granted political rights to their territory by these rulers 
of Dolakha. This history complicates the standard janajati narrative of 
land lost to Indo-Aryan invaders (whom indirectly, if not directly, are 
cast as representatives of the Hindu state), which Regmi recounts as 
follows: 
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The Kipat system may have been a relic of the customary form of 
land control which communities of Mongoloid or autochthonous 
tribal origin established in areas occupied by them before the 
immigration of racial groups of Indo-Aryan origin. (1976: 87-88) 
This racialized portrayal of two dualistically opposed groups (which 
recalls the “interface” model of Himalayan ethnicity described in 
Chapter 3) does not account for the more complex history of Thangmi 
settlement, or that of most other groups in Nepal, for that matter. 
Rajendra Pradhan posed the problem of indigeneity for Nepal as 
follows in 1994: 
 
Do we want to deny the history and tradition of a Nepal where all 
communities are descended from migrants from outside during 
different periods of history? Specially when these different waves 
of migrants have either intermingled or broken up to form the 
numerous ethnic/linguistic communities which today constitute 
the peoples of Nepal... 
 In other words, this whole question of indigenous peoples 
is a false problem because indigenous peoples do not exist in 
Nepal; or if they do, the majority of the Nepalis are indigenous, 
including many of the Bahuns and Chhetris. (R. Pradhan 1994: 
45) 
I heard similar arguments frequently over the course of my fieldwork in 
Nepal, generally from individuals who did not consider themselves 
members of janajati groups. Such arguments may represent history 
most accurately from an objective perspective, but they are simply 
unacceptable to most self-defined indigenous activists, who posit a 
one-to-one correlation between each piece of territory and a single 
group who is indigenous to it. Nepal’s 2007 ratification of the ILO 
Convention on the rights of indigenous peoples demonstrated that the 
activists had won this debate at the public policy level (regardless of 
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what individuals continued to think in private), and current proposals 
for federal restructuring along ethnic lines have taken the tenets of 
indigeneity to their next logical step. 
For Thangmi activists in Nepal, the problem with all this was that 
the scanty evidence they had of their own indigeneity (both oral and 
written), implicated the Newar as at least equally, if not more, 
indigenous, in terms of their chronologically earlier residence in the 
area.22 The forebears of the contemporary Newar—who themselves 
cannot easily be defined as either “Indo-Aryan” or “Mongoloid”, an 
issue which continues to cause both Newar and janajati activists in 
general much consternation—were clearly already present when the 
Thangmi, or people who became the Thangmi, settled in Dolakha and 
its environs. The Thangmi settlers were in fact granted land rights by a 
local king, not by the central Nepali state. Later on, from the 
perspective of the state, Thangmi kipat was certainly incorporated into 
that national framework (as affirmed by Regmi’s citations of state 
documents that mention the group), but from the Thangmi 
perspective, the local Newar rulers of Dolakha remained the primary 
sociopolitical authority in relation to which they defined themselves 
(see Chapter 8 for further discussion). 
                                       
22 Kuper (2003) describes how this sort of uneasiness with histories of migration is 
common among people who identify as indigenous the world over. He cites Hugh 
Brody’s (2001) story of a Cree student in Canada who argues against historical 
evidence for Cree migration across the Bering Straits because, “If their ancestors were 
themselves immigrants, then perhaps the Cree might not after all be so very different 
from the Mayflower’s passengers or even the huddled masses that streamed across the 
Atlantic in the 1890s” (2003: 392). 
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Although this close relationship with the Newar may be seen as a 
liability by contemporary Thangmi activists in Nepal who seek to paint 
themselves as the sole indigenous inhabitants of the area they would 
now like to claim as Thangmi territory, I suggest that it is in fact this 
in-depth, inter-ethnic historical relationship with the Newar at the 
local level which provides some of the conditions for Thangmi activists 
in India to conceptualize Thangmi territory as an ethnic possession 
that transcends the confines of the Nepali nation-state. At the time at 
which Thangmi began migrating to India, they may not have envisioned 
their right to territory in relation to the national socio-political order of 
the Nepali state, but rather as a set of local power relations which 
located the Dolakha Newar at the top. It was first of all the Thangmi 
ancestors and territorial deities who granted dominion over territory to 
those who propitiated them through the ritual actions that will be 
described shortly, and second of all the Dolakha Newar who tacitly 
allowed Thangmi to maintain this special relationship with their 
territorial deities without political intervention. The ritual relationships 
enacted every year at Dasain between the Thangmi and the Dolakha 
Newar cemented Thangmi territorial claims vis-à-vis the local Newar 
authority (see Chapter 8), who in turn provided a buffer of sorts 
between the Thangmi and the emerging Nepali state. As Holmberg, 
March, and Tamang have suggested, “... most renditions of Nepali 
history over emphasize the effects of central power” (1999: 7). The fact 
that Thangmi were not listed in the 1854 Muluki Ain suggests that 
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indeed, they were not fully incorporated into the Nepali state at that 
seminal moment of consolidation.23 However, as the myth itself 
suggests, the Newar could not protect the Thangmi forever once the 
“Chhetri king” came to power,24 and eventually the encroachment of 
high-caste settlers became one of the factors leading to the 
beginnings of migration to India as described in Chapter 4. Rather than 
seeing these movements as an escape from an already entirely 
hegemonic state, however, we might see them as an exit from a 
crumbling set of tried and tested local power relations, the successor 
to which was anxiety-producing in its unfamiliar, but apparently 
exploitative, nature. If this was indeed the scenario, the Thangmi who 
first arrived in India at the turn of the 20th century would have 
conceptualized themselves as residents of their own ritually 
legitimated territory, with fealty to Newar authorities at the edges of 
their locality, rather than as subjects of a Nepali state. 
 
The Problem of Indigeneity in India 
                                       
23 It is curious that Thangmi were listed as rightful holders of kipat lands, but were 
not classified anywhere in the Muluki Ain. Investigation of this apparent paradox is 
beyond the scope of my discussion here, but well worth further research. 
24 They could and apparently did intervene when more recent high-caste settlers 
went too far in appropriating Thangmi lands. According to Miller, when high-caste 
settlers “took the step of preventing the Thamis from getting the harvest” 
(1997[1979]: 90), Newar priests interceded and negotiated on behalf of the Thangmi 
with the Bahun-Chhetri families who were blocking Thangmi access, and that the 
problem did not recur in the future (1997[1979]: 91). Newar efforts to protect 
Thangmi territorial integrity may have emerged largely out of their own interests in 
appropriating Thangmi ritual services and labor for themselves, rather than any 
particular sympathy for the Thangmi (see Chapter 8). 
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This history, and the ensuing century of colonial and post-colonial 
Indian nation-building, makes the indigeneity equation for the modern 
descendants of early Thangmi migrants in Darjeeling entirely different 
from the one which troubles their Nepali counterparts. Rajendra 
Pradhan’s argument against the concept of indigeneity, as presented 
above, is in fact very similar to the legal stance of the Indian state. Alpa 
Shah explains: 
 
The official position of the Indian State is that there are no 
indigenous people in India since its complex migration patterns 
mean that, unlike some countries such as Australia or Canada, it 
is impossible to establish who the original settlers in a particular 
region are. (2007: 2) 
However, Shah continues to describe how groups officially 
recognized by the government as Scheduled Tribes in India—
commonly referred to as “tribals”—in fact consider themselves to fit 
the “indigenous slot” (Li 2000, Karlsson 2003). Members of such 
groups have put the Indian government under pressure to adopt the 
legal category of indigeneity since 1985, when representatives of 
Indian tribal groups began participating in UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples (WGIP) meetings (Shah 2007: 2). Accession to the 
transnational category of “indigenous” is by no means a fait accompli 
for Indian tribal groups, however, both because the state continues to 
resist that move, and because, as Kaushik Ghosh suggests: 
 
...in certain postcolonial contexts like India, WGIP-like 
transnationalism introduces “a politics of place” that undermines 
the struggles through which indigenous people have historically 
attempted—and to some extent significantly succeeded—to 
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wrest certain autonomies within the formal dominion of modern 
states. (2006: 502) 
Such arguments build upon a long history of scholarly and political 
debate over the colonial construction of the category of “tribe” in 
opposition to that of caste (Ghurye 1963; Corbridge 1988; Bates 1995; 
S. Guha 1999; Dirks 2001).25 At stake is the validity and ownership of 
the term adivasi, which literally translates as “original inhabitants”, and 
is often used by groups recognized by the Indian state as Scheduled 
Tribes to describe themselves. 
 As described in Chapter 5, Indian citizens of Nepali heritage in 
Darjeeling were not particularly interested in claiming membership in 
this category until after 1990, when a constellation of political factors 
came together to push them towards assuming an adivasi identity. 
Once this became the objective, however, groups like the Thangmi 
were compelled to think carefully about what seeking tribal status 
would mean for their relationships to a range of territories, both in 
India and Nepal, and their public representations of these 
relationships. Ironically, although India does not recognize the concept 
of indigeneity, the term adivasi is popularly perceived to index a link 
between ethnicity and territory for those recognized as Scheduled 
Tribes within Indian national discourse, in much the same way as the 
term indigeneity does within transnational discourses. Through print 
and visual media that described adivasi struggles in other parts of the 
                                       
25 Shah’s 2007 overview of the concept of indigeneity in India provides extensive 
additional references to this debate. 
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country, which were prominent throughout the 1980s and 1990s (in 
Assam, Meghalaya and Jharkhand, for instance), Thangmi activists in 
Darjeeling became aware of this perceived requirement of the tribal or 
adivasi category to which they aspired, despite the fact that 
government criteria for ST status included only the obtuse statement 
that tribes should exhibit “geographical isolation”. Thangmi in India 
thus set about considering how to represent themselves as 
autochthonous to the areas in which they lived, and often used the 
English term “indigenous” in conversations with me to explain this part 
of their project. As Rajen explained at a meeting in 2004: 
 
We are definitely adivasi, just look at how backwards we are and 
how unique our language and culture are. But the government 
won’t recognize these things unless we can also show how 
“indigenous” we are. 
 The problem with demonstrating such indigeneity was twofold. 
First of all, it was common knowledge that the ancestors of 
contemporary Indian citizens of Nepali heritage had at some point 
migrated to the area from Nepal. Second of all, the ethnic 
heterogeneity of the pan-Nepali community, and the mixed residential 
patterns throughout both urban and rural areas of Darjeeling, meant 
that there was no specific territory to which the Thangmi (or any other 
group of Nepali heritage in Darjeeling involved in applying for ST 
status) could claim exclusive indigeneity. Except, of course, if they 
wanted to piggy-back upon the claims to indigeneity that Thangmi 
activists in Nepal were already making in relation to “their” territory in 
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Dolakha and Sindhupalchok. This was a simultaneously exciting and 
impossible option for Thangmi activists in India. Exciting, because 
many Thangmi in India were familiar with the idea of Thangmi territory 
as articulated through ritual practice that invoked territorial deities 
(even if they did not often participate in such practices themselves), 
and making political claims to indigeneity on the basis of their special 
relationship with territorial deities would be a particularly elegant 
manner of transforming divine into political recognition. Impossible, 
however, because claiming territory in Nepal as a marker of indigeneity 
in India was not only illogical, but dangerous, since the threat of being 
characterized as foreigners in their own country due to their perceived 
associations with Nepal was always imminent. For Indians of Nepali 
heritage in Mizoram and Meghalaya, such characterizations as 
“foreign” had resulted in mass expulsions in the 1980s, as they had in 
the early 1990s for people of Nepali heritage who thought themselves 
to be citizens of Bhutan (Hutt 2003). 
 It was such insecurities—wrought by the paradox of the 1950 
Indo-Nepal treaty which made dual citizenship impossible, despite the 
fact that the permeable border was the site of constant movement 
between the two countries—that made it inconceivable for Thangmi in 
India to produce a diasporic identity through a simple affirmation of a 
“vital relation with the point of origin”. That point of origin was, in a 
sense, too close to be a safe source of identity, too unbounded in its 
potential to claim them, rather than allowing them to maintain the 
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agency to claim it. Instead, Thangmi in India felt that they needed to 
constantly disavow links to Nepal in order to claim their rights as 
Indian citizens, which included the right to demand special treatment 
via Scheduled Tribe status. At the same time, however, the entire 
complex of ritual practice which Thangmi activists in India intended to 
deploy as evidence of their tribal nature took for granted the existence 
of a Thangmi territory in Nepal, the place names and territorial deities 
of which were recited at every ritual instance in an entirely embedded 
manner that defied erasure. 
 
Encountering the Originary Other 
The puzzle of how to at once make use of the concept of Thangmi 
territory to shore up their claims to indigeneity in India, while 
simultaneously disassociating such territory from a physical location 
within Nepal’s national borders, was a key issue for Thangmi activists 
in India during my fieldwork. It led to much dissimulation and 
manipulation of known history among members of the BTWA, as well 
as to increasingly contentious attempts to access originary knowledge 
which might help guide the way. 
One attempt to solve this conundrum involved the assertion that 
Thangmi had in fact originally lived in India, but had then migrated to 
Nepal, whence they eventually returned to their point of origin in India. 
Inverting the emphasis that Thangmi activists in Nepal placed on the 
origin story’s trope of settlement in Dolakha, Thangmi activists in India 
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focused instead on the trope of migration from Simraugadh. They 
argued that the historical site of Simraugadh was inside India’s border, 
even thought the contemporary settlement of the same name is just 
inside the border of modern Nepal. For example, a document compiled 
by the Sikkim branch of the BTWA entitled Thami Community and their 
Rituals, which was submitted to the Union Minister for Tribal Affairs, 
claimed (in English) that: 
 
From the books written by some eminent historian the THAMI 
might have migrated from Asia Minor and settled down in 
Simroungad (the capital of TIRHUTDOYA 1097-1326 A.D., map 
is enclosed herewith),26 bordering present India and Nepal in 
Western Indian frontiers ... This ethnic Thami community is an 
aboriginal race residing as indigenous inhabitants in North-East 
region of India from the hoary past. (ASTS 2005: 1) 
If Simraungadh had indeed been in India, then Thangmi could claim 
indigeneity on that basis, even though they had spent several 
generations living in Nepal before returning to their “homeland” in 
India. During my 2004 fieldwork in Darjeeling, this argument was 
made most forcefully by Rajen, the general secretary of the BTWA, who 
stated it at several meetings, and even requested me to back up this 
assertion to a journalist at a public meeting. I refused to do so, but 
nonetheless this version of history appeared in quotation marks 
attached to my name in the following day’s paper. I later learned that 
Rajen had told other BTWA members that my scholarship was not to be 
trusted because I was not willing to provide “proof” for this alternative 
history. 
                                       
26 Unfortunately, the map is not actually enclosed with my copy of the document. 
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In interviews with me, Rajen refused to talk about his family 
history, since admitting that his own parents migrated from Nepal as 
late as the 1940s would have created an embarrassing contradiction to 
his public statements about Thangmi indigeneity in India. During one 
video interview in early 2005, Rajen accidentally let down his guard 
and alluded to his father’s early experiences in Darjeeling as a migrant 
from Nepal. Some minutes later, he requested that I erase that part of 
the tape. I complied, but I already knew the details of his family history 
from interviews with other less militant community members.27 Rajen’s 
claim was wishful thinking, which even other Thangmi who initially 
supported it eventually came to question: if the Tamang and Limbu 
had received Scheduled Tribe status (in 2003), and they too were 
known to have migrated from Nepal, then why bother going so far to 
claim indigeneity on what were obviously specious grounds? 
I first became aware of how much interpersonal tension these 
issues could create between Thangmi activists in India and circular 
migrants from Nepal in 2004 during a deusi “cultural program” 
organized by the BTWA on the Hindu holiday of Tihar (also known as 
Diwali). BTWA officers had requested a group of Thangmi migrants 
from Nepal to perform “traditional” dances and songs in the Thangmi 
                                       
27 I feel comfortable presenting this anecdote here because during conversations in 
my second period of long-term fieldwork in Darjeeling in late 2005, Rajen had 
softened his position on this issue, and apologized for having demanded that I erase 
the tape. He then told me that I was free to use the entire interview as I saw fit (as 
mentioned above, the tape had already been erased, but I can recall the content). By 
this time, Rajen was no longer General Secretary of the BTWA, and seemed to be 
engaged in a period of intensive self-reflection about the positions he had taken 
while he held that office. 
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language in order to raise money for the BTWA, since the BTWA 
leadership did not themselves possess the cultural knowledge to put 
on such a performance. I traveled by jeep with the BTWA leadership to 
the site of the program in Jorebunglow, some kilometers outside of 
Darjeeling bazaar. When we arrived, the performers were not yet there, 
despite the fact that one of the BTWA officers had apparently spent the 
previous day confirming the details of the program with them. We 
waited for over an hour, which the BTWA officers spent complaining 
about how unreliable, uncultured and unsavory Thangmi from Nepal 
were, and how their behavior gave all Thangmi a bad reputation. When 
the performers arrived, all grown men, Rajen gave them a dressing 
down, calling them “boys” and asking them how they expected 
Thangmi culture to develop if they could not even be on time for a 
performance. The Thangmi from Nepal shrugged off this critique, 
asking how Rajen expected Thangmi culture to develop if their 
stomachs were not full, and requested some drinks and snacks as they 
prepared to perform. 
While we then waited for the audience to gather—a multi-
generational, multi-ethnic group from the surrounding residential 
area—I interviewed the performers, and learned that they typically 
spent six months of the year in Darjeeling, although most of them had 
wives and children back in Nepal, all in the village of Lapilang. When I 
asked which place they considered home, one of them said, “This is 
our village, but that is also our village. Really, they are the same 
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village.” Overhearing this conversation, Rajen approached just as I was 
writing the label for the videocassette which I had cued up to record 
their performance, and said, “Well, since it’s all one village anyway, 
please don’t write on the cassette that they are actually from Nepal. 
Just write that this performance occurred in Darjeeling.” It is in this 
sense that Thangmi territory can be envisioned as a translocal ethnic 
territory, which transcends the national borders which may appear to 
circumscribe it on the ground. I compromised with Rajen’s request by 
writing “Lapilang dancers in Jorebunglow” on the cassette, using local 
rather than national descriptors. 
This experience hit home to me how circular migrants from 
Nepal often became foils for the struggles of Thangmi in India to 
express the complex territorialities which shaped their own sense of 
Thangminess. On the one hand, the cultural knowledge and skill in 
both practice and performance of Thangmi from Nepal were valued as 
links to the originary, which could work on both affective and 
pragmatic levels to articulate Thangmi identity in a positive manner. 
On the other hand, circular migrants embodied the national other 
which Thangmi in India (like other people of Nepali heritage in India) 
worked so hard to define themselves in contradistinction to, so 
appropriation of their knowledge to shore up Thangmi claims of 
indigeneity in India was in some ways a political gamble. 
Psychologically speaking, however, for BTWA activists who were deeply 
enmeshed in the pragmatism of tribal politics, but felt insecure about 
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their own lack of cultural knowledge, listening to the songs about 
territorial deities and Thangmi villages that the Lapilang group 
performed—the lyrics of which were much like the ones cited in the 
epigraph to this chapter—boosted morale by reminding them of how 
divine recognition worked. “See,” Rajen said to me, as we watched the 
program finally get underway and he settled into his seat with a drink, 
“How can the government deny us? All of those deities the boys are 
singing about, aren’t they our deities too? They should help us in our 
‘campaign’.” 
 
The Ritual Solution 
That these deities, and the territory they marked as Thangmi, could 
transcend the physicality of geographical and political borders was 
further made clear to me some weeks later at an all night ritual 
conducted by Latte Apa to banish malevolent spirits from a Darjeeling 
Thangmi household that had recently experienced a spell of bad luck. I 
was offered cheap whiskey (T: ding ding, literally “red red”), which here 
replaced the ever-present home-brewed beer (T: tong) of such rituals 
in Nepal. Smoke from the burning uirengpati (T) incense made from 
the fresh leaves of the wormwood tree began to permeate the entire 
wood-paneled room. 
Ajay, an overweight teenager born and raised in Darjeeling, took 
me aside to ask in English, “Do you understand what he is saying?” “A 
little bit,” I responded. “So then you know that he is taking us back to 
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the original birthplace of all Thamis in order to get the blessings of all 
of the important deities there?” “Yes”, I said. “But you see,” said Ajay, 
“he tries to make it interesting to us too by talking about places that 
we know—Siliguri, Chowrasta, Tungsung—not just those strange 
village names somewhere out there in the pahar (N; literally “hills”, a 
Darjeeling colloquialism that refers to rural Nepal in general, as 
described in Chapter 2) where we’ve never been.” I suddenly realized 
that I needed to listen more carefully. The seemingly familiar cadence 
of the paloke had lulled me into complacency, and I had forgotten to 
focus on the specifics of what Latte Apa was saying. In fact, he was 
entering new territory, by expanding the origin story narrative to 
encompass the Darjeeling migrations. Instead of leaving off in 
Dolakha, where Rana Bahadur’s rendition presented above ended, Latte 
Apa’s paloke incorporated the place names that Thangmi migrants 
from Nepal to India encountered on their long journey. As Latte Apa 
brought the narrative right up to the doorstep of the house in which we 
were sitting, I began to understand how he was ritualizing the process 
of migration and turning it into an integral part of the origin myth 
itself. 
Latte Apa’s paloke in practice shows how origin myths may do 
more than describing “creation” at a fixed moment sometime in the 
mythic past, but may themselves be creative forms that incorporate the 
ongoing process of migration as part and parcel of their narrative. 
Latte Apa’s extension of the ritual chants to include the process of 
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migration to Darjeeling worked to make young Thangmi in India, like 
Ajay, feel included in the practice of Thangmi ritual, by ritually 
transforming familiar local places into Thangmi territory, rather than 
simply limiting it to an area of rural Nepal which was alien to young 
Thangmi in India like Ajay. In this process, deities were ritually 
“deterritorialized” from their abodes in Nepal, and “reterritorialized” 
not just in India, but in a transcendent conception of Thangmi 
territory.28 
 
A Landscape of Deities and Ancestors 
At first, Latte Apa’s capacity to do this seemed novel and specific to his 
role as senior guru in the “diasporic” context of Darjeeling. On further 
reflection and analysis of my ethnographic materials from Nepal, 
however, it became clear that such conceptualizations of divine 
territory as at once immanent and transcendent were in fact a feature 
of Thangmi worldviews there as well. The world of Thangmi divinity 
seemed to mirror the tension between fixed residence and movement 
that characterizes the world of Thangmi humans. Or was it the other 
way around?  
There has been much scholarly discussion in Tibetan and 
Himalayan Studies about the link between territory and identity as 
reflected in the worship of territorial deities (Blondeau and Steinkellner 
                                       
28 These terms originate in the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1977). Here, however, I 
use them to suggest not “a weakening of the link between culture and place” (Inda 
and Rosaldo 2002) but rather an expansion of such links to new locations. 
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1996; Ramble 1997; Blondeau 1998; Huber 1999a, 1999b; Buffetrille 
and Diemberger 2002; Tautscher 2007). In short, in a paradigm widely 
attested across the Tibetan cultural zone as it extends into the 
Himalayas, group identity is linked most closely to attachment to 
particular territories, which are personified by deities (Ramble 1997). 
These deities and their whims control the agricultural productivity of 
the land, as well as the fates of the people who work it. In many areas, 
such deities are linked to sacred mountains, and although this is not 
always the case in the Thangmi context, Thangmi territorial deities 
otherwise fit the model. Scholars of Himalayan Hinduism have 
described a seemingly similar paradigm in the cults of kul deuta (N), 
lineage deities identified with individual clans (Gaborieau 1968, 
Chalier-Visuvalingam 2003; Michaels 2004). From Nepal’s elite Rana 
family downwards, every family has its own kul deuta, who resides in a 
specific location and must be propitiated on a regular schedule to 
assure good luck for the family. 
Such territorial and lineage deity traditions are also the central 
feature of the Thangmi divine world, and in fact the two types of 
practice are conflated in the worship of the single deity of Bhume.29 As 
in the song which serves as the epigraph to this chapter, Bhume is 
commonly referred to both as mul deva (T)—the chief territorial deity—
                                       
29 Bhume or bhumi is a Sanskrit term meaning earth, which is used in every day 
contemporary Nepali discourse to mean “soil” or “ground”. Throughout South Asia, 
bhumiputra, meaning “sons of the soil”, has been used as an epithet by ethno-
nationalist parties. In the Thangmi context, no such usage of the term has yet been 
suggested. 
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and kul deva (T)—a lineage deity.30 Bhume is in fact a pan-Himalayan 
earth deity, whose worship is a cornerstone of shamanic practice for 
many ethnic groups, and is not in any objective sense unique to the 
Thangmi.31 However, Thangmi conceptualize the ritual practices 
through which they propitiate Bhume as evidence of their special 
relationship with the deity in its particular instantiation within Thangmi 
territory.32 Other lineage deities (kul deva) attached to specific 
households (see Chapter 4) are all under Bhume’s dominion, and 
include Bahradeva, Biswakarma, Chyurkun, Gatte, Golduk, Gosai and 
Sundrawati. 
In a brief but illuminating article on Bhume in the Gulmi district 
of western Nepal, Marie Lecomte-Tilouine suggests that Bhume unites 
in a single divine entity what she calls the “tribal” notion of 
territoriality, and the Hindu “Indo-Nepalese” notion of lineage, as key 
markers of group cohesion and power (1993). In Gulmi, she attributes 
this mixture to the process of co-habitation between Magar and caste 
Hindu settlers in the area, in which Bhume provided a symbolic 
affirmation of both groups’ claims to territory and power at once: the 
Magar claimed rights as propitiators of Bhume’s territorial aspects, 
                                       
30 Deva is the Thangmi language equivalent to the Nepali deuta. 
31 Marie Lecomte-Tilouine (1993) describes the worship of Bhume among the Magar, 
based on research in Gulmi as well as an earlier article by Marc Gaborieau (1968). She 
also alludes to personal communication from Corneille Jest, who asserts similar 
practices among Tamang. 
32 Since as described above, bhume simply means “earth” and comes from the archaic 
Sanskrit, there is no reason to assume that deities called by the same name by 
different Himalayan/South Asian ethnic groups should have similar characteristics, a 
shared history, or indicate close affinities between the groups who worship them. 
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while the caste Hindus claimed rights as propitiators of its lineage 
aspects. Bhume seems to play a similar role within the Thangmi 
context, except for the fact that, unlike in Gulmi, in Thangmi areas 
non-Thangmi do not participate directly in the deity’s worship at all—
except to receive consecrated offerings from a Thangmi officiant.33 As 
we shall see below, the worship of Bhume is a mode of asserting 
Thangmi ritual control over the specific domain conceptualized as 
Thangmi territory, and therefore asserting the power of Thangmi 
identity itself. 
 
Have Bhume, Will Travel 
“As they walked and walked from Simraungadh, Ya’apa and Sunari Ama 
brought Bhume with them,” said Guru Maila of Suspa to explain this 
most important divinity’s peripatetic tendencies.34 Bhume is both 
integrally attached to the land where the Thangmi settle, and eminently 
transportable when they move. Having made the journey from 
Simraungadh with the ancestral Thangmi couple, Bhume is for the 
moment moored to the site of Thangmi settlement near Rangathali, in 
present day Suspa-Kshamawati VDC, Dolakha. As a song written by a 
Suspa youth group proudly broadcasts, “Bhume stayed here in our 
                                       
33 In addition, the Thangmi Bhume is a non-gendered, non-anthropomorphic deity, 
while the Magar Bhume that Lecomte-Tilouine describes is imagined as a female 
deity similar to the Hindu earth goddess (1993: 128). 
34 Original Nepali: Simraungadh bata hirdai hirdai Ya’apa ra Sunari Amale bhume liera 
ayo. 
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village of Suspa, here in Rangathali where our ancestors settled.”35 
Indeed, the most important communal Thangmi propitiation ritual in 
Nepal is Bhume Jatra, held annually at the Suspa Bhumethan temple 
near Rangathali on the full moon of Buddha Jayanti, the birthday of the 
Buddha.36 
The timing may be simply a coincidence, since Buddha Jayanti 
falls in late April or early May around the time of the spring planting 
season, when Bhume’s beneficence is most needed. However, there is 
also a perceived resonance between the primary role that Bhume plays 
in the Thangmi ritual world and that of the Buddha for their Buddhist 
neighbors. Guru Maila articulated the difference between the Thangmi 
and the Tamang with the statement: “We worship Bhume, they worship 
Buddha.”37 This simple summation also suggests how, in recent years, 
many Thangmi have sought to express their own complex of practice 
and belief in politically recognizable terms that situate it relationally vis-
à-vis the “great traditions”. For instance, as enumerators for the 2001 
Nepal census began to visit Thangmi villages, activists organized a 
series of meetings to determine how Thangmi should respond to census 
questions about religion. Although no consensus was reached, many of 
the gurus present argued for “Bhume dharma”—the religion, or way, of 
Bhume—as the most accurate representation of their practice, which 
                                       
35 Original Nepali: Hamro Suspa gauma hai hai bhume baseko yahanai purkha basne 
Rangathalima. 
36 The suffix -than means “locality” or “place”, but has the sense of a sacred abode; 
“Bhumethan” is therefore “the sacred abode of Bhume”. 
37 Original Nepali: Hamile bhume manyo, uniharule buddha manyo. 
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maintained Thangmi uniqueness instead of collapsing them into the 
existing census categories of Buddhist, Hindu, or Kirant religion.38 In 
inter-ethnic political meetings at NEFIN, I often heard Thangmi activists 
compare Bhume to Buddha or Brahma, despite the fact that Bhume is 
not an anthropomorphic divinity with human-like characteristics, but a 
black rock. 
Located inside the house of Bhume’s chief priest, or pujari (N), 
that black rock embodies both the essence of the earth, and the 
essence of Thangminess.39 However, the Suspa rock is not unique. 
Instead, it is infinitely replicable wherever the Thangmi go. Dolakha 
and Sindhupalchok districts have long been peppered with minor 
Bhumethan in which the deity can be worshipped by those too far away 
to make it to Suspa, and more recently, new Bhumethan have been 
established in Jhapa and Darjeeling, as will be described in detail 
below. As one man who had relocated from Lapilang to Jhapa 
explained, “After we built our Bhume temple, we thought, ‘we can 
really stay here permanently’”.40 Suspa remains the Thangmi Bhume’s 
chief abode, and propitiation rituals conducted elsewhere must always 
make reference to the Suspa Bhume. But as an all-pervasive earth deity 
present in every natural site, there is in fact nowhere that is not 
                                       
38 The arguments of those activists who advocate accession to the category of “Kirant 
religion” are described in Chapters 3 and 5.  
39 Like the term guru, the term pujari is hereafter represented without italics for ease 
of reading due to its frequent appearance in the text. 
40 Original Nepali: Bhume mandir banaera hami pakka yaha nai basna sakchau 
bhanera sojeko. 
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Bhume’s abode. Therefore it can be propitiated in any place that willing 
Thangmi reside. 
This divine flexibility—the capacity to simultaneously sacralize a 
particular piece of earth, and to be present everywhere—and the 
“transcendentalization” of territory that it enables, accounts in part for 
the resilience of Thangmi identity within a context of high mobility. 
Bhume’s enduring presence in Suspa creates a focal point around 
which the concept of Thangmi territory can be constructed as a source 
of a distinct identity, but at the same time, the very divine entity that 
gives this territory its symbolic power is infinitely expandable, 
manifesting in multiple natural sites wherever the people who believe 
in it recognize its presence. The territory claimed by contemporary 
activists in Nepal as Thangmi kipat in political terms, as marked by 
Bhume’s chief temple in Suspa at its center, is in ritual terms only a 
temporary holding pen for practices which can go anywhere the 
Thangmi go. Bhume itself came from somewhere else with Ya’apa and 
Sunari Ama, and although installed in Suspa for at least 500 years—an 
adequate time span for the surrounding communities to develop an 
attachment and accord interpretive importance to its current location—
the deity’s continued residence there is a matter of tradition, not 
primordial necessity.41 For Thangmi in India, this interpretation of 
Bhume’s territoriality is key: its current location in Suspa is seen as a 
                                       
41 As noted above, the earliest inscription dates the Thangmi settlement of the area 
to the 16th century; Thangmi gurus familiar with that chronology date the arrival of 
Bhume to that time, if not earlier. 
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chance resting place for both the deity and the people, a location 
determined by the contingencies of history, not by an essential, 
unshakeable link between territory-divinity-identity. 
The diverse practices through which Bhume is propitiated, 
remain, however, an enduring means of reproducing Thangminess, 
both in Nepal and India. Performances and other objectifications in 
which the deity and its current location is refigured as an iconic symbol 
of Thangmi identity are also part of this process. Like Bhume, Thangmi 
identity is everywhere and nowhere at once, linked to a notion of 
sacred territory that transcends the geographical physicality of its 
location. Expressed in ritualized action at a range of locations, and in 
communication between the people who move regularly between those 
places, the whole of Thangminess is comprised of the links between 
these practices, people and movements, and their references to each 
other. To show what I mean, I present below a set of vignettes that 
demonstrate the range of ritualized actions through which Bhume 
plays centrally in the production of Thangmi identity: propitiation, 
performance, and pilgrimage. 
 
Private Propitiations: Bhume as Lineage Deity 
One warm May evening in 2000, I left my host family’s house in 
Balasode to spend the night in the hamlet of Arkapole observing the 
annual Bhume propitiation ritual at the home of Birka Bahadur, the 
pujari of the Suspa Bhumethan. During the 40 minute walk along the 
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uphill grade of the new agricultural road which runs through Suspa’s 
scattered hamlets, I considered how the uneven distribution of ritual 
responsibilities among the village’s households might indicate the 
vestigial remains of a once-elaborate system of clan-based territorial 
deity worship. Gurus and lay Thangmi both routinely asserted to me 
that each family had its own kul deva, determined by their clan 
affiliation, and that the propitiation rituals for each such lineage deity 
were very specific and maintained only by the relevant families. 
However, the reality that I observed in practice was that for the most 
part, propitiation rituals for each of the lineage deities looked and felt 
exactly the same. In many cases the household members 
commissioning the ritual had to ask the guru which deity was their own 
kul deva. 
Bhume was different, however, in the sense that everyone knew 
that there were only two families who could count this most important 
god of the earth, to whom all other deities were secondary, as their 
personal lineage deity. Only these two families had Bhume shrines 
within their own homes—built around black rocks that served as 
symbolic markers of Bhume’s all-encompassing presence—and only 
the men of those two families were authorized to play the role of 
officiant in Bhume’s annual propitiation ritual. The brothers Birka 
Bahadur and Dhan Bahadur in Arkapole were the incumbents of one 
family, while Subha Bahadur in Lisapotok represented the other. 
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This was both a traditional right which these men proudly 
asserted as exclusive to their families, and a major responsibility which 
required significant outlays of money and time. Each priestly family 
had to provide on an annual basis a minimum of five chickens for 
sacrifice, 12 eggs, a mana of oil, and substantial quantities of various 
grains with which to make effigies. In addition, they had to commit 
several days and nights (since most of the ritual episodes begin after 
sundown and typically take all night to complete) of their own time to 
overseeing the ritual process, during which their own houses were 
transformed into communal ritual spaces. 
These two households were believed to represent, in metonymic 
fashion, the “original” 18 Thangmi houses of Suspa. As Birka Bahadur 
explained: 
 
Our family has been doing this for at least seven generations. We 
are the only ones who can trace our lineage directly back to the 
time of Yapati Chuku and Sunari Aji, and since Bhume came with 
them, we must continue to honor the deity in our houses. In the 
past, the ritual was done in all 18 houses, but now only ours are 
left so we must do it here as if we are doing it in all 18.42 
Neither the fate of the other 16 houses nor the significance of 
the number 18 is entirely clear, especially since the origin myth 
otherwise describes seven brothers and seven sisters. We may recall, 
though, that the first episode of Rana Bahadur’s narrative (as presented 
in Chapter 3) casts the Thangmi as the last of 18 ethnic groups to 
receive their language. Furthermore, Alexander Macdonald describes 
                                       
42 Gurus and elders in other villages such as Alampu and Lapilang also assert that 
there were 18 original houses in their villages where Bhume should be propitiated. 
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how in Tamang and Sherpa mythology, there are believed to be 18 
“pure” human lineages (1975: 202). The invocation of these original 18 
houses—which perhaps represent 18 lineages—in reference to 
Bhume’s propitiation suggests that this practice is a powerful symbolic 
means of asserting Thangmi claims to territory by demonstrating the 
special relationship between the Thangmi lineages and the area’s chief 
territorial deity. 
Since Bhume embodies the entire earth, its propitiation also 
entails calling upon the subsidiary territorial lineage deities, who are all 
in a sense Bhume’s deputies. In fact, the first part of Bhume’s annual 
propitiation ritual, as conducted in the pujari’s house before the 
officiants move to the Bhumethan itself, is identical to that for 
propitiating the minor lineage deities (such as Bahradeva, Sundrawati 
and Cyurkun) as and when families require such rituals to ensure good 
luck for their households. For this reason, in the interest of space I 
include only a single description of a propitiation ritual at the pujari’s 
house on Bhume Jatra, from which the ritual sequence and mechanisms 
of lineage deity propitiation can also be understood. However, the 
scope of the rituals are different: maintaining the patronage of one’s 
own lineage deity ensures good luck for one’s own family, while 
remaining in Bhume’s good graces is essential for the ongoing success 
of the Thangmi community as a whole. 
The pujari’s household ritual began late in the afternoon two 
days before Buddha Jayanti, when Bhume would be publicly celebrated 
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by thousands of villagers at the Bhumethan temple near Rangathali.43 
Birka Bahadur’s house was about an hour’s walk from the temple site, 
where the following evening he would wash and adorn the black rock 
in festival finery in order to prepare the deity for the coming day’s 
mass worship. But before all this, Birka Bahadur himself had to be 
empowered to perform his duties as Bhume’s priest, and his own 
house consecrated. Both of these objectives would be achieved with 
the help of several guru, who would propitiate all of their lineage 
deities in Birka Bahadur’s home, requesting their support for a 
successful Bhume puja. 
As I arrived at the pujari’s house just before 6pm, ritual 
preparations were already underway. A wooden platform was 
suspended from the ceiling in the middle of the room. From the 
bottom of the platform hung three strings of silver dollar-like dried 
leaves called baldane in Thangmi (N: totala; oroxylum indicum - 
Latin),44 which are a definitive feature of Thangmi ritual events. At the 
bottom of each string of four leaves was tied a bunch of fragrant 
uirengpati leaves used as incense. To the right of the platform sat the 
big conical piece of black rock, about 1.5 feet high, that was this 
household’s personal piece of Bhume’s presence, in fact the resting 
place of the mul deva itself: the “original” Bhume said to have been 
                                       
43 This ritual description is based on events I observed between May 16-18, 2000. 
44 See Turin (2006: 711). Baldane becomes bandalek in the Sindhupalchok dialect of 
Thangmi, and the latter term is also heard frequently. 
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carried by Yapati Chuku and Sunari Aji. My research assistant Bir 
Bahadur offered his interpretation of this assertion: 
 
Although people say that Ya’apa and Sunari Ama brought this 
rock with them, what they really mean is that they worshipped 
Bhume throughout their journey by propitiating the deity 
everywhere they went. Then, upon settling in Suspa, they said, 
“Now we will make this our Bhume”, so that others could also 
worship the deity and that responsibility was no longer theirs 
alone. Then, once they passed away, people said, “Ya’apa and 
Sunari Ama brought this Bhume with them”. 
To the deity’s left was a small metal dais atop which sat two smaller 
black rocks, also ringed by a necklace of coins. Above the whole setup, 
metal trisul (N), small tridents that serve as one of the deity’s symbols, 
were suspended from the roof rafters.45 
Earlier this afternoon, the pujari, who must fast for the duration 
of the ritual, had washed and purified the deity alone—no one else is 
allowed to observe this process. Now, Birka Bahadur doused the rock 
with water, then with milk, sandalwood-infused oil, and honey. Finally, 
he sprinkled it with uirengpati dipped in water, and adorned it in red 
and yellow powder, a necklace of coins, and silver “glasses” where the 
eyes might be imagined. 
The pujari now sat in front of the brightly-colored rock 
fashioning a set of seven thurmi from the wood of the uskul tree (T; N: 
kag balayo). After scoring each peg on three sides and wrapping it in 
                                       
45 The trisul is also the symbol of the Hindu deity Shiva, often known as Mahadev to 
the Thangmi. Indeed, Thangmi gurus often refer to the deity Mahadev, whom they 
equate with Bhume, in an example of the well-attested process in which local 
territorial deities come to be identified with specific Hindu or Buddhist deities (cf. 
Tautscher 2007). 
 388 
white string, he reinforced each nail by hammering a small piece of 
iron vertically into it. He then placed four of these pegs at each corner 
of his house, one of them at the door, and one on each of the main 
paths leading to the front and back of the house. These thurmi serve to 
ritualize the every day space of the pujari’s house as sacred and 
specifically Thangmi territory, providing a map for the deities who will 
be propitiated over the coming hours. 
Birka Bahadur then turned to making puchuk (T), sacrificial 
effigies made of grain flour similar to the torma (Tib) found in Tibetan 
ritual practice. For Bhume, five puchuk of roasted wheat flour were 
required, but the number, material and style varied depended on the 
specific deity being propitiated and other conditions of the ritual. One 
puchuk in a simple conical shape had been completed and placed on a 
large dumla (T; N: nibhara) leaf in front of the deity, and the pujari was 
now making a second one in a more elaborate style. Called takare (T), 
this one had two branches at its top and was placed in the center of 
the leaf, with two simple ones surrounding it on either side. The pujari 
explained that the branched effigy held the power of the deities 
controlled by Thangmi gurus, while the simple ones on either side 
represented lamako deva and bamriko deva—the deities of the 
Buddhist lama and the Hindu brahmin respectively. With both Buddhist 
and Hindu divine power subsumed by that of Thangmi territorial 
deities, the presence of this trio in every Thangmi propitiation ritual is 
one of the clearest material representations of Thangmi synthetic 
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subjectivity. The takare is treated with special reverence, placed at the 
center of the offering tray or leaf altar. 
As the pujari carefully garnished the top of each puchuk with a 
bright orange marigold, Suspa’s three active senior gurus and their 
personal assistants walked through the door. Junkiri, whose name 
meant “firefly” in Nepali, was the oldest at around 70. Only Rana 
Bahadur was his senior, and the two were arch-rivals. Since Rana 
Bahadur was now too frail to make it through the all night ritual and 
stayed home, Junkiri was the unchallenged chief guru.46 Panchaman 
was around 60, but despite his ritual competence, he had never had 
the charisma required to claim a devoted following, and was already 
being eclipsed in popularity by the decade-younger Guru Maila. Each 
guru represented a different hamlet and administrative ward within 
Suspa. Bhume Jatra was the chief occasion at which they met each year, 
and as they each showed their skill in propitiating and placating the 
deities, the event served as an opportunity for them to assert their 
personal power in public. There was an unspoken understanding that 
whichever guru demonstrated the greatest power at today’s event 
would be vested with the authority to settle any disputes related to 
cultural practice or other traditional domains, including land rights, 
that might arise within the local Thangmi community over the coming 
year.47 This prize seemed to be driving the competitive posturing and 
                                       
46 Due to my own close relationship with Rana Bahadur, I could never get to know 
Junkiri well on a personal level. My interactions with him were limited to public events 
like this one, since he repeatedly evaded my requests for personal interviews. 
47 This authority did not extend to the Thangmi community in India. 
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one-upmanship in the gurus’ movements as they checked the tautness 
of their drums and unpacked their bags full of ritual implements: 
thurmi, mirkang (T: tiger bone trumpet) and necklaces made of bells 
and snake vertebrae. 
As the pujari lit a small oil lamp on the high altar in front of the 
mul deva, his helpers poured a bowl of homemade millet beer (T: tong) 
for each guru. Tong is the fuel of most Thangmi rituals, providing not 
just a pleasant alcoholic buzz, but stomach-filling nourishment that 
keeps the gurus and other participants going all night. The pujari lit a 
second lamp on the lower altar, and inserted a stick of incense into 
each puchuk. He then placed two eggs on small leaves on either side of 
the lamp. 
The pre-ritual tension grew as the gurus slowly shook their 
aluminum bowls of beer to bring the settled bits of fermented grain to 
the top, polished their drum handles, and brought the audience’s 
anticipation to a fevered pitch by delaying the start of the ritual for 
almost an hour after their arrival. About 40 people were crammed into 
the single ground-floor room of the pujari’s house, bended knees and 
elbows tucked into every conceivable nook and cranny, and as the 
alcohol circulated they began clamoring for the gurus to begin the 
ritual chants that would bring the deities into the human world. 
Just before 11pm, each guru took hold of a baldane leaf in his 
right hand, closed his eyes, and began chanting. The pujari lit the 
incense stuck into the puchuk, and smoke swirled through the room. 
 391 
The first part of the propitiation ritual, called sagun totko (T: the 
consecration of the alcohol) proceeded with the following chant. 
 
With sacred water move the unmoved, with sacred earth move 
the unmoved, with the household’s mother deity, move what has 
remained unmoved by the nearby star [Venus] above the rooftop 
beam, with stalks of dry wheat move the unmoved, with the leaf 
of the brown oak move the unmoved, with the deity of the four-
cornered door, move the unmoved. 48 
With all the bamboo strips used to tie the house beams 
together, move the unmoved, being of the high places ... beings 
of the low places, with the incense of the sal tree, move the 
unmoved, with incense move the unmoved, beings of the middle 
places, with the nana leaf... 
Now our assistants must move the unmoved, Parmesvara, 
with the small and large baldane move the unmoved.49 With the 
places we have constructed for the deities on the floor and on 
the leaves, move the unmoved. With offerings of unhusked rice 
move the unmoved. 
Oh Parmesvari, move the unmoved. Move the unmoved. 
Now these deities, Bhume, Jalesvar, Kasesvar, Bisuni, Bisvakarma, 
oh Parmesvara, these deities which came from Simanghat and 
Kumanghat.50 
The deity of our necklaces, the deity of our drums, the 
deity of the baldane tree, all of these deities, move the unmoved. 
You gods who have come from Thimi, this deity of the large 
baldane, deity of the small baldane, oh Parmesvara, the Mai deity 
of the deep place. The deity of the bampa [the tall wind-blocking 
stone described in Chapter 4], Cyurkun Macha deity, Gorkha 
Macha deity, Yankate deity, the deity of the livestock shed, stay 
here under Parmesvara’s protection. 
After about half an hour of repeating these refrains, the gurus 
took a break for beer and cigarettes. The deities had been called into 
attendance, and it was now time to move on to the deva paloke. These 
                                       
48 Here I have translated the deity’s names that refer to objects or places, but left 
intact those that are untranslatable proper names. 
49 Parmesvara, Parmesvari, and Parmesvar are all epithets for the Hindu deity Shiva, 
but they literally mean “Supreme God” in Sanskrit, and here refer to Bhume. 
50 Simanghat is another pronunciation of Simraungadh. Kumangat refers to 
Kumraungadh, another Tarai town close to Simraungadh. 
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chants remind the deities of their divine responsibilities, and the 
humans of how they came to be who, what and where they are. 
The gurus slowly draped necklaces of metal bells and snake 
vertebrae over their shoulders and turned to face the Bhume rock 
directly. Each guru took a sip from a container of water ritually purified 
with the uirengpati leaves proffered by the pujari, who then threw a 
handful of mustard seed into the fire burning in the hearth at the 
center of the room to purify the space. As smoke enveloped everyone 
again, Junkiri moved to the center of the room and dipped his hand 
into the fire, scooping up a handful of ash. He began singing a 
haunting melody alone as Panchaman blew his thigh bone trumpet and 
Guru Maila anointed himself with a tika (N: ritual marking on the 
forehead) of ash. The pujari then gave himself a tika of ash and 
sprinkled consecrated water on the Bhume rock, while the drone of the 
mirkang echoed through the room. Just before midnight, Guru Maila 
began to chant. 
 
Move, move, while moving bring [the deities], hai, while moving 
[in all directions] bring [the deities]. Hai, the deities’ congress is 
in session, what shall be done, how shall it be done? All the ritual 
items are also present, what shall be done, how shall we do it? 
Having said this, lau hai, now what is found all over the earth? 
Barja guru went to Martelok to wander around and see 
what was there. I sent him to Martelok, and he found that there 
were no plants or jungle there. He found that there was no earth 
or forest there. 
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There were also no trees, also no water, they said. The 
deities said: what to do? how shall we do it? Saying this, Mahadev 
pulled some earwax out of his ear.51 
The demon Madhukaite came into being from [Mahadev’s] 
earwax.52 [The deities] said: what shall be done? how shall it be 
done? This [demon] sat unmoving on the earth. [The deities] 
said: what shall be done? how shall it be done? 
[The deities] said: let’s kill him. Entering the water, 
[Mahadev] created Jalesvar, Kasesvar, Bisuni, and Bisvakarma 
deities. They also created a sword with a sharp blade. Lo, now 
let’s kill the demon Madhukaite with the sword [they said]! 
The demon’s head became [the peaks of] Himalchuli and 
Gaura Parbat. His blood became the water. His flesh became the 
mud. His bones became the rocks. His fat became the sand. 
La, now what is to be done? How shall it be done? said [the 
deities]. Lai, now there is still no sacred water. They said: go to 
Chukur Gumba and sit in meditation there for seven days and 
seven nights.53 
What business have you come on, what kind of business 
have you come on? said [the lamas of Chukur Gumba]. You must 
give me sacred water, said [Barja Guru]. They gave him sacred 
water, they also sent him with hail stones, they sent all the 
sacred water. 
They also sent hail stones. Now, what is to be done, how 
shall it be done? said [the deities]. With the sacred water lakes 
were also made. Bandu Pokhari also came into being, the kali-
kath tree also came into being, it is said. Ragat Pokhari [Blood 
Lake] also came into being, Dudh Pokhari [Milk Lake] also came 
into being. 
The deities said: Now what is to be done? How shall it be 
done? We’ve made all the sacred water, but now there remains 
no bushes or jungle, they said. Now with this sacred cow’s dung 
...make a small lake on Sumeru Parbat, make a small lake [the 
deities said to Barja Guru]. Covering [the lakes] with cow dung 
(N: gobar) for seven days and seven nights, on the seventh day 
[they] saw that bushes and jungle had appeared, seeds had also 
appeared. These were planted all over the earth. 
                                       
51 Here the singular creator deity is known as both “Barja Guru” and “Mahadev”. 
“Barja” has resonances with the “bajra/vajra” thunderbolt imagery of Mahayana 
Buddhism, while as described above, the second term has Hindu resonances: 
Mahadev is one of Shiva’s manifestations. Thangmi gurus use the two names 
interchangeably. 
52 In some tellings this demon is called Markepapa instead of Madhukaite. 
53 Gumba is a variation on the Tibetan gompa, which is usually translated as 
“monastery”, although it literally means simply “place of meditation”. 
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In the place where white leaves fell, white mud appeared. 
In the place where red leaves fell, red mud appeared. In the place 
where black leaves fell, black mud appeared. 
The deities said: ahai, now what is to be done, how should 
it be done? Now all over the earth, everything has been made, 
they said... 
Chanting, the deities said, ‘Now what is to be done, how 
shall it be done?’ and from the mountains to the plains they went 
playing the drum. 
The deities said, we’ve also held the divine congress, we’ve 
also gathered all of the ritual items, we must create humankind. 
Shiva guru, Barma Guru and Vishnu guru sat together and made 
a gold [man] and a silver [man], but he did not speak... 
From this point on, as humankind is created and differentiated 
along ethnic lines, Guru Maila’s paloke chants more or less converge 
with those of Rana Bahadur as recounted in Chapter 3. The key theme 
to note here is that by killing the demon, the deities imbue the 
surrounding territory with evidence of their divine power: every rock, 
every bit of mud is a testament to the victory of deity over demon.54 
The ongoing presence of these deities is felt deeply by the Thangmi 
individuals who depend upon the land for their livelihoods—that is, the 
majority of Thangmi in Nepal. Propitiation rituals for Bhume and other 
lineage deities are crucial opportunities for the human community to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the divine powers within whose domain 
they live. 
After chanting the entire paloke, which recounts the history of 
the Thangmi up until their settlement in Rangathali, Guru Maila and the 
others took an extended break. It was now after 1am, and the audience 
                                       
54 This is a common mythic element across the Himalayas. I discuss this theme in 
greater detail in Chapter 7. 
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was beginning to yawn. They snapped to attention as the gurus 
signaled that they were about to begin the next ritual component, the 
jokhana (N: divination), essentially a ritual horoscope for the coming 
year. In lineage deity propitiations, the results of the jokhana apply 
only to the individual family in question, but during Bhume puja the 
predictions concern the entire Thangmi community. They are therefore 
of great importance, since any instructions that the deities might give 
for averting disaster must be carefully heeded by Thangmi everywhere.  
As the gurus began to go into trance to channel the deities and 
receive their spiritual forecast for the year, everyone present crowded 
around closely so as to hear whatever pronouncements might be made. 
Junkiri’s breathing was punctuated by increasingly sharp cries as his 
eyes rolled back in his head, and he shook with the force of possession 
as the deity entered him. The other gurus became similarly possessed, 
but Bhume chose to speak through Junkiri, whose seniority had clearly 
trumped the other two. For several minutes Junkiri emitted a series of 
unintelligible grunts and cries. Slowly the sounds began to shape into 
words, and a single phrase emerged, repeated over and over: “I have 
been tied”.55 
The pujari and the gurus’ assistants looked perplexed. People 
pushed and shoved to get closer to Junkiri so they could hear the 
divine words themselves. “I’ve been tied, I’ve been tied,” he moaned, 
his voice sometimes rising to an eerie wail. Everyone looked at each 
                                       
55 Original Nepali: Malai banneko. 
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other, seeking some insight to make sense of this obtuse utterance. 
After about ten minutes of confusion, the pujari raised his eyebrows. 
“Eh heh ...” he said with the rising intonation of a question. “Bhume 
must be upset that we have built walls around its place of worship in 
Suspa. The god feels tied down, it cannot move.” 
 
A Captive God 
The previous year, Gopal, a Thangmi schoolteacher in upper Suspa, 
and an active member of the then newly unified Nepal Thami Samaj, 
had launched a campaign to raise funds to build a temple building 
around the Bhumethan rock near Rangathali. This Bhume Jatra was the 
building’s inaugural year, the first time that the deity would be set 
apart from the outside world. With stone walls, wooden rafters, a 
yellow aluminum roof topped with a monastery-like steeple, and an 
elaborate wooden door, the new structure looked appropriately 
synthetic, with stylistic allusions to both Hindu and Buddhist Himalayan 
temple architecture (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). Despite the temple’s 
hefty price-tag of over 500,000 rupees (approximately $6280 at 2008 
rates) and 742 days of villager-manpower, Bhume apparently remained 
unimpressed. However grand the temple built in its name was, the 
deity did not, it seemed, appreciate being walled in, or tied down, to its 
present location. 
Junkiri’s jokhana gave voice—and not just any voice, but the 
voice of Bhume itself—to an existing sense of frustration among many 
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villagers about what had happened to the Bhumethan. Although some 
had agreed with Gopal’s logic that spending money and time on such a 
structure showed their great devotion to the deity, and would also help  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Birka Bahadur at the Suspa Bhumethan before the new 
building was erected, May 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 New Suspa Bhumethan temple building at its inauguration, 
May 2000 
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make the Thangmi practice of Bhume worship more recognizable to 
non-Thangmi observers, many Thangmi with whom I spoke felt that to 
enclose Bhume was to challenge the very source of the deity’s power. 
After all, Thangmi came to make offerings to the rock itself, embedded 
in the earth, not icons or statues installed in a temple. My hostess in 
Balasode expressed her opinion on the matter as follows: 
 
For us Thangmi, Bhume is part of the earth. We are different 
from Hindus and Buddhists because we do not need temples to 
know that Bhume is with us. Now the temple that they have built 
makes our Bhume small and makes it seem like any other Hindu 
deity. The walls separate us from Bhume. I do not want to go 
inside there now. That temple belongs to Gopal, not to Bhume or 
common Thangmi people like us. 
Her statement suggests how building walls around Bhume set up 
a stark division between sacred and profane, which was at odds with 
the way in which many Thangmi conceptualized Bhume as at once part 
of the earth and part of themselves. To people who shared this view, 
the temple building seemed to aspire to Hindu mores, not to 
encourage Thangmi practice.56 
When I asked Gopal about the rationale behind building the 
temple, he told me that the walls served to keep non-Thangmi out, 
since the Thangmi needed to act fast to protect Bhume against 
encroaching Hinduization. In his desire to preserve an exclusively 
Thangmi space, his logic appealed to the very exclusivity of Hinduism 
                                       
56 Here it is worth recalling that Gopal, the organizer of the temple building project, 
was the same man who had authored the 1990 pamphlet cited in Chapter 5 which 
advocated a path to progress which entailed the disavowal of “wild” Thangmi 
practices in favor of a Hinduized modernity. 
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itself. The concept of barring outsiders had not previously been a 
feature of Thangmi practice, which had been conducted in outdoor 
environments open to all. The grain-flour puchuk effigies consecrated 
by Bhume during the course of the ritual had also always previously 
been distributed to local Bahuns and Chhetris as well, as a blessing 
from the territorial deity who controlled the land which they all 
inhabited. However, Thangmi gurus were the only people empowered 
to actually mediate the human relationship with the territory’s chief 
deity. Thangmi had felt secure in their knowledge of the power 
generated by this exclusive relationship, and therefore saw no need for 
walls to protect Bhume. Putting them up was therefore a contested 
move among the local Thangmi community 
Clearly, Bhume itself was not happy with this state of affairs and 
expressed those sentiments through Junkiri’s jokhana. As the guru’s 
trance subsided and he stopped shaking, whispers echoed across the 
room. People were discussing how to placate the angry deity. Some 
were upset that Bhume did not appreciate the great effort the 
community had invested in building the new temple as a sign of 
devotion. Others felt vindicated by the deity’s protest and proposed a 
special propitiation ritual to apologize and ask the deity how the 
community could make good. Still others suggested that they simply 
needed to explain to Bhume that the temple building was a form of 
development, which would strengthen the position of the Thangmi 
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community vis-à-vis local caste-Hindu families, ultimately ensuring 
Bhume’s position as the chief territorial deity of the region. 
These deliberations soon gave way to the desire to conclude the 
ritual at hand. It was just after 4am, and a chicken was brought in for 
sacrifice. The pujari had raised the chicken for a full year especially for 
today’s occasion, and once its blood had been sacrificially spilled, a 
new chicken would immediately be designated for next year’s ritual. 
The pujari handed the chicken to Junkiri, who in one deft motion 
ripped off its head and sprayed its blood across the ritual altar in front 
of the gurus. Then, individuals had the opportunity to present their 
own chickens as offerings to the deities, and a long line of people 
clutching chickens quickly formed, stretching out through the door 
into the courtyard. 
Finally, just after 6am, one of the gurus’ assistants removed the 
bamboo tray full of puchuk effigies from the room. Several of them 
were splattered with blood. Walking away from the house, he crossed 
the nearest small stream and broke the puchuk into small pieces. He 
returned one piece to the pujari’s house, where the pujari must 
consume the consecrated offering, before anyone else may touch it. 
The guru’s assistant then found a child to take another piece of the 
puchuk across the river as an offering to the families there of all ethnic 
affiliations. Finally, he distributed additional puchuk pieces to the 
assembled audience in the immediate area of the pujari’s house. The 
preliminaries to the Bhume ritual conducted at the pujari’s house had 
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now come to an end, and everyone returned home to sleep for much of 
the day before arriving at the Bhumethan itself for the main event later.  
 
Bhume as Cultural Performance 
While the gurus slept, a mass of villagers of all ages were gathering at 
the Bhumethan for an afternoon “cultural performance” (N: sanskritik 
karyakram) put on by Suspa’s youth in honor of Bhume Jatra.57 A big 
red welcome banner hung over the main entrance to the new temple 
enclosure. Tenuous electricity lines ran down to the temple from 
village houses up the hill in the hopes of illuminating a sea of tiny 
lights draped over the temple as darkness fell. 
While waiting for the gurus to arrive at the pujari’s house the 
night before, I had ventured next door to watch a village youth group 
rehearsing songs for this event. The leader of the group was Gopi, the 
pujari’s teenage son, who had written several songs in the Thangmi 
language, including one entitled “Yapati Chuku and Sunari Aji” which 
set the portion of the origin myth about the ancestral couple to music. 
The performance group’s inspiration came in large part from 
Darjeeling, in the form of the Amako Ashis cassette recorded there the 
previous year, which had been billed as “the first Thangmi language 
                                       
57 Monica Mottin’s PhD in progress on “The Politics of Performance in Nepal” (SOAS) 
shows how the category of “cultural performance” put on by “cultural groups” (N: 
sanskritik samuha) emerged as a nationalist form of expression promoted by the 
Nepali state during the panchayat era. 
 402 
cassette” and was received with great interest as it made its way to 
Dolakha with returning circular migrants. 
When I dropped into their rehearsal session, the young members 
of the group were busy editing lyrics scratched out in the margins of 
old newspapers and trying out different rhythyms on the madal, the 
long, narrow two-sided drum that is at the center of musical traditions 
all over village Nepal.58 When I asked whether they were ready for their 
upcoming performance, Gopi laughed nervously and confided that it 
was going to be the group’s debut, and in fact the first time anything 
of the sort had been performed as part of Bhume Jatra. 
While Birka Bahadur enacted Bhume’s ritual practice inside the 
Bhumethan, then, his son was at the forefront of the performance 
tradition developing outside the temple. As the pujari’s oldest son, 
Gopi was next in line to take on the responsibilities of Bhume’s annual 
propitiation. Instead of observing his father’s careful ritual 
preparations so as to learn the practice himself, however, Gopi was 
crafting performances that objectified his father’s practice and 
translated it into catchy musical refrains more accessible to a broad 
range of listeners. The pujari himself was not displeased with this state 
of affairs, taking great pride in Gopi’s performance and leadership 
abilities. The difference between father and son’s relationships with 
                                       
58 As with other objects like the ritual dagger and the shaman’s drum, the madal is 
not uniquely Thangmi, yet they claim it as an identity marker. As described in 
Chapter 5, it is at the center of the NTS logo, and Rana Bahadur once told me that 
there was a particular rhythm on the madal which would make only Thangmi go into 
trance. 
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Bhume seemed to indicate the diversification that Thangmi cultural 
production was undergoing. Here in Suspa, as in Darjeeling, practices 
were increasingly becoming performatized, as explained in Chapter 2. 
The new enclosure around the Bhumethan was also part of this 
transformation. The building introduced a stark separation between 
the space for ritual practice—which would by necessity be conducted 
inside now, in a clearly delimited Thangmi-only space in close 
proximity to Bhume itself, as embodied in the black rock—and the 
space for cultural performance, which would take place outside in a 
public, inter-ethnic environment. Perhaps effecting this separation 
between practice and performance was part of the intended objective 
of the temple building project in the minds of activists like Gopal. By 
shifting practice—the actual propitiation of the deity by the gurus—to a 
behind-the-scenes space inside the temple that was essentially hidden 
from public view, the activists could reorient public attention to the 
realm of cultural performance, over which they themselves maintained 
tacit control. Khumbalal, the senior activist who, as cited in Chapter 3, 
had written passionately about the need to wrest control of Thangmi 
culture from the gurus, had traveled from Kathmandu to attend this 
inaugural Bhume Jatra at the new temple. Along with other NTS 
activists, such as Megh Raj, he sat in the audience for the afternoon’s 
cultural performance. 
Now, at around 3pm on the afternoon of Bhume Jatra, Gopal 
began the cultural program with an amplified welcome to all who were 
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gathered there. Approximately 800 villagers crowded around a large 
rock at the base of the temple, where the oldest deity of the area—
even pre-dating Bhume—was believed to reside. Gopi’s group 
performed several song and dance numbers in the Thangmi language 
on a wooden stage, with the aid of the erratically functioning 
microphone. Then several students from the local high school 
performed another dance to a Nepali pop tune, and several students 
read out poetry they had composed for the occasion. Between each 
item, Gopal made sure to ask for additional donations to cover the 
remaining costs of the new building. Several NGOs working in the 
district made announcements about their current projects, and then 
political leaders from the main parties took their turns, along with 
Maoist guerrillas, who were present in civilian dress.59 
Finally, the program began to wind down as dusk fell. Just when 
people were beginning to stray to the edges of the Bhumethan area 
and break into small conversation groups, the sound of the gurus’ 
drums began to echo across the hills, getting closer and closer. They 
were working their way up the hill from the pujari’s house, where they 
had reconvened to have a drink, preparing to make an entrance that 
would remind the festival-goers that ritual power could not be 
expressed in its entirety trhough performance alone. 
 
                                       
59 See Shneiderman and Turin (2004) for a discussion of their presence in Dolakha at 
that time. 
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Public Propitiations: Bhume as Territorial Deity 
Heralded by an assistant carrying a white flag draped with garlands of 
baldane and the rhythmic beat of their drums, eight gurus cut through 
the crowd shortly after 8pm. Each guru was wearing a different 
brightly-colored cotton shirt in jewel hues of green, blue, red and 
purple, and a long white cotton skirt. Birka Bahadur, the pujari at 
whose house I had spent the previous night, accompanied the gurus. 
He carried a box of ornaments passed down through his family’s 
lineage, with which he would adorn the Bhume rock while the gurus 
demanded the deity’s attention. His assistant carried a cane tray 
overflowing with offerings: several small oil lamps; a takare puchuk 
made of wheat flour; one puchuk made of rice flour; a leaf plate full of 
a paste made from cooked rice; a leaf plate full of honey; one mana of 
homemade mustard oil; a metal jug of water consecrated with 
uirengpati leaves; and a metal censer filled with burning uirengpati 
incense. The bearer of these offerings had to walk carefully, since the 
oil lamps had to be kept alight; a dying flame would mean that Bhume 
was angry. 
First the group stopped at the house of Santa Bahadur, the pujari 
of upper Suspa. His house was located just below the large rock at the 
base of the Bhumethan, and was believed to be the other remaining 
house of the original 18. Santa Bahadur placed baldane atop each of 18 
puchuk that he had made. This pujari then joined the procession as 
well, as the gurus danced their way towards the Bhumethan itself. 
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The gurus stopped outside the gate of the temple building to 
give Bhume one last warning of their impending visit. As they had at 
several points on the path between lower and upper Suspa where 
minor deities were believed to reside, here the gurus sang of their 
journey and called the deities to attention with the beat of their drums. 
While the gurus held the audience’s attention outside the temple, the 
pujaris went inside to begin preparing the deity for worship.60 
First the two pujaris washed the deity with water consecrated 
with uirengpati. Then they mixed some of this water with the rice paste 
brought from Birkha Bahadur’s house to make a liquid which they 
called “milk”, and washed the black rock with the mixture. Next they 
doused the deity in honey before dressing it in the antique ornaments 
that Birka Bahadur had carried: a set of silver glasses, a silver crown, 
and several necklaces made of old coins from India.61 They placed 
flower garlands around its “head” and sprinkled handfuls of red 
powder on it. By now the only items left in the ornament box were 
three small silver umbrellas, which Birka Bahadur carefully unfolded, 
displayed before the deity for inspection, and then placed in front of 
the rock where Bhume could “see” them. Finally, the pujaris lit a new 
batch of incense and waved the censer around the temple. Once the 
                                       
60 Since the temple building carried a prohibition against non-Thangmi entering, I 
was unable to observe events that went on inside the building. The following 
paragraphs are based upon the pujaris’ and gurus’ description of what they did 
during this specific ritual event as elicited the following day. 
61 Some of these coins, like those of necklaces worn by many Thangmi women, date 
to the turn of the 20th century and are said to have been brought back to Nepal by 
early migrant laborers. 
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smell of uirengpati permeated the entire space, the two pujaris exited 
through the door and motioned to the gurus that everything was now 
prepared for their entrance. 
While the gurus sang their way into the building, moving in a 
slow serpentine line to the beat of their drums, the pujaris walked to 
the foot of the big rock below the Bhumethan where the afternoon’s 
cultural program had been held. Here lived the tore deva (T), the “old 
man” deity, who was thought to be the oldest deity in the area, 
predating even Bhume’s arrival with Ya’apa and Sunari Ama. The 
pujaris offered red powder and betel nut to this old god, lit a fresh 
batch of incense in his honor, and chanted a few lines to reassure him 
that even if Bhume no longer resided here, they would continue to 
honor him. Later, Birka Bahadur told me that he had put extra effort 
into honoring the Tore Deva this year, since he was concerned that the 
stage for the cultural program might have been erected without an 
appropriate ritual to secure the deity’s permission. 
After the pujaris finished their work, they sat back on their 
haunches with lit cigarettes to join the rest of the crowd in listening to 
the grand finale inside the temple. “Listen” is the key word: since few 
people could fit inside the temple building, most of the attendees 
could only hear what was going on rather than seeing it themselves as 
they had in the past. Murmurs of discontent about this state of affairs 
rumbled through the crowd, but many of the onlookers were too drunk 
to worry and began dancing themselves in the absence of visual access 
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to the gurus’ practice. Much of the crowd dissipated soon after the 
gurus entered the temple; there was no longer anything to see and it 
was getting towards midnight, so the revelers made their way home. 
Once inside the temple, the gurus placed the 18 puchuk in front 
of the deity, along with metal jug full of tong topped with five baldane 
leaves. As their assistants lit a small offering fire atop a combination of 
unhusked rice, husked rice, buckwheat, and clarified butter, the gurus 
sat down in a row facing the deity and began to chant. First they 
consecrated the alcohol, and then called the deity into presence. These 
chants were almost identical to those of the previous night at the 
pujari’s house, but here the only deity addressed was Bhume. The 
lineage deities who had been propitiated the previous night, and 
remained at attention now, had made it possible for the pujaris and 
gurus to arrive at the moment of Bhume’s own propitiation without 
encountering obstacles along the way, and now Bhume itself was to be 
addressed. 
Despite the personal attention, now Bhume did not “speak”: none 
of the gurus went into trance as Junkiri had the night before. When 
reviewing the sequence of events with me the following day, Guru 
Maila suggested that Bhume may have chosen to speak out at the 
relatively private preliminary ritual at the pujari’s house instead of at 
the public festival to avoid causing embarrassment, or worse, violence, 
at the larger event. As the gurus assured Bhume that they would 
protect its territory and make all of the necessary offerings over the 
 409 
coming year, they took several breaks for tong, afterwards resuming 
their chants with a fresh burst of energy. Soon there was a hint of 
dawn in the sky. Junkiri tentatively peeked his head out of the temple 
door and gestured to a line of waiting villagers that they could hand 
over their chickens for sacrifice. This was no doubt the ritual climax for 
the hardy few who were still left standing in the hazy morning light. 
Junkiri collected over 20 chickens just outside the door of the temple, 
and motioned to the other gurus and their assistants to join them. At 
his command, they each picked up a chicken, and the living birds were 
quickly reduced to a pile of carcasses whose blood was sprayed in 
front of Bhume’s image to demonstrate the community’s commitment 
to their territorial deity. 
Finally it was time to conclude the ritual, and the gurus began 
the chant to usher the deities back to their abodes. Once the deities 
had dispersed, one of the pujaris began removing Bhume’s ornaments 
and returning them to their box, while the other lit five small lamps 
with string wicks laid out in a line in front of the rock. The gurus began 
to leave the building, continuing to beg leave from the deities as they 
exited. Following the gurus, the pujaris closed the temple door behind 
them and lit five more small lamps on the threshold outside the 
building to demonstrate to the deities that they could expect no 
further offerings this year. As the gurus descended down the hill, 
heading towards the pujari Birka Bahadur’s house, they reminded the 
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deities to behave, since the offerings they had made should be 
adequate for the coming year. 
 Upon arriving at the pujari’s house once more, the gurus 
immediately began investigating a bamboo tray where several puchuk, 
including the takare, had been left during the course of the ritual at the 
Bhumethan. They were all still intact, which was taken as a sign that 
the gurus’ supplications were successful and the deity was not angry. 
The pujari rustled around in a basket at the corner of the room and 
produced five eggs, one of which was placed next to the takare, while 
four were placed on a ledge above it. 
Now it was time to prepare the graha (N), a form of ritual 
exorcism that would remove any traces of illness-causing bad luck that 
might remain in the ritual space of the pujari’s house, thereby 
metonymically purifying the entire Thami community. In a small open 
weave basket, the pujari arranged a leaf plate laden with corn kernels, 
unhusked rice, wheat, a single oil lamp, and nine one paisa coins. He 
then made one new puchuk out of wheat flour, and placed it on the 
floor in front of the bampa along with the single egg that had been 
placed next to the takare. In what Bir Bahadur joked was a game of 
“Thangmi football”, the gurus took turns gently kicking this last 
puchuk and the egg out the door, taking pains to keep both intact. 
Carrying the tray holding the takare, the pujari then circled the fire 
once, and followed the gurus out the door. He picked up the “football” 
puchuk and egg and dumped them in the basket, then topped it off 
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with the original puchuks from the tray. Finally, the pujari pulled two 
small pieces of uskul wood out of his pocket, marked them with the 
fire poker, and stuck them on top of the now disintegrating puchuk in 
the basket. The assembled company followed the pujari down to the 
river below his house and watched him dump the contents of the 
basket in the water, thereby disposing of the graha. 
It was now time to dismiss the minor lineage deities of the 
pujari’s household, who had been standing guard throughout the 
entire Bhume puja since the moment they had been called into 
presence almost 48 hours ago. The pujari provided three more 
chickens, who were promptly dispatched as a final offering to Bhume’s 
deputies. One tray of puchuk remained, and one of the eggs placed on 
the altar was cracked over them, while the others were fried in the fire 
and distributed to everyone present as a divine offering. The gurus 
began playing their drums again, telling the deities to leave the human 
realm until this time next year. With another small piece of uskul wood, 
the pujari broke of the tops of the remaining puchuk, and splattered 
chicken blood over them. Men began to line up in front of the pujari to 
receive a mark on their forehead of chicken blood and rice, while 
women received a mark of egg and rice. Each individual also received a 
small piece of the puchuk in his or her hand as a blessing from the 
deities. 
Finally, the gurus began the concluding chant of the entire ritual 
event. Blessing three bowls full of alcohol and one mana of uncooked 
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rice topped with banadalek flowers, the gurus took leave from both the 
divine and human communities, asking to be released from their duties 
(towards Bhume at least) until the following year. Still singing, the chief 
guru Junkiri carried the chicken leg from the first day’s sacrifices and 
walked out the door, followed by the other gurus, each carrying a paisa 
coin and a small oil lamp in their cupped hands. Out in the courtyard, 
they threw the coins and oil lamps on the ground and stamped them 
out with their feet. Bhume Jatra was over for the year, and everyone 
went inside to eat a feast of rice and chicken heads prepared by the 
pujari’s wife. 
 
Marking Ethnic Territory: Bhume as Identity Icon and Pilgrimage Site 
The debate over the new temple building had subsided by the time 
Bhume Jatra rolled around the following year, in 2001. Those who had 
been opposed to the building began to accept its reality as part of their 
local landscape, and the deity appeared to have been placated by an 
additional set of propitiation rituals organized some months later. 
Gopal decided to capitalize on the building’s apparent success and 
exploit its potential as a powerful political icon by using it as the site 
for a four day-long “national Thangmi conference” on the occasion of 
Bhume Jatra in 2001. With financial support from a Japanese INGO, 
Thangmi from all over Nepal and India were invited to gather in Suspa 
for Bhume Jatra. At least 20 gurus from across the Thangmi world 
participated, along with around 2000 laypeople. The objective of the 
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conference, as one participant told me, was to “discuss the differences 
between Thami culture in different areas and think about how to create 
a more unified culture”.62  
For many Thangmi from India, as well as the most far-flung 
Thangmi settlements in Jhapa and Udayapur, the occasion was their 
first opportunity to actually see the site where the Bhume which they 
had heard so much about stood. Some of the participants from India 
took photos of the new Suspa Bhumethan building home with them, 
and by 2003 this photo graced the cover of Niko Bachinte, the first 
substantial publication of the Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association (see 
Figure 6.5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Photo of Suspa Bhumethan on the cover of Niko Bachinte 
                                       
62 Further details of this conference are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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After appearing on the publication cover, the image began to pop up 
everywhere in Darjeeling: on poster-size photo prints adorning 
household walls, on invitations to BTWA events; and on certificates 
presented to participants in BTWA-organized cultural events. Despite 
the distaste with which many Thangmi in Nepal had originally viewed 
the temple building, its image quickly became iconic in India. It then 
circulated throughout the Thangmi public sphere, returning to Nepal in 
2007 on the cover of Reng Patangko, the second Thangmi language 
music cassette, which was produced in Kathmandu. 
The Bhumethan as shown on the cover of Niko Bachinte 
appeared to float in space, a free-standing architectural icon 
unmoored from its physical setting. There were no people or other 
contextualizing details to indicate the building’s location in a rural hill 
village in Nepal. The caption for the photo, which is reproduced on the 
title page of the publication, read: 
 
The Bhumethani in Suspa—the auspicious pilgrimage site of the 
Thami community. The ‘Bhumeshwor’ was set up there in 
unknown times by a historic couple from the Thami community, 
Yapati and Sunari, from Simraungadh. This temple is situated on 
an exciting hill in Suspa, to the northeast of Charikot, the district 
headquarters of Dolakha, from where it can be reached on foot 
in three hours. (Niko 2003: 1) 
This paragraph captured several characteristics of the concept of 
Thangmi territory that was emerging in India. First of all, it valorized 
the locality in which the temple was situated without mentioning Nepal 
at all. Second of all, it emphasized the migration of the ancestors to 
this location from Simraungadh. Third of all, it presented the Suspa 
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Bhumethan as a pilgrimage site to which one traveled from afar, rather 
than as the abode of a local deity intimately involved in every day life. 
The proposal to promote the Suspa Bhumethan as a Thangmi 
pilgrimage site had first been presented by Thangmi activists from 
both Jhapa and Darjeeling at the 2001 Bhume Jatra conference. Along 
with concurrent plans to build a new Bhume temple in Darjeeling, and 
renovate an existing one in Jhapa, conceptualizing the Suspa Bhumethan 
as a pilgrimage site was part of an effort to establish symbolic links 
between a set of Bhume temples to mark the contours of Thangmi 
ethnic territory, which was primarily imagined in translocal, rather than 
transnational, terms. The continuities between this set of places, each of 
which physically marked Bhume’s presence, grounded an otherwise 
transcendent notion of both deity and territory in specific, ethnicized 
locations.63 
The idea of pilgrimage was certainly not new to Thangmi in 
Nepal. Every year on the mid-summer full moon of the Nepali month of 
Bhadau (August-September), gurus and laypeople from all over the 
region made the arduous climb up to the 13,000 foot high summit of 
Kalinchok.64 This peak straddled the district border between Dolakha 
                                       
63 The relevant anthropological literature on pilgrimage is too immense to consider in 
detail here. While Turner (1974, 1978) provides the paradigmatic description of 
pilgrimage as a liminal experience with characteristics of an initiation rite, Coleman 
and Eade (2004) provide a useful overview of contemporary work in the field that 
complicates Turner’s position. Some of these arguments are discussed in further 
detail below. 
64 Some Thangmi chose other pilgrimage sites on the same day; for instance, several 
gurus from the village of Alampu went to an alpine lake called Baula Pokhari, while 
others living in villages very close to the Tibetan border went instead to Deodhunga, 
a large rock on the old, largely defunct trading path between Dolakha and 
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and Sindhupalchok, and was believed to be the abode of Kali Mai. 
Although the summit of Kalinchok played an important role in the 
Thangmi origin story—as the point from which the seven brothers shot 
their arrows to determine their future places of residence—the peak 
was considered to be a boundary marker of the outside limits of 
Thangmi territory, not an integral part of it. Kali Mai was similarly not 
conceptualized as a particularly Thangmi deity in the same manner that 
Bhume was, and the pilgrimage to Kalinchok was an inter-ethnic affair, 
with devotees from Tamang, Kirant and caste Hindu groups 
participating in large numbers.65 Gurus often told triumphant stories 
about winning competitions against shamans from other ethnic groups 
at Kalinchok, and the rare opportunity to assert their particularly 
Thangmi power in an inter-ethnic context seemed to be a large part of 
what motivated gurus to make the journey every year. Laypeople often 
recalled the exciting experiences, and diverse fellow pilgrims, they had 
encountered en route to the summit. 
For Thangmi living in the villages of Dolakha and Sindhupalchok, 
the arduous uphill journey to the summit of Kalinchok could be 
conceptualized as a pilgrimage in Victor Turner’s classic terms, 
“betwixt and between the categories of ordinary social life” (1974: 
273). However, a journey to the Suspa Bhumethan, located right in the 
                                                                                                              
Khasa/Dram. All of these pilgrimages had similar ritual forms, and all were also 
joined by a people from a range of ethnic groups. 
65 See Tautscher (2007) for a full description of the role that this pilgrimage site plays 
in Tamang practice. Miller (1997[1979] also describes a pilgrimage to Kalinchok in 
the company of caste Hindu “faith healers”. 
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midst of the most accessible Thangmi village, could only really be 
imagined as a pilgrimage in the classic sense for Thangmi who lived 
outside of the area. However, as Simon Coleman and John Eade have 
argued, perhaps the Turnerian definition of pilgrimage is too limited, 
and: 
pilgrim sites, rather than being contexts for the cultivation of anti-
structure, can provide arenas for the rhetorical, ideologically 
charged assertion of apparent continuity, even fixity, in religious 
and wider social identities. (2004: 15) 
It was in this sense that thinking of the Suspa Bhumethan itself as 
a pilgrimage site opened new possibilities for asserting Thangmi claims 
to singular authority over an ethnic territory. Emerging out of Thangmi 
activist agendas in India, the idea of Suspa Bhumethan as a pilgrimage 
site was initially articulated in a translocal idiom that downplayed the 
temple’s situatedness within the nation-state of Nepal (as in the photo 
caption cited above). At the same time, the very fact that Thangmi who 
resided outside the putative borders of Thangmi ethnic territory wanted 
to visit the Bhumethan (while they were relatively uninterested in 
Kalinchok), brought the Suspa temple, as well as the people who lived 
around it, into relationship with ideas of an exclusive ethnic territory 
articulated in relation to national and transnational regimes for 
recognizing indigeneity. 
Thangmi activists in Nepal liked the idea of Suspa Bhumethan as 
a pilgrimage site because it deemphasized the inter-ethnic, localized 
terms in which gurus asserted ethnic power at Kalinchok, resituating 
pilgrimage practice in an exclusively Thangmi environment which 
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provided evidence of singular ethnic power in terms recognizable to the 
nation-state. No specific efforts were made to stop pilgrimage to 
Kalinchok, but in public contexts NTS leaders began describing the 
Suspa Bhumethan as the only important Thangmi pilgrimage site.66 As 
Tek Bahadur, the young activist from Lapilang introduced at the 
beginning of this chapter, explained to me in early 2008, “Kalinchok is 
a place where gurus go to fight with shamans from other ethnic groups, 
it’s not so important for people like us. Bhumethan is really the place 
for younger Thangmi to go every year in order to show that this is our 
territory.” He then proceeded to tell me that in his role as JANSEEP 
coordinator, he had invited a film crew from Nepal TV to travel from 
Kathmandu to Dolakha with him in order to document that year’s 
upcoming Bhume Jatra. Tek Bahadur was not alone in representing 
participation in the Bhume Jatra festival as equivalent to undertaking a 
pilgrimage to a sacred site. Indeed, for activists who lived outside the 
bounds of ethnic territory, the Suspa Bhumethan had become sacralized 
as an easily recognizable symbol of that territory’s existence, and the 
journey to the temple—rather than simply the events once there—began 
to take on ritual qualities. For most participants in the festival, however, 
the temple was still right next door. 
One way of appropriating the symbolic power of the Bhumethan, 
even when one could not actually make the journey to Suspa, was to 
                                       
66 The Nepali term tirthayatra was often used for “pilgrimage”, but the English term 
was also commonly inserted in Nepali sentences. At the end of Chapter 4, I describe 
another kind of proposed pilgrimage site which was also referred to in English, in this 
case as a “cultural heritage site”. 
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reterritorialize Bhume elsewhere. In a phenomenon that Katia Buffetrille 
(1996) describes as “flying mountains”, there are several examples in 
which Tibetan and Himalayan territorial deities—usually identified with 
sacred mountains—are known to have been transferred from one 
physical abode to another as people themselves move from place to 
place. In Darjeeling, some Thangmi had taken the initiative to do this 
themselves, building small shrines outside their houses at which they 
propitiated Bhume in the private lineage deity sense. I interviewed two 
people who had done this, and both of them stated that only after they 
procured a metal trident that had originally been consecrated at the 
Suspa Bhumethan did they feel that their own shrines were efficacious. 
Without that physical link to the Suspa Bhumethan, the deity would not 
recognize the new shrine as its abode. 
Despite the long-standing existence of these private lineage deity 
shrines, Bhume’s presence in its communal territorial deity aspect had 
not been fully realized in Darjeeling during the time of my fieldwork. 
Instead, Thangmi Bhume propitiations were conducted at the large 
Mahakal temple above Darjeeling bazaar. Like Kalinchok in Nepal, this 
large complex was an inter-ethnic ritual site, with both Hindu and 
Buddhist shrines, as well as shrines dedicated by individual community 
and ethnic organizations for the special use of their members. In the 
earlier phase of pan-Nepali identity construction in Darjeeling, Mahakal 
had been a key site for the demonstration of ethnic unity, since in the 
absence of separate ritual spaces, every group of Nepali heritage 
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conducted its rituals there. As one member of the Thangmi community 
in Darjeeling who was in his 80s explained to me, “Bhadau Purnima is 
the biggest Thami holiday here. On that day, we have a big meeting 
and Guru Puja. We use the occasion to show our ethnic unity [with 
other Nepali groups]”. Indeed, on Bhadau Purnima, the same day of the 
calendar that Thangmi in Nepal had made their pilgrimage to 
Kalinchok, Thangmi in Darjeeling had participated in the inter-ethnic 
Guru Puja, a source of pride for many Thangmi of this elder speaker’s 
generation. 
By the time I arrived in Darjeeling, however, the era of tribal 
politics was well underway, and the inter-ethnic ritual space of Mahakal 
was no longer felt to be adequate. Along with initiating pilgrimages to 
the Suspa Bhumethan, Thangmi activists in India sought to establish a 
similarly exclusive marker of Thangmi ethnic territory in Darjeeling. A 
formal proposal requesting land and funds to build an exact replica of 
the Suspa Bhumethan building in Darjeeling was submitted to the 
municipal government in 2003. Two years later, the municipality 
approved the proposal to build the temple on a piece of land where a 
defunct Thangmi-owned jam factory stood. In August 2005, the land 
was officially deeded to the BTWA by the three brothers who had 
inherited this property from their father (who had been known as 
“Jamwala”).67 As Shova, then the BTWA secretary, told me, “Jamwala 
                                       
67 Intriguingly, the land title document states that the benefactors who are donating it 
to the BTWA are “by faith Hindu”. 
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really cared about the improvement of the Thami community. He made 
many contributions to our organization while he was alive. He would 
be very happy to know that we are finally building our own Bhumethan 
here on his land”. 
At the groundbreaking ceremony in late 2005, Latte Apa planted 
in the earth a small metal trident from the Suspa Bhumethan, which he 
had commissioned a circular migrant from Nepal to deliver.68 Some 
BTWA members questioned the need for this link to Suspa, but Latte 
Apa explained that without this physical connection, the deity might 
not recognize its new abode, and the guru was allowed to proceed. 
Many speakers at the program described how the prospect of having 
their own Bhume temple signified that the Thangmi community had 
finally “arrived”, both as Indian citizens in general and as an 
indigenous group deserving of tribal status. On the first count, having 
their own Bhumethan meant that they would no longer need to 
reference the Suspa Bhumethan in Nepal as the source of their 
immediate territorial power, thereby once and for all confirming their 
status as full Indian citizens. On the second count, they would no 
longer need to rely solely upon participation in inter-ethnic ritual 
events at Mahakal to demonstrate their relationship to Bhume through 
ephemeral practice. Instead, they could point to Bhume’s physical 
presence in the temple building as incontrovertible evidence of the link 
                                       
68 In September 2007, Shova told me that this trident had since been removed from 
the building site, since the BTWA now sought to downplay any “Hindu” aspects of 
their practice since they had been told that evidence of such might disqualify them 
from being recognized as tribal. See Chapter 7 for further details of these dynamics.  
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between ethnicity and territory not just in Nepal, but in India too—the 
foundation of an adivasi identity. 
Even before the temple building was completed, during my last 
visit to Darjeeling in late 2006, I saw that the Bhumethan construction 
site was already becoming an important communal location at which 
both Thangmi from India and Nepal gathered. The very idea of a 
Bhumethan in Darjeeling seemed to create parity between Thangmi 
from Nepal and their counterparts in India, by emphasizing their 
shared identity as inhabitants of Bhume’s domain, whatever their 
national, educational or economic status. Through the processes of 
reconceptualizing the Suspa Bhumethan as a pilgrimage site, and 
building a new Bhumethan in Darjeeling, Thangmi ritual productions of 
a transcendent ethnic territory had converged across national borders. 
Each Bhumethan simultaneously served as an anchor for a shared set 
of propitiation practices through which identity was produced at the 
local level, as well as serving as a pilgrimage site to those from far 
away, together marking the translocal whole of Thangmi ethnic 
territory. The political deployments of this territory would certainly 
differ within each nation-state framework—in Nepal, it would be used 
to make claims to an autonomous territory within a newly restructuring 
state, while in India it would be used to claim an individual tribal 
identity in contradistinction to the pan-Nepali territorial autonomy 
promised by the passage of the Sixth Schedule to India’s constitution—
but the mechanisms through which such territory was produced in 
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each location were becoming increasingly similar. For people who 
moved back and forth between Nepal and India, without necessarily 
conceptualizing their movement as pilgrimage, encountering evidence 
of Bhume’s presence everywhere they went just confirmed what they 
already knew: that it was all one village, in which Bhume was 
everywhere and nowhere at once. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Work of Social Reproduction: 
Clan Affiliations and the Life Cycle 
 
Yo parampara hoina, kam ho. 
“This is not tradition, it’s work.” 
- Ram Bahadur, Dumkot guru, of a funerary ritual in Dolakha, 2004 
 
Bhojuko kam sakera ‘meeting’ ko kam garnu parcha. 
“Now that grandmother’s work [cremation] is finished, we must have a 
meeting [literally: do the work of a meeting].” 
- Gautam, BTWA activist, at a cremation in Darjeeling, 2003 
 
This chapter explores how life cycle rituals effect the “work” of social 
reproduction across the Thangmi community. In particular, the 
marriage (T: bore) and funerary (T: mumpra) ritual cycles at once posit 
a specific quality of Thangminess as a prerequisite for their success, 
and provide a means of recognizing that quality in one’s self through 
the explicit articulation of clan affiliations.1 This quality is not based on 
an essential notion of purity embodied in idioms of blood (Clarke 
1995) or bone (Levine 1981) as is common elsewhere in the Himalayas, 
but rather in a processual concept of how one becomes Thangmi—or 
more accurately, how one does Thangminess—through participation in 
a set of rituals that are themselves synthetic in nature. This assertion 
returns to the argument made in Chapter 3 that Thangmi modes of 
self-recognition emphasize practice—“what Thangmi do”—rather than 
essence —“what Thangmi are”. Exploring how life cycle rituals work for 
                                                
1 In the Sindhupalchok dialect of Thangmi mumpra becomes mampra. Since Dolakha 
dialect has a greater number of speakers, mumpra is heard more frequently both in 
Nepal and India (see Turin 2006 for details of dialect differences), and I use this term 
throughout. 
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a range of Thangmi individuals in different locations helps to 
demonstrate how Thangminess is constructed not only in relation to 
the discursive imperatives of political recognition, but is also produced 
through the affective imperatives of spiritual recognition, even in the 
case of those Thangmi whose desire to participate in the latter is 
prompted by the former. Such individuals still have children, get 
married, and part with their dead. It is through these processes that 
they come to recognize themselves as Thangmi at the subjective level, 
in large part by articulating a clan identity through participation in life 
cycle rituals. Once engaged in, the affective dimensions of such 
practices both counter and condition political agendas. 
 In making this assertion, I engage in the long-standing 
anthropological discussion over the relationship between “structure” 
and “sentiment” in shaping ritualized behavior. As Peter Metcalf and 
Richard Huntington explain:  
The funeral material [as presented by Durkheim] makes it clear 
that emotional “effervescence” does not replace structure but, on 
the contrary, results from structure. Durkheim's approach stands 
in contrast to later debates in anthropology that saw explanations 
based on “structure” and those based on “sentiment” as mutually 
exclusive. (1991: 51) 
In particular, Metcalf and Huntington cite Radcliffe-Brown, whose 
functionalist paradigm they read as granting ritual the exclusive power 
to generate emotion in a unidirectional manner; Bloch and Parry 
(1982), whom they see as continuing this tradition by privileging the 
role of ritual over that of emotion (Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 2); 
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and Rosaldo (1989), who tends towards the other extreme with an 
analysis that “lays emphasis on the power of emotion and is 
contemptuous of mere ritual forms” (Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 3). 
Here, I follow Metcalf and Huntington’s lead by returning to a 
Durkheimian position that sees “structure” and “sentiment” as mutually 
productive, rather than mutually exclusive, and applies this 
understanding not only to ritual, but ethnicity. In other words, in my 
analysis of Thangmi life cycle rituals, I strive to understand the 
relationship between structure and sentiment—or in the terms of 
classical ethnicity theory, the relationship between instrumentality and 
affect—in producing and reproducing ethnicity through ritualized 
behavior. 
 
The habise Chant 
In 1999, I attended what was to be the first of many mumpra in the 
Dolakha village of Suspa. Over the course of my fieldwork, I observed 
ten such events, almost evenly split between Nepal and India. I quickly 
learned that for most Thangmi—regardless of their citizenship, 
educational status, or views on textuality and orality—the mumpra was 
the definitive ritual process through which their sense of belonging to 
a collective was produced in the present, and through which they were 
reassured that the collective would continue to exist in the future. 
More so than any other Thangmi ritual, the elements of the mumpra 
were remarkably similar from place to place, and guru to guru, 
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although these components themselves were of a diverse, synthetic 
nature. 
 At that first funerary ritual in Dolakha, as I entered the kerosene 
lamp-lit house for the all night habise (T) ritual which prefaced the 
major funerary ritual (T: jekha mumpra) that would take place the 
following day, I was surprised to hear several voices rise in unison to 
chant the refrain om mani padme hum. I recognized this as the 
Buddhist mantra of the deity Avalokiteshvara (or Chen Rezig in 
Tibetan), which I had heard frequently in Tibetan contexts.2 I did not 
expect to find it in this Thangmi ritual presided over by Guru Maila. In 
previous conversations with me, this guru had ardently advocated 
“Thangmi dharma” as a distinctive religion that could not be 
adequately described in terms of Buddhist, Hindu, or even Kirant 
religion. When he finally took a break from chanting to have a sip of 
beer, I asked Guru Maila why he was using a Tibetan Buddhist mantra. 
“What are you saying?” responded Guru Maila accusatorily. “It’s not 
Tibetan or Buddhist, it’s Thangmi ritual language.” Surely he was aware 
of the mantra’s Tibetan origin, I countered. “Well of course, Tibetan 
and Tamang lamas use this too,” he said. “But when we chant it, the 
language becomes Thangmi, otherwise the spirit of the dead person [T: 
sidumi] wouldn’t understand it. Isn’t that obvious?”3 
                                                
2 See Studholme (2002) for a discussion of this mantra’s origins and meanings. 
3 Guru Maila here used the Thangmi term sidumi, which literally means “dead person” 
or “deceased”. Thangmi use this interchangeably with masan, derived from the Nepali 
mosan, as an umbrella term to refer to the whole of the deceased’s spiritual 
substance, or as Metcalf and Huntington put it, the “homomorphic counterpart of the 
deceased” (1991: 86). The Berawan soul that Metcalf and Huntington describe 
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I suddenly felt terribly embarrassed. I had been trying to reduce 
everything I encountered to one or the other relevant great traditions, 
just as earlier ethnographers must have done when they concluded 
that the Thangmi, “do not have any exclusive ritual worth mentioning” 
(Subba 1993: 185) because most of their ritual elements seemed 
familiar from Hindu and Buddhist contexts. The fact that the habise 
mantra had a clearly identifiable Tibetan cognate did not mean that it 
was “Tibetan” in any essential sense, just as the fact that Guru Maila 
was addressed as lama bonpo in his role as funerary priest (see 
Chapter 3) did not mean that he was a lama in the Tibetan sense.4 The 
habise mantra had its own meanings and effects within this Thangmi 
ritual context, within which it was just one of several components, 
some of which appeared Hindu in origin (like the fact that the male 
mourners all had shaved their heads), others which appeared Buddhist 
(like the habise mantra), and still others which seemed distinctively 
Thangmi, such as the reconstruction of the deceased’s body from a 
range of every-day food items. According to Guru Maila, the soothing 
repetition of the habise mantra gave the spirit notice to prepare its self 
for the transformations it was to undergo during the mumpra the 
following day, while also providing reassurance it would be well cared 
                                                                                                                                       
changes its nature and manifestations at different points in the funerary ritual cycle, 
while in the Thangmi context, the sidumi is perceived as a whole, but different 
aspects of it are addressed by each phase of the mumpra. Here, I use the term 
English “spirit” when referring to the sidumi as a whole. 
4 Andras Höfer cautions against this kind of reductionism in the analysis of Tamang 
oral texts: “Etymological meanings serve to throw some light on the sources and the 
development of Tamang oral tradition, rather than to ‘correct’ present meanings as 
given by the informants” (1999: 234-235). 
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for during the process. As will be discussed in further detail below, 
such explanations fit well within a van Gennepian-Hertzian schema 
that identifies separation, transition, and incorporation as the primary 
objectives of mortuary ritual (Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 130). 
For a moment, Guru Maila’s explanation that the mantra had to 
be Thangmi so that the spirit could understand it made perfect sense 
to me—indeed, how could a Thangmi spirit be expected to understand 
a language not its own? In the harsh light of day the next morning, 
however, Guru Maila’s logic appeared utterly tautological. If this 
mantra, which even the guru acknowledged had non-Thangmi 
antecedents, became Thangmi in the ritual context simply because the 
spirit already was, what actually constituted the spirit’s Thangminess? 
How did we know that the spirit was not something else, or that other 
forms of ritual or language would not work equally well to dispatch it 
to the realm of the ancestors? 
 
Clan Identities, Marriage and Death 
Over time, I came to understand that the qualifications to become a 
Thangmi ancestor in death were established by the possession of a 
Thangmi clan identity in life, which was explicitly affirmed at the time 
of marriage. Before marriage, ethnic identity was seen as relatively 
flexible, particularly (although not exclusively) in the case of women. 
An individual’s Thangminess therefore had to be publically articulated 
through the assertion of his or her clan identity during the marriage 
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ritual cycle, which often took several years to complete. By the time of 
death, however, possibilities for alternative identities had been 
foreclosed, and in order to be efficacious—to accomplish its “work”, to 
use the colloquial metaphor that Thangmi regularly used to describe 
this particular ritual process—the funerary rites had to take place 
within a bounded Thangmi frame of reference. These parameters took 
shape between the nodal points of the guru himself, the clan members 
and out-clan affinal relatives required for certain ritual tasks, the 
household in which the ritual took place, and the ritual language used 
to invoke the spirit’s presence, all of which could only be efficacious if 
they were in themselves Thangmi. The objective of bore marriage 
rituals, then, was to socially validate couples as legitimate reproducers 
of Thangminess at the individual level (often after the biological fact of 
reproduction, since marriage rituals were commonly completed long 
after children were born), while the mumpra’s objective as funerary rite 
was to create Thangmi ancestors and attach them to Thangmi territory, 
thereby guaranteeing the persistence of Thangminess at the communal 
level. Clan affiliations facilitated the relationship between these two 
levels of identity. 
Unlike that of funerary rituals, the form of marriage rituals varied 
substantially from place to place as well as over time, and had been 
particularly influenced by normative discourses and practices of gender 
and sexual propriety in both Nepal and India. Still, despite the 
differences in ritual practice at each juncture of location and history, 
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the ritual objectives of both marriages and funerals, and  the particular 
notion of Thangminess that they entailed, remained fairly constant. As 
Hertz famously noted, the similarity between marriage and death rites, 
“expresses a basic analogy”, in that both bring about a fundamental 
change of status, in which, “transition from one group to another, 
whether real or imaginary, always supposes a profound renewal of the 
individual” (2004ƒ[1907]: 209). However, I suggest that within the 
Thangmi context, funerals are accorded greater priority than marriages, 
perhaps for much the same reasons that Metcalf and Huntington 
describe for the Berawan—in short, that in a system with little status or 
rank differentiation, mortuary rites provide the most concrete means of 
reproducing sociality (Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 150). Like the 
Berawan, the Thangmi do not have “a rigid system of prescribed rank” 
and it is not “possible to specify the status of a child”, so mortuary 
rituals provide a social concreteness that weddings cannot match 
(Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 150). 
 
What Makes a Thangmi Soul? 
Thangminess appeared to be understood as a specific, embodied 
quality, but one whose existence could only be fully validated through 
participation in the life cycle rituals that prompted its self-recognition. 
This quality of Thangminess was not necessarily present from birth, 
since in many cases it was never ritually affirmed until marriage, at 
which time a clan identity could be assigned by a guru if it had not 
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been inherited from one’s father or mother (i.e. if one was not in fact 
“Thangmi” by descent). Once an individual’s clan affiliation had been 
made explicit through the rituals of marriage, this identity could not be 
easily rejected.5 All of this held true even for those individuals most 
assimilated to mainstream pan-Nepali practices in Darjeeling—even 
the Tumsong tea plantation family, for example, had passed on 
knowledge of their clan name through otherwise increasingly 
Hinduized generations. The very ability to state their clan affiliation 
marked them as Thangmi at some level (to themselves and others), 
even though they did not maintain all of the associated ritual practices 
which would have brought about a greater sense of self-recognition as 
such. Accordingly, many members of the family were strongly 
conflicted about their simultaneous possession and dispossession of 
Thangminess. 
 In the introduction to a recent compendium on the anthropology 
of death, Antonius Robben asks, “How often do deaths in the personal 
sphere or in the field remain unreported?” (2004: 13). He continues to 
suggest that such personal experiences may deeply influence 
individual anthropologists’ interpretations of death rites within their 
chosen ethnographic domain, citing in particular the probable effects 
                                                
5 This begs the question of what happens to people who never marry. This was an 
extremely small percentage of the adult Thangmi population, since there was no 
tradition of religious asceticism, and marriage—at least for some time period, even if 
it was followed by divorce—was the expected life path for both men women. I 
therefore never observed a mumpra for an unmarried individual, but I was told by 
several guru that it would diverge substantially from the usual ritual practice for a 
host of reasons, since there would also be no affinal relatives or sons to act as the 
primary mourners, and this would affect way that ritual space was conceptualized. 
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of Malinowski’s mother’s death on his interpretation of Trobriand 
mourning, and Renato Rosaldo’s well-known shift in interpreting 
Ilongot grief in the wake of his wife Michelle’s death (Robben 2004: 
13). In my case, the death of my 96 year-old grandmother, who passed 
away in Israel in 2004 while I was conducting fieldwork in Darjeeling, 
led to a key sent of insights about how Thangminess was constituted 
through a life-long set of ritual practices which occasioned self-
recognition. I had been very close to my grandmother, and since it was 
logistically impossible for me to travel to the funeral in time, I wanted 
to mark her passing in some way. I asked Latte Apa if he could conduct 
a mumpra for my grandmother. The request was a genuine one on my 
part—like many Thangmi laypeople, I was quite taken by Latte Apa’s 
charismatic personality as a ritual officiant, and had imagined that just 
as I had often seen Buddhist lamas conduct memorial rituals for the 
deceased relatives of Western friends in Kathmandu, Latte Apa could 
conduct a mumpra for my grandmother. Reasoning that, “funerals are 
concerned more with the living than the dead” [V. Turner 1967: 8, 
citing Radcliffe-Brown]), I imagined that the fact that the mumpra 
would be meaningful to me within the context of my research on 
Thangmi ritual would make it worthwhile, even though neither my 
grandmother nor I were Thangmi. Furthermore, since the main 
mumpra typically took place several days, weeks or months after the 
body was cremated, I thought that it would not be a problem to 
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conduct one in a situation where the actual body of the deceased was 
oceans away. 
 Both of these assumptions turned out to be misguided. Latte Apa 
listened to my request carefully. “You must be suffering now that your 
grandmother has died, we all experience that suffering when one of 
our own goes,” he said. “But I need to think about it for a little while. 
Can you come back tomorrow?”. 
 The next day I made my way back down the slippery path to his 
one-room wooden house. He was sitting cross-legged on the bed. “Ah 
hah, here you are,” he said, “I have been waiting for you, your request 
kept me from sleeping last night since I did not know the answer right 
away. No one has ever asked me to do a mumpra outside the Thangmi 
community before.” I was surprised to hear this senior figure of 
cultural authority admit that there was something he did not know, and 
flattered by the attention he had given to the issue. “Here is the 
problem,” he said, 
 
I could do the mumpra, which might give you a feeling of 
satisfaction. But that is because you have been living with 
Thangmi people for a long time and you understand what it 
means to do a mumpra. But your grandmother, now I am sure 
she was a respectable member of her own society in her life, but 
she was not a Thangmi. She was not born a Thangmi and I do 
not think she married a Thangmi. 
He looked to me for confirmation. “True,” I said. He continued, 
 
This means that she did not belong to a Thangmi clan, and so, 
speaking truthfully, nothing about her was Thangmi. So her 
spirit, which has not yet left the world of the living, would not 
respond when I call it to come into the grains [in which the body 
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is reconstructed during the mumpra]. She would not know that I 
was talking to her. It is only for Thangmi, she would not 
understand it or know that this mumpra was for her. Since she 
never saw a mumpra in life, how would she know what it was in 
death? Anyway, her soul must be hanging around her own house, 
or maybe the house of her oldest son, that is why mumpra are 
always conducted near the house of the chief mourner.6 I am 
sure we are too far away for her soul to travel. No, I am sorry, it 
will not work, and it could even be dangerous. It could confuse 
her if somehow she heard that you were calling her—that is the 
only way I can see that she would even know to come near, since 
she does not know me or my language—but still she would not 
understand how to become an ancestor in the Thangmi way. I do 
not know what would happen to her soul if that happened, but I 
don’t think you should wish for it. What does your jat 
[ethnicity/caste] do after death anyway? I think that is what you 
should do, and I cannot do that. 
The situation had compelled Latte Apa to think carefully through his 
own ritual logic. His answer helped me understand that Thangmi 
practice, although synthetic, could not encompass the souls of those 
who did not already possess Thangminess. Contrary to my naïve 
expectations, Thangmi practice was not inclusive in the same manner 
as Buddhist practice seemed to be; rather it was more similar to my 
native Judaism in its exclusivity than I had previously understood.7 
Unlike the universalizing tradition of Buddhism, which incorporated 
new adherents without regard to their background, like Hinduism, both 
the Jewish and Thangmi religious systems for the most part limited 
access to those who possessed a specific internal quality which defined 
                                                
6 Here I translate the Nepali term atma as “soul”. 
7 The fact that like Jews, the Thangmi consider the consumption of pork taboo (in 
contrast to their Kirant neighbors), had already led to jokes between me and Thangmi 
friends about being each other’s “lost tribe”. 
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them as already part of that system.8 However, both allowed 
“conversion” in the context of marriage, at which point Thangminess 
could be conferred through the assignment of a clan identity and 
participation in the marriage rituals themselves, as we shall see below. 
I shared with Latte Apa my rudimentary knowledge of Jewish funerary 
practices, and agreed with him that some approximation of this would 
be more suitable for my grandmother than a Thangmi mumpra. 
 
Thangmi Clans: Parallel Descent in Theory and Practice 
 
In Rangathali Ya’apa and Sunari Ama  had seven sons and seven 
daughters. But there was no one for these sons and daughters to 
marry, except each other, which was impossible since they were 
brother and sister. So Ya’apa and Sunari sat down to discuss the 
situation. They decided to assign each of the children separate 
clans, after which they could marry each other. They gave arrows 
to their sons and held a shooting event. Wherever each son’s 
arrow landed, that place or thing would become his clan name. 
Then they went to see what kind of work each daughter was 
doing, and that became her clan name.9 
                                                
8 There has been much discussion over whether “Jewishness” is a religious or ethnic 
identity. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jewish_identity (accessed November 9, 
2008; although I do not generally rely on Wikipedia, here I simply want to provide an 
accessible portal to the popular debate over these issues). One could ask the same of 
“Thangminess”, and in my mind, the answer is comparable: both are simultaneously 
religious and ethnic identities, with the balance between the two dependent on 
political, historical and individual particularities which vary contextually. In both 
situations, the ethnic aspect of the identity is marked in large part by religious 
and/or ritual symbolism (although not exclusively, and for both groups economic 
status and stereotypes are probably the next most important set of markers), even 
for individuals who do not participate extensively in the practices from which those 
symbols derive (such as myself). A more systematic comparison of the identity that is 
often expressed as “culturally Jewish” in the US—which leaves unstated the presumed 
opposite against which it is defined, the “ritually Jewish”—and what we might call 
“cultural Thangminess”, particularly in India, could be worthwhile. 
9 I am grateful to David Holmberg for suggesting that the natural and domestic 
objects from which clan names derive might be conceptualized as totems. 
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As presented in Chapter 6, this description of the origin of Thangmi 
clans is part of the paloke that gurus chant in some form on all major 
ritual occasions. The mythic episode presented here functions as a 
sociological schema in the Lévi-Straussian sense (1987[1973]: 163), as 
it is one of the most widely discussed portions of the origin myth 
among Thangmi everywhere, and is often used as the basis for 
contemporary identity claims. 
 The myth suggests that the entire raison d’etre of the clan 
system is to remove the stigma of incest from the inevitable marriages 
of brothers to sisters. However, this problem does not become evident 
until the children have reached marriageable age, so before that time 
there is no clan system. In contemporary practice, those children born 
to Thangmi parents are recognized as having an incipient clan 
affiliation at the time of birth based on descent from their mother or 
father depending on their gender, but still these memberships are only 
made socially explicit and meaningful at the time of marriage.10 
 The myth also crucially outlines a system of parallel descent, in 
which men and women have separate clan affiliations, which they pass 
on to their same-sex children.11 This means that opposite sex siblings 
                                                
10 Further research is necessary on the rituals conducted for those who die in an 
unmarried state. All of the mumpras I witnessed were for married individuals. 
11 The term parallel descent seems to have been coined by Davenport (1959: 579). 
Systems that fit this description are rare anywhere in the world, but variations on the 
theme have been described for the Apinaye of Brazil (Maybury-Lewis 1960); the 
Quechua of Peru (Isbell 1978); the Ainu of Japan (Sjöberg 1993: 68); and the Ömie of 
Papua New Guinea, although in this case the author prefers the term “sex-affiliation” 
(Rohatynskyj 1997). In addition, the practice of serfdom in historical Tibet has been 
characterized as having an element of “parallel descent”, as Goldstein explains: “all 
laymen and laywomen in Tibet were serfs (Mi ser) bound via ascription by parallel 
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with the same biological parents can never be of the same clan, since 
they inherit their clan identity from their same-sex parents. This 
makes it sound as if the practice of clan exogamy in choosing marriage 
partners—which is shared by many Himalayan ethnic groups—would be 
very easy, since all men and women are already members of different 
clans. To the contrary, it becomes more complicated, since the clan 
affiliations of both the potential marriage partner and his or her sisters 
or brothers are considered, and ideally there should not be any shared 
clan affiliations through either the male or female line for seven 
generations.12 This suggests that although clan affiliation passes 
primarily from same-sex parents to children, it is not entirely bounded 
by gender. 
 Similarly, in theory, women should inherit and use their mother’s 
clan name exclusively, but in reality women often identify themselves 
by their father’s, and in some cases, husband’s, clan name as well 
(while men almost never invoke their mother’s or wife’s clan name). 
Such patterns may be relatively recent, as I found that knowledge of 
female clans in particular, but male clans as well, was rapidly 
disappearing or being redeployed in new ways in both Nepal and 
                                                                                                                                       
descent to a particular lord (dPon-po) though an estate, in other words sons were 
ascribed to their father’s lord but daughters to their mother’s lord” (1971: 15). 
However, it is unclear if this economic form of “descent” is linked to other aspects of 
clan identity or not. More detailed comparison of the Thangmi parallel descent 
system with others elsewhere in the world would be a productive avenue for future 
research. 
12 I am unable to describe the Thangmi kinship system in detail here. See Turin 
(2004b, 2006a: Chapter 2.7) for a full description with charts. 
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India.13 The details of these transformations will be described at the 
end of this section; first I wish to focus for a moment on the range of 
male and female clan names, their meanings and their geographical 
distribution. 
 
Ya’apa then told his seven sons and daughters [who were now 
married to each other] to migrate to different parts of this area. 
In order to decide where they would each go, the seven brothers 
climbed to the top of Kiji Topar [“Black Summit”, the Thangmi 
name for Kalinchok], where they held a second archery contest. 
Each brother followed his arrow and went to live with his wife 
wherever it landed. The places were as follows [by descending 
order of the age of the sons who settled there]: Surkhe, Suspa, 
Dumkot, Lapilang, Kusati, Alampu, and Kuthisyang. 
Just as every guru has his own paloke, every Thangmi village is said to 
have its own clans, and just as the complexity and inconsistency of the 
paloke can be frustrating to those who seek to standardize them, so 
can the wide array of clan names. In short, although certain clan names 
are found in several locations, there are as many that are found only in 
specific places, and still others which are compound combinations of 
two terms which are found separately elsewhere. There are also several 
names which appear to be etymologically similar, but have different 
pronunciations across dialect zones. There is not a clear bipartite 
division of society into two supra-clans, as Holmberg (1989) describes 
for a western Tamang locale in the Himdung and Dimdung, nor is there 
any clear sense of status hierarchy between the clans, which are 
                                                
13 Already in 1978, Peet stated that, “Whether at one time there were also female 
lineages is hard to determine. Clearly all informants agree that there were originally 
named female kin groups, but their exact form and function could not be 
remembered” (229). 
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different in each village.14 If the mythical migrations described in the 
origin story are grounded in historical reality, these regional 
differences may be explained by the fact that the inhabitants of each 
area are descended from the clan that settled there, especially if the 
early Thangmi practiced patrilocal marriage, as they do today and few 
men from other clans were brought in. Over time, the population might 
have expanded through group-exogamous marriage, with new clans 
emerging in response to inheritance disputes and other social 
fractures. Man Bahadur, a well-respected figure in Chokati, a 
Sindhupalchok village not included in the list of the original seven 
settlements, where clan names differ substantially from those found 
elsewhere, explained that, “Over time, brothers leave their natal 
villages due to inheritance problems, and in this way, the clans travel 
and also transform as new lineages are established.” 
 Such transformations are also common in India, where Thangmi 
from different parts of the Nepal have met and married over several 
generations. For this reason, one finds the most eclectic and dense 
range of clan names within a small geographical region in Darjeeling, 
where Thangmi who trace their heritage to different villages in Nepal 
are familiar with different sets of clans. However, membership is 
                                                
14 The authors of Nan Ni Patuko assert that at least in Lapilang, the three clans of 
Markebhot, Sansari and Akyangmi, “performed ritual duties for the other Thamis and 
are dependent on others for a living” (Patuko 2054 VS: 4), a statement which is 
repeated in Thami Samudaya (Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 20). None of my data suggests 
that this is the case in current practice, although it may have been at some point in 
the past. Several guru and laypeople to whom I read this statement to inquire about 
its veracity dismissed it as the fantasy of activists in Nepal who wanted to appear 
more “modern” (i.e. more “Hindu”) by asserting that the Thangmi had a caste system. 
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concentrated in a few clans, since early migrants often came to 
Darjeeling through kinship connections, and therefore certain clans 
were over-represented while others were under-represented. 
 For all of these reasons, it is pointless to provide an exhaustive 
list of all of the clan names attested to in different locations; several of 
the Thangmi publications present such information, and there is little 
to be gained from repeating the exercise.15 Instead, I take the clan 
names most commonly found in the Damarang and Pashelung areas of 
Suspa-Kshamawati VDC, Dolakha, as a single example for further 
analysis. I choose this particular set of clan names because I worked 
most extensively in this locale, and therefore had the opportunity to 
discuss the details at length with several laypeople and gurus, 
including Rana Bahadur and Guru Maila. According to these 
informants, the original clans, seven each, male and female, were as 
follows: 
 Male      Female 
 akal akyangmi    budati 
 kyangpole akyangmi   yante siri 
 areng akyangmi    khatu siri 
 dumla akyangmi    calta siri 
 danguri akyangmi    alta siri 
 mosanthali akyangmi   khasa siri 
 jaidhane akyangmi16   bampa siri 
All of these names have clear, commonly known etymologies in the 
Thangmi language, with the exception of the final male clan, jaidhane, 
                                                
15 See, for example Reng (1999: 26-27). 
16 Other male clans found in this area, but not considered to be among the “original” 
seven, were budapere, dungsupere and saiba akyangmi. Two further clans roimirati 
(male) and apan siri (female) will be discussed below. 
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the meaning of which remains a subject of conjecture. Several of the 
male clans are traceable to the terms for specific plants in which the 
arrows of the original Thangmi brothers are said to have lodged, while 
many of the female clan names allude to design features of Thangmi 
houses. 
 The term akyangmi, which appears in all of these male clan 
names, means “people of the needle wood tree”, referring to the 
common tree known as chilaune in Nepali (Latin: Schima wallichii).17 
Although it is unclear why this particular tree is of such importance, 
akyangmi is one of the most common components of Thangmi clan 
names everywhere. Akal refers to a flowering tree known as chiplo 
kaulo in Nepali (Latin: Machilus odoratissima). Kyangpole means “trunk 
of the needle wood tree”. Areng denotes an oak tree, arkhaulo in 
Nepali (Latin: Lithocarpus elegans), while dumla refers to a common 
fig, or nebharo in Nepali (Latin: Ficus carica). 
Danguri means “the searcher”. According to the myth, after all 
the sons had shot their arrows, one of them was sent to find out where 
they had landed. He searched far and wide, and when he had collected 
all of the arrows and returned them to his parents, they dubbed him, 
“the one who searches”. In one version of the story, the son never finds 
his own arrow. He thus returns to his parents and brothers bearing 
only six arrows, and is thereafter fated to spend the rest of his life 
wandering. Some gurus suggest that the first migrants to India 
                                                
17 All Nepali and Latin botanical terms are cited from Turin (2003). 
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therefore must have come from this clan. Mosanthali, which means 
“place of the spirits”, or perhaps “cremation ground”, is the single clan 
name derived from a Nepali language phrase.18 This brother’s arrow is 
said to have landed in a cremation ground, an intriguing allusion to the 
central role of funerary rites in constituting Thangminess, since they 
are the only social event to be reflected in a clan name. However, 
contrary to what might be expected, contemporary members of this 
clan have no special status or chores in relation to death rituals. This is 
the norm for other clans as well. If there were any clan-specific 
statuses or functions in the past, they are now defunct, since despite 
my efforts, I was unable to collect any information about such roles 
even from the most otherwise knowledgeable senior informants. In this 
sense, in the contemporary Thangmi world, it is not the specific 
identity conferred by  membership in any particular clan that is 
important, but rather the larger identity as Thangmi that the 
possession of a Thangmi clan name—regardless of which one—
affirms.19 
 The seven daughters are said to have received their clan names 
while their brothers were busy firing their arrows. While the clan names 
of their brothers were determined by the plants their arrows hit, the 
women’s clan names were derived from whatever chore or craft they 
                                                
18 Mosanthali is derived from the Nepali masan, “burning ground where the dead are 
burnt; burial-ground; cemetery; ghost” (Turner 1997 [1931]: 496) and thali “place, 
ground, spot” (Turner 1997 [1931]: 294-295). 
19 Peet made a similar observation: “Thamis behave as if general kindred ties (agnatic, 
cognatic, affinal) were about as important as any specific patrilineal connections” 
(1978: 230). 
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were engaged in. The term siri, which is suffixed to the end of each 
clan name, is derived from the Indo-European term sri, which is 
prefixed as a form of respectful address for men across South Asia 
(e.g. “Sri Basant Thami”). The questions of how this became attached to 
Thangmi female clan names as a suffix, and why the budati clan alone 
does not have it, remain puzzling. 
 Otherwise, budati is a Thangmi ritual language term for one of 
several types of leaf plates on which ritual offerings are made, and the 
daughter who received this name was said to have been involved in 
weaving them. Two other female clan names refer to plants: alta siri 
derives from the Thangmi calta “edible fern shoot”, or unyu in Nepali 
(Latin: Dryopteris cochleata), while alta siri derives from the Thangmi 
altak, or rhododendron (Latin: Rhododendron arboreum). These two 
daughters are said to have been out collecting fern shoots, 
rhododendron flowers and wood when the clan names were assigned. 
 The remaining female clan names allude to features of the 
Thangmi household. Yante siri refers to the quern, yante in Thangmi or 
jato in Nepali, a simple two-layered circular hand-driven millstone with 
a wooden handle, which continues to be a prominent feature of almost 
all Thangmi houses in Nepal.20 Khatu siri refers to backstrap 
handlooms (khatu) which were once commonly used to weave simple 
                                                
20 Insufficient food supply together with the considerable poverty of many rural 
Thangmi families in Nepal mean that they cannot afford to lose even the smallest 
measure of ground grain to the owner-operator of increasingly common electric or 
gas-powered mechanical mills as a commission. 
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clothes out of nettle and hemp fibers. Due to the time-consuming 
nature of these processes and the prevalence of cheap factory-made 
clothing, such weaving is now a rare occupation, but looms themselves 
are still stashed away in the corner of many households. Khasa siri 
derives from the archaic Thangmi khasa, meaning “ladder, wooden 
steps or stairs”, which this daughter was busy making from a tree 
trunk when the clan names were assigned. The final clan name, bampa 
siri, refers to the large, flat black stone which was once placed between 
the fireplace and the door in all Thangmi homes. The symbolic 
meanings of the bampa are discussed in Chapter 4; here we may 
simply recall that it is one of the most distinctive features of a 
traditional Thangmi house, and a potent symbol for contemporary 
activist representations of Thangmi identity. Some suggest that the 
seventh daughter was busy fashioning a bampa for her house when the 
clan names were distributed, while others say that she was cooking on 
the hearth in front of it. 
 
Thangmi Egalitarianism? 
These clan names highlight the de facto differences between “men’s 
work” and “women’s work” by linking most of the male clans to the 
natural world, or specialized activities such as migration and funerary 
ritual, while female clans are overwhelmingly associated with every-day 
modes of domestic production such as grinding grain, collecting 
fodder, weaving and cooking. However, there are equal numbers of 
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male and female clans, and the names themselves are not inherently 
gendered. None of the female clan names refer to gendered activities 
such as child bearing or raising, nor do the clan names directly 
subordinate women and women’s activities to men and men’s 
activities. In this respect, the clan structure instantiates a so-called 
“egalitarian” model of social organization, which has been one of the 
few features of Thangmi society noted consistently by every researcher 
who has encountered it (Haimendorf in 1974 field notes, as cited in 
Shneiderman and Turin 2006; Miller 2007 [1979]; Peet 1978; Stein, 
personal communication). At least in theory, the origin myth outlines 
an egalitarian descent system, and in addition there are no prescribed 
social divisions based on relative purity and pollution such as those 
found in caste-Hindu communities, or in a more subtle manner within 
other janajati communities.21 Thangmi individuals are often aware of 
the fact that such egalitarianism is not the norm among caste Hindu 
Nepalis, and at the level of both household conversation and political 
representation, it is cited as a distinctive feature of Thangminess. As 
my hostess in Suspa, a woman in her forties with no formal education, 
                                                
21 NEFIN and other janajati organizations suggest that such egalitarianism is common 
to all janajati groups (for instance in the statement that janajati groups have no 
internal hierarchies, as cited in Chapter 3). However, issues of clan-based status and 
hierarchy have long been part of the internal cultural politics of many ethnic groups, 
with such dynamics perhaps most well-documented in the Gurung case (Macfarlane 
1997). I am not suggesting that there are no inequalities and divides in the Thangmi 
community—I have outlined the major fault lines in Chapters 3 and 5—but rather that 
they are not determined by clan affiliation in an essential manner. 
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explained, “We can differentiate our ethnic group from others by the 
fact that we say, ‘men and women are equal’”.22 
 In reality, the dynamics of gender are much more complex than 
this, but a detailed examination of these issues is unfortunately 
beyond the scope of my discussion here.23 In short, in Nepal, Thangmi 
women lag far behind men in terms of commonly used development 
indicators such as educational accomplishment and participation in 
politics and governance. For instance, no women have ever been 
office-holders in the NTS leadership, although there are several female 
general members. At the household level, however, women are often 
equally engaged in decision-making processes, and do not feel that 
they are discriminated against in the ways that they have observed 
their caste Hindu counterparts experience. Binita, a woman in Dolakha 
who was born a Chhetri, explained that she wanted to marry a 
Thangmi man in large part to escape the oppressive gender hierarchy 
of her natal community. She stated that she had not been disappointed 
in the relatively substantial degree of gender equality that she had 
experienced in her post-marriage identity as a Thangmi woman. 
Binita’s story will be discussed in further detail below. 
 In India, by contrast, Thangmi women are much more involved in 
associational life and politics, with several women holding prominent 
                                                
22 Original Nepali: Hamro jatle “mahila purus barabar ho” bhanera arko jat bata 
chutauna sakinchha. 
23 I hope to address the politics of gender in the Thangmi world in a future article, 
with special attention to the manner in which parallel descent challenges the terms of 
classification and legal recognition in both Nepal and India. 
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leadership positions in the BTWA in both Darjeeling and Sikkim. 
However, within the discourses of unnati and pan-Nepali nationalism 
that prevailed in Darjeeling for the bulk of the 20th century, the notion 
of parallel descent and the egalitarianism derived from it were long 
seen as erratic, anti-modern idiosyncrasies to be done away with, like 
other particularities of individual ethnic groups. In India, even old 
women for the most part did not know their mother’s clan name, while 
in Nepal, most women over 30 still identified themselves by it. 
However, like almost all women in India, younger women in Nepal also 
did not use their mother’s clan names. This does not mean, however, 
that Thangmi women who did not know their mother’s clan names had 
no clan identity at all; rather, they had begun to identify themselves 
with their fathers’, and in some cases, husband’s, clan names. As 
Kamala, a woman in her mid-20s, responded with some frustration 
when I queried why she had stated her father’s clan rather than her 
mother’s when asked about her clan affiliation, “How would I know my 
clan? I never asked and my mother never talked about it.” In contrast, 
she was well aware of her father’s clan identity, which was often 
brought up in public discussions related to marriage, death and other 
rituals. 
 This begins to suggest how, over the last several decades, 
dominant Hindu-influenced gender ideologies have begun to impinge 
upon Thangmi gender practices in Nepal as well as in India. Other 
effects of this include the recent stigmatization of the Thangmi 
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practice of completing marriage rituals later in life, often only after 
children are born,24 and the concomitantly liberal attitudes towards 
having multiple sexual partners (at least until any relationship results 
in children, at which point marriage is expected). Rather than bringing 
about greater equality, it seems that increased exposure to national 
discourses on gender and empowerment may have chipped away at 
long-standing egalitarian systems.25 
 
The Politics of Clan Affiliation and Parallel Descent 
At the same time as female clan identities seemed to be diminishing in 
importance, male clan identities were taking on new meanings within 
political contexts. In the 1990s, many activists began to use their clan 
name as a last name in place of “Thami”, particularly in Nepal. Their 
rationale was that “Thami” was a label slapped upon them by the state, 
not their own ethnonym, which was “Thangmi”. Advocating the official 
use of “Thangmi”, however, was likely to lead to confusion, since it was 
so close to “Thami”, and in any case, if a change was to be made, 
shifting to clan names seemed most appropriate, since it was these 
which affirmed Thangmi identity at the individual level.26 In India, by 
                                                
24 This is often disparagingly referred to as budho biha—”the old folks’ wedding”—
and has been written about by several non-Thangmi reporters in the Nepali press as 
an ethnic oddity. As with incest, this is one “traditional” Thangmi practice that 
activists have largely stayed away from valorizing since it is too overwhelmingly at 
odds with dominant attitudes that have influenced their personal moral sensibilities. 
25 This is more of a hunch than a hypothesis for now; substantiating it will require 
additional research and analysis. For discussions of related dynamics, see Tamang 
(2002), Pettigrew and Shneiderman (2004), Leve (2007). 
26 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, similar debates raged among other ethnic 
communities in Nepal as well. 
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contrast, since the group had been engaged in seeking support or 
recognition from the state in some form since the 1940’s on the basis 
of its name, it was not deemed strategic to use clan names in public 
contexts. Some individuals who did so based on their knowledge of 
this movement in Nepal were actively reprimanded by the BTWA 
leadership for potentially hurting the unity of the ethnic cause. By the 
late 2000s, the trend of using clan names in public documents and 
speeches had also largely abated in Nepal, apparently for reasons 
similar to those that had kept it from becoming popular in India. The 
prospect of state recognition within some sort of affirmative action 
system was on the cards as part of state restructuring, and activists 
began to fear that they would lose their hard-won, but still minimal, 
political visibility by shifting to clan names which were even less 
familiar than “Thami”. 
 As Thangmi activists in both Nepal and India have sought to 
identify and objectify distinctive features of their culture for political 
purposes, they have faced the challenge of how to valorize the system 
of parallel descent as unique, without simultaneously affirming the 
historicity of the incest which generated it. This is a feature of the 
origin myth which many activists find morally abhorrent at a personal 
level, even if it might serve well to demonstrate the “primitiveness” of 
their group, a particularly salient feature within ST politics in India. 
Although it might appear easy to dismiss such concerns with the 
argument that the myth is just a myth, and therefore in no way 
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indicative of the sexual behavior of “real” Thangmi people, activists 
have invested so much in “proving” the “truth” of other aspects of the 
origin myth—such as those which bolster Thangmi claims to 
distinctiveness as discussed in Chapter 3, and those which establish 
Thangmi claims to territory discussed in Chapter 6—that it would be 
difficult for them to regard only this aspect of the story as myth, while 
treating the other parts of it as “truth”. Instead, they have discounted 
the incestuous versions of the myth as based on the hearsay “stories of 
the elders” rather than “research” (Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 17), and 
focused instead on crafting a new history. In a version of the origin 
story which was first presented in the 1999 Dolakhareng, and repeated 
in the 2002 Thami Samudaya and 2003 Niko Bachinte publications, 
there are in fact two ancestral Thangmi couples whose children marry 
each other, thereby avoiding the problem of incest. The first couple 
remains Ya’apa (Yapati Chuku) and Sunari Ama (Sunari Aji), as in the 
oral renditions of the myth that I recorded, while the second couple is 
called Uke Chuku and Beti Aji.27 Khumbalal makes a strong argument 
for accepting this version of the story: 
 
It is said that as there was no one else from the same ethnic 
group for the children of Yapati Chuku and Sunari Aji, so the 
seven daughters and seven sons were married to each other. 
                                                
27 It is interesting to note that the 1997 Nan Ni Patuko publication posits only one 
couple, and does not yet seem concerned with the incestuous nature of their 
childrens’ relationships. Here however, the single couple has the names of what I 
have called the “second” couple: Uke Chuku and Beti Aji. Indeed, in some oral 
versions of the story that I documented, these were alternate names for Ya’apa and 
Sunari Ama. Ironically, activists who are otherwise concerned with standardization 
have exploited this inconsistency to suggest that these were actually two different 
couples. 
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This saying obviously can’t be true. Those who tell these stories, 
whether scientists, old people from the Thami community, or 
foreigners, must be telling these stories on the basis of what 
they hear from elders, not by doing research…It is 100% 
mistaken that the sons and daughters of Yapati Chuku and 
Sunari Aji were married among themselves with each other 
(Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 17). 
This critique of the origin myth—or at least of the way it is told by “old 
people”—is not perceived to undermine the presence of parallel 
descent or its power as an ethnic marker. For instance, Megh Raj, who 
argues against the incestuous version of the origin myth, elsewhere in 
the same publication claims that, “The female subcastes are unusual 
and proof of the originality of our identity” (Reng 1999: 27). Here, the 
functionalist tendencies of activist attitudes towards myth eclipse the 
strcturalist ones (see Chapter 3), so that rather than acknowledging—
as gurus do—that myth is about social impossibility, activists seek to 
transform the myth itself by rewriting it along the lines of the charter 
that they desire. 
 
Becoming Thangmi at Birth 
What, exactly, does it mean to be born into a Thangmi clan? The 
answer is, not much. Ritually speaking, birth is the least important 
aspect of the life cycle for establishing an individual’s Thangminess. 
Many families call a guru or jhankri to conduct a nwaran, a Nepali term 
for “naming ceremony” (Turner 1997 [1931]: 354) also used by other 
ethnic groups. Unlike at marriage or death rituals, where only fully 
trained senior gurus may officiate, lower-status jhankri may also 
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officiate at the nwaran. Some gurus did not like to conduct this ritual 
even though families requested it; Rana Bahadur stated that this was 
because it was a newly introduced ritual derived directly from 
normative caste-Hindu practices. He claimed that it had not been 
common in Dolakha when he left for India (around 1940), and that he 
had only seen it introduced after he returned in the late 1950s, with its 
popularity increasing steadily throughout the ensuing decades. From 
Rana Bahadur’s perspective, the nwaran was not a Thangmi ritual, but 
one that some families wanted to adopt as part of a broader process of 
Hinduization, of which he was skeptical. The fact that he differentiated 
in kind between the virtues of appropriating wholesale a Hindu ritual 
like the nwaran, and integrating specific ritual elements associated 
with Hindu or Buddhist practices (such as head-shaving or the habise 
chant within the mumpra) into rituals that established their own 
synthetic Thangmi frame, was in itself an interesting commentary on 
the nature of synthetic subjectivity and its ritual expression. 
 Indeed, the nwaran seemed most important to Thangmi in urban 
Kathmandu and Darjeeling. There were three reasons for this. First of 
all, since it was a very brief ritual with simple offerings, it was much 
easier to organize than the multi-stage wedding or funerary rites with 
their esoteric collection of offerings, made up of natural and 
agricultural products often unavailable outside of Thangmi villages. 
Second of all, since it could be conducted by minor jhankri as well as 
guru, there was a much greater prospect of finding an appropriate 
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officiant, even in the absence of a senior guru.28 Finally, since it was 
similar to Hindu naming rituals, it did not occasion feelings of 
embarrassment for those living in multi-ethnic environments, as the 
more “unusual” wedding and funeral rituals could. 
 Performed on the third or fifth day after birth, the nwaran is 
essentially a naming ritual. It also serves to disperse the ritual pollution 
of birth, which permeates the house in which the child was born, 
affecting all of the child’s immediate family, as well as both its paternal 
and maternal uncles. All of these individuals must be present at the 
ritual, during which the officiant consecrates the household with a 
mixture of cow urine, turmeric, uirengpati, and a type of grass called 
kuruk,29 and ties a string soaked in this mixture around the baby’s 
wrist. This provides protection to the child for its first ventures outside 
the house; from the time of birth through receipt of this consecrated 
bracelet, the baby must be kept inside. The officiant then pronounces 
the child’s full name for the first time: both giving the baby a personal 
name (which may or may not be the same as the one the parents have 
chosen), and invoking his or her appropriate clan name based on the 
same-sex parent’s clan identity. Finally, a chicken is sacrificed to the 
household’s tutelary deity to ensure the child’s future success, and the 
                                                
28 The fact that the nwaran could be conducted by jhankri might suggest that there 
are actually multiple officiants with the Thangmi ritual system, but here the exception 
proves the rule, since many guru themselves did not consider the nwaran a Thangmi 
ritual at all, as described above. 
29 According to Turner, kuruk is “an edible tip of Asparagus plumosus” (1997 [1931]: 
100). 
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guru or jhankri is presented with the meat of this chicken, along with 
an offering of alcohol and some unhusked rice. 
 In village households in Nepal where this ritual is done, the 
entire process takes less than half an hour, and it is often done with 
minimal publicity—other members of the extended family or neighbors 
may not even know that it is occurring. Perhaps this understated 
approach is due to the fact that infant mortality rates continue to be 
very high, and therefore many parents do not want to ritually mark the 
birth of a child any more than is absolutely necessary. In discussing 
this issue, many informants in rural Nepal said that the most important 
feature of the nwaran was the audible pronunciation of the child’s clan 
name, but that this can be done in a very discreet manner that does 
not require full ritual articulation. Once the ritual is over, the child’s 
nwaran name is often not pronounced again until marriage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Ram Krishna officiating at a nwaran in Kathmandu, 
November 2005 
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 By contrast, in Darjeeling, and to some degree in urban 
Kathmandu and Jhapa as well, the nwaran has become a more 
important moment for demonstrating group identity. In the context of 
tribal politics, BTWA activists are eager to use any opportunity to 
publicly state their distinctive clan names, even if the form of the ritual 
within which they do so is not particularly distinctive, as in the case of 
the nwaran. Adapting to such desires, Latte Apa did not seem have the 
same resistance to conducting the nwaran that Rana Bahadur did. 
Indeed, he instead developed a rhetorical strategy for making the 
pronunciation of the child’s name a more elaborate affair than it is 
elsewhere, taking as his model a part of the wedding ritual. There, the 
guru inserts brief histories of both the bride’s and groom’s lives into 
the paloke, mentioning the names of the places they have lived and 
their accomplishments in the same recitative style in which the 
locations along the ancestors’ migratory routes are listed (see Chapter 
6). Latte Apa incorporated a similar recitation into the nwaran by 
describing the parents’ accomplishments and stating their clan names 
several times in the build-up to narrating the birth of the child and 
pronouncing his or her clan name: “… and now this child, he who is the 
son of Radha of the Alta Siri clan and Dipesh of the Akyangmi clan, this 
child of an Alta Siri mother and an Akyangmi father, he is now 
Akyangmi, let us welcome this new Akyangmi to the world”. 
 At home with his own family, Latte Apa was in the habit of using 
the clan name “Akyangmi” as a pet name for his young grandson: “Eh, 
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Akyangmi, come here and eat your rice!” This was not standard 
practice, since most Thangmi would not refer to each other by clan 
names or even state them outside of a ritual context. Latte Apa’s 
deceptively simple habit served two purposes. First, it made his 
grandson aware of his Thangminess on an every-day basis, which Latte 
Apa perhaps felt was especially necessary since the child’s mother—the 
guru’s daughter-in-law—was by birth a Marwari woman who had 
received her Thangmi clan name at marriage. Secondly, without 
apparent political pretense, it communicated the distinctiveness of 
Thangmi identity to Latte Apa’s never-ending stream of Thangmi and 
non-Thangmi visitors. “Akyangmi, that’s an unusual name,” someone 
would invariably say, giving Latte Apa the opportunity to explain the 
term’s significance as a clan name and launch into a brief recitation of 
the origin myth if he felt so inspired. 
 Such rhetorical strategies were both necessary and effective in 
part due to Darjeeling’s ethnically heterogeneous residence patterns, 
in which neighbors—who were more often than not from a range of 
different ethnic groups—sought to be a part of each other’s life cycle 
rituals. Most residential clusters have their own neighborhood 
organization, which was usually involved in the financial sponsorship 
and planning of Thangmi birth, marriage and death rituals in 
Darjeeling—just as it was for comparable rituals of residents from 
every other ethnic group in the area. This meant that unlike in Nepal, 
where Thangmi generally lived in ethnically homogenous areas and 
  458 
there were rarely any non-Thangmi present at such occasions, in 
Darjeeling a large proportion of the attendees at any life cycle ritual 
were from non-Thangmi backgrounds. Prior to 1990, multi-ethnic 
participation at such events probably compelled participants to de-
emphasize the ethnically specific aspects of the ritual at hand, but in 
the highly-charged context of tribal politics in which I conducted my 
fieldwork, it had exactly the opposite effect, as both gurus and 
activists sought to use such occasions to convey to others exactly how 
uniquely Thangmi they and their rituals were. This prerogative led to 
the embedding of much additional explanatory rhetoric within the 
ritual chants themselves (like that described above in the nwaran). 
Non-Thangmi present at such occasions—along with many Thangmi 
themselves—could not be expected to understand the implicit purpose 
of each ritual element, and so it had to be made explicit. In this sense, 
even rituals like the nwaran which had very little distinctively Thangmi 
content could be used as arenas within which to objectify the rules of 
Thangmi ethnicity clearly for all to see. 
 
Initiation Rites under Construction 
It was in this sense that a ritual known as chewar was also “under 
construction” as part of the Thangmi life cycle during the course of my 
fieldwork in Darjeeling. This hair-cutting ceremony for boys between 
the ages of three and five was essentially an initiation rite, and is well-
documented across the Himalayas for groups such as the Tamang 
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(Fricke 1990; Holmberg 1989), Newar (Gellner forthcoming a) and 
caste Hindu groups (Michaels 2004). During the early phases of my 
research, such rituals were not common among Thangmi in Nepal, and 
I heard the term chewar for the first time in Darjeeling in 2004. There, 
several members of the BTWA who had experienced this ritual (either 
having their own hair cut or participating in the ceremony for close 
neighborhood friends) as an essential part of a generic, pan-Nepali 
culture, sought to Thangmify it.30 This is perhaps a variation on the 
theme that David Gellner has described for other janajati groups who 
have begun to adopt Buddhism, for whom, “using life-cycle rituals to 
define a separate and to some extent oppositional social identity is a 
strategy that is now being followed, quite consciously and deliberately” 
(Gellner forthcoming a). 
 The BTWA activists adapted the ritual form with which they were 
familiar from the practice of other groups, but substituted a written 
version of some portion of the paloke to substitute for the mantras 
that would be chanted by a Hindu pandit or Buddhist lama in other 
ethnic contexts.31 This scripturalized version of the paloke was 
necessary because most gurus refused to participate in this ritual 
                                                
30 Chalmers has highlighted, “the rigidity which religious and ethnic affiliation had 
been bound together” (2003: 273) in the process of creating a pan-Nepali ethnic 
identity in Darjeeling. The dominant religious identity associated with this ethnicity 
was undoubtedly a Hindu one: “there was almost no questioning in public discourse 
of the consistent identification of Nepal and Nepalis with Hindusim” (2003: 273). 
31 I was never actually observed a Thangmi chewar, in part due to bad timing, but 
also since it had not been thoroughly adopted by all families, which meant that there 
were in fact very few performances of it. This brief description is based on the VCD 
version as well as accounts from individuals who had participated in chewar rituals. 
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neologism. Families had to recite the paloke themselves without a 
guru’s guidance, making the chewar perhaps the first ritual arena in 
which activists were able to publicly demonstrate their successful 
appropriation of originary power through the twin processes of 
scripturalization (see Chapter 3) and ritual invention. This process had 
occurred over the course of more than a decade; the 1992 OBC 
application did not mention the chewar at all, while the draft ST 
application materials that I saw in 2005 highlighted it as a distinctively 
Thangmi ritual. These assertions were backed up by the “videoalized” 
documentation of the ritual as conducted for the son of Laxmi, the 
dance choreographer introduced in Chapter 2 (the child was also the 
nephew of Basant, the BTWA General Secretary until 2003). As Laxmi 
showed me a copy of this VCD with obvious pride, she explained, “The 
chewar is so important to us now, it is the one tradition that people 
like me feel we can understand and do ourselves”. The concept also 
made its way back to Nepal in the 2002 Thami Samudaya publication, 
which contains a set of stage direction-like instructions for how to 
conduct a chewar ritual (Samudaya 2061 [2056]: 68). 
 There was only one problem with promoting the chewar as an 
example of Thangmi ritual for political purposes: its similarity to Hindu 
practices, as well as to the chewar of other groups.32 Unlike the OBC 
category, for which religion was not perceived to be diagnostic (and 
                                                
32 Although there are elements associated with Hinduism in other Thangmi rituals, 
none are so similar in overall form as the chewar and the nwaran. The latter, 
however, was recuperable for ST purposes since gurus were still the officiants, giving 
the ritual a “shamanic” rather than “Hindu” tone despite its structural similarities. 
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indeed, the Thangmi OBC application had made repeated reference to 
the Hindu-influenced aspects of their practice), there was a growing 
sense that in order to be eligible for ST status, groups had to be able 
to demonstrate their unique, non-Hindu nature through performances. 
This was made explicit in the 2006 Cultural Research Institute review 
of ST aspirant groups, during which BTWA activist Shova told me that 
one of the verifiers had critiqued the Thangmi materials with the 
comment, “You must not ‘touch’ anything which has to do with the 
Hindu religion”.33 Moreover, videoalized rituals turned out to be 
insufficient for the verifiers’ purposes; Shova reported them as saying, 
“Only ‘live’ will do”.34 Latte Apa was thus called in at the last minute to 
demonstrate Thangmi ritual in practice before the verifiers—with the 
explicit instructions that all allusions to Hindu practice must be 
removed—and the chewar VCD was quietly slipped out of the Thangmi 
application package. 
 Despite their subjective feelings of success, and quite literally, 
empowerment, at having accessed originary power directly without a 
guru’s mediation through their practice of the chewar, activist attempts 
to package this power for the state failed due to the persistence of 
bureaucratic biases about what “tribal” culture should be. Contrary to 
the activists’ expectations, the state itself privileged practice (albeit 
enacted in a performative frame) over outright objectifications of it in 
                                                
33 Original Nepali: Tapai harule Hindu dharmako kura ‘touch’ garnu hundaina. 
34 Original Nepali: ‘Live’ matrai chahinchha. 
  462 
text or video, and also privileged the figure of the guru over that of lay 
practitioners, thereby reifying precisely the form of power that activists 
hoped state recognition might ultimately help them subvert. The 
policies of a democratic, secular state which in theory were designed to 
“uplift the marginalized” regardless of their culture or religion were at 
once stymying activist attempts to democratize ritual power, and 
perpetuating the Hindu-tribe dichotomy.35 
 
Becoming Thangmi at Marriage 
“Marriage is about bringing our community together. It’s about the 
bride and the groom and their families recognizing each other. The 
details don’t matter so much, it’s the way people feel that’s important.” 
Bir Bahadur and I were reviewing notes from a wedding ritual we had 
observed in Dolakha in early 2005, and in his role as research 
assistant, my friend was frustrated with my persistent questions about 
the literal meanings of the Thangmi language terms for each phase of 
the bore (T) ritual cycle (such as sauti, ayu, cardam and seneva). I was 
also fascinated by the symbolic meaning of each particular item, such 
as the rapeng (T), a dead frog placed on a wicker winnowing tray, 
along with several less unusual offerings, and suspended from the 
rafters of the groom’s house as his family’s lineage deities were 
propitiated. But Bir Bahadur was urging me to look at the big picture, 
to consider the purpose that marriage rituals served at the communal 
                                                
35 See Middleton and Shneiderman (2008) for further discussion of these dynamics. 
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level, rather than fixating on the details of an idealized ritual form, 
which, as he reminded me, hardly existed. Unlike funerary rites, which 
followed a clear sequence that was remarkably similar from guru to 
guru and place to place, marriage rituals varied immensely according 
to location and historical juncture. Here I therefore consider the 
significance of marriage rituals in a more general social sense without 
presenting any particular ritual schema in full, whereas in the 
discussion of funerary rituals that follows below, I do the opposite. 
 The wedding that we had just observed in Dolakha, Bir Bahadur 
continued to explain, was part of a very recent trend in which gurus 
had agreed amongst themselves—in part due to encouragement from 
both NTS and BTWA activists—to return to a more “traditional” 
Thangmi ritual form which their predecessors had largely jettisoned 
several decades earlier in favor of a Hinduized ritual framework. The 
central acts of exchange through which the two families recognized 
each other and affirmed the couple’s clan identities (see Figure 7.2), 
along with a set of wedding songs performed to the beat of a madal 
drum, and the requisite consumption of alcohol had remained fairly 
constant elements over time. However, the celebratory idiom within 
which these actions were carried out had shifted, with symbolic items 
like dress, gifts, and food brought into line with pan-Nepali Hindu 
norms over the course of the latter half of the 20th century (see Figure 
7.3). 
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Figure 7.2 Groom’s father and bride’s mother exchanging flower 
garlands during a Thangmi wedding. Chokati, Sindhupalchok, Nepal, 
February 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Groom (Komin) and bride (Shanti) at the center of their 
wedding procession, both dressed in styles common across Nepal. 
Chokati, Sindhupalchok, Nepal, February 2008 
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 According to oral histories, the immediate impetus behind the 
appropriation of Hindu ritual styles for Thangmi weddings was the fact 
that one of the primary offerings in the Thangmi marriage ritual cycle 
had been the hind quarter of a cow. The bride’s family had to slaughter 
the animal as an indication that they accepted the initial offer of the 
groom’s family, and cure the meat for consumption as part of the sauti 
(T; N: koseli) “engagement” ritual. The hind leg, however, was saved 
and displayed above the hearth until the marriage rituals were actually 
completed. This could take months, or in some cases, years. Around 
2005 VS (1948 AD), in the waning days of Rana rule, a Thangmi mizar 
(N), from Suspa named Sure, who served as a liaison between the local 
community and the central government, was personally berated by an 
official from Kathmandu after he caught sight of a bovine leg 
suspended from the rafters of a Thangmi house during one of his rare 
visits to Dolakha. The official threatened to immediately arrest any one 
who so brazenly displayed evidence of breaking the law—since to kill a 
cow was a felony in the Hindu state of Nepal until 2006—and Sure sent 
a message out across the entire area that any such evidence should be 
immediately destroyed. In subsequent years, Sure led a campaign to 
transform marriage practices completely so that cow slaughter would 
not only no longer be necessary, but so that state representatives 
would not even entertain the suspicion that it might be. In its most 
extreme form, this objective entailed inviting Hindu pandits to conduct 
wedding rituals in place of Thangmi gurus. 
  466 
 This reformist agenda (which could perhaps be identified as an 
early instance of activism, although there was no formal organization 
to support it) drove a wedge between two community factions. On one 
side were those who supported Sure’s plan on the basis that it would 
both protect the Thangmi from persecution, and improve their 
standing in the eyes of the Hindu state.36 On the other side were those 
who decried it because they felt marriage rituals to be an essential 
expression of Thangminess, as well as a worthwhile act of resistance 
against the Hindu state. Although Sure’s faction eventually won out 
and marriage practices were largely transformed, the contours of this 
social divide remained evident in Dolakha half a century later when I 
conducted fieldwork. Some people characterized Sure and his 
descendants as slippery social climbers who had taken on the 
unpleasant brahmanical features of the caste that they aspired to 
emulate, while others valorized Sure and his family as the savior of the 
Thangmi, whom otherwise would not have realized the backwards 
error of their ways. The former group, who seemed to be in the 
majority, had within a decade or so returned to using Thangmi gurus 
as the primary wedding officiants, but the context had already been 
substantially Hinduized in a manner that would only become more 
difficult to reverse as panchayat era policies further promoted such 
transformations along the path to nationalist modernity. 
                                                
36 See W. Fisher (2001) for a detailed description of how Hindu practices were 
strategically adopted for similar purposes in the Thakali community. 
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This mix of Thangmi gurus chanting their paloke at otherwise 
Hindu-style weddings, which Bir Bahadur jokingly described in Nepali 
as khachar biha—“half-breed weddings”—was prevalent in most 
Thangmi areas of Nepal when I began my fieldwork. The common 
awareness of the historicity of the process through which this mix had 
become normalized as specifically Thangmi demonstrated another 
facet of synthetic subjectivity at work. The situation only began to 
change in the mid-2000s, as activists emboldened by a decade of 
janajati politics began urging gurus and families to “return” to their 
earlier forms of practice.37 Still, there was a great diversity of opinion 
about the wisdom of this idea, and, even among those who were in 
favor of it, there was much debate about exactly how to implement it. 
Every one of the six weddings that I witnessed parts of therefore had a 
different balance of “old” and “new”, and it was often unclear which 
was which, or for whom. These inconsistencies troubled many activists, 
as well as young people and their families, when it came time to plan a 
wedding. Almost as a rule, when I asked laypeople about Thangmi 
marriage practices (or asked them to describe their own wedding), they 
expressed the opinion that agreeing upon a consistent set of marriage 
rituals should be a cultural priority for the NTS. 
These concerns were also high on the BTWA agenda. Those 
Thangmi who migrated to India before Sure’s intervention in the late 
                                                
37 Recall the activist writings valorizing khami—as guru are called in their wedding 
officiant role—as an example of “people who organize things at different levels of 
society”, and whose presence demonstrates the “completeness” of the Thangmi social 
system (Niko 2003: 45). 
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1940s might have brought knowledge of earlier marriage practices 
from Nepal with them, but if so, these were quickly subsumed by the 
generic Hindu-based pan-Nepali forms that developed in the multi-
ethnic environment of the migrant community. BTWA leaders who had 
pinned their hopes of videoalizing a Thangmi wedding on circular 
migrants were disappointed when two workers were married in 
Darjeeling, and instead of evidence of a coherent, “original” ritual, the 
wedding (and therefore the video) contained a messy array of largely 
Hinduized practices. The activists then planned to videoalize what they 
called a “dramatization” of a traditional Thangmi wedding for their 
Scheduled Tribe application.38 Some time later, they were pleased to 
discover that a group of circular migrants regularly gathered to play 
the madal and sing some of the old Thangmi language songs which 
were still played at weddings in Nepal—the migrants could sing these 
celebratory melodies even if they did not know much about the details 
of ritual practice per se. It was these songs which provided the 
inspiration for the musical style used on the Amako Ashis cassette, 
which in turn served as the soundtrack for the performance billed as a 
“wedding dance” that was described in Chapter 2. While the chewar 
was a suitable site for the exercise of a new kind of ritual power 
precisely because it had no history as a Thangmi practice, the long 
history of ritual mixture surrounding the “Thangmi wedding” allowed 
                                                
38 I do not know whether this was ever accomplished or not, and if so, whether the 
final product was included in the final set of application materials, or later pulled out 
as the chewar VCD was. 
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multiple forms of power to stand, with each sub-group—whether 
defined by kinship, residence, loyalty to a guru, associational 
membership, or some other kind of affinity—moulding the ritual form 
to their particular needs. 
Despite this diversity of form, at the most fundamental level, 
every wedding still required a guru to officiate. However, most gurus in 
both India and Nepal seemed surprisingly unconcerned with the debate 
over the ideal form of a Thangmi wedding. At first I thought that they 
had perhaps given up control over this particular domain so long ago 
that it was no longer a battle worth fighting. Later, I came to 
understand that despite their temporary displacement from the ritual 
process, they had never really ceded control of the underlying social 
power inherent in this moment of the life cycle at all. Even when Hindu 
priests were employed as ritual officiants, it was still gurus who had to 
be consulted about the issue of clan identity and the choice of proper 
marriage partners. Pandits from outside of the Thangmi community 
simply could not have access to this information; knowledge of the 
Thangmi clan system, and its living instantiations in the genealogies of 
prospective brides and grooms, was an ethnically and locally specific 
matter. So even at the height of Hinduized marriage practice, gurus 
were still called upon to investigate clan histories, pronounce partners 
marriageable, and oversee the sauti—a preliminary set of exchanges of 
alcohol and breads made of rice flour (which had eventually been 
substituted for the cow leg) between families—at which time which 
  470 
clan affiliation was validated. Despite the otherwise great variation in 
ritual form, these simple preliminaries, and the gurus’ role in 
orchestrating them, remained very similar in both Nepal and 
Darjeeling. This state of affairs lent credence to the assertion that 
whatever other purposes weddings might come to serve, their 
fundamental social function was to affirm the Thangminess of their 
protagonists by pronouncing their clan affiliation in public for the first 
time since birth, and in some cases, for the first time ever. 
 
“Conversion” to Thangminess 
It was during the sauti that those marriage partners who did not have a 
Thangmi clan name were assigned one by the guru, thereby receiving 
the seeds of Thangminess which could be brought to fruition through 
participation in future rituals, and ultimately in the transformation into 
an ancestor at death. For the most part, this category of “converts” was 
comprised by women from other ethnic backgrounds who married 
Thangmi men, but it also included smaller numbers of men who 
married Thangmi women. Thangmi residence patterns in all locations 
were generally patrilocal, but I documented several exceptions to this 
rule, where the man either resided with the woman’s family, or the new 
couple set up their own household in an entirely different location (this 
was certainly the case for many migrant families who left both sets of 
parents behind in Nepal to settle in Darjeeling). In patrilocal marriages, 
a non-Thangmi woman always became Thangmi, but in either of the 
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latter two cases, a non-Thangmi man could “convert”, always through 
the assignment of a clan name.  
 From the very earliest days of migration to India, inter-group 
marriage was almost the norm for Thangmi in Darjeeling, as it was for 
most other groups of Nepali heritage. Indeed, if the Thangmi 
population was truly only 13 as listed in the 1872 census, it is hardly 
surprising that they began to marry people from other groups. 
Genealogical work that I conducted with three Thangmi families in 
India who had been settled in Darjeeling for three, four and seven 
generations showed that about 75% of marriages over time were with 
non-Thangmi.39 Marriage partners were from other groups of Nepali 
heritage, including Rai, Limbu, Tamang, Magar, Gurung, Newar, Bahun, 
and Chhetri; from other Indian communities, including Bengali, Bihari, 
Marwari and in one case Muslim; and in a surprisingly high number of 
cases, from dalit backgrounds.40 In all of these marriages, women from 
other groups who married Thangmi men became Thangmi in the same 
                                                
39 Based on fieldwork conducted in the early 1980s, Subba reports a 32% rate of what 
he calls “intercaste marriage” in Rangbull, a village on the outskirts of Darjeeling 
bazaar (1989: 69). This is a higher rate of intercaste marriage than in two 
successively more remote villages, in which 27% and 13.7% of marriage were 
intercaste respectively, leading Subba to suggest that intercaste marriage is higher in 
more urbanized areas. This may account in part for the much higher rates of 
intergroup marriage that I documented, since the majority of the Thangmi I worked 
with lived in urban areas. Other relevant factors include the 20 year time gap between 
Subba’s research and my own, and the fact that as described above, Thangmi are 
relatively unconcerned with issues of status and hierarchy and so do not rule out 
members of any group as potential marriage partners, so are likely to have a higher 
inter-group marriage rate than the more diverse group with whom Subba worked. 
40 Although some Thangmi individuals expressed reservations about choosing a dalit 
as a marriage partner in theory, the reality was that many prominent Darjeeling 
Thangmi had done so (including a BTWA office-holders and a well-regarded civil 
servant), and neither these individuals nor their children appeared to be stigmatized 
within the Thangmi community. 
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manner—by having a guru assign them a female clan name (which 
could be any clan except for their mother-in-law’s) during the sauti—
regardless of their ethnic or caste identity at birth. In this way at least, 
the ideal of Thangmi egalitarianism was realized through a lack of 
concern about hypogamy or hypergamy based on normative Hindu 
notions of caste-based status. Thangmi women who married men of 
other groups would generally take on their husband’s ethnic identity, 
but many also retained a strong sense of Thangminess. This suggests 
that although one could gain Thangminess at marriage, one did not 
necessarily lose it by marrying outside the group.41 As Sheela, the 
Gangtok BTWA secretary explained in answer to my question about 
why she was so involved with a Thangmi organization even though she 
had married a Bahun, “Naturally I am interested since the first name I 
had in my life was Thami”.42 
 Inter-group marriage rates were much lower in Nepal, where 
most Thangmi lived in ethnically homogenous areas. Comparable 
genealogical work in Nepal turned up only one instance of inter-group 
                                                
41 I do not have comparative data about the ritual processes through which women 
(or men) of Thangmi origin are incorporated into other ethnic groups. 
42 Original Nepali: ‘Naturally’, mero ‘first’ nam Thami ho, tyasle garda mero ‘interest’ 
chha. One might surmise that tribal politics provided some expedient reasons for 
such a choice for continued identification as Thangmi, but given the fact that Indian 
law only reckoned descent through the paternal line, and therefore Sheela’s two 
children would not be eligible for ST status even if the Thangmi received it, for her I 
believe the feeling of Thangminess was a deeply embedded subjective one. This was 
corroborated by the fact that she continued to keep ‘Thami’ as a hyphenated part of 
her full name (Sheela Thami-Dahal), as did several other women, rather than doing 
away with it as they might be expected to do upon marrying high-caste Hindus. 
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marriage prior to the present generation,43 in which I was familiar with 
four cases, the partners in which did not appear to be stigmatized.44 In 
one case, a Newar man lived with his wife’s Thangmi family; in the 
other three cases, Chhetri (Binita the school teacher, as described 
above), Tamang and Gurung women lived with their husband’s families 
as Thangmi. As Binita explained, “Before our marriage Guru Maila gave 
me my Thangmi clan name. In the community I came from, women do 
not have their own names. It felt very special, and still I think about 
that name every day.” 
 Indeed, women who had become Thangmi by marriage in both 
Nepal and India were often hyper-aware of their clan names, and 
talked about them openly in public. This habit had the opposite effect 
of that intended, since it diverged sharply from the mannerism of other 
Thangmi women, who would almost never mention their clan names 
except in ritual contexts. For instance, the wife of the BTWA secretary 
Rajen, who identified as Chhetri by birth (although her mother was 
Rai), greeted every participant who came through the door at a BTWA-
sponsored event by introducing herself by her Thangmi clan name and 
asking each newcomer theirs. Many of the Thangmi migrants from 
                                                
43 It may well be the case that people in previous generations who married non-
Thangmi may have made the decision to settle in India on that basis, since despite 
Thangmi flexibility about these issues, in broader social terms Nepal was a more 
challenging place for inter-ethnic couples to live. This has changed to some extent in 
recent years, particularly in urban areas, but inter-group marriage is still not the 
acceptable norm in Nepal that it is in Darjeeling. 
44 My suspicion is that inter-ethnic marriages are becoming increasingly common as 
young Thangmi spend more time in Kathmandu, Charikot, Bahrabise and other urban 
centers for education, but I do not yet have data to support this. 
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Nepal who attended this event were clearly uncomfortable with her 
affect, since although not secret, in their experience, clan names were 
not used casually in social interactions like this. This recent convert’s 
novel use of clan names simultaneously highlighted both her 
Thangminess and her non-Thangminess in a paradoxical manner. 
 Although perhaps discomfiting to some at a visceral level, the 
fact that this woman possessed both qualities at once could not be 
construed as contradictory within the ideological framework of an 
ethnicity, which, as we may recall from Chapter 3, defines itself by 
reference to the multiple levels of mixture (religious, racial, linguistic) 
at its core. In Darjeeling in particular, most people who called 
themselves Thangmi, and were involved in seeking recognition from 
the state on that basis, in fact had mothers, grandmothers, great-
grandmothers and uncounted other relatives who were “actually” 
something else.45 This reality of mixture—which was equally the case 
for most people in Darjeeling, regardless of what ethnic name they 
held and which organization they joined (if any)—was living proof that 
pan-Nepali nationalist ideology had worked, and should have provided 
a powerful challenge to legal classificatory rubrics that emphasized 
ethnic distinctiveness and boundedness. Unlike gurus, who had long 
used the mixture invoked in their paloke to challenge hegemonic ideas 
                                                
45 Regardless of subjective attachments that individuals might have to their mother’s 
identities, the Indian legal recognition of paternal descent alone meant that for most 
individuals, maternal rather than paternal identities became “other”. Clearly, this legal 
definition of paternal descent is at odds with Thangmi notions of parallel descent. I 
hope to address this issue in detail in the future. 
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about ethnic purity in village Nepal, however, activists were not yet 
emboldened enough to use their cultural resources to challenge state-
supported notions of tribal distinctiveness in India, and instead sought 
to modify their myths to meet the perceived demands of the state. 
 In crafting an alternative platform for recognition, activists might 
have started with a portion of the origin myth that we have not yet 
examined, which demonstrates how people from hybrid backgrounds 
might be integrated into the Thangmi social world. 
 
When the brothers went to reclaim their arrows, they found a 
female child in the woods. She was the daughter of a forest spirit 
(T: apan; N: ban manche). They took her back with them and she 
joined the family, becoming the eighth sister… 
There was no one for her to marry, so she went to sit in 
meditation retreat in a cave. The Dolakha king heard that there 
was a woman sitting alone in the jungle from his royal hunters, 
and he requested that they bring this woman to him. He liked 
her, so he put his previous wife in a different house and married 
this Thangmi woman. After some time, the Thangmi brothers 
went to check on their sister in the cave, but to their surprise she 
was gone. They suspected the king, so they went to look for 
their sister in Dolakha. They did a funny dance with costumes 
and instruments to attract her attention, wherever she might be. 
She saw them out of the palace window, but told them not to 
touch her because she was pregnant with the king’s child. But 
eventually they convinced her to leave, and she came back to live 
with them in Suspa. Later she gave birth to twin boys, who 
became the first of the roimirati clan.46 
This eighth daughter, who does not appear in all versions of the myth, 
is given the clan name apan siri—“respected forest spirit”. In this way, 
she is brought into the Thangmi fold, but only to leave again to marry 
a Newar king. However, she does not “become” Newar as we might 
                                                
46 As recounted by Rana Bahadur. 
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expect, nor do her children; instead they all return to live as Thangmi, 
with the two sons becoming the primogenitors of two sub-clans within 
the overarching roimirati clan. Roimi means “Newar”, and rati is used 
interchangeably in Thangmi with jati, so roimirati means simply “the 
Newar group”.47 This clan continues to be well-represented all across 
the Thangmi world, and until very recently played a special ritual role 
in the Devikot-Khadga Jatra annual rituals that will be described in 
Chapter 8. Many members of the roimirati clan, such as the political 
activist and ritual lineage-holder Gopilal, are proud of what they view 
as their Newar heritage. Newars do not, however, recognize Thangmi 
roimirati as part of their community, despite the fact that the clan’s 
forefather was supposedly a Newar king. In short, this part of the myth 
provides a script for dealing with hybrid members—whether daughters 
of forest spirits or sons of Newar kings—by incorporating them 
through the creation and assignment of new clan names which 
underscore, rather than conceal, their hybrid origins. 
 
Becoming a Thangmi Ancestor 
There is little between marriage and death in one’s own life cycle to 
mark it as particularly Thangmi; there are no rituals surrounding 
                                                
47 In Dolakha the term roimirati can also be used to refer to the offspring of more 
recent unions between Newar men and Thangmi women. In Sindhupalchok, however, 
a distinction is made between members of the original roimirati clan and present-day 
children of such liaisons, the latter being called nagarkoti. See also Holmberg (1989: 
70) who attests to similar usage of this term among Tamang to refer to children of 
Newar men and Tamang women. 
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pregnancy, for instance, or the attainment of a certain age.48 But this 
does not mean that life is ritually empty. Rather, participating in other 
people’s life cycle rituals affords ample opportunities to fully realize 
one’s own Thangminess. 
 Funeral rituals provide the most fulsome context in which to do 
this, in large part because they are not contested in the way that all of 
the other rituals described in this chapter have been. The ritual 
sequence has a built-in provision for flexibility regarding certain 
pragmatic details (in the form of a myth, recited at the conclusion of 
every mumpra, that details the ritual’s own transformation over time), 
and this is perhaps part of what has allowed it to be so enduring, with 
relatively consistent structure and content across time and place.49 
Recall that the first ever Thangmi association, the Bhai Larke Thami 
Samaj, was founded in 1943 for the express purpose of organizing 
mumpra for its members, which suggests that there is a high degree of 
historical continuity in this ritual’s importance as a key identity 
practice. 
 In the ethnographic present, participation in the funerary rites of 
one’s family and friends was generally recognized as a diagnostic 
feature of Thangminess. The exceptions to this proved the rule: one 
family in a rural area of Darjeeling district was infamous for using 
lamas to part with their dead in a Buddhist style, while the Tumsong 
                                                
48 For example, the Newar bura janko, Hindu chaurasi puja or Tibetan Buddhist thar 
chang. 
49 Detailed descriptions of the Thangmi mumpra are also found in Chhetri (n.d.) and 
Sapkota (2045 VS). 
  478 
tea plantation family employed Hindu pandits, and some recent 
converts to Christianity in Nepal expressed an oppositional identity by 
abstaining from even the mumpra of their own immediate relatives.50 
These choices for alternative death rituals were routinely invoked by 
others (in the gossip of circular migrants, the speeches of activist 
leaders, and the rhetoric of gurus) as evidence that the individuals 
involved had lost or were losing their Thangminess. In Nepal, such 
doubt was generally expressed in the idiom of breaking kinship 
bonds—“if his faith does not allow him come to our father’s mumpra, 
he cannot be our brother any longer”—while in Darjeeling such choices 
were seen as a break in political ranks. In one case that I followed, the 
BTWA officers temporarily refused to give a recommendation letter for 
an OBC certificate to a member of a family who had not employed a 
guru for a recent mumpra, but this decision was reversed when the 
individual appealed with the argument that she had not been in control 
of that familial decision. At one Darjeeling mumpra, a mourning son’s 
request to “call a lama for a conference with our gurus” about the best 
way to conduct the funerary rites for his father was met with disdain by 
his brothers, who reprimanded their brother for challenging the guru’s 
authority in public, and thereby challenging their entire family’s 
reputation as Thangmi.  
                                                
50 For instance, Rana Bahadur’s youngest son (who had previously trained as a guru 
with his father) refused to participate in his father’s mumpra after he converted to 
Christianity. 
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Perhaps these powerful feelings arose in the context of the 
mumpra because, “the issue of death throws into relief the most 
important cultural values by which people live their lives and evaluate 
their experiences” (Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 25), or because “the 
community in its enduring aspect is constructed by reference to the 
dead” (Bloch and Parry 1982: 36). For the Thangmi, this was quite 
literally so, since the underground world of the ancestors to which 
spirits were dispatched through the mumpra was what anchored the 
soil upon which living Thangmi walked in their everyday lives. To 
question the efficacy of the Thangmi mumpra was to question the very 
potential for Thangmi social reproduction itself by negating the 
process through which Thangmi territory was constructed through the 
bodies of the ancestors. As described in Chapters 4 and 6, this 
territory and its stone symbols (the household bampa and the Suspa 
Bhumethan) had quite different valences within the ideological 
constructions of Thangminess in India and Nepal, but ultimately 
Thangmi territory was a sacred object for one and all. By embedding 
ancestral bodies in the land, the mumpra was the process through 
which individual souls became part of the communal sacred, and 
thereby the best link the living had to originary power. Moreover, as a 
paradigmatic synthetic ritual which seamlessly integrated elements 
associated with both Buddhist and Hindu practice within a distinctively 
Thangmi framework (legitimated as such by the figure of the guru as 
officiant, and the clan affiliations of the participants), it expressed in 
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ritual form the ideology of synthesis that underlay Thangmi subjectivity 
at multiple levels. 
For the vast majority of Thangmi who did employ guru to 
conduct mumpra, there was therefore not much debate over what the 
core ritual should entail. This was the event at which gurus most visibly 
demonstrated their powers, and even the most militant activists did 
not meddle with their mastery over ritual form during the actual 
practice of a mumpra—although they might seek to scripturalize 
components of it for later use.51 Early in my fieldwork, the one major 
difference that I noted between mumpras in Nepal and India was that 
in the former context, the funerary ritual cycle had three major phases, 
while in the latter only two were observed. In both locations, the same 
series of practices were repeated immediately after cremation and then 
13 days after death, while in Nepal they were repeated another time in 
between on the third day after death.52 This intermediate mumpra was 
called the black (T: kiji) or minor (T: ocyana) mumpra, and in India it 
had been condensed into the single major (T: jekha) mumpra which 
                                                
51 Nan Ni Patuko offers a brief overview of the ritual and part of the gardul puran (T) 
tale that is told at the end of the mumpra (Patuko 1997: 22-23). Thami Samudaya 
offers a more detailed schematic description of the ritual process, again in the style 
of instructions, which match well with what I observed take place in process on 
multiple occasions. The last line of the description states that the cheti (T), the woven 
mat on which offerings are placed during the mumpra, is “a unique identifier of the 
Thami community” (Samudaya 2061 [2056] VS: 85-92). 
52 Small children under five are buried in a special corner of the mosandanda instead 
of being cremated. Some guru claim that Thangmi once buried their adult dead as 
well, but if this is the case the practice ceased long ago, since it was not known to 
have occurred in living memory.  
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was conducted 13 days after the cremation.53 The actual ritual 
sequence was exactly the same for the minor and major mumpra, it 
was just a question of whether this sequence was repeated once or 
twice. The minor mumpra had long ago been dropped in India because 
most Thangmi were involved in wage labor there and could not afford 
to lose the additional time—as described in Chapter 5, it was difficult 
enough to raise the funds and participants for a single day-long ritual. 
Over the course of my fieldwork, many Thangmi in Nepal began to 
adopt the shorter ritual form common in India, as greater numbers of 
Thangmi began doing wage labor closer to home as well. While I had 
observed two minor mumpras in the late 1990s, by the mid-2000s 
they were becoming equally uncommon in Nepal. Hertz suggests that 
such condensations of ritual time are fairly common, and that they do 
not necessarily indicate diminished efficacy (2004[1907]: 200). 
In the ritual description that follows, I provide an overall sense of 
the process by drawing upon my observations of ten mumpras 
between 1999 and 2005 in various parts of Nepal and India, as well as 
further explanations of them elicited from gurus and laypeople. I argue 
that in its particular framing of the “homologies such as cosmological 
space::geographical space::local space::domestic space::bodily space 
(Bickel and Gaenszle 1999: 13), and, I would add, ethnic space, the 
Thangmi mumpra integrates a range of ritual orientations that have 
                                                
53 This particular timing was a relatively recent adjustment to Hindu norms; according 
to gurus and older lay informants, a generation ago all jekha mumpra were 
conducted only in the Nepali month of Pus (January-February), regardless of when 
the person died. 
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been classified as “tribal”, “Indic”, and “Tibetan” (Blondeau and 
Steinkellner 1996; Blondeau 1998; Bickel and Gaenszle 1999). At the 
level of discourse, contemporary Thangmi engaged in the process of 
defining themselves vis-à-vis state classification systems also struggle 
with the fact that these elements appear to “belong” to separate 
religious traditions. At the level of practice, however, these elements 
have long been closely interwoven, and synthetic engagement with 
them as mumpra participants in fact generates a strong sense of 
belonging to a Thangmi religious tradition in the holistic sense. In such 
situations, national discourses that equate ethnic distinctiveness with 
religious singularity render invisible groups like the Thangmi whose 
“tribal” nature is in fact premised on mixture in practice. 
My description and analysis refers to Hertz’s classic work on 
death riuals, as well as Metcalf and Huntington’s more recent 
extension of Hertz’s insights. In particular, Thangmi funerary rites 
follow the pattern of temporary burial as elucidated by Hertz, in which 
cremation, “far from destroying the body of the deceased ...  recreates 
it and makes it capable of entering a new life” (2004[1907]: 202). The 
subsequent reconstruction of the body with various food items provides 
a means of both dispatching the individual spirit, and validating 
Thangminess at the communal level. As Hertz explained, “It is the action 
of society on the body that gives full reality to the imagined drama of 
the soul” (2004[1907]: 210).  
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Ritual Actors 
There are four primary sets of actors involved in the mumpra. The first 
group is the kiryaputri (N), the sons and brothers of the deceased.54 
Thangmi kiryaputri must observe several ritual taboos which they share 
with their caste-Hindu counterparts, including those on the 
consumption of meat and salt, and any dancing or singing. More 
interesting than these generic taboos are another set of ritual 
prohibitions that emphasize the local boundaries of the funerary rites, 
and their integral role in defining Thangmi identity. The oldest son, or 
otherwise senior kiryaputri, must abide by the following injunctions for 
the period of time between the death and the mumpra:55 he cannot 
cross a river, he cannot sleep anywhere but in his own house, and he 
cannot speak with people from any other ethnic group. The integrity of 
the ritual process as a Thangmi-only affair occurring on Thangmi 
territory is established from the outset through these imperatives to 
maintain the boundaries of both geographical and ethnic space. In 
Darjeeling, the first two taboos are upheld, but the last one must 
usually be interpreted flexibly, since given the high rates of inter-
ethnic residence described above, close friends and neighbors who 
                                                
54 There is no Thangmi language term for this, or many other ritual concepts, and 
Nepali terms are used instead. The names of the items used to reconstruct the body 
of the deceased are the major exception to this rule, as described below. For a 
definition of kiryaputri and other Nepali terms in the Brahmanical Hindu context, see 
Michaels (1999). 
55 In cases where the minor mumpra is performed three days after death, these 
taboos are lifted after that first ritual sequence, but if, as is more common now, only 
the major mumpra is performed 13 days after death, the taboos must be observed 
until that time. 
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want to be involved in the event are often from other ethnic groups. 
Latte Apa reinterpreted the ethnic taboo in geographical terms by 
instructing mourners not to speak with anyone who did not live within 
the immediate vicinity of the deceased’s house, but he also explicitly 
reminded the participants that this was a deviation from the original 
necessitated by the pragmatic reality of life in Darjeeling. 
The second actor is the kutumba (N), whom, according to the 
Thangmi definition of the term, must be a male out-clan member from 
one of the six clan groups other than that of the deceased.56 Often this 
role is played by a damari (T; N: jvai; son-in-law or husband of 
younger sister) or jarphu (N: bhenajyu; husband of elder sister), but 
this role may also be played by any other out-clan member who is not 
directly related to the deceased.57 The celibeti (N), or immediate female 
relatives of the deceased, also play a prominent role. Throughout the 
ritual cycle, they are responsible for arranging and bringing syandang 
(T), the primary food offerings for the deceased. 
Last but not least are the gurus who officiate from the point of 
death through the end of the funerary rites. Often, a senior guru like 
Rana Bahadur, Guru Maila, or Latte Apa will be accompanied by three 
or four younger gurus in training, who help gather the diverse array of 
                                                
56 Turner’s definition suggests that Nepali usage of the word kutumba is similar, 
although slightly different in scope: “Family, relations, esp. relatives of daughter’s 
husband’ (Turner 1997 [1931]: 96). 
57 The Thangmi do not fit the pattern described by Oppitz for both the Magar and 
Gurung in which the death ritual largely serves to cement affinal ties by assigning the 
bulk of the ritual work to the deceased’s son-in-law (1982). Since the Thangmi do 
not practice matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, which is the partial prerequisite for 
Oppitz’s model, this is not overly surprising. 
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items needed for ritual offerings and construct these while the senior 
guru chants his paloke. Together, they are responsible for managing 
the transformations of the body as it is disposed of, reconstructed, and 
ultimately attached to the land as an ancestor. 
 
The Funeral Procession 
After a tiger’s bone horn (T: mirkang)58 is blown by the acting kutumba 
to announce the death, the family and other ritual actors gather at the 
home of the deceased. A bier (T: marangseng) to carry the body is 
made out of two bamboo or wood sticks (T: kapa), and three supports 
of bamboo or wood are attached to the bier at the level of the corpse’s 
feet, chest, and forehead, which are considered the definitive points of 
the body. In the past, the corpse was usually tied on to the bier with a 
rope of Himalayan nettle (T: nangai; N: allo; Girardinia diversifolia).59 In 
contemporary practice, the corpse is usually tied with babiyo (N; 
Ischaemum angustifolium) or with strips of fabric torn from a white 
cummerbund. Guru stress the importance of securing the corpse with a 
cord of natural materials rather than the plastic ropes and twine now 
available. The presence of a synthetic material would interfere with the 
body’s reintegration with the land, a prerequisite for the spirit’s timely 
departure. 
                                                
58 This is sometimes replaced by a conch shell (N: sankha) in both Nepal and India. 
59 Latin terms are cited from Turin (2003). 
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 Before the funeral procession begins, small amounts of husked 
and unhusked rice are arranged as offerings on leaf plates, and placed 
in a small home-made wooden bowl (T: toke). A tool is placed on top 
of the rice—a knife for a man or a sickle for a woman—and the entire 
offering bowl is placed on a bamboo tray (T: lembe).60 The corpse 
bearers (T: guthimi) will carry this tray as they walk, along with a hoe, 
altered so that the blade faces the opposite direction from its normal 
placement,61 and an axe to cut the firewood for the cremation. Two 
small flags of white cloth are attached to bamboo poles and carried 
ahead of the corpse. These will be used to mark the head and foot of 
the body after its cremation and absorption into the land. 
Now the procession prepares to set off from the house to the 
cremation ground, called the mosandanda (T), meaning “ridge of the 
spirits”. Each Thangmi settlement in Nepal has its own mosandanda, 
usually located in the forest at an uninhabited high point above the 
village. The preference for a high point is not dictated by a belief that 
the hill itself is the abode of a deity, or that high points are believed to 
be closer to the sky/heaven/deities, as has been detailed for many Rai 
communities (cf. Gaenzsle 1999, Forbes 1998). Rather, guru explain 
                                                
60 This is one of a number of gender markers found throughout the ritual. Men 
usually carry knives, whereas women carry sickles for their field work, and the 
associated tool travels with them in death. 
61 Such inversions are a common feature of death rituals throughout the Himalayas. 
Allen tells us that in Thulung Rai death rites, “the dead man is told forcibly to depart 
to where he belongs, to the village of the ancestors. The sharpness of separation is 
expressed by reversal of the orientations that he has obeyed while alive” (1972: 86). 
Gaenszle describes the phenomenon among the Mewahang Rai, explaining that 
“symbolic inversions of the ordinary world signal that the deceased is no longer part 
of it … (1999: 56). 
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the preference as a practical choice: the only uninhabited areas are 
found above villages, and since it is essential that the ritual be 
conducted in a place where the land can be donated, in fact deeded, to 
the deceased, it cannot be land belonging to anyone else. In recent 
years, many of the mosandanda in rural Nepal have been recognized as 
dharmik ban (N: religious forests)—by the state, and are thereby 
protected from encroachment. Each of the seven male Thangmi clans 
has its own designated area on the mosandanda, and the corpse must 
be burned in the appropriate location (see Figure 7.4). Women are now 
cremated in the space designated for their husband’s clan; it is not 
clear whether they may once have had separate cremation sites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 One of seven cremation platforms at the newly refurbished 
mosandanda in Suspa-Kshamawati VDC, Dolakha, Nepal, March 2007 
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In the more densely populated, multi-ethnic urban setting of 
Darjeeling, such exclusive cremation grounds are an impossibility. 
Thangmi cremate their dead at government-built concrete shelters 
available at the outskirts of each settlement. This means that guru 
must conduct an additional set of preliminary chants which first 
sanctify this public place as particularly Thangmi, and then as the 
appropriate cremation site for the clan of the deceased. In so doing, 
gurus invoke the attributes of mosandanda as found in Thangmi 
villages in Nepal, just as they make reference to the Suspa Bhume when 
consecrating new Bhume shrines in Darjeeling (see Chapter 6). In this 
way, despite the geographical distances between the two locations, the 
ancestral territory in which bodies are embedded are ritually 
continuous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 A funeral procession stops to make offerings at a 
crossroads under Latte Apa’s guidance, Rangbull, Darjeeling, January 
2005 
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A conch shell is blown to announce the procession to the 
cremation site. As the large group of mourners and hangers-on slowly 
walks up the hill, the corpse bearers throw roasted unhusked rice (T: 
layo < N: laya) at each crossroads (see Figure 7.5). The corpse’s head 
must face forward as it is carried. At the base of the mosandanda, or 
just in front of the concrete shelter, the corpse bearers dig thrice in the 
ground with the inverted hoe, and the layo is offered over the hole. The 
corpse is paraded around this hole three times counter-clockwise, and 
as it completes its final circumambulation, the corpse is turned so that 
the feet are now facing forward for the remainder of the journey. This 
journey to the top of the hill has parallels in the Magar and Gurung 
processions to cremation or interment places (cf. Oppitz 1982; 
Pettigrew 1999). However, in the Thangmi situation, the journey does 
not refer to a historical point of origin or other cosmological voyage. It 
takes place within known territory, on paths which the participants 
walk every day of their lives. The processional route must be marked 
out as temporary ritual territory by scattering grains at each 
intersection, an action which attaches literal importance to the earth 
that is trodden upon. Ann Armbrecht Forbes describes a similar pattern 
of temporary sacrality in the Yamphu Rai community: “ … trees, rocks, 
mountains become sacred when incorporated into metaphorical 
journeys that re-enact the travels of the ancestors. Once the journeys 
are over, the places are no longer sacred” (1998: 111). In the Yamphu 
case, however, the funeral procession is linked to the collective mytho-
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historical “journey of the ancestors”, while for the Thangmi each 
funeral procession stands as an inherently effective practice event in 
the present. 
 
Cremation: Attaching the Body to the Land 
The procession now reaches the cremation site, where a funeral pyre is 
built. Six thurmi are planted in the ground in two parallel lines, 
defining the area where the corpse is to be burnt. The finely carved 
image of a guru’s thurmi will be familiar from the discussion in 
Chapter 3 in which it comes to serve as a symbol of Thangmi identity 
for the BTWA. Here, by contrast, the nails are rough-hewn pieces of 
wood which will be burnt in the crematory fire, and in themselves have 
little symbolic value; it is the work that they effect—pinning the body 
to the land—that is important. On top of these stakes, a wooden 
platform of seven layers is built with thin strips of overlapping wood. 
The corpse is paraded around the structure three times, and the tiger 
bone horn or conch shell is blown. A small fire (T*: rojeme) is made 
some distance from the corpse, and from this three torches are lit. One 
kiryaputri places a torch at the corpse’s head, and another places one 
at the corpse’s feet. The last torch is placed at the corpse’s chest by 
the kutumba. An entire small tree called chyatamarang (T*) is placed 
on the pyre and burned with the corpse. 
The act of “pinning down” the body at once suggests both a 
“body-based” concept of spatiality that invokes the “Indic” concept of 
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the mandala to establish links between the body and the cardinal 
directions (Bickel and Gaenszle 1999: 19),62 and a “tribal” version of 
this, which, “is based on territorial notions (e.g. sacred mountains) that 
are largely absent in the traditional Indic conception” (Bickel and 
Gaenszle 1999: 19). Janet Gyatso outlines the archetypal Tibetan myth 
of a demoness’ subjugation by “horizontal crucifixion”—attachment to 
the land by a series of nails (Gyatso 1987)—through which her body 
parts (liver, bones, blood, hair, etc) become embodied in local 
geographical features. Versions of this story are found throughout the 
Tibetan and Himalayan world;63 a Thangmi take on it in which the body 
of the demon Madhukaite (also known as Markepapa) becomes 
embedded in local territory was presented Chapter 6 as part of the 
Bhume paloke. Wherever a variation of this story is told, corporeality 
provides an orienting structure for notions of directionality and 
location, with the local landscape perceived as pieces of the demonic 
body. 
The Thangmi practice of “pinning down” a corpse before 
cremation occurs on a more local, human scale, but the effect is 
similar. As we shall see below, the piece of ground to which the corpse 
is attached adopts the features of the body itself, at the same time as 
                                                
62 Bickel and Gaenszle contrast this body-based notion of spatiality to what they call 
the “geomorphic” spatiality common among Kiranti groups (Bickel and Gaenszle 
1999: 17), in which space is ordered according to directional notions derived from 
mountainous geography, rather than the human body. The Thangmi language 
demonstrates evidence of both geomorphic and homomorphic forms of spatial 
ordering (Turin personal communication). 
63 See also Ramble (2008). 
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the physical body is believed to become part of this territory. Although 
the corpse lays claim to only one small piece of land demarcated by the 
six wooden stakes, the concept of embodied land is abstracted and the 
physical earth and the underworld in general are conceptualized not 
only as the realm of the ancestors, but as physically constructed by 
their bodies. What better way to feel like one belongs than by laying 
claim to territory by linking it to the bodies of one’s ancestors?  
Thangmi laypeople sometimes use the Hindu idiom of sworga 
(N)—“heaven”, with all of its skyward implications—to describe the final 
destination of the spirit after death, but the ritual chants used to 
dispose of the body and disptach the spirit focus on the underworld. 
This is not conceptualized as a Judeo-Christian hell, but as a 
subterranean spirit world where the marginalized position of the 
Thangmi in the above-ground human world is reversed. As Latte Apa 
once explained: 
 
The deities hid all of our sacred objects underground. That is 
why the ancestors must go there, so that they can finally use 
them. It is their territory, our real Thangmi territory. This is why 
Thangmi history is so unknown, because nothing is obvious 
aboveground. 
Perhaps this valorization of the underworld was part of what made it 
possible for inhabitants of Khaldo Hotel (described in Chapter 4) to 
rationalize the difficulties of their daily existence.64  
 
 
                                                
64 Unfortunately I was not able to pose direct questions about this. 
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Reconstructing the Body 
In the next segment of the mumpra, we encounter a set of practices 
which invokes, “a recurrent theme in Hindu religious thought … the 
homology which is held to exist between the body and the cosmos” 
(Parry 1994: 30). This inverts the Tibetan concept in which the body is 
embedded in territory by suggesting that “all the gods and the whole 
of space are present within the human body” (Parry 1994: 30).65 Before 
the corpse is completely reduced to ashes, one piece of flesh is 
removed and offered to the spirit as it leaves its body, along with the 
leftover unhusked and cooked rice, the knife or sickle, and the wooden 
handle of the hoe that had been turned backwards. Called sikitip (T), 
the last bit of flesh represents the body of the deceased itself and 
forms the focal point of the next part of the ritual cycle back at the 
deceased’s house. After the cremation is completed, two flags are 
placed at the head and foot of the funeral pyre. 
All of the participants return down the hill following the exact 
route they used to climb it, and bathe in the nearest river or water tap. 
The officiating guru follows at the end of the procession and is the last 
to bathe. As he bathes, he chants: “The deceased’s spirit is under the 
earth, the spirits of the living are above the earth,” a phrase that recurs 
throughout the entire ritual cycle. After washing, the group returns to 
                                                
65 Parry continues to explain that this notion is “explicitly elaborated in the Garuda 
Purana (part 15), to which the Banaras sacred specialists continually refer” (1994: 30). 
The Thangmi mumpra concludes with a reference to this text. However, the ritual 
segment that Thangmi guru refer to as the gardul puran does not match the content 
of the actual Garuda Purana text, while the earlier ritual segment known as the 
sikitipko bhakha has some narrative overlap with the Garuda Purana. 
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the base of the mosandanda or the cremation shelter, where at the 
outset of the procession a hole had been dug with the inverted hoe. 
There branches of thorny plants are collected to fill up the hole. This 
prevents the spirit from returning to the world of the living from the 
high funeral pyre, and encourages it to accept the transformations its 
body has undergone. 
Then the entire group returns to the deceased’s house, where 
the gurus conduct the sikitipko bhakha (T). In the next ritual phase the 
spirit of the deceased will be transferred from the sikitip to an 
assemblage of foodstuffs out of which its body is reconstructed. Until 
the body is properly honored and is led through the process of 
regeneration as part of the earth itself, the spirit of the deceased 
remains improperly in the land of the living. It is the status of the body 
itself which determines the location of the spirit, or as Metcalf and 
Huntington rephrase Hertz’s original insight, “the fate of the body is a 
model for the fate of the soul” (Metcalf and Huntington 1991: 34). Until 
the body is ritually transformed into a feature of the local landscape, 
the spirit cannot depart. Until that time, it hangs around in domestic 
space, inhabiting various parts of the house like the base of the stairs 
(T: calipole), the base of the millstone (T: yantepole), the base of the 
doorframe (T: kharoupole), the base of the hearth (T: thapupole), and 
the rooftop (N: dhuri). In the days between death and the final funeral 
rite, small offerings of rice must be made in these places to feed the 
spirit. The rites conducted in later phases of the cycle embody the 
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spirit in different objects, ultimately a chicken, in which form it may 
finally depart from the land of the living. Each of these successive 
embodiments emphasizes a different component part of the soul, all of 
which are simultaneously present in the living, but which must be 
dispatched separately in death. Gurus used the analogy of peeling 
away the layers of an onion to describe this ritual process. 
 The process of reconstructing the body with foodstuffs that 
double as offerings to the deceased occurs repeatedly throughout the 
ritual cycle, and stands as one of the most prominent features of the 
entire process.66 Two long pieces of wood (T*: ulangseng) are placed 
parallel to each other on the ground. On top of these a bamboo mat (T: 
cheti; T*: elebethere) is built, always eight by eight strips square. A 
large, flat “funeral leaf”, or mumpra aja (T) is placed upside down on 
top of the bamboo mat. Ground millet flour is sprinkled on top of the 
leaves. All of the other collected items are placed on top (see Figure 
7.6). The chicken which will eventually embody the spirit is also 
procured at this time, shown to the assembled guests, and then put 
away until the final funeral rite some days later. 
                                                
66 The funerary rituals of many other Himalayan ethnic groups are notable for their 
emphasis on effigies of the deceased (cf. Ramble 1982 on Tibetan communities of 
Mustang, and Oppitz 1982 on the Magar). Descriptions of Thakali (Vinding 1982) and 
Newar (Gellner 1992) funerary rites mention body reconstructions with food items, 
but as ritual components of minor importance compared with the effigy, which 
remains the primary marker of the deceased. In the Thangmi rite, no effigy exists 
other than this assemblage of foodstuffs, which highlights again the direct 
correlation between the body and the land via natural products directly linked to 
body parts rather than through a more abstract “human-like” representation. In this 
regard, the Thangmi process of reconstructing the body appears more like the 
orthodox Hindu “refinement of the body” described by Parry in Banaras (1994: 
Chapter 6) than anything else. 
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Figure 7.6 Latte Apa and his colleagues begin chanting, with the 
mumpra offerings laid out on leaves atop bamboo mats. Rangbull, 
Darjeeling, January 2005 
Then the gurus begin their chants, first recounting what has 
already occurred at the ridge-top cremation ground. The entire ritual is 
described, and the relationship between body and land is finally made 
explicit. The spirit is reminded that it has been granted a piece of land, 
the very same piece of land which it has become: 
This offering has now been given.  
Now that piece of land [as defined by thurmi] has been put aside 
for you. Isn’t that so? 
 
On this small piece of land, a flag has also been planted where 
your forehead was. Isn’t that so? 
 
And at your feet another flag has been planted. Yes now, 
And on this piece of land a seed has also been planted. 
And cooked rice and vegetables have been placed on your pillow. 
Isn’t that so? 
 
The spirits of the dead are under the ground, the spirits of the 
living are exposed above the ground but are contemptible in 
comparison. Isn’t that so? 
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Now we have arrived at the house of the funeral rites, so listen to 
this melody of the sikitip. 
Through this melody of the sikitip now your body has become 
one with the mud of the earth. 
Your body has become one with the rocks. Isn’t that so? 
 
From above you have become one with the trees and seedlings, 
now you have become one with the weeds and bushes of the 
jungle. Isn’t that so? The spirit of death that killed you, don’t 
send it to us. 
Once the body has been disposed of and integrated into the 
land, the focus shifts to reconstructing the body with food items, each 
identified with a specific part of the body.67 These items are all 
products of the fertile soil into which the deceased’s body has been 
integrated, and therefore can be used to regenerate a new “body” 
inseparable from the land itself. This body then serves as the conduit 
through which the spirit can be escorted away from the land of the 
living. All of the food items are brought forward and offered on a 
mumpra aja, and the chant continues:  
 
The pieces of wood below are your shinbones, so come. Having 
said that these are your shinbones, come. Yes now. 
 
From the bamboo mat all of your ribs have been made, so come. 
Yes now. 
 
Having made these funeral leaves your skin, come. Yes now. 
 
From the flour is made all of your fat, so come! Yes now. 
 
From the soybeans are made your eyes, so come! Yes now. 
 
                                                
67 Kashinath Tamot has informed me that a substantial number of these body-part 
terms in Thangmi ritual language have cognates in the early classical Newar language 
(personal communication). See also Turin (2004a) on Thangmi/Newar lexical 
correspondences and Shneiderman (2002) for a detailed list of the Thangmi and 
Nepali names of each food item used in the mumpra. 
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From the upside down breads are made your two ears, so come! 
Yes now. 
 
From the corn is made all of your teeth, so come! Yes now. 
 
Now having made these ritual offerings, from the yams are made 
your brain, so come! Yes now. 
 
Having made your kidneys in the name of the grain balls, come! 
Yes now. 
 
From one of the upside down breads is made your spleen, so 
come! Yes now. 
 
From the rice ball is also made your heart, so come! Yes now. 
 
Don’t say this isn’t enough, don’t get angry. Yes now. 
 
Since we have made these offerings to you, spirit, don’t send us 
other death spirits. Yes now. 
After reconstructing the body, the gurus call the spirits of the 
dead to the feast. The spirits are invited to eat as well, so as to protect 
the living from their wrath. The ritual then concludes with the following 
lines, and nothing more is done until the mumpra several days later: 
 
Your sons have been sitting here, your daughter-in-laws are also 
sitting here. Isn’t that so? 
 
If these things alone were not enough, we have pledged this 
small piece of land in your name. Isn’t that so? . . . 
 
Don’t say anything, don’t do anything (against us). Yes now . . . 
 
From the hand of the lama bonpo food has been provided on an 
upside down leaf. Isn’t that so? 
Having done as such now, the lama bonpo’s melody is finished. 
Yes now . . . 
 
With the long hand make offerings (T*: sawo), with the short 
hand offer salutes (T*: nothio). Yes now. 
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Throughout the day’s recitation, the themes of territoriality and 
embodiment are revisited a number of times. As the ritual comes to a 
close, the spirit is expected to have understood and accepted the 
transformations of its body which have occurred: it has first been 
cremated, then both absorbed by the earth and given dominion over it 
as an ancestor, then reconstructed with products of the earth. At this 
point, the spirit should be placated and honored with its new position 
as an ancestor embodied in the land beneath its descendants’ feet. 
 
Finalizing Death 
The ritual is then concluded for the day. The next part of the cycle is 
the habise, as described at the beginning of this chapter, which occurs 
the night before both the minor or major mumpra. While the mourners 
chant om mani padme hum, the gurus propitiate a range of territorial 
deities, to whom the mourners present cooked rice as offerings.68 
These are then disposed of outside, and the spirit begins the next step 
in its journey during the itil isako bhakha (T), which takes place on the 
same night as the habise. The spirit is transferred into an offering of 
rice contained in a small open-weave bamboo basket that looks like a 
muzzle for an animal, known as the itil isa (T*). After the basket is 
                                                
68 The latter part of this ritual is called sergyam (T) and may have some link to 
Macdonald’s description of a Tamang propitiatory song called “sergem la hvai”, in 
which: “the officiant, after having offered rice to the divinities of the four cardinal 
points, of the underworld, of the atmosphere, of the village, and of his house, 
requests the help of … many other divinities.” He then comments that, “One notes in 
these invocations the syncretic aspects and the lack of sectarianism. They seem to be 
rooted as often in the great as in the little Nepalese religious traditions, which in turn 
are derived from Indian and Tibetan models” (1975: 134-135). 
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hung outside on top of a wooden stake, each mourner must add a 
handful of cooked rice to the basket. Then each male relative sprinkles 
a few drops of purified water on top of the rice. Sitting outside, the 
entire party drinks grain beer, which on this occasion only is called rem 
(T*). The habise chanting continues all night, and when it becomes 
light, the itil isa is thrown out of the basket as an offering to the spirit 
of the deceased. The kutumba must carry the rice across a river in 
order to dispose of it. In Darjeeling, some families also light 108 small 
butter lamps during the habise as offerings to the deceased, but this 
ritual addition in the Buddhist idiom was not universally accepted as 
part of Thangmi practice. 
In the morning, after the itil isa has been disposed of, the main 
portion of the mumpra begins. The mourners shave their heads and 
don white clothes, wearing only one of their shirt-sleeves in the same 
manner as Hindu mourners. Another ritual basket is arranged, called 
solo (T*), which looks similar to the one used the night before, with 
layers of leaves and rice, but this one is topped off with three walnuts. 
This basket is placed in front of the gurus at the beginning of the 
ritual. Later in the day, the spirit of the deceased will be transferred to 
this container. 
The gurus sit outside under a temporary shelter which has been 
constructed especially for the mumpra. Inside, two large rice balls (T: 
phorokko isa; N: pinda) are made. These must be molded very carefully 
so that they do not break as other offerings are placed on top of them, 
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as this would bring bad luck upon the family of the deceased. They are 
brought outside and placed on an upside down funeral leaf in front of 
the gurus. This is then placed on one of the bamboo mats that has 
been made, while the other offerings of the body are placed on the 
second bamboo mat. One of these is for offerings from those whose 
parents are still alive, while the other is for those whose parents are 
deceased—these mourners must make an additional offering to their 
own parents’ ancestral spirits. 
As the gurus chant, the female relatives of the deceased now 
place offerings on the bamboo mats, including millet flour, cooked 
rice, milk, and bottles of beer or spirits. These are offered to the 
deceased. The women also bring plain breads and alcohol to offer to 
the mourners. All of the mourners throw cooked rice on the funeral 
leaves to demonstrate that they are no longer ritually polluted by 
death. The taboo on eating salt is now lifted. Then the guru collects 
offerings of rice from the mourners, and gives them to the kutumba, 
who consolidates them in his hand and circles them three times around 
the large rice balls. Then offerings must be made to the each of the 
seven male and female Thangmi clans. In theory, a representative of 
each clan should be present, but given the lack of agreement on what 
the seven original clans are, as described above, there is no way to 
adhere to this rule strictly. Instead, members of as many clans as 
possible are invited, and each individual receives a portion of the 
offering, even if this means that it must eventually be divided into 
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more than the original seven pieces. It is for this moment of the 
mumpra that people make the most effort to be present; the 
opportunity to represent one’s clan is not to be missed, and people 
often vie with each other to actually receive the clan offering if more 
than one member of their clan is present. The rice balls are left 
outside, and when the gurus’ chants are completed, they call the spirit 
to come and eat. Then the rice ball is placed on an upside down 
bamboo tray. The kutumba picks it up and walks far enough to cross a 
river (or even a small stream or drainage pipe) and disposes of it. This 
section of the ritual is known as daciko bhakha (T), after the offerings, 
which are called daci (T*). 
The reconstruction of the body that was performed on the day of 
death is now repeated by the gurus in exactly the same manner (here 
this is called sereringko bhakha [T] rather than sikitipko bhakha). When 
the chants and offerings are completed, everyone eats. To extend the 
funeral feast with a moment of comic relief, now a bawdy skit about 
going hunting is enacted. This is called ahare thesa (T*; N: shikar 
khelne), and must be performed by two kutumba. They procure a long 
piece of wood, to which they tie a small piece of red meat, which is 
called ahare (T*).69 The two kutumba carry this long stick between 
them on their shoulders, shouting, “let’s go hunting!” They walk a ways 
                                                
69 Some gurus claim that in the past a whole animal was used. This suggests that as 
in the wedding ritual, there may have been an unsavory (from the perspective of the 
Hindu state) use of cow meat here, which was done away with during the period of 
Hinduization described above. However, if this is the case, it is unclear why it did not 
lead to wholesale restructuring of the mumpra as it did for the bore. 
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above the shelter where the ritual continues, but within shouting 
distance. They shout down lewd sexual comments about the 
participants from above, supposedly to embarrass the spirit and make 
it want to leave. Then they return, as if from a hunt, and approach the 
gurus, who ask them questions about their hunt. “Where did you go?” 
“What did you kill?” “To which deities did you make offerings for good 
luck?” The gurus then instruct the hunters to remove their “kill” (the 
small piece of meat) and roast it. Then they return the meat to the 
gurus, who place it on the full bamboo mat, saying, “Look, spirit, we’ve 
brought you a fine kill from the big forest! Spirit, come and eat!”. In 
Darjeeling, this component of the ritual was often felt to be so obscene 
that women were asked to leave (including me), while in Nepal, women 
as well as men eagerly looked forward to this part of the ritual, and 
one and all enjoyed a good laugh. 
 The spirit now begins its final journey. In the next three sections 
of the ritual, it is called and controlled by the gurus, transferred from 
the bamboo mat—where it has been residing since it was called to eat 
the piece of meat—to the solo basket which has been waiting since the 
morning, and ultimately dispatched to the realm of the ancestors in the 
body of a chicken, or thang (T*). Unlike during the earlier phases of the 
ritual, where the gurus’ attitude towards the spirit was one of cajoling 
appeasement, they now take a firmer attitude towards the spirit, 
scolding and in fact threatening it with consequences if it does not act 
appropriately by departing at this crucial moment. Now residing in the 
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solo, the spirit must be moved once again, this time to the chicken that 
was put aside for this purpose at the time of death some days before. 
The senior guru holds the chicken tightly, directing his chanting 
towards it. After repeating the chants to call the spirit into the body of 
the chicken several times in an increasingly threatening tone, the guru 
holding the chicken tips it down to eat some of the rice in the solo 
basket. If the chicken eats, the spirit is happy and has entered into the 
chicken, but if the bird doesn’t eat, the spirit is still unconvinced. 
Usually it takes quite some time to compel the bird to eat, and the 
gurus repeat the chants to call the spirit into the body of the bird, with 
different family members taking turns holding the chicken, until it 
eventually eats. Whoever is holding the chicken when it eats is believed 
to be the favorite family member of the deceased. As soon as the spirit 
has entered into the chicken, the bird becomes known as the gongor 
pandu (T*). Once this happens, the temporary shelter built for the 
ritual is immediately broken down. 
Then, while holding the chicken, the gurus go into trance, 
shaking hard, in order to accompany the spirit on its final journey to 
the realm of the ancestors. Finally, the chief guru throws the chicken 
over a ridge and falls backward, fainting into the arms of someone who 
is waiting behind to catch him (see Figure 7.7). This is the mumpra’s 
climactic moment, for which everyone gathers around to watch, both  
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Figure 7.7 Guru Maila faints after throwing the thang. Pashelung, 
Suspa-Kshamawati VDC, Dolakha, Nepal, November 1999 
out of a somewhat voyeuristic desire to see the powerful guru faint,70 
and out of a practical one to receive affirmation that the soul has 
finally departed from the land of the living and will not cause further 
trouble. Once the chicken is thrown, its name changes again, and it 
becomes known as the thang (T*). After returning to consciousness, 
but still in trance, the guru confirms that the deceased has reached the 
underworld realm of the ancestors, and he can also see if anyone else’s 
soul has been wrongly taken along. If this has indeed happened, an 
                                                
70 This is both a demonstration of the guru’s power—in his capacity to access the 
ancestral world—and a public admission of the limits of it, since doing this makes 
him lose consciousness entirely, in a manner different from any other ritual trance. 
Several people (particularly those involved with activist projects) commented that the 
fact that gurus lost consciousness at this point demonstrated that their power was 
not absolute, and could perhaps be refashioned in other forms. 
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additional ritual component called the ayu (T; similar to the jokhana 
divination during the Bhume propitiation described in Chapter 6) is 
conducted in order to recall this person’s soul to the world of the 
living. After the chicken is thrown, the kutumba collects it and may 
keep it or eat it as he sees fit. 
In an anti-climactic moment in which everyone has already 
begun to disperse, the ritual concludes with the chief guru recounting 
a myth about how the Thangmi conducted their death rituals long ago. 
This is called the gardul puran (T),71 a name which is clearly related to 
the Garuda Purana, a Hindu funerary text (cf. Parry 1994: 30). Beyond 
the fact that both are about the process of conducting death rituals 
themselves, however, the specific content does not appear to be 
directly related. Rana Bahadur narrated it as follows: 
 
Long ago, one child went missing from each Thangmi 
house. No one knew where their children had gone. One clever 
man finally devised a series of traps to catch the child-stealing 
culprit: he hid an egg in the fireplace, he dropped an ant in the 
oil, and put a snake in the water jug. Finally, he set a mousetrap 
on the threshold of his house and fashioned an arrow out of 
bamboo, which he left on the veranda of the house. He left one 
child inside the house, while he hid to watch what happened. 
Lo and behold, a woman came to eat the child. First she 
stoked the fire, but the egg hidden inside the fireplace burst and 
burnt her eyes. Then she tried to wash her face with the water, 
but the snake bit her. Then she tried to rub oil on the wound to 
soothe it, but the ant in the oil bit her. She was in so much pain 
that she tried to run away, but she got caught in the mousetrap, 
and then finally tripped on the line attached to the arrow, which 
shot out and pierced her skin. She still tried to escape, but she 
dripped blood all along the path as she ran. And the man who 
                                                
71 Some gurus refer to this as alolorungko kura (T), referring to the reed mat (T: 
alolorung) in which corpses were wrapped before the advent of cotton cloth. 
  507 
had set the traps followed her. Finally she reached a cave, where 
she fell down and started wailing from the pain, “Aya! Aya!”. She 
was about to die, when the man who had followed her 
confronted her, saying, “Aha! You haven’t learned anything 
through your escapades. And now you’re about to die. But I 
won’t kill you. I will bring you whatever you need to die 
peacefully. What do you need?” 
She said, “I need 360 bundles of wood, 360 funeral 
bearers, 360 axes, 360 sickles, 360 wooden nails, 360 fire 
tongs, 360 piles of wood, 360 dead oxen, and 360 buckets of 
grain beer. So the man collected all of these things, and the 
woman died. The 360 funeral bearers took her body to the 
cremation site. They had to wash 360 times after cremating her. 
In the old days, this is what was needed to conduct a 
mumpra. If all of these things weren’t collected, the spirit would 
not depart the world of the living. These were the traditions for a 
long time. 
Many years later, an orphan came along. He was a funeral 
bearer at a mumpra along with 359 other people. Each person 
was supposed to bring one of each of the necessary items to 
make up the required 360. But the orphan went to the funeral 
with nothing in hand. Everything was counted at the cremation 
ground, and it was noticed that one of each item was missing, 
and the orphan was found out. The others said, “Well, you go sit 
by the corpse, and we’ll go collect the extra things you neglected 
to bring.” While he was sitting there waiting, the corpse came 
back to life and started a fight with the orphan. The corpse said, 
“Why have you tied me up in three places?” As the corpse and the 
orphan argued, they kept changing places. The corpse would 
jump out of his shrouds, and the orphan would jump in. Then 
suddenly, they saw the other funeral bearers returning. But at 
that moment, the corpse was outside and the orphan was inside 
the shroud. So the corpse called out, “Eh! The funeral bearers are 
coming! Come out and I’ll go in!” But the orphan just scolded the 
corpse. The corpse was afraid that the funeral bearers would hit 
him if they found him out of the shroud. Finally, the orphan 
agreed to come out, saying, “But you, corpse, must promise to 
do whatever I say.” The corpse agreed.  
The orphan began: “From now on, corpses should not be 
wrapped in such elaborate shrouds. From now on, only three 
funeral bearers should be necessary.” And he reduced all of the 
numbers to three. Instead of the 360 oxen, he asked that only 
one small bird be offered. He continued, “If I can be burned 
quickly with just one small flame, rather than with all the pomp 
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and ceremony of 360 piles of wood, I will come out of your 
shroud.” The corpse agreed, and they changed places, just as the 
funeral bearers were returning. They were so upset that they had 
had to collect the extra wood and waste time, so they ordered 
the orphan to make the funeral pyre on his own. So they all left 
and went to bathe 360 times. The orphan set the fire, and the 
corpse was burned easily in just a minute. And the orphan 
bathed just three times. While the others were still bathing 360 
times, the orphan went to the deceased’s house. He was already 
there when the other funeral bearers arrived. Confused, they 
asked him how he had finished the work so quickly, and got 
angry with him, not believing that he had burned the corpse 
properly. But when the guru and the mourners had to prepare 
rice to feed the spirit three days and three nights after the 
cremation [in the minor mumpra], they saw that indeed the body 
had been fully burned. They believed the orphan, and when they 
returned, he explained the new system to them and said, “From 
now on we won’t go to such extravagant expenses. We don’t 
need 360 of everything.” 
And that is the end of the story.72 
 In reciting this statement of flexibility at the end of each 
mumpra, gurus themselves recognize the possibilities for, and 
sometimes necessity of, ritual change. Many have experienced such 
contingencies in their own lifetimes, and have molded the ritual 
accordingly, for example, in the way that Latte Apa modified the taboo 
on not speaking with members of other ethnic groups. Just as the 
ritual holds within its form diverse ritual elements, as well as multiple 
orientations towards embodied territoriality, it also provides a 
framework for pragmatic adjustment. All of these factors have 
contributed to making it so resilient, and more recent campaigns for 
reform like the one outlined in the gardul puran have in fact been 
                                                
72 Every mumpra that I witnessed concluded with this explicit statement of conclusion 
from the guru, so I have included it here even though it may appear to be outside the 
frame of the story itself. 
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successful—such as one led by Jhapa-based activists in the early 2000s 
to reduce the amount of alcohol consumed during mumpra rituals. Like 
the protagonist of the gardul puran, these Thangmi ethnic activists did 
not attempt to ban the ritual use of alcohol in its entirety, which would 
have been unacceptable, since alcohol is a crucial part of the offerings 
made to the deceased, as well as to the living participants in the 
mumpra,73 but rather sought to minimize its use. Although some guru 
were initially reluctant to agree with the proposed changes, they 
eventually assented in the face of overwhelming popular support for 
the proposal that all could benefit if every mumpra-holding family 
agreed to contribute roughly the amount saved from alcohol purchases 
to a rotating village credit fund for community projects. During the 
course of my fieldwork, the actual amounts of alcohol expected as 
offerings decreased dramatically everywhere, and such rotating credit 
funds were set up in many locales. 
 Ultimately, making this adaptation did not directly challenge the 
structure of the mumpra or contravene the ritual power that it 
generated for gurus. Those gurus who took up the cause actively (like 
Latte Apa and Guru Maila, both of whom found ways to incorporate 
references to the alcohol-minimizing directive into their paloke) found 
that it in fact contributed to their popularity, since it showed that 
despite the other aspects of their power struggle with activists for 
                                                
73 Maoist activists did attempt to implement such a comprehensive ban in Thangmi 
villages in Nepal from around 2001 onwards, but they were unsuccessful in enforcing 
it and eventually gave up the effort. 
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control over originary power, they were able to compromise to some 
extent in order to adapt to what were perceived as more “modern” 
expectations. This was just one of the many ways in which the mumpra 
as a ritual in practice provided a point of convergence for the 
competing ideologies at work in defining Thangminess. Whatever their 
particular commitments were, participation in a mumpra left each 
participant feeling that they, too, belonged in some way, and therefore 
had a vested interest in maintaining the structural framework of the 
ritual, even if some of them sought to revise particular details that 
unfolded within it. Structure and sentiment, instrumentality and affect, 
were all part of the ritual whole. 
 
Ancestral Bodies and Legal Claims 
The mumpra ritual cycle finally concludes in the building of a memorial 
resting place, a chautara (N), in honor of the deceased. This memorial 
is never built on the actual site in which the spirit is attached to the 
land at the point of cremation, but elsewhere, usually on a busy village 
path. In this sense, the chautara is a metaphorical memorial rather 
than a direct indication of a body or ancestor believed to reside 
beneath it. Metcalf and Huntington explain that, “memorialization 
amplifies the equation that Hertz made between the fate of the body 
and the fate of the soul. The corpse, by association with its container, is 
made enduring and larger than life in order that its owner's name be 
the same” (1991: 151). In the Thangmi context, however, the emphasis 
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is not on making the specific individual “larger than life”, but rather on 
endowing the Thangmi community as a whole with a lasting, 
recognizable, territorially-grounded presence. Chautara-building is a 
communal affair, with members from all of the clans required to 
participate (just as they did during the mumpra), and the inscriptions 
that these rough stone memorials bear often read only “Thangmi”, 
without a personal name or other individual details.74 The series of 
chautara so inscribed, which one encounters on paths leading into 
Thangmi areas in Nepal, explicitly identify the terrain as Thangmi 
territory by reminding all who pass that the surrounding hillsides are 
full of their ancestors.75 Ultimately, it is the Thangmi social body that is 
made lasting and larger than life, fortifying the communal edifice from 
within which individual projects of recognition and acts of resistance 
are launched. “The exploiters know they can not fully own the land 
they have extracted as payment for unfair debts from us, because we 
don’t let them forget that their crops grow out of the bodies of our 
ancestors,” explained one old woman, who herself became an ancestor 
shortly after our conversation, which I recalled poignantly at the 
unveiling of her chautara. 
                                                
74 By contrast, memorial chautara erected by members of other groups in the region 
often contain an individual’s full name, their dates of birth and death, and perhaps 
the names of surviving family members. 
75 In Darjeeling, Thangmi chautara were interspersed with those of multiple other 
ethnic groups. Recall, however, that through reference in the paloke to the 
mosandanda as found in Nepal, even the multi-ethnic territory of Darjeeling is 
ritually included as an extension of Thangmi territory in Nepal. 
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 Her assertion was borne out in legal terms when, several years 
later in 2006, a group of Bahun and Chhetri villagers sued the Thangmi 
community organization of Suspa over usage rights to the dharmik ban 
(N), the “religious forest” whose boundaries protected the local 
Thangmi mosandanda from other uses. To the surprise and 
satisfaction of many Thangmi, the Dolakha district court supported the 
Thangmi community by ruling that, due to the historical precedent set 
by land surveys dating back to 1950, this piece of land had always 
been used for religious purposes, and would remain classified as a 
religious forest, not a community forest (N: samudayik ban) as the 
claimants had demanded.76 The decision did not explicitly state 
whether the land was reserved for use by members of any particular 
religion—an ambiguity which some observers felt was dictated by 
broader political circumstances, since Nepal had become a secular 
state while the case had been pending, and the judges might not wish 
to be seen as favoring any one religion over another. This lack of 
specificity led some of my Thangmi friends to joke that caste Hindus 
would be welcome to use the mosandanda as well—as long as their 
deceased had a Thangmi clan name which would enable the officiating 
guru to determine where to burn the body, since this “modern” (N: 
adhunik) mosandanda, as they liked to call it, had seven clearly distinct 
                                                
76 I was not able to review the actual legal documents or land deeds connected to this 
case, but was told consistent versions of the story by several informants. Further 
research on this topic—particularly within the context of federal restructuring in 
which indigenous land claims will play a major part—would be worthwhile. 
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concrete cremation platforms that the local organization had recently 
built (with the money saved from minimizing alcohol consumption). 
 
So Much Work To Do 
“Our mumpra, it’s really the most important thing that we Thangmi do, 
it’s the ‘foundation’ of our identity. If it is destroyed we would no 
longer have a house to live in,” explained Basant, the BTWA general 
secretary. He, Gautam and I were sitting on a steep ledge on the 
hillside behind Darjeeling bazaar that overlooked a public cremation 
shelter where the body of an old Thangmi woman was about to be 
burnt. There were several hundred people gathered around her corpse, 
which was being carried towards the concrete pyre in a procession. 
Latte Apa was sitting under the shelter, where he had been chanting 
for the last several minutes in order to consecrate it as a mosandanda. 
As the corpse was placed on the bier and the guru continued with his 
chant, my companions restlessly played with their cell phones. 
 The moment we saw the first flames, Basant and Gautam jumped 
up. “Let’s go!” said Gautam, “We have so much work to do. Now that 
grandmother’s work is finished we must have a meeting, come on, let’s 
go back to the association office.” I was taken aback by this sudden 
shift in focus and felt torn. It was the first cremation I had witnessed in 
Darjeeling, and I wanted to know what happened next. But I also 
wanted to know what the work of their meeting was, and how the 
aspects of Thangminess produced in the domain of political action that 
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they were about to enter articulated with those reproduced in the 
domain of ritual action that they had just participated in. I suggested 
that they go ahead, and said that I would find them later at the office 
once the cremation was finished. Raising his eyebrows skeptically, 
Gautam said, “Are you sure you don’t need a guide?” I shook my head. 
Gautam looked to Basant for direction, who shrugged his shoulders 
and set off up the hill. Latte Apa motioned to me to come join him next 
to the burning body. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Ambivalent Agencies: Resisting the End of a Ritual 
In October 2006, a buffalo calf bled to death in the courtyard of 
Devikot, a temple complex dedicated to the tantric goddess Tripura-
Sundari that perches on a hillside below Dolakha bazaar. Along with 
the young animal died one “line” (in the sense in which gurus use the 
English word to describe parts of their paloke) of Thangmi tradition. It 
was the first time in remembered history that two nearly naked 
Thangmi men had not been waiting, in trance, to drink warm blood 
directly from a buffalo’s vein as it was severed by a Newar butcher, 
while priests and dancers from that ethnic group looked on. Called nari 
in Thangmi,1 or hipathami in Newar, every year these two Thangmi 
men and their entourage had walked the four hours from their village 
of Dumkot to Dolakha on the appointed day in order to commit this 
dramatic act, which was the visual and visceral climax of a much larger 
ritual cycle comprised of the two festivals of Devikot Jatra and Khadga 
Jatra.2 These, in turn, were part of the local Dolakha version of the 
series of Dasain (Dussera) rituals which take place throughout Hindu 
South Asia during the harvest season.3 
When I first began working with the Thangmi in 1999, this event, 
which I shall hereafter call Devikot-Khadga Jatra, was an annual 
                                                   
1 Nari is hereafter represented without italics for ease of reading. 
2 Khadga means “sword” in Nepali, and refers to the demon-slaying weapons carried 
by Khadga Jatra’s Newar ritual dancers. 
3 For a thorough discussion of Dasain as a ritual of state power practiced throughout 
Nepal, see Krauskopff and Lecomte-Tilouine (1996). 
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highlight for people throughout the region, both as participants and 
observers. When I asked what the most important Thangmi ritual was, 
many people gave Devikot-Khadga Jatra as their answer. In other 
conversations, once I had gotten past initial statements that the 
Thangmi had no culture, I was told that Devikot-Khadga Jatra was a 
key component of it. People from various Thangmi villages who had no 
personal connection to the ritual itself made these statements as often 
as those from Dumkot who were members of the naris’ families or 
otherwise involved with Devikot-Khadga Jatra. I was intrigued and 
puzzled about how participation in a ritual which appeared to take 
Thangmi individuals to the nadir of ritual impurity could in fact be so 
prominent in their schemes of self-recognition. I read Casper Miller’s 
careful description of Devikot Jatra, which comprised a substantial part 
of his 1979 Faith Healers in the Himalayas (the book described 
shamanic practice throughout the Dolakha region among a range of 
ethnic groups). He suggested that Devikot Jatra demonstrated a 
“double view” of the world and reality (1997[1979]: 77), in which the 
Thangmi believed one thing to be going on, while the Newar saw 
something else. This analysis made sense, yet did not seem to account 
fully for the ritual’s prominence in Thangmi identity statements. I 
wanted to understand more, and also to know if the ritual process 
itself, as well as the meanings people attached to it, had changed in 
the quarter century that had elapsed between Miller’s work and my 
own. I therefore made Devikot-Khadga Jatra a focal point of my early 
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research in Dolakha in 1999 and 2000, and returned to observe it 
again in 2004 and 2005 after having spent much of the intervening 
time in Darjeeling. 
 
Thangmi Being “Really Tribal” 
When my Thangmi interlocutors in India discovered that I had spent 
time in the Thangmi villages of Nepal, one of the first questions that I 
was routinely asked  was whether I had witnessed Devikot-Khadga 
Jatra. When they learned that I had not only seen the festival, but had 
recorded it on video, I was asked to show the video so that they could 
see, “Thangmi being really tribal”, as Puran, a BTWA executive 
committee member, enthusiastically described the event. These 
individual requests became so frequent that I decided to organize a 
few formal screenings of the Devikot-Khadga Jatra footage. At first 
unintentionally, these events also became public forums for diverse 
members of the Thangmi community in Darjeeling to express their 
views about Devikot-Khadga Jatra. 
It turned out that while Thangmi from Nepal were generally 
consistent in feeling that participation in the ritual was a positive 
statement of Thangmi identity, which showcased their special 
command over sacred power before a multi-ethnic public,4 Thangmi in 
India were tensely divided over the question of whether Devikot-
                                                   
4 “We may look like demons, but if we don’t go the Newar can’t have their ritual, and 
that is our power,” was the type of statement made, similar to what I had heard in 
Nepal. 
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Khadga Jatra was a positive identity statement which should be 
continued in the future, or a negative sign of Thangmi domination at 
the hands of others which should be stopped as soon as possible. I will 
return later to the question of what the ritual might mean to Thangmi 
who actually participate in it in Nepal, here I wish to dwell for a 
moment on what it meant to those in India. 
It was clear that the debate over Devikot-Khadga Jatra had been 
ongoing within the Thangmi community in India long before I arrived. 
My contribution of visual images (which few Thangmi in India had 
previously seen, except in a few blurry photos from Miller’s book, 
which were reprinted in every one of the Thangmi publications from 
Nepal alongside articles about Devikot-Khadga Jatra) only served to 
sharpen the arguments on both sides. Those who agreed with the 
Thangmi from Nepal that Devikot-Khadga Jatra was a positive 
expression of Thangmi identity argued that not only was it a long-
standing “tradition” (the word was used in English), which Thangmi 
clearly wanted to continue—otherwise why would they keep doing it?—
but it was incontrovertible evidence of their “tribal” nature. Young 
BTWA activists like Puran were mostly aligned on this side of the fence. 
On the other side were largely older members of the BTWA leadership. 
One such individual, who used his clan name “Akyangmi” as his first 
name, stood up to speak passionately at several video screenings 
about how the footage of Thangmi drinking blood caused him deep 
personal pain, even making him feel physically sick, since the images 
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showed his Thangmi brethren forced into a disgusting act by the 
Dolakha Newar who dominated them. He argued that Thangmi 
participation in Devikot-Khadga Jatra should be banned immediately, 
and even requested the BTWA to organize a “mission” to go and 
“convince” the Dumkot Thangmi to end this tradition. Much of the 
senior BTWA leadership, such as the Vice President Gopal, shared 
Akyangmi’s opinion (which Gopal told me privately after summoning 
me to his house one evening to ask for my advice on the matter), 
although most were not so eager to assume responsibility for bringing 
about the end of the ritual, for any intentional action in this direction 
would clearly alienate a large portion of the Thangmi community. 
For Thangmi in India, this divide seemed to be a generational 
one, which showed starkly how tribalness was a very new kind of 
identity for them, the political desire for which did not always match its 
affective contents. That is to say, for older BTWA members like Gopal 
and Akyangmi who had grown up striving to be modern Indian citizens 
within a pan-Nepali, Hindu idiom, watching Thangmi consume buffalo 
blood or imagining them eating mouse meat (see Chapter 5) produced 
visceral feelings of aversion. Yet these men were passionate advocates 
of the campaign for ST status at the political level, and these were the 
types of actions linked to the concept of tribalness within the popular 
and governmental imaginations. By contrast, for younger activists like 
Puran or Rajen, who had become involved with the BTWA during the 
1990s when tribal politics was already becoming the dominant frame 
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for ethnic activism in Darjeeling, the images of Thangmi drinking 
blood produced visceral feelings of pride and excitement at their tribal 
heritage. The fact that such positive feelings were based on the 
fetishization of images of Thangmi in Nepal doing things that neither 
Puran or Rajen themselves were immediately eager to do is besides the 
point here; rather, I want to emphasize that these younger activists 
were more than willing to identify themselves with such behaviors in a 
way that older individuals were not. The terms of recognition in India 
had shifted so substantially after the implementation of the Mandal 
commission report—or at least had been perceived to shift in this 
manner—that the younger generation had actually come to feel very 
differently about what it might mean to refigure Thangmi as a tribal 
identity than the older one. Such transformations demonstrate how the 
results of ethnicization within a set of national or transnational frames 
may be not only instrumental—compelling people to objectify or 
performatize certain practices for their political value—but affective, 
changing at the subjective level the way people feel about their own 
participation in, or identification with, such practices. 
As the stakes in the ST game increased with the Tamang and 
Limbu attainment of that status in 2003, and the senior BTWA 
members receded further into the background (Gopal died in 2005 
after a long illness), the younger faction who sought to valorize 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra as a Thangmi identity practice won out. Towards 
the end of my first long fieldwork stay in Darjeeling in 2004, I was 
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summoned to a special meeting of the BTWA executive committee 
meeting, at which I was asked to contribute to the organization’s 
activities in several ways. Beyond the request for a financial 
contribution to their efforts to secure land for a new Bhume temple 
(the results of which were described in Chapter 6), the highest priority 
on their list was that I write an article about Devikot-Khadga Jatra, 
illustrated with photos, which they could include in their ST 
application. The video which I had already handed over to them was 
not enough; as would be made explicitly clear to them during the 2006 
CRI verification visit (as described in the section on the chewar ritual in 
Chapter 7), the BTWA leadership had already begun to feel that written 
work, especially in the format of an academic article with my name and 
university affiliation on it, would carry much more weight with the 
government than anonymous, unedited video footage. 
 
Complicit Agendas 
This request for an article was not out of line with my own existing 
agenda, on which the idea of writing an article about Devikot-Khadga 
Jatra had been an item for some time already. I worried that my 
observations from the 1999 and 2000 events were becoming dated, 
and I felt that Devikot-Khadga Jatra would be a suitable topic for a 
pre-dissertation academic publication. I also felt increasing pressure to 
make some of my ethnographic material available to the naris and their 
communities in Dolakha, as well as to the NTS. Although I had already 
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returned loose photo prints to the naris, I had not embedded them in a 
written document. On a recent trip to Dumkot I had asked the naris 
and the gurus involved in Devikot-Khadga Jatra about the propriety of 
writing about the ritual and using their photos in an academic 
publication; I had worried that writing about the ritual might challenge 
or diminish the naris’ power, or make them feel that I was taking 
advantage of them in some way. However, these issues did not seem to 
concern the naris. In answer to my question, Sukhbir, the senior nari in 
whose house we sat, rummaged in the rafters above our heads to pull 
out a dog-eared, termite-eaten copy of the original 1979 edition of 
Miller’s book, which fell open immediately to the spread of photos 
depicting the nari in trance, and said, “Yes, you must write a new book. 
We can’t even see ourselves in this one anymore, it is so old. If your 
purpose was not to write a book, why did you come?” Everyone nodded 
in agreement. 
This was a very different kind of accusation from those I had 
occasionally had to defend myself against from other Thangmi, who 
suspected that I might be personally profiting from the sale of photos I 
had taken of them. Here, the naris seemed to be saying that I had a 
responsibility to write about what I had seen at Devikot-Khadga Jatra, 
in order to validate as worthwhile their efforts over the course of 
several years to welcome me into their homes, include me in their 
entourage as they walked from Dumkot to Dolakha, and explain the 
complexities of their ritual role. In this context, my writing could 
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provide a sense of existential recognition, augmenting rather than 
challenging the naris’ power. This potential existed in part due to both 
my and the naris’ particular positionalities, and the relationships 
between them, which made this situation rather different from the case 
of Thangmi activists seeking to scripturalize gurus’ paloke. The nari 
were not guru—they did not mediate between the human and divine 
worlds on any other occasion—and as such they held no personal 
purchase on the power generated from their participation in the ritual, 
which was already considered to be the shared resource of all 
Thangmi. Furthermore, I was not a Thangmi activist, and although 
most Thangmi might not fully understand what motivated me to do 
such extensive research in their community, they did not suspect me 
of sharing what was often perceived as the nefarious agenda of their 
own activists to appropriate originary power for personal benefit. 
All of these issues weighed on my mind as I watched the debate 
over Devikot-Khadga Jatra unfold in Darjeeling; I often had to bite my 
tongue in order to avoid expressing too strongly my own opinion that 
since the naris themselves felt proud of their ritual role and not only 
wanted to continue it, but wanted it to be recognized in writing, a 
BTWA mission to terminate the tradition would be counter-productive 
both for their organization and for the Thangmi as a whole. I was 
therefore pleased when such proposals began to weaken and popular 
opinion backed the younger leaders who advocated the continuation of 
the practice. In this context, the request that I write an article about 
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Devikot-Khadga Jatra felt like a vindication of sorts, foremost for the 
naris and their status within the broader Thangmi community, but 
secondarily for me and my assessment that the ritual did indeed play 
an important role as a positive site of Thangmi identity production. 
I set about writing the article in early 2005, and by that spring it 
had been accepted for publication in the European Bulletin of 
Himalayan Research, pending revisions. It was published in fall 2005, 
just in time for me to take copies to Darjeeling on my next field trip 
there. The BTWA leaders were pleased that I had taken their request so 
seriously and quickly produced exactly what they wanted. From my 
perspective, their desire for such an article was simply the impetus that 
pushed me to move forward with my own long-standing idea of 
writing it, and in my own way I stood to benefit as much, if not more, 
from the publication as the BTWA or the naris themselves (or the NTS, 
who had asked me to contribute photos of Devikot-Khadga Jatra for a 
display mounted on the wall at their May 2005 conference, the details 
of which are described in Chapter 5). My relationships with these 
varied groups of Thangmi were cemented through the publication of 
the article, in a manner that demonstrates well the complicity that 
George Marcus has described as characteristic of contemporary multi-
sited research projects: “Despite their very different values and 
commitments ... the ethnographer and his subjects are ... broadly 
engaged in a pursuit of knowledge with resemblances in form and 
context that they can recognize” (1999: 103). 
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The End of Devikot-Khadga Jatra 
One year after my article was published, the Thangmi stopped 
participating in Devikot-Khadga Jatra. After subduing my initial 
disbelief, I had to come to terms with the fact that most Thangmi 
seemed unconcerned by this turn of events, including the same people 
whom just a few years earlier had told me how important the ritual was 
to them. Conditioned as much by the particular desires of the naris in 
Dolakha as those of my activist informants in Darjeeling, each seeking 
recognition in their own way, I had wanted to believe that I understood 
those desires, and could even help fulfill them. Perhaps too much of 
the “you are our god” talk that I described in Chapter 1 had gone to my 
head, but the sudden disappearance of what had seemed to me an 
important ritual felt initially like a personal betrayal, which rattled my 
confidence. I wanted to resist the end of the ritual, but instead it 
seemed to resist my analysis. 
Upon reflection, I came to see that the conclusion of Thangmi 
participation in Devikot-Khadga Jatra demonstrated forcefully that the 
sacred object of Thangmi identity transcended any single set of 
historically embedded practices that at one time produced it. The 
agency to produce this object was diffuse, located in the simultaneous 
action of the multiple practices and performances of all those who 
identified as Thangmi, not in any piece of writing—academic, activist, 
or otherwise—which limited that agency by promoting any one of the 
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many possible interpretations of it as singularly enduring beyond the 
active frame of its own production. For some Thangmi, writing itself 
was one such form of agentive action—this was certainly the case for 
the activists who worked hard to produce Dolakhareng or Niko 
Bachinte, formulating their own positions as Thangmi as they wrote—
but the resultant texts did not, as they hoped, encapsulate the totality 
of Thangminess in all of its disaggregated variations. Nor did the 
paloke of the guru, which could not fully incorporate the experiences 
of young, educated Thangmi, for whom writing had become an 
embodied necessity just as orality was for the gurus. Unable to 
anticipate what was just around the corner, the text of my 2005 article 
was similarly incomplete, just as this one is. 
I review these details of the article’s back-story because I want 
to provide context for several excerpts from it presented in their 
entirety below. These excerpts accomplish several tasks: First, they 
explain what Devikot-Khadga Jatra was like while it was practiced, 
recognizing its continued value as a piece of Thangmi history. Second, 
they present my analysis of what it meant to those who participated in 
it, within a broader theoretical context that addresses other important 
questions about Thangmi agency that remain relevant to this 
dissertation beyond the specific context of Devikot Jatra. I do not 
disavow this analysis, rather, I still believe it explains well what 
happened within the frame of Devikot-Khadga Jatra. The problem is 
simply that I could not, at the time, recognize it as a frame and 
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separate it analytically from the practices and performances that 
unfolded within it. In the concluding part of this chapter I transpose 
the original analysis to the new post-Devikot-Khadga Jatra frame. 
Third, these excerpts demonstrate my complicity in constructing 
Devikot Jatra as a timeless structure that was somehow essential to the 
production of Thangmi identity, rather than recognizing it as a 
contingent practice that articulated aspects of Thangmi identity in a 
manner recognizable to a specific audience at a specific time and 
place. As far as I know, the Indian government has not been informed 
about the ritual’s end, and my article stands as the primary description 
of it in the Thangmi application for Scheduled Tribe status. Perhaps its 
presence there had no effect anyway; or even the opposite effect of 
that desired by the activists who had solicited it. “Why is there an 
article about a ritual in Nepal here anyway?”, I can imagine the 
bureaucrat saying, as he tosses the file to the bottom of the towering 
stack of applications.5 I will probably never know exactly how it was 
received; some details are beyond the limits of even the most complicit 
multi-sited ethnographic project. 
The following excerpts from my 2005 article are presented in 
unedited form as long block quotations, unchanged from the original 
with the exception of small stylistic details for clarity and consistency.6 
                                                   
5 Recent estimates put the number of aspirant ST groups across India at over 1000 
(see Middleton and Shneiderman 2008: 43). 
6 I am grateful to the European Bulletin of Himalayan Research for permission to 
reprint this material. The original article is listed in the bibliography as Shneiderman 
(2005b). 
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Footnotes are part of the original article unless otherwise noted. 
Ellipses denote places where portions of the original article have been 
left out. For the most part, the omitted sections are background 
material which the reader will already have encountered elsewhere in 
this dissertation. New analysis is interspersed in standard formatting. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the particular historical 
conjuncture that brought the ritual to an end in 2006, and its 
implications for Thangmi in the future. 
Agency and Resistance in the Thangmi-Newar Ritual 
Relationship: An Analysis of Devikot-Khadga Jatra in 
Dolakha, Nepal 
Introduction 
Every year on the tenth day of the autumn Dasain festival, a 
diverse crowd gathers in the courtyard of Devikot, a temple 
complex dedicated to the tantric goddess Tripura-Sundari in the 
historic town of Dolakha, in Nepal’s central-eastern district of 
the same name. The crowd is here to watch two men go into 
trance and drink the blood of a live buffalo calf. The blood 
drinkers are members of the Thangmi ethnic group, a population 
of approximately 40,000 who speak a Tibeto-Burman language 
and are marginalized within Nepal’s ethnic and caste hierarchies 
...  
Taken together, the Devikot and Khadga Jatras are an 
arena for the negotiation of power relationships between two of 
the most numerically prominent ethnic communities in the 
Dolakha region: the Thangmi and the Newar. The Newar 
community, which in Dolakha is dominated by the Shrestha 
caste, has historically occupied a position of economic and social 
dominance in the area ... In general terms, the relationship 
between the Newar and Thangmi communities could be read as 
that of ruler to subject, dominator to dominated. However, I 
argue here that the ritual performances of Devikot and Khadga 
Jatra demonstrate that such a dualistic reading of Newar-
Thangmi relationships is too simplistic, as is explaining Thangmi 
participation in these rituals as a standard narrative of 
resistance.  
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To Thangmi participants in the rituals, the act of blood-
drinking signifies a state of union with the goddess they call 
Maharani, and thus serves as a source of divine agency and 
power. To Newar participants, on the other hand, the 
consumption of animal blood marks the Thangmi as demons and 
carriers of ritual impurity. Although a natural reading of these 
ritual acts would be one of Thangmi subjugation as speechless 
subalterns, who manage everyday forms of resistance (Scott 
1985), but little else, here I seek a different interpretation. I 
follow Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney’s call to recognize the 
“construction of multiple structures of meaning” (1987: 5) within 
ritual performance, in order to understand how the apparent 
process of identity negation embedded in the ritual structure of 
these festivals in fact generates expressions and actions of 
agency—albeit ambivalent and uneven ones—which are central 
to the formation of Thangmi identity. 
... One central question that arises when considering the 
formation of Thangmi identity is why the numerically substantial 
and culturally distinctive Thangmi population has remained 
almost entirely absent from lay, academic, and political 
discourses on ethnicity in Nepal, particularly in an ethnographic 
context where other groups with much smaller populations have 
been extensively “anthropologised”. The lack of any obvious 
material culture or large-scale performance tradition that is 
uniquely Thangmi is a large part of the answer. Without 
distinctive dance, song or craft customs performed in their own 
villages, Thangmi individuals emphasize participation in 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra as an important component of their own 
identity narratives, and represent the blood-drinking 
performance in Dolakha bazaar as a key event in creating and 
maintaining a sense of ethnic pride and communal identity. What 
appear as rituals of subordination on a superficial level are in 
fact a fundamental aspect of the production of an agentive 
Thangmi ethnic consciousness. This is not an anomaly within an 
otherwise typical identity narrative built upon positive markers of 
ethnicity such as cultural and religious purity or racial 
homogeneity. Rather, the ritual performances that I describe 
here are one component of a broader process of identity 
production in which the Thangmi community intentionally 
highlights their absence from national ethnicity discourses that 
focus on purity, and instead emphasize a distinctive identity 
built around expressions of impurity such as cultural mixture, 
religious syncretism, and racial hybridity.  
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Theoretical and Comparative Frameworks  
Absence, Agency and Resistance 
The concept of “absence” builds upon the theory of “negation”, 
as developed by Ranajit Guha in his classic description of 
peasant consciousness (1983) and addresses some of the 
limitations of Guha’s definition of the latter term. Guha argues 
that domination and resistance exist in a dialectical relationship 
that can never escape the terms of domination. However, I 
suggest instead that reading ritual as a polysemic performance 
that has entirely different effects within multiple, simultaneous 
phenomenological frameworks may indicate how even an 
apparent negation of subaltern consciousness—such as the 
Thangmi role in Devikot-Khadga Jatra—can in fact be 
understood as a constructive site of agency production. 
Moreover, the intentionality that the concept of negation 
attributes to dominant forces gives them too much credit. Using 
the motif of absence to describe a conscious strategy that 
transcends the conditions of domination acknowledges that 
subaltern agencies are often produced in unexpected ways on 
their own terms.  
I use this theoretical framework here for two reasons. 
First, despite the importance of Subaltern Studies within Indian 
intellectual circles, there has been relatively little reference to 
this school of theory within Nepal and Himalayan studies to 
date.7 Correcting this oversight may help develop more nuanced 
perspectives on important social issues in Nepal, and the present 
material lends itself well to such an analysis. Second, although 
there has been a backlash against the over-use of the concept of 
“resistance” within anthropology and other social sciences over 
the past decade (Brown 1996), I believe that there remain fresh, 
productive ways that it can be employed, particularly in tandem 
with a careful understanding of “agency” that recognizes its 
ambivalence. Given the history of exploitative relationships in 
many parts of rural Nepal, there remains a clear need for 
discussions of the specific, culturally constructed channels 
through which power operates in Nepali contexts. Although 
Nepal does not share India’s history of direct colonization, which 
may be another reason why scholars of Nepal have not fully 
                                                   
7 This may be due in part to an understandable distaste in Nepal for outright 
appropriations of scholarship from India. However, it is important to move beyond 
such knee-jerk reactions in order to determine which insights emerging from this 
theoretical school might be useful for interpreting Nepali socio-historical contexts. 
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engaged with the post-colonial emphasis of Subaltern Studies, 
the politics of Nepal’s “internal colonialism” (Holmberg 2000: 
928-929) are equally suited to such analyses. 
Laura Ahearn offers a bare-bones definition of “agency” 
as, “the socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (2001: 112). 
Using such a broad definition allows us to move beyond 
misunderstandings of the term, which have often cast agency as 
simply a “synonym for resistance” (Ahearn 2001: 115). I follow 
theorists like Ahearn and Sherry Ortner in arguing for an 
approach which moves beyond the notion that agency equals 
resistance. This false equation limits agency to the oppositional 
politics which oppressed groups employ vis-à-vis their 
oppressors, rather than contextualizing it as a culturally 
constructed mode of action which various groups and individuals 
understand and use on their own terms in a wide array of 
situations that are not necessarily oppositional. As Ortner puts 
it: 
Agency is not an entity that exists apart from cultural 
construction... Every culture, every subculture, every 
historical moment, constructs its own forms of agency, its 
own modes of enacting the process of reflecting on the 
self and the world and of acting simultaneously within and 
upon what one finds there. (1995b: 186) 
 
I agree with Ortner’s ensuing analysis that often, “resistance 
studies are thin because they are ethnographically thin: thin on 
the internal politics of dominated groups, thin on the cultural 
richness of those groups, thin on the subjectivity—the 
intentions, desires, fears, projects—of the actors engaged in 
these dramas” (1995: 190). Here I attempt to engage with this 
critique by offering an analysis which focuses especially on 
Thangmi individuals’ subjective experiences of the cultural and 
religious forms of agency enacted in their performance at 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra, and their ensuing representations of these 
performances in identity discourses. 
When I wrote the original article, I had not yet made the distinction 
between “practice” and “performance” that is introduced in Chapter 2 
of this dissertation. However, terming the naris’ ritual participation at 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra “performance” remains appropriate, at least in 
part. As described in Chapter 2, for the Thangmi, performance is a 
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form of ritualized action conducted in the public domain for non-
Thangmi publics which objectifies certain aspects of the sacred object 
of Thangmi identity for the purposes of political recognition. As I shall 
argue at the conclusion of this chapter, at one level, this is precisely 
what the Thangmi participation in Devikot-Khadga Jatra did within the 
historical context of the Newar polity of Dolakha. It is telling that 
Thangmi gurus describe the anointing of the naris with red powder as 
a process of “imitating” or “dressing up” (N: nakal parnu) as demons. 
As described below, Devikot-Khadga Jatra cannot proceed without this 
transformation, which clearly marks the naris’ participation in the ritual 
as a performance set apart from their daily life. This performance is 
intended to assert command over ritual power in relation to the Newar, 
who are otherwise in the dominant position. 
On another level, however, the naris engage in an internally 
focused practice, in which they commune with the goddess Maharani. 
In this sense, the naris’ act was at once both practice and performance, 
which converged in the particular frame of Devikot-Khadga Jatra in 
Dolakha for a substantial period of time. Now, however, these two 
elements have been delinked: the performance is no longer conducted, 
but the practice has, in a sense, been “re-practicalized” within an 
exclusively Thangmi context in Dumkot, where the naris continue to 
go into trance at the same time each year in the comfort of their 
homes, without painting their bodies red or otherwise engaging in the 
performance aspects of what used to occur in Dolakha.  
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Power and Ritual in Nepal 
In making this argument, I follow David Holmberg’s discussion 
of Chhechu, a key ritual for the Tamang, another ethnic group 
who speak a Tibeto-Burman language and whose experiences of 
the Nepali state are in many ways comparable to those of the 
Thangmi. Holmberg focuses on the production of indigenous 
Tamang consciousness and power through the annual Chhechu 
ritual, in which the dominant Hindu hierarchical order is mocked 
and derided. In one sense this is a perfect example of Guha’s 
“ritual inversion”, in which subaltern identity is ritually produced 
in dialectical fashion as a negation of dominant identity. But 
Guha’s framework is limited by its dualistic structure, embodied 
in the presumption that rituals operate in a unitary symbolic 
field to which each individual must relate as either dominant or 
dominated. Holmberg expands upon this by acknowledging the 
multiplicity of ritual meanings at work:  
The plays of Chhechu are evidence of opposed and 
continuously differentiating semiological and social order 
in structures of domination in the state of Nepal ... The 
ludic plays expose the arbitrariness of orders of 
domination, and the exorcisms of antisocial beings linked 
to that political order constitute the symbolic first steps of 
a metaprocess to produce collective oppositional power ... 
(2000: 932)  
 
In Holmberg’s formulation, Chhechu is not simply an 
inversion of structures of dominance, but rather an expression 
of the multiple “semiological orders” at work in the Nepali 
context. Within that multiplicity exists a latent Tamang 
consciousness, which although “not isolable from implicit and 
explicit affirmations of social values opposed to .... the values of 
those who dominated them” (Holmberg 2000: 932), is 
nevertheless premised on a fundamentally different 
configuration of the symbolic order. 
Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka (1996) takes a similar approach in 
her description of the annual Dasain ritual at Belkot in far 
Western Nepal. She demonstrates how local interpretations of 
the national Dasain cycle serve as an opportunity for ethnic 
communities to negotiate their relationship with the state and 
each other. Identifying Dasain as a ritual of “state power”, Pfaff-
Czarnecka shows how local elites in different parts of the 
country use the festival to at once express their loyalty to the 
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central rulers in Kathmandu, and emphasize their local power 
over others by “linking their prerogatives to symbols related to 
the central rulers” (1996: 64). In this context, Pfaff-Czarnecka 
also emphasizes the importance of multiple ritual meanings. 
Although Dasain is indeed intended as a ritual of state 
dominance, it contains within it the potential for other agencies: 
Power rituals in complex societies pertain to specific 
sociopolitical orders and to the authority of those in focal 
political positions within these orders. They not only 
express and dramatise social realities, but also, more 
specifically organise social groups by relating them with 
one another. One important element in relating social 
groups is the establishment of symbolic means for 
expressing the supremacy of one group and the 
subordination of others. However, there always remains a 
large scope for ambiguity and for disagreement between 
various participants who may attach multiple meanings to 
a religious celebration at different ritual levels. (1996: 59) 
 
This analysis points towards one of the most important 
polysemic aspects of the Devikot-Khadga Jatra complex. On a 
phenomenological level, the Dasain ritual serves as a source of 
embodied social and religious power for Thangmi participants 
within the web of local hierarchical relationships, while for Newar 
participants, it provides a means of asserting political power at 
the national level by deploying central power symbols in a show 
of domination over local populations such as the Thangmi.  
Both Holmberg and Pfaff-Czarnecka conclude their articles 
by asserting an indigenous Tamang “consciousness of the 
circumstances of their domination” (Holmberg 2000: 940). In 
Holmberg’s case this consciousness results in “defiant” rituals 
such as Chhechu, while in Pfaff-Czarnecka’s case it results in a 
Tamang boycott of Dasain.8 Like Holmberg, Pfaff-Czarnecka 
argues that the Tamang clearly understand their symbolic 
subjugation and “ritual inferiority within the Hindu hierarchy”, 
and that they combat it with their own “powerful symbolic means 
in order to make a forceful political statement” — choosing “to 
‘read’ Devighat [Dasain] as a symbol of their oppression within 
the Hindu realm” (1996: 89). 
These insights form the foundation for my own analysis by 
                                                   
8 The idea of boycotting Dasain is not only a local phenomenon in Belkot, but rather a 
strategy used at the national level by several ethno-political organizations 
representing different minority groups in recent years, as described by Susan Hangen 
(2005b). 
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delinking indigenous consciousness from the terms of its 
domination and locating a potential space for alternative 
subjectivities in the polysemic nature of ritual symbol. However, 
the Thangmi case is different from those discussed above 
because there is no obvious defiance displayed in their ritual 
performance, nor any clearly expressed, symbolically powerful 
statement such as a boycott. Although some younger Thangmi 
ethnic activists based in Kathmandu have discussed the option 
of joining such a boycott called by organizations representing 
more prominent ethnic groups such as the Tamang and Gurung, 
they have faced extensive resistance to this idea from senior 
community members in the Thangmi villages in Nepal, who see 
Dasain in general, and Devikot-Khadga Jatra in particular, as a 
quintessentially local Thangmi festival rather than an imported 
Hindu one. This situation could be read as evidence that, unlike 
the Tamang ritual actors whom Holmberg and Pfaff-Czarnecka 
discuss, the Thangmi participants in Devikot-Khadga Jatra 
remain unconscious of the terms of their domination. I suggest 
instead that from a Thangmi perspective, enacting their annual 
ritual role within the Newar-dominated Devikot-Khadga Jatra 
ritual complex is an agentive act that articulates an indigenous 
consciousness which challenges the terms of domination by 
unexpectedly appropriating them as a positive source of identity, 
and thereby power. 
Building upon the earlier discussion of agency as the 
socioculturally mediated capacity to act, I turn to Judith Butler 
for a slightly more nuanced understanding of the term. Butler 
sees agency as a fundamentally ambivalent quality dependent on 
both power and resistance:  
…the act of appropriation may involve an alteration of 
power such that the power assumed or appropriated works 
against the power that made that assumption possible. 
Where conditions of subordination make possible the 
assumption of power, the power assumed remains tied to 
those conditions, but in an ambivalent way; in fact, the 
power assumed may at once retain and resist that 
subordination. This conclusion is not to be thought of as 
(a) a resistance that is really a recuperation of power or (b) 
a recuperation that is really a resistance. It is both at once, 
and this ambivalence forms the bind of agency. (1997b: 
13)  
 
This notion of “ambivalent agency” is a useful analytical tool for 
interpreting the superficially contradictory aspects of domination 
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and subordination embedded in the Thangmi roles within the 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra complex. Butler’s formulation permits 
contradictions, locating the production of agency itself in the 
tension between power and resistance. 
 
Setting the Scene  
Dolakha Newar History and Religion  
Dolakha bazaar is located in northeastern Nepal, 140 kilometers 
away from Kathmandu by road, and about 20 kilometers as the 
crow flies from the border with China’s Tibetan Autonomous 
Region. It is a provincial, middle hills town that is now secondary 
in importance to Charikot, the contemporary Dolakha district 
headquarters, but was historically a centre of power for the 
entire central-eastern Himalayas. Slusser suggests that Dolakha 
most likely began as a Licchavi settlement (1982: 85), and was 
then an independent principality ruled by the ancestors of 
today’s Dolakha Newar population. The dialect of the Newar 
language spoken in Dolakha is substantially different from those 
spoken in the Kathmandu Valley (Genetti 1994), and local Newar 
cultural practices are similarly distinctive, although many of the 
overarching ritual forms find parallels in those practiced in 
Kathmandu, Bhaktapur and Patan.  
Unfortunately there has been very little social scientific 
research conducted on Dolakha Newar society or culture to date, 
and since my own focus is on Thangmi identity and practice, I 
am not able to do justice to the Newar perspective on events. 
However, several publications on Dolakha’s history provide 
important clues to the roots of the Newar-Thangmi relationship. 
The earliest written record from the area dates to 1324 AD, in 
which the town is mentioned as the refuge destination for a 
deposed Mithila prince who died en route (Slusser 1982: 259). By 
1453 AD, Dolakha was under the control of King Kirti Simha 
(Regmi 1980: 136).9 He and his descendants used the term 
dolakhadipati to designate themselves as rulers independent 
from the powers of the Kathmandu Valley. Dolakha’s kings 
depended upon their strategic location—which gave them 
control over access to a primary Kathmandu-Lhasa trading 
route—to maintain favorable relations with rulers on both sides 
of the border. King Indra Simha Deva demonstrated his 
kingdom’s economic power beyond a doubt by minting the first 
                                                   
9 As part of his Regmi Research Series, Mahesh Chandra Regmi translated into English 
key sections of the authoritative work on Dolakha’s history: Dolakhako Aitihasik 
Ruprekha by Dhanavajra Vajracharya and Tek Bahadur Shrestha (2031 VS). My 
citations of the work here refer to Regmi’s English translation. 
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coin within Nepal’s borders in approximately 1546 AD (Regmi 
1980: 171).  
At the religious level, Dolakha’s inhabitants were and 
remain largely Hindu, with a striking absence of the Buddhist 
vajracharya priests prominent among the Kathmandu Valley’s 
Newar communities. The primary Buddhist influence in Dolakha 
came from its rulers’ direct contact with Tibet through trade, 
rather than from Kathmandu Buddhist institutions (Regmi 1980: 
174). Early on, the deity Bhimsen became the tutelary deity of 
Dolakha’s rulers.10 In an inscription dated to 1568 AD, King Jita 
Deva and his co-rulers call themselves “servants of Bhimeswara” 
(Regmi 1980: 176). A 1611 AD inscription refers to the 
renovation of the Bhairav, or Bhimsen, temple in the bazaar, so it 
must have already existed before that date. As Slusser explains:  
Bhimasena’s cult is apparently relatively recent in the 
Kathmandu Valley, and its source is Dolakha, a large 
Newar settlement in eastern Nepal. Even today in Dolakha, 
Bhimasena worship exceeds that of Shiva and Shakti in 
popularity, and his annual festival is the chief event of the 
region. (1982: 258) 
 
This emphasis on Bhimsen is central in understanding the 
Newar-Thangmi ritual relationship, for as we shall see below, the 
Thangmi believe that he was originally “their” deity, which the 
Dolakha Newar appropriated. In addition, Tripura-Sundari, the 
goddess who presides over the Devikot temple where the blood-
drinking ceremony occurs, is revered as Bhimsen’s mother.  
Another aspect of Dolakha Newar social organization that 
may have been central in shaping their relationship with 
Thangmi villagers is the lack of a Jyapu caste. The Jyapu are the 
low-caste peasants who comprise the bottom rung of Newar 
caste society in other areas such as the Kathmandu Valley 
(Gellner 2003) and Nuwakot (Chalier-Visuvalingam 2003). 
Several authors have commented on the striking absence of this 
group in Dolakha (Peet 1978: 399, van Driem 2001: 765). As 
Vajracharya and Shrestha comment, “...most of the Newars of 
Dolakha are Shresthas, very few of them are Udas or Vajracharya. 
There are no Jyapu peasants in Dolakha as in Kathmandu Valley” 
                                                   
10 This deity is linked with the pan-South Asian Bhairav, and in Nepal is referred to 
alternately as Bhimsen and Bhimeswara. As Visuvalingam and Chalier-Visuvalingam 
put it, “Bhimsen, whom the Newar explicitly identify with Bhairava, receives blood 
sacrifices ...” (2004: 125). In Dolakha, Bhimsen is also worshipped as Mahadev 
(Regmi 1981: 106), and this is often the name preferred in Thangmi prayers to the 
deity. 
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(Regmi 1980: 126). In other Newar communities, Jyapu peasants 
are often called upon to carry out ritually impure acts within 
major religious festivals.11 With no Jyapu available to perform 
such ritual roles in Dolakha, Newar ritual officiants may well 
have adapted to local conditions by turning to poor Thangmi 
peasants to fulfill these roles instead. 
 
Newar-Thangmi Relationships 
... In general, the Thangmi are regarded as people of low social 
status in the eyes of both hill Bahun-Chhetris and Dolakha 
Newars. This is due in part to their poverty, but also to the fact 
that their reliance on cultural and religious mixture keeps them 
from being categorized clearly in Nepal’s caste hierarchy ...  
Although the current low socio-economic position of the 
Thangmi appears to be more a factor of exploitation by Bahun-
Chhetri landlords, rather than a direct result of Newar 
oppression, this three-way power dynamic shapes the 
consciousness of Thangmi ritual participants and their desire to 
perform their ritual roles. In fact, the exploitative practices of 
caste Hindus have pushed the Thangmi closer to the Dolakha 
Newar, whom many Thangmi see as less abusive than their 
Bahun-Chhetri counterparts. In general, Thangmi tend to view 
Dolakha Newar as wealthy relatives who are condescending but 
not dangerous, while they view Bahun-Chhetri as harmful 
outsiders. 
Linguistically speaking, there are a surprising number of 
lexical correspondences between the Thangmi language and the 
Dolakha dialect of Newar (Turin 2004a). While it remains unclear 
whether these shared lexical items and grammatical features 
indicate a close genetic relationship or rather point to intensive 
borrowing over generations, the linguistic data suggests that the 
two communities have been in close contact for a very long time. 
At the level of affective identity, Thangmi feelings of closeness 
to the Dolakha Newar are also fostered by the fact that a 
Dolakha Newar king features prominently in a Thangmi myth 
which describes the origin of the Thangmi clans [as also 
described in Chapter 7 of this dissertation]. In this story, the 
king’s servants find a lone Thangmi woman meditating in a cave, 
and when they bring her back to Dolakha and present her to the 
                                                   
11 Chalier-Visuvalingam describes the blood-drinking Jyapu dhami in Nuwakot’s 
Bhairav festival (2003). Marie Lecomte-Tilouine has told me of another ritual devoted 
to the goddess Varahi in Tistung, Makwanpur district, during which a person from 
the most impure group available (as classified in the Muluki Ain), must serve as a 
“specialist in impurity” for the Newar high caste celebrants (personal communication). 
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king, he falls in love with her immediately. The king marries the 
Thangmi woman, and after some months her brothers come to 
find her in Dolakha and return her to the village. By the time they 
locate her and smuggle her out of town, she is pregnant with the 
king’s child. The pregnancy results in twins, who are the 
forefathers of the Thangmi roimirati clan—derived from the 
Thangmi term roimi, meaning ‘Newar’. Several of the Thangmi 
participants in Devikot-Khadga Jatra belong to this clan. Many 
Thangmi maintain a sense of closeness to the Dolakha Newar 
despite their different socio-economic circumstances. This 
feeling of shared heritage remains largely unreciprocated by 
Dolakha Newar, who are anxious to distance themselves from 
the poor and low status Thangmi. For most Newar participants, 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra provides an annual opportunity to express 
their paternalistic dominance over the Thangmi. 
 
Ritual Description 
Overview  
The Devikot and Khadga Jatras take place within the broader 
context of Dasain, the twelve day Hindu festival which 
commemorates the victory of the goddess Durga over the demon 
Mahisasura. My description draws upon the three times I 
witnessed the festival in October 1999, 2000, and 2004, as well 
as Casper Miller’s account from 1974-1975 (1997[1979]). 
Miller’s description provides a valuable time depth to the 
discussion, and many of the ritual actors that Miller introduces 
remain the same twenty-five years later.  
The Devikot Jatra takes place on Dasami, the tenth day of 
Dasain, at the Devikot temple devoted to Tripura-Sundari at the 
northern end of Dolakha bazaar. In addition to being a 
manifestation of the great goddess alternately known as Parvati 
or Bhagvati, Tripura-Sundari is one of the ten tantric 
mahavidyas, or great wisdom goddesses, known for their strong 
associations with death, violence, pollution, and despised 
marginal social roles. It is therefore not surprising that the 
Devikot ritual is famous for its gruesome highlight: two Thangmi 
ritual practitioners, known as nari in Thangmi, or hipathami in 
Dolakha Newar, are chosen by the goddess to drink blood from 
the vein of a live buffalo as it is slowly sacrificed to Bhairav, 
Tripura-Sundari’s son, whose statue stands inside the temple.12 
Newar officiants say that the buffalo embodies the demon 
Raktabir and must be killed so that the goddess may prevail. 
According to various Newar informants, the nari are symbolically 
                                                   
12 Hipa means ‘blood’ in Dolakha Newar, while thami refers to the ethnic group. 
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cast as either attendants to the goddess, or her spies, but in 
either case their purpose is to drink the demon Raktabir’s blood 
in order to prevent the regeneration of new demons from it. As 
far as I have been able to ascertain, this festival as a separate 
ritual entity held on Dasami is unique to Dolakha, although 
parallel elements may be found as components of other days of 
the Dasain festival elsewhere in the Newar world (Levy 1990: 
537).13 
Khadga means ‘sword’ in Nepali, and refers to the daggers 
held by the twelve Newar dancers (all Shrestha) who create the 
backbone of the Khadga Jatra ritual procession. Occurring on 
Ekadasi, the eleventh day of Dasain, Khadga Jatra can be seen as 
a continuation of the Devikot Jatra held the day before. However, 
unlike Devikot Jatra, Khadga Jatra is celebrated in other Newar 
communities across Nepal (Levy 1990: 551; Gellner 1992: 314). 
In each area, the ethnic configuration of the ritual participants is 
different, but it seems that non-Newar groups are often 
incorporated. For example, Pfaff-Czarnecka describes a “Magar 
specialist” who carries a sword on the seventh day of the Dasain 
festivities (1996: 71). All this suggests that Khadga Jatra in 
particular and Dasain in general may well be standard formats 
for the negotiation of power relations between Newar 
populations and the other groups with which they come into 
contact. However, the Dolakha situation is unusually complex 
because the Thangmi are so central to the proceedings, and their 
participation in the ritual is so essential to their own identity 
formation. 
 
Before the Festival: Preparations in Dumkot 
The Thangmi involved in the festival come exclusively from 
Dumkot, a largely Thangmi village located in Sundrawati VDC, 
about four hour’s walk northwest of Dolakha bazaar. Their group 
includes the following members: four nari, who work in two 
pairs, alternating as blood-drinkers for Devikot Jatra from year 
to year; two guru, or shamans, who act as spiritual guides to the 
nari; four assistants who are often the sons or other close male 
relatives of the nari they serve; two tauke (Thangmi, derived 
from the Nepali tauko, meaning ‘head’), the men who will carry 
the heads of slaughtered buffaloes on Khadga Jatra; an 
accountant; a manager who collects offerings and keeps track of 
the groups’ supplies; a person responsible for making and 
                                                   
13 Chalier-Visuvalingam describes a Newar festival in Nuwakot in which a Jyapu ritual 
specialist drinks the blood of a buffalo sacrificed to Bhairav, but this occurs during 
the springtime ratha-yatra rather than during the autumn Dasain (2003). 
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maintaining the shelter, or Dasain ghar (N), or house, in which 
the entire group will stay during their tenure in Dolakha; and a 
chief porter to organize transport of all the supplies. Although 
the public parts of the festival in Dolakha begin only on Dasami, 
all of these participants must begin making preparations at 
home two weeks before the festival.  
The nari begin their annual possession on the new moon 
two weeks before Dasami, when they begin shaking at least 
twice a day, in the morning and evening, indicating that the 
goddess is beginning to possess them. During this period, the 
nari must be attentively cared for by their families, since if the 
shaking begins while they are doing physical labor they can 
injure themselves, or if when eating they may choke. One family 
member is usually assigned as an attendant to each nari, and 
this person will spend most of the next few weeks looking after 
him. Often the attendant is a son or other close young male 
relative, and this is also an opportunity for him to learn about 
the nari’s role and anticipate himself in it someday.  
On Astami, the eighth day of Dasain, the nari and their 
attendants begin preparing for a ritual that will start at sundown 
and last all night long at the house of the oldest nari. Sukhbir, 
who currently occupies this position, is 75 years old and has 
been acting as a nari for forty years, since he was 35. Although 
the evening ritual takes place in his house, the officiants are 
Dumkot’s Thangmi gurus, not Sukhbir himself or the other nari. 
The purpose of the ritual is to propitiate all territorial and 
tutelary Thangmi deities, make offerings to them, and request 
their guidance and help in making the following several days of 
high-profile ritual participation in Dolakha successful. Most 
importantly, the local deities—Sundrawati, Gatte, and 
Biswakarma—are asked to provide security to the nari when they 
are possessed by the goddess so that they are able to 
accomplish their tasks for her without making any inauspicious 
moves. After the deities are propitiated, fortunes are told for the 
nari, and finally, as day breaks, a chicken is sacrificed to each 
deity. The chants used to propitiate the deities on this occasion 
conform to a standard rhetorical model common to other 
Thangmi ritual, but the specific requests made of them differ. An 
abbreviated version of the same ritual “text” is repeated on the 
following day in Dolakha, before the nari commence their blood-
drinking. 
Once day breaks and the household ritual is over, two 
more rituals remain to be conducted before the Thangmi group 
can begin their journey to Dolakha. The first is a set of goat 
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sacrifices at the Dumkot Bhimsen temple, and the second is a 
chicken sacrifice at a cave above the village called Sada Apok.14 
At the Dumkot Bhimsen temple, which local Thangmi refer 
to as Dolakha Bhimsenko dai, or “Dolakha Bhimsen’s older 
brother”, twelve goats must be slaughtered as a prelude to the 
following two days of buffalo sacrifice at the Dolakha Bhimsen. 
The sacrifice is carried out by two hereditary Thangmi pujari, or 
temple officiants. According to Thangmi informants, if the 
Dumkot Bhimsen is not satisfied first, the Dolakha sacrifices 
cannot be conducted. If anyone tries to preempt this order, 
Bhimsen will fly into a rage directed at all those who disobey 
him. This is because the Dumkot Bhimsen is in fact the “original” 
deity, from which the Dolakha Newar appropriated his image as 
the centrepiece of their own temple, which they now claim is the 
primary one. Nonetheless, the Thangmi remain devoted to their 
own Bhimsen temple in Dumkot. The Thangmi party which 
travels to Dolakha to perform at Devikot-Khadga Jatra must bear 
evidence of the completed sacrifices at Dumkot Bhimsen, or else 
the Dolakha sacrifices cannot begin. They carry a piece of the 
sacrificial animal’s intestine to demonstrate that the ritual has 
indeed taken place.  
The Dumkot Bhimsen sacrifice is conducted simultaneously 
with another one at Sada Apok, which is carried out by the chief 
nari, Man Bahadur, who doubles as pujari at this temple. Three 
ritual items which represent different aspects of the deity 
Biswakarma are kept in a basket at this cave, each with a 
distinctive Thangmi name: a knife (nyangsuri), a sickle 
(nyangkatari) and a Nepali-style khukuri knife (nyangmesa).15 
These items are reputed to be ancient relics from Simraungadh, 
and they are only taken out of the cave once every other year on 
the full moon of the month of Jeth (May-June) (Miller 1997[1979]: 
118). On Nawami, the ninth day of Dasain, they are simply 
worshipped without viewing, and a chicken is sacrificed in the 
deity’s honor. To the Dumkot Thangmi gathered at the cave, 
these relics are strong symbols of ethnic identity and history, and 
honoring them before making the trek to Dolakha to participate 
in the inter-ethnic ritual of Devikot-Khadga Jatra provides a sense 
                                                   
14 In Thangmi, apok means ‘cave’, while sada is most likely a Nepali loan word 
meaning ‘sacrificial’. 
15 According to Dumkot guru Ram Bahadur Thami, the prefix nyang- marks each of 
these terms as Thangmi ritual lexicon. The vernacular terms for these objects are the 
same as the ritual language terms but without the prefix, although nyangkatari 
inverts the final two consonants in the colloquial Thangmi word for sickle, karati. In 
vernacular Thangmi mesa means ‘buffalo’, and according to the same guru the knife 
known as nyangmesa in ritual Thangmi may in fact refer to an animal deity. 
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of solidarity and confidence in the powers of Thangmi 
consciousness, even in the presence of dominant others. 
Here we have another apparent exception to the rule about 
Thangmi identity serving as its own sacred object due to the lack of 
material objects to serve that purpose, as described in Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation. However, like the wooden dagger and the drum 
described there, the objects kept in this cave are generic implements 
in hill Nepal, which have no particularly sacred, or particularly 
Thangmi, meaning except by virtue of their special names in ritual 
language. They become sacred only in the presence of Thangmi guru 
and the recitation of their paloke. In addition, most Thangmi did not 
know about these objects and their power; only the nari and their close 
associates in Dumkot were familiar with them. Other Thangmi knew 
only about the nari and the ritual act they performed in Dolakha; in 
this sense any sacred power that these objects might have held was 
transferred to the nari before their departure for Dolakha, and it was 
the nari themselves who came to embody the originary power of 
Thangmi identity and serve as its living sign. 
 
Devikot Jatra  
Once these rituals have been completed in Dumkot, the nari and 
their supporting group of about twenty people make the four-
hour trek to Dolakha on the afternoon of Nawami, carrying all of 
the supplies they will need for their three to four day stay there. 
Immediately upon arrival, they begin building the Dasain ghar, a 
small thatched-roof shelter in the corner of a courtyard 
belonging to a wealthy Newar family who provide financial 
support for the Thangmi ritual work.16 Early the next morning, 
the two nari who will perform this year prepare themselves for 
                                                   
16 See the section on economic issues below for more details. 
  544 
the task at hand. They strip down to nothing but loincloths, and 
begin to shake slightly as the goddess controls them. The guru 
begin propitiating the Thangmi deities, as described above [see 
Figure 8.1]. They shake increasingly violently, and after several 
minutes the guru go into trance. The entire group then begins 
their procession from the Dasain ghar to the Bhimsen temple, 
where the nari briskly wash themselves. They proceed quickly 
downhill to Devikot, followed by a few hundred onlookers of all 
ethnic groups and ages. The nari enter the Devikot temple, the 
inner sanctum of which contains a representation of the 
goddess, which no one except the Devikot priest himself may 
see.17 After offering themselves to the goddess, the nari are 
anointed with oil and daubed with red powder all over their 
bodies by the Devikot priest [Figure 8.2] As they reemerge 
outside, they begin shaking more forcefully, crouching with their 
backs to the temple, so that the goddess may ride them.  
A male buffalo calf is brought into the temple courtyard, 
and as a large crowd looks on, a Kasai (Newar butcher caste) 
man cuts the main artery in its neck. The nari lean forward as 
they crouch with their backs towards the temple, and thrice 
drink the squirting blood of the dying buffalo, rinsing their 
mouths out with water in between. They remain in trance the 
entire time, and the excess blood is drained into clay pots. 
After drinking the blood, the nari and their entourage 
leave the Devikot courtyard quickly and proceed towards 
Rajkuleswar, a small shrine at the eastern edge of the town, 
followed again by hundreds of onlookers. At Rajkuleswar, the 
nari must swallow flaming wicks, and then beat another buffalo 
tethered in the courtyard three times.18 Afterwards, this buffalo 
is also slaughtered. Both its head and that of the buffalo calf 
sacrificed earlier at Devikot will resurface during Khadga Jatra on 
the following day. At this point, the nari have completed their 
responsibilities for the day, and they are finally able to bathe and 
wash off the blood covering their bodies. The assistants who 
have been with the nari all day shake them to bring them out of 
trance. Finally the entire group returns to the Dasain ghar to rest 
                                                   
17 The current head priest, Man Kaji Shrestha, was 73 years old in 2004 and had been 
serving in this position since 2053 VS. There are two other assistant priests who work 
under him, also from the Shrestha caste. 
18 Thangmi and Newar interpretations of this ritual element differ. The nari and their 
attendants say that eating the burning wick brings the nari out of trance. This is 
consistent with broader Thangmi practice: in every shamanic ritual, burning wicks are 
fed to those in trance in order to return them from the invisible to the visible world. A 
newsletter published by a Dolakha Newar cultural organization claims instead that, 
“burning lamps are inserted in their [the naris’] mouths as a symbol of Thami power”. 
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and eat again, since they have been fasting since they left their 
home in Dumkot a few days before. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Thangmi gurus from Dumkot propitiating deities at Devikot 
Jatra, Dolakha Bazaar, October 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Naris anointed with red powder to mark them as demons, 
shortly before drinking blood at Devikot Jatra, October 2004 
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Khadga Jatra  
The ritual cycle continues on the following day with Khadga 
Jatra, which commemorates the victory of Tripura-Sundari’s son, 
Bhairav, over the demon Mahisasura. The Thangmi group spends 
the morning in the Dasain ghar, with the guru chanting the 
standard propitiation of deities, as on the previous two days. As 
the morning progresses, the guru become increasingly 
animated. The Khadga Jatra festivities begin around mid-day, 
with music wafting up from the procession of nine Newar 
dancers making its way through the bazaar. The dancers are all 
men, one from each of nine Shrestha families who participate in 
the ritual every year. Onlookers touch the khadga ceremonial 
swords to bring good luck for the coming year. In the Dasain 
ghar, the nari begin shaking at the knees. Big white flags on long 
wooden poles are carried past. These precede the procession of 
dancers to herald the coming of the gods. 
By mid-afternoon, the first group of Newar dancers finally 
approaches the Thangmi. Six dancers in white carry offerings. 
The guru and nari are both shaking in earnest. The first group of 
Newar dancers pass by the Dasain ghar, and wait on the main 
path. A second group of three dancers approaches, followed by a 
third group of three, and these six stand together. The dancers 
finally enter the small courtyard where the Thangmi participants 
are waiting, and salute the Thangmi with their swords. Then, as 
on the day before, the united group heads off together, behind 
the Bhimsen temple and down the hill. The Thangmi lead the 
way, far ahead of the Newar dancers, who stop to dance in front 
of crowds at every intersection.  
The entire group enters the courtyard of Tripura-Sundari, 
after circumambulating the building clockwise. The Thangmi 
immediately ascend the steps to enter the temple, with the guru 
and nari making offerings to the goddess inside the Devikot 
shrine. After about half an hour the first group of Newar dancers 
arrive. They go inside to make offerings, and the Thangmi 
participants come and sit outside on the entrance steps while the 
dancers look on from the windows above.  
After another quarter of an hour or so, the senior group of 
dancers finally arrive. This includes the dharmaraja, or religious 
king, who leads the divine army forward to vanquish the 
demons. They dance outside the temple for some time, and then 
go inside. Shortly thereafter, the two Thangmi charged with 
carrying the heads from the buffaloes sacrificed the previous day 
during Devikot Jatra emerge. The slain heads are perched on 
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these two men’s shoulders [see Figure 8.3]. The senior tauke, or 
head-carrier, is Gopilal, a prominent social figure in his sixties 
who was one of the first Thangmi to become involved with 
national politics, through the Nepali Congress party. He remains 
an important local political activist and this role does not appear 
to be contradictory to his ritual one; since he believes strongly 
that continued Thangmi participation in Devikot-Khadga Jatra is 
essential to maintaining a unique Thangmi identity within a 
modern Nepal. The younger head carrier is Sanuman, in his 
forties, and both he and Gopilal belong to the roimirati clan. 
During one of the years I observed the ritual, Sanuman was on 
crutches and required help from his wife and son to carry his 
bloody load. When I asked why someone else couldn’t take his 
place, I was told that the hereditary nature of this responsibility 
dictates that the current tauke must play the role until he dies. 
No exceptions are granted, even for temporary or permanent 
disabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Sanuman and Gopilal carrying the heads of sacrificed 
bufflaos at Khadga Jatra, Dolakha Bazaar, October 2004 
 
Finally, the two tauke come down the main steps and exit 
the compound, waiting on a small plateau just below. Then the 
Newar dancers begin to stream out of the temple. The 
dharmaraja, usually portrayed by an older Newar man, is the last 
to emerge. He wears the intestines of that day’s sacrificed 
buffalo, linked in a long, necklace-like chain, as proof of his 
successful conquest of the demons. The intestines jiggle as he 
  548 
dances in a wild trance. He requires an assistant on either side to 
support him, since he seems unable to control himself.  
As soon as the dharmaraja makes it all the way down the 
steps and out of the compound to where the Thangmi head-
carriers are waiting, the procession starts again. The head-
carriers lead, and the procession makes its way slowly through 
the whole town, stopping at each intersection to sing of 
vanquishing the demons. Finally, the whole entourage ends up at 
Rajkuleswar temple at the opposite end of town from Devikot. At 
Rajkuleswar, the demons are banished for the final time when 
the head- carrying Thangmi cut off the tails of the dead 
buffaloes lying there, and stuff the tails in the mouths of the 
severed heads. The whole festival concludes after the dancers 
chant verses to scare the demons into dispersing. The heads are 
then ritually useless and are dragged along the ground carelessly 
instead of carried proudly on shoulders. They heads are returned 
to Devikot, where they will be chopped up into small pieces and 
given as a ritual offering to the Newar participants. 
Upon reaching Devikot again, two kubindho (N), large 
pumpkins, are hacked apart.19 There is a scramble to get a piece 
of the pumpkin, the meat of which is believed to make infertile 
cows and other livestock fertile again. The pumpkin pieces retain 
their power for twelve years, so people take home whatever 
pieces they can grab, dry them in the sun, and use them little by 
little as necessary. With this last substitute sacrifice complete, 
the ritual concludes for the year. The Thangmi participants 
prepare to return to Dumkot that night. 
 
Economic Issues  
The history of the guthi (N < Newar), or lands granted to the 
temples which were used to support the rituals carried out at the 
Devikot and Bhimsen temples, provides a valuable window 
through which to view the relationships between the Thangmi, 
Newar and Bahun-Chhetri communities in Dolakha. Documents 
dating to 1850 VS (1793-1794 AD) show that Rana Bahadur 
Shah endowed guthi lands to the Dolakha Bhimsen temple at 
that time (Regmi 1981: 14). It is possible that a separate guthi 
was endowed for the Devikot temple at a similar time, but there 
are no available documents to date the Devikot guthi precisely.20 
                                                   
19 Chalier-Visuvalingam also describes a pumpkin sacrifice in Nuwakot, where she 
claims the gourds stand in for human heads (1989: 169). 
20 Miller claims that there was a single guthi which supported both the Devikot and 
Bhimsen temples (1997[1979]: 88). Although their management may have been 
linked, several informants have confirmed that there were indeed two separate tracts 
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In any case, Thangmi informants claim that the Devikot guthi 
included 268 muri of land. According to the nari and their 
families, this was adequate to support the Thangmi participation 
in the ritual by providing food and grain alcohol during their stay 
in Dolakha, as well as a small additional “payment” of surplus 
grain. 
However, problems arose in the management of the guthi 
in the mid-twentieth century, and both temple guthi were finally 
abolished in the early 1990s during a central government effort 
to measure and reallocate such lands all over Nepal. Miller 
suggests that difficulties over Thangmi access to the guthi lands 
may have begun as early as 1905 AD (1997[1979]: 89), but 
escalated severely in 2005 VS (1948-1949 AD). This matches 
with reports from Dumkot Thangmi informants, such as the 
senior nari Sukhbir, who claims that his father led a protest 
against the abuse of guthi lands towards the end of his life term 
as a nari. Since Sukhbir took over the role upon his father’s 
death in 2021 VS (1963-1964 AD), it is likely that his father’s 
protest actions took place in the 1950s. 
The assertion that conflict over guthi lands escalated in 1948 
dates it to the same year in which the Suspa mizar, Sure, set about 
Hinduizing Thangmi wedding traditions in response to concern 
expressed by representatives of the central government, as described 
in Chapter 7. The fact that this occurred in the same year as conflict 
over access to the guthi began escalating suggests that the Nepali 
state substantially increased its presence in Dolakha and its 
engagement with the Thangmi at this time.21  
 
In any case, both Newar and Thangmi narratives concur that at 
some point in the last century, the Thangmi participants in 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra began to have difficulties accessing the 
guthi lands for harvest because Bahun-Chhetri families newly 
established in the area refused to respect the guthi charter and 
claimed those lands as their own. According to Miller, these high 
                                                                                                                                                  
of land. 
21 Comprehensive historical research on local conditions in the late 1940s would help 
contextualize the isolated incidents that I have been able to describe here. 
  550 
caste settlers “took the step of preventing the Thamis from 
getting the harvest from this land” (1997[1979]: 90). The Newar 
priests at Devikot did not know what had happened until the 
Thangmi failed to arrive on Nawami in time for Devikot Jatra. A 
concerned delegation from Dolakha trekked to Dumkot to 
inquire, and there learned that since the nari and their families 
had been unable to access the guthi lands, they did not have 
food supplies for their stay in Dolakha and had therefore 
decided to stay home. Miller suggests that the Newar priest 
interceded and negotiated on behalf of the Thangmi with the 
Bahun-Chhetri who were blocking access to the guthi lands, and 
that the problem did not recur in the future (1997[1979]: 91).  
At the time Miller visited Dolakha in 1974-1975, it 
appears that the guthi was still functional, since he writes of the 
Thangmi entourage being fed several large meals from guthi 
proceeds during the festivals he observed. However, Thangmi 
participants complained to him about the miserly nature of the 
meals and suggested that they were unhappy with the 
arrangement.  
By the time I began research in 1999, the guthi was no 
more, and a new system had been improvised to take its place. 
During the nine months in 1994-1995 when the Communist 
Party of Nepal (UML) formed a majority government in 
Kathmandu, they had implemented a policy of abolishing certain 
guthi lands across the country. Their rationale was that many 
temple organizations were becoming wealthy on income derived 
from the surplus harvest from their large tracts of guthi land, 
which should be made available to common citizens as public 
land instead. In the Dolakha case, the irony was that the guthi 
had in fact been used to provide for a disadvantaged segment of 
society—the Thangmi of Dumkot—in exchange for their ritual 
services.  
When the guthi disappeared, Laxman Shrestha, a wealthy 
Dolakha businessman, took it upon himself to provide some 
support for the Thangmi ritual participants. Shrestha’s 
forefathers had been involved in managing the Bhimsen guthi, 
and he felt a sense of personal responsibility for ensuring that 
the Thangmi would continue to participate in Devikot-Khadga 
Jatra. In 2051 VS (1994-1995 AD), he established a 50,000 
rupee bank fund for the nari. Since then, he has distributed the 
annual interest from this investment among the Thangmi ritual 
participants and their attendants, which amounts to 5000-8000 
rupees per year for the entire Thangmi group, depending upon 
national economic conditions and interest rates. At most, when 
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divided among the approximately twenty-strong Thangmi group, 
this leaves 200-400 rupees per person, out of which they must 
pay for all of their food and supplies for their three to four day 
stay in Dolakha. Although the nari, tauke and other Thangmi 
participants are generally grateful to Laxman Shrestha and see 
him as a thoughtful benefactor, they still complain that the 
amount they receive is not adequate compensation for their 
efforts. 
 
Analysis  
The Power of Impurity  
So why do the Thangmi keep participating? The answer lies in an 
understanding of ambivalent agency, which explains the 
apparent conundrum of devoted Thangmi performance in a ritual 
that seems to take place entirely outside the world of Thangmi 
social relations, without any visible social benefit for them, and 
which is degrading to their social status in the eyes of most 
observers.  
Miller’s explanation for ongoing Thangmi participation in 
these rituals is that the nari are compelled to perform their role 
not by the Newar ritual officiants, whom it appears they are 
serving, but in fact directly by the goddess Tripura-Sundari, 
often called Maharani, herself. Such an explanation fits nicely 
within the paradigm for “multiple structures of meaning as 
engendered by different readings of ritual performance by 
different social groups” outlined by Ohnuki-Tierney (1987: 5) in 
general, and articulated in the Nepal-specific context by 
Holmberg (2000) and Pfaff-Czarnecka (1996), as discussed 
above. 
In the Hindu story of Bhagawati and Raktabir, which they 
are going to see re-enacted now, the Newar spectators 
have a symbol of moral righteousness triumphing over 
irrational evil; but the non-Hindu tribal Thamis viewing 
and participating in the scene today contemplate rather an 
invisible power becoming visible in their midst and 
satisfying through them its desire for blood-offerings. 
They call it “Maharani” and no attempt is made to 
rationalize her appetite for blood; she has chosen the nari 
for this purpose because she wants it so. Because of this 
double view of the ceremony, and the double view of the 
world and reality which it implies, there is a doubling of 
religious specialists here as well. (Miller 1997[1979]: 77) 
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Indeed, in the Dolakha Newar world view, the Thangmi 
play the undesirable role of demons-by-association: having 
drunk the demon’s blood, represented by the blood of the 
buffalo calf, they themselves become demons incarnate. As the 
nari exit the Devikot grounds after drinking the blood, shouts of 
rakshas—demon—ring out from Newar onlookers jeering at the 
Thangmi. But for the Thangmi themselves, participation in the 
ritual is an important form of mediation between the human and 
the divine. As Miller puts it, “it is a case of the invisible becoming 
visible in the Thami nari and their jankri gurus” (1997[1979]: 
73).  
A Japanese comparison provides further insight into the 
power dynamics at work in the Devikot-Khadga Jatra situation. 
To some extent, the Dolakha scenario is structurally similar to 
the one Ohnuki-Tierney describes for a Japanese monkey ritual: 
“... the monkey and the special status people have always been 
assigned the role of keeping the Japanese pure; they did so as 
mediators by bringing in the pure and creative power of the 
deities, and they do so as scapegoats by shouldering the 
impurity of the dominant Japanese” (1987: 151). Like their 
Japanese counterparts, the Thangmi serve both as mediators 
between the seen and unseen worlds—an important trope in the 
Himalayan ritual world just as it is in Japan—and as scapegoats 
for ritual impurity. 
Ohnuki-Tierney claims that despite their social 
marginality, the “special status people” who performed the 
monkey ritual were marginal without being “negative in 
valuation” (1987: 86). In fact, she suggests that elite members of 
the outcaste groups were often in close literal and metaphorical 
proximity to centres of sociopolitical power. She therefore 
argues that impurity in itself is not always a negative value. 
Instead, in many cultural contexts, “specialists in impurity”, in 
the Dumontian sense, are an absolute social necessity, and carry 
with them an unexpectedly positive status (Ohnuki-Tierney 
1987: 89-91). This inversion also recalls Declan Quigley’s 
argument about the “impure priest”, in which the priestly 
activities of brahmans—who are usually portrayed as the highest 
Hindu caste—in fact mark them as a particular kind of 
untouchable (1993: 81). By the same token, Miller reports that 
the Dolakha Newar he initially interviewed about the Thangmi 
blood drinkers described the nari as “like Brahmins” 
(1997[1979]: 65).22 Within this framework, we can begin to 
                                                   
22 Thangmi participants themselves do not necessarily see being “like Brahmins” as a 
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understand how Thangmi marginality and impurity, as asserted 
in their ritual role, is not necessarily “negative in valuation”, but 
may instead afford the Thangmi a modicum of sociopolitical 
power vis-à-vis the Dolakha Newar.  
Ohnuki-Tierney’s “special status people” attain power only 
through their proximity to its centre, not by asserting it on their 
own terms. This formulation is rather similar to Guha’s “ritual 
inversion” argument (1983), since in both contexts the power 
attained remains subject to the terms of domination. As outlined 
earlier, such a framework is not entirely adequate to address the 
Thangmi situation. There is an important difference between the 
Japanese monkey ritual and the Devikot-Khadga Jatra situations. 
In the former, the “special status people” perform the monkey 
ritual as a means of gaining power within the dominant system 
and see themselves as subordinated in a dualistic relationship 
with those who dominate them; whereas in the latter, the 
Thangmi mediation between the seen and unseen worlds is 
effected primarily for indigenous Thangmi soteriological 
purposes, according to the terms of Thangmi consciousness, 
rather than to satisfy Newar requirements. 
 
Ritual Reiteration  
This is not to suggest that the Thangmi participants remain 
unaware of the pragmatic social power gained through serving 
as specialists in impurity for the Newar. In fact, the nari 
themselves, as well as many members of the broader Thangmi 
community are very conscious of this aspect of their 
performance and speak about it frequently in a variety of 
contexts. However, the social power gained in relation to the 
Newar community is seen as an added bonus resulting from the 
ritual, rather than its primary aim. For this reason, Miller’s 
assertion that a dualistic “double view” of the world governs 
Thangmi and Newar participation in Devikot-Khadga Jatra is too 
simplistic, although on the right track. I would revise Miller’s 
interpretation by suggesting that the Thangmi are fully 
conscious of both views, not just their own. Both structures of 
meaning operate simultaneously and are dependent upon each 
other, so accepting one inherently entails accepting the other. 
Like the Tamang described by Holmberg and Pfaff-Czarnecka, 
                                                                                                                                                  
positive attribute, since they have had largely negative experiences with members of 
that caste group, and associate Brahmins with exploitation and dishonesty. However, 
what is important here is that Miller’s Dolakha Newar informants recognized the 
Thangmi nari as ritual specialists carrying out sacred duties, not just demons to be 
derided. 
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the Thangmi nari and their extended communities recognize the 
terms of their domination, but in a manner that does not 
necessarily result in a resistance structured by those same 
terms, as Ohnuki-Tierney or Guha would have us believe. 
Instead, the Thangmi participation in Devikot-Khadga Jatra 
results in an ambivalent agency, which appropriates power from 
the source of domination, but in the process of its restructuring 
according to indigenous terms, effects a shift in consciousness 
from that of subordination to that of positive identity 
construction. 
Butler articulates this type of dynamic by posing a set of 
questions:  
 
A significant and potentially enabling reversal occurs when 
power shifts from its status as a condition of agency to the 
subject’s ‘own’ agency … How are we to assess that 
becoming? Is it an enabling break, a bad break? How is it 
that the power upon which the subject depends for 
existence and which the subject is compelled to reiterate 
turns against itself in the course of that reiteration? How 
might we think resistance within the terms of reiteration? 
(Butler 1997b: 12)  
 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra is a clear ethnographic example of a 
situation in which the power “which the subject is compelled to 
reiterate turns against itself in the course of that reiteration” 
(Butler 1997b: 12). As a calendrical ritual, Devikot-Khadga Jatra 
is annually reiterated, providing within itself the constant 
promise of resistance. The ritual framework in which the 
Thangmi perform is indeed structured by the dominant Newar 
need for socio-religious scapegoats, but the power which the 
Thangmi generate through their ritual performance rejects and 
in fact alters the terms of domination by appropriating it as a 
fundamental aspect of Thangmi identity itself. The power 
accrued by individual Thangmi nari through the ritual 
performance takes on a life of its own beyond the ritual, 
becoming a foundation for identity construction within the realm 
of Thangmi social relations. Yet this appropriation of ritual 
power is not detached from an awareness of the source of that 
power, as Miller’s “double view” formulation would suggest. 
Instead, by acknowledging that ritual power is an important 
source of Thangmi agency, Thangmi identity at once reiterates 
and resists it.  
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Individual and Collective Consciousness  
Understanding how Thangmi ambivalent agency works requires 
one more turn, which is to examine more closely the individual 
identities of the Thangmi participating in the ritual, and how are 
they chosen. These men embody the link between the ritual 
power of Devikot-Khadga Jatra and everyday Thangmi ethnic 
identity. The nari positions are semi-hereditary and held for a 
lifetime, with a new nari chosen by the goddess among the 
immediate male family members of a recently deceased nari. 
Within the Thangmi community, it is considered an honor to be 
chosen by the goddess, although on a practical level it is 
obviously a burden as well. It is important to note that nari are 
not equivalent to guru: the nari perform no other shamanic 
functions for their community. They are only expected to go into 
trance once a year during Devikot-Khadga Jatra, in order to carry 
out their clearly delimited ritual role. After these annual 
responsibilities are over, they return to lay life as farmers and 
laborers, without any expectation that they will take on further 
ritual duties or maintain special abilities to communicate with 
the divine world. Although the nari are well aware of these 
limitations at the internal level of consciousness, the external 
image of them as demons sticks. Dolakha Newar individuals 
often refer to members of the Thangmi ethnic group as 
“demons” in casual conversations, long after the rituals have 
been completed for that year.  
The sharp distinction between Thangmi guru and nari 
limits the ritual pollution accrued in the performance by limiting 
it to two common individuals. In contrast to the Thangmi guru, 
these men are otherwise uninvolved with the maintenance of 
collective Thangmi identity through ritual. Distinguishing the 
powers of the nari during Devikot-Khadga Jatra from other 
modes of Thangmi-internal shamanic power highlights the 
importance of the power appropriated through the Devikot-
Khadga Jatra performance for constructing Thangmi identity 
within the broader sociopolitical world. The fact that the nari are 
common people makes it much easier for a broad range of 
Thangmi individuals to appropriate the power these men 
embody during Devikot-Khadga Jatra as part of their own 
process of identity construction at the psychological level, since 
Thangmi gurus are already set apart from lay people by their 
access to the unseen world of deities. In this sense, the nari 
allow their individual consciousness—and pride—to be effaced in 
their performance as demons in order to produce a collective 
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Thangmi consciousness through that act. At the same time, their 
individual sense of self is formed within the collective framework 
of power and identity that their actions as nari, as well as the 
actions of those who came before them in this role, create. ...  
 
Conclusion: The Threat of Refusal  
Unlike the Tamang in Pfaff-Czarnecka’s case, for whom 
boycotting Dasain constitutes resistance on a political level, for 
the Thangmi to refuse participation in Devikot-Khadga Jatra 
would be to undermine the very basis of Thangmi identity on a 
psychological level. But it is unclear that the Thangmi choice to 
continue participating is any less an act of resistance than the 
Tamang boycott. Rather than situating themselves in opposition 
to the ritual by boycotting it, the Thangmi are committed to 
reiterating it in order to continue appropriating the ritual’s 
power for their own purposes, thereby transforming its terms in 
the process.  
At the same time, there are certainly symbolic plays on the 
theme of refusal, which provide opportunities for the Thangmi to 
clearly assert their power in a manner comprehensible to their 
Dolakha Newar neighbors. The Newar festival cannot proceed 
without the involvement of the Thangmi, so at a fundamental 
level the Thangmi participants have control over the ritual’s 
efficacy. Threatening refusal is an obvious way for the Thangmi 
to refigure the ritual on their terms and claim power in relation 
to the socio-economically dominant Newar. For this reason, the 
threat of refusal itself has become embedded as part of the 
performance. As described above, Miller relates an apocryphal 
tale about a year in which the Thangmi refused to come to 
Dolakha because of a land dispute that affected their 
compensation for ritual duties (1997[1979]: 89-91). When the 
Thangmi failed to appear, the goddess possessed the entire 
Dolakha Newar population instead and drove them all the way to 
Dumkot. They found the nari shaking wildly under the goddess’s 
influence, and although the broader Thangmi community urged 
them to stay away from Dolakha for political reasons, the nari 
could not refuse the goddess and so followed the Newar 
contingent back to Dolakha of their own accord.  
This is only one of many possible forms the threat of 
refusal may take. According to Thangmi informants and my own 
observations, every year there is some conflict or other which 
causes the Thangmi group to threaten that they will not return 
the following year. The Newar are always duly frightened, and so 
give in to the Thangmi demands. In 1999, the lunar calendar 
  557 
inserted an extra day between Navami (ninth day of Dasain) and 
Dasami (tenth day of Dasain), of which the Thangmi were not 
aware. So the Thangmi group arrived in Dolakha one day early, 
and the Devikot priests asked them to wait an additional day to 
perform the ritual. The Thangmi refused, since the nari must fast 
from the moment they leave their homes, and they did not want 
to go hungry for an additional day. They repeatedly threatened 
to leave Dolakha, forfeiting their ritual role, and several times 
began walking back up the path towards Dumkot. The Newar 
priests called them back each time, and eventually gave in, 
agreeing to hold the entire ritual a day ahead of schedule. 
Dolakha Newar onlookers were very upset about this turn of 
events, as the Thangmi refusal required them to perform the 
ritual on an inauspicious and calendrically incorrect day. But they 
knew they had no choice, and the ritual proceeded with a 
fraction of the usual crowds in attendance.  
In 2004, a dispute took place inside the Devikot temple, 
shortly before the sacrifice was to be made. The Devikot priests 
are supposed to anoint the nari with sindur (N), a dry red powder 
used in Hindu rituals, all over their bodies in order to mark them 
as demons. This year, the priests were apparently in a rush and 
had not purchased a new stock of sindur. With only a little bit of 
the red powder at their disposal, they painted a few barely 
visible marks on the nari and then tried to push them outside to 
get on with the blood-drinking. The attendants to the nari 
became very angry with the priests for doing this in such a half-
hearted manner, and shouted that it was unfair to the nari if they 
were not properly marked as demons, for if they went through 
the ritual without first being transformed they would be tainted 
with impurity in their daily lives rather than simply during the 
clearly demarcated ritual context. Demanding that the Newar 
priests procure additional sindur to complete the job properly, 
the Thangmi group threatened to leave without completing the 
ritual. The priests shoved the nari roughly, shouting that they 
didn’t understand the problem, but the nari held their ground. 
Finally it became clear that they would not exit the temple in 
order to drink the sacrificial blood outside unless the priests 
complied, and several minutes later a new packet of sindur was 
delivered and the ritual continued.  
These examples demonstrate how the annual threat of 
refusal asserts Thangmi power, unsettling the Newar assumption 
of dominance which remains unquestioned for the rest of the 
year. However, the Thangmi have never followed through on the 
threat. In the end, they always participate, for the threat of 
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refusal is not nearly as powerful as the performance of the ritual 
itself. The performance itself constitutes Thangmi agency, while 
the threat of refusal which always precedes it lays bare the 
ambivalence at its core. 
In conclusion, I turn to a final quotation from Butler which 
lucidly articulates this paradox:  
Agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled. One 
might say that the purposes of power are not always the 
purposes of agency. To the extent that the latter diverge 
from the former, agency is the assumption of a purpose 
unintended by power, one that could not have been 
derived logically or historically, that operates in a relation 
of contingency and reversal to the power that makes it 
possible, to which it nevertheless belongs. This is, as it 
were, the ambivalent scene of agency, constrained by no 
teleological necessity. (Butler 1997b: 15) 
 
In their yearly ritual performance, then, the nari reiterate 
an indigenous, collective Thangmi agency. Although always 
ambivalent, this agency is in part an unintended consequence of 
attempted domination by the Dolakha Newar, caste Hindus, and 
the Nepali state. The ritual relationships embedded in Devikot-
Khadga Jatra shape the expression of Thangmi agency and 
identity, and by appropriating the power generated through 
these relationships for their own purposes, Thangmi 
participation transcends the structure of domination. 
 
A Sign of the Times 
In 2006, the Thangmi called their own ritual bluff. My assertion that 
the threat of refusal was not nearly as powerful as the reiterative 
performance of the ritual itself was off the mark. Or to be more 
generous, it described an earlier paradigm that no longer applied by 
2006, and had probably already begun weakening several years earlier. 
I was too close to notice, and also too invested in the “teleological 
necessity” of interpretive certainty that my work entailed, thereby 
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curtailing its real potential for agency. Could I have seen it coming? 
Perhaps, if I had read the tension between Newar and Thangmi which 
seemed to increase year by year as a sign of these particular times, 
instead of as a timeless structural feature of the ritual itself. 
What actually happened in 2006 to finally transform the threat of 
refusal into a real refusal? Captioning a photo of the Newar dancers at 
Khadga Jatra, the Kathmandu Post suggested that, “Due to a protest 
from the Maoists, the tradition of drinking a water buffalo’s blood and 
carrying its head was cancelled this year” (TKP October 5, 2006: 1; see 
figure 8.4).23 Unsurprisingly, this explanation came from none other 
than the journalist Rajendra Manandhar, who was infamous among the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 The Kathmandu Post photo and report about the end of 
Thangmi participation in Devikot-Khadga Jatra, October 2006 
                                                   
23 The caption misrecognizes the Newar dancers as Thangmi: “People from the Thami 
community armed with traditional weaponry take out the Khadga Jatra procession, a 
centuries-old tradition”. 
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Thangmi for his article claiming that they were the descendants of yeti 
(as described in Chapter 1), and did not tell the whole story from the 
Thangmi perspective. 
I knew that the Maoists had in fact been calling for the 
cancellation of Devikot-Khadga Jatra for several years now—they had 
been active in the area since the late 1990s, and did not like 
ostentatious displays of power put on by anyone but themselves.24 
However, these demands had been oriented towards the public festival 
as a whole, and applied to all participants, not just Thangmi, and to all 
ritual elements, not just the act of blood-drinking. In any case, the 
Newar organizers of the event had always refused to comply. Many 
Dolakha Newar were middle-class members of civil society—teachers, 
hospital administrators, shopkeepers—whose goodwill the Maoists in 
large part depended upon, and perhaps this emboldened them to 
ignore the Maoist calls to cancel their public Dasain rituals. In any 
case, it seemed unlikely that a Maoist threat which had gone unheeded 
for several years would suddenly bring about such a dramatic change 
of heart. 
As I arrived in Dolakha some weeks after the ritual would have 
taken place, I ran into Ram Bahadur on the road. He was the youngest 
of the Dumkot gurus at 30. He was literate but also deeply committed 
to his practice as a guru, and I had heard him speak against 
                                                   
24 See Shneiderman (2003) and Shneiderman and Turin (2004) for more details of the 
Maoist presence in the area. 
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scripturalization of the paloke at a recent NTS meeting. I asked him 
whether the naris and the rest of the Dumkot community were upset 
about the Maoist decree. “You believed that too?” he laughed. I didn’t 
understand, and asked him to explain further. 
We held a meeting in Dumkot and decided that it was finally time 
to stop going. See, the guthi doesn’t provide enough for us, I 
think you know that, and it was getting harder and harder to go. 
The naris said they could do their shaking [go into trance] at 
home. Sukhbir [the senior nari], he is so old now that he can 
barely walk to Dolakha, why should he suffer? Before, we always 
thought about not going, but we were worried that the Newar 
would make our lives difficult, we needed them. Now, we don’t 
need them so much anymore, it’s only they who need us. They 
were so embarrassed and angry when we didn’t come that they 
told everyone it was because of the Maoists. It’s true that the 
Maoists had been asking us not to do it for a long time, but that 
is not why we stopped. 
Could it really be true, that just like that, the naris had decided 
they didn’t need to go anymore? If so, then it was a tremendously 
agentive act, and as such a demonstration of power, yet one that 
canceled out the power that they had previously achieved through 
participation in the ritual. What was qualitatively different about this 
new form of power, and did other Thangmi relate to it as 
representative of their own identity in the same way they had to the 
ritual act itself? Ram Bahadur had explained the end of the ritual in a 
very matter-of-fact manner, which put my own initial dismay at 
hearing about the end of the ritual in perspective. If the naris were in 
fact not only happy with this outcome, but had made the decision for it 
themselves, then I certainly had no place being upset. 
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Gopilal, a senior figure of Thangmi society in his 60s who had 
been one of the head-carriers in Khadga Jatra and was also a long time 
Nepali Congress activist, helped me understand more clearly what had 
happened. I asked him why they felt that they didn’t “need the Newar 
so much anymore”, as Ram Bahadur had put it. 
After the People’s Movement last spring [April 2006], everyone 
felt different. We saw that the King could no longer stop what the 
people wanted. It’s time for the old rulers to go and for people’s 
democracy to take their place. For us, the Newar were like the 
King is for the whole country, and just like that their rule is also 
finished. 
Gopilal’s statement pointed back to Dasain’s history as a ritual 
of state power, which, as described above, worked to legitimate nested 
levels of ruling power from the Shah kings at the top, down to the 
rulers of individual principalities at the local level throughout Nepal, 
like the Newar of Dolakha. Gopilal seemed to be saying that the old 
frameworks within which power was asserted had dissolved in the 
wake of the 2006 People’s Movement, which brought the end of the 
Nepal’s ruling Shah dynasty into sight.25 At an ideological level, the 
loss of royal power also deeply unsettled the Dolakha Newar position 
in national hierarchies of rule, even if nothing had changed overnight 
in their local economic or social status. Recall Pfaff-Czarnecka’s 
statement that, “Power rituals in complex societies pertain to specific 
sociopolitical orders and to the authority of those in focal political 
                                                   
25 Gyanendra Shah was only officially deposed in May 2008, but the People’s 
Movement in April 2006 brought about the end of his 14 months of autocratic direct 
rule, and effectively stripped him of political power during the interim period while 
his ultimate fate was decided. 
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positions within these orders” (1996: 59). With the 2006 People’s 
Movement and the ensuing moves towards elections, a constituent 
assembly, and the restructuring of Nepal as a secular federal republic, 
the sociopolitical order of Hindu divine kingship within which Dasain 
had served as a power ritual at the national level had fallen away, along 
with the local instantiation of it in Devikot-Khadga Jatra, in which the 
Newar were the focal figures of authority. The political transformation 
that the country had experienced meant that the Dolakha Newar were 
no longer a local proxy for royal rule, and therefore no longer in 
control of the ritual power out of which the Thangmi had learned to 
craft their own. 
 
Uncertainty in the New Order 
The end of Devikot-Khadga Jatra was probably one of many signs 
across the country that the ritual idiom of state power that had defined 
Nepal as a nation since 1769 (Burghart 1984) was in its dying days. But 
what was to replace it, and how would the agentive power of 
Thangminess be articulated within whatever the new framework was? 
For a start, let me return to the guru Ram Bahadur’s assertion 
that the naris could still go into trance at home. Indeed, this is 
apparently what has happened every year since 2006: the naris still 
begin shaking and go into trance on the same day that they used to, 
the gurus still come to sit with them and guide them through their 
journey to the divine world, and the naris still experience the goddess 
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riding them. The soteriological aspect of what used to occur at 
Devikot-Khadga Jatra continues, and has in fact been reframed within 
an exclusively Thangmi practice context that looks much like the 
propitiation of Bhume described in Chapter 6, or the propitiation of 
deities at a mumpra funerary rite as described in Chapter 7.26 The 
fundamental characteristics of Thangmi originary power as articulated 
in practice have not changed, then, but the ways that this power is 
performatized for presentation to broader public audiences have. 
The composition of those audiences, or, in other words, the 
agents from whom Thangmi seek recognition of their power, has 
changed along with the scale on which that power is conceptualized 
and the idiom in which it is expressed. Rather than seeing the 
localized, Newar-dominated public sphere of Dolakha as the outer 
limit of their power as expressed through the ritual idiom of Devikot-
Khadga Jatra, Thangmi have now begun to conceptualize the national 
Nepali public sphere as a primary arena within which such power must 
be demonstrated, in the political idiom of ethnic activism, in order to 
secure recognition. 
Perhaps contrary to expectations, active participation in the 
Nepali national public sphere is much newer for most Thangmi than 
participation in the transnational public sphere created through 
circular migration between Nepal and India that is described in 
                                                   
26 It is also worth noting here that the family-based aspects of Dasain practice, such 
as receiving the blessing of tika from one’s elders continue without notable change in 
the Thangmi community. 
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Chapters 4 and 5.27 As explained in Chapter 4, in fact, the sense that 
one could “belong” in India in political terms from very early on, in a 
way that one could not belong in Nepal, was one of the primary 
motivating factors that compelled Thangmi to settle in India, or at least 
spend much of their time there. The naris themselves had, in fact, all 
engaged in circular migration at one point of their lives, but unlike 
other Thangmi, they did not feel that they had the option to settle 
permanently in India, since they felt compelled to return to Nepal every 
year in order to carry out their ritual duties. One might think that they 
would settle in India precisely to avoid these obligations; however, they 
feared the consequences that lack of participation might wreak on 
their extended families who remained behind in Dolakha. Most 
Thangmi villages had some sort of ritual obligation to the Dolakha 
Newar during other calendrical rituals throughout the year, although 
none were so dramatic as the blood-drinking of the Dumkot naris. For 
instance, Thangmi from Lapilang were required to provide the 
materials for and pull the chariot at the Machendranath festival in the 
spring. These responsibilities may be one explanation for why 
substantial numbers of Thangmi engaged in circular migration, rather 
than settling in India permanently. Their localized ritual obligations to 
the Dolakha Newar tied them to their home territory, but did not 
preclude participation in the political life of another country because, 
                                                   
27 The transnational public sphere does not necessarily encompass fully both national 
public spheres that it mediates between, but rather outlines a third sphere which 
links some aspects of each national sphere to some aspects of the other through 
circular migration between particular localities in each. 
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as shown in Chapter 5, they did not until much later consider 
themselves citizens of Nepal with political obligations—or desires for 
recognition—in that national public sphere. 
These histories help pinpoint how the Thangmi communities of 
Nepal and India began to develop along different trajectories over 
time: for those who remained based in Nepal, identity was produced 
primarily through the power of ritual within the framework of a Hindu 
state, while for those who settled in India, identity was produced 
primarily through associational politics, or what we might call the 
power of association, within the framework of a secular state. Ongoing 
circular migration, however, bound the two groups together. As I have 
argued in Chapter 5, knowledge of both places has long been a 
hallmark of Thangminess, and here we might extend this assertion to 
encompass knowledge of, and appreciation for, both forms of power, 
even if most individuals could only easily command one, if any. Silipitik 
traveled to India and marveled at the power of a political speech (as 
described in Chapter 4); activists from India came to Devikot Jatra and 
marveled at the naris’ bold act. However, as Silipitik himself explained, 
the form of civil power that he witnessed in the speech in Darjeeling 
had little place within the ritually legitimated sociopolitical order of the 
Nepali state. Circular migrants like him were aware of how such power 
worked in India, and quite fascinated by it, but until the order changed 
at the highest level in Nepal, there was little point in expressing power 
in those terms there. 
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Multiple Agencies 
The 2006 People’s Movement did not happen overnight, rather, it was 
the culmination of decades of political activism dating back at least to 
1950, with the civil conflict between the Maoists and state forces that 
began in 1996 only the most recent upheaval in recent memory.28 
Throughout these decades, while young activists from Nepal (Thangmi 
and otherwise) traveled to India to learn about the techniques of power 
politics,29 in Nepal the sociopolitical order and its power rituals stood 
fast. Thangmi became involved in party politics (largely via 
communism, but some, like Gopilal, were Nepali Congress members) 
and then ethnic activism, and slowly political power and ritual power 
began to articulate with each other. Activists set out to write about the 
Thangmi role in Devikot-Khadga Jatra30 and the naris threatened 
refusal, but still, every year, they continued to drink blood, and 
Thangmi everywhere continued to tell me how important this act was 
in constituting their identity. The agency generated through the naris’ 
performance was not immediately erased or overtaken by the new type 
of agency, rather, the former provided the foundation for the latter’s 
                                                   
28 The People’s War formally ended in November 2006, with the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
29 Recall that all of the major political parties in Nepal were formed in exile in India 
(largely in Banaras) before their members were able to return to Nepal in 1950. Many 
returned to India again during the most authoritarian phase of Mahendra’s rule in the 
late 1950s 
30 As far as I am aware, the first Thangmi-authored publication about it is Bhaba’s 
1997 description of it in Nan Ni Patuko. In an interview, the former NTS general 
secretary told me how the experience of conducting research on this topic just after 
graduating from high school positively augmented his own sense of identity as a 
Thangmi after having spent the better part of his life in a boarding school. 
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existence. Both forms of agency were fundamentally ambivalent in the 
sense that they remained subject to the conditions of larger sets of 
power relations. Just as Nepal’s king co-existed with an elected 
parliament for a substantial period of time, the two strategies for 
articulating ethnic power co-existed for several decades, as 
personified in the figure of Gopilal, who was one of the rare individuals 
with reasonable command of both. For most Thangmi, however, it 
would be a long time before the agency produced through political 
action became evident in a recognizable manner—before they 
recognized themselves in it, or it in themselves—in the same way that 
they recognized the agency produced through the naris’ ritual 
performance.  
This was one of the monumental tasks that Thangmi activists 
had before them as I conducted my fieldwork: figuring out how to 
present the sacred object of their own identity in a powerful manner 
that would simultaneously occasion recognition from Thangmi 
laypeople from a range of backgrounds, and from the national (Nepali 
and Indian) and transnational (development organizations, 
international indigenous rights movement) publics in relation to which 
they now oriented themselves. The naris’ ritual act, with its double 
meaning, its binding of practice and performance, had accomplished 
this perfectly within the framework of the old sociopolitical order. The 
uncertainties of what the new order might be meant that no single 
ritual act was likely to fit the bill. Rather, activists were experimenting 
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with a range of ritualized performances at different times and places 
were being tried, such as those described in Gangtok in Chapter 2, and 
at Bhume Jatra described as in Chapter 6, complemented by other 
strategies of objectification such as writing, videoalizing, and holding 
public conferences. The concatenation of all of these actions, ordered 
within the framework of two modern nations and the transnational 
public sphere which linked them, were becoming the new rituals 
through which Thangmi engaged with the states in which they lived. 
The end of Devikot-Khadga Jatra therefore did not signify the 
end of a fundamental, if ambivalent, aspect of Thangmi agency, as I 
had presumed it might when I heard the initial reports that the Maoists 
had forced the naris’ hand. Instead, it signified the diffusion of 
Thangmi agency across multiple national, political, and ritual frames, 
enacted in a range of practices by as many individuals, who at times 
only ambivalently recognized the others’ role in their shared project. 
The challenge for Thangmi now is synthesizing these forms of action 
in a manner which will enable them to control the terms of their own 
recognition, transforming the ambivalent agency of the past into a 
decisive one for the future. I look forward to watching and writing. 
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EPILOGUE 
Thangmi ke ho?: Processes and Objects of Identity 
“Hello, hello,” Rajen’s voice rang out across the cavernous Gorkha 
Duhkha Nivarak Sammelan (GDNS) auditorium in the center of 
Darjeeling Bazaar.1 He was testing the sound system for the public 
program at which my husband and I were to speak about our research 
with the Thangmi, and show video footage from our fieldwork in Nepal. 
Invitations for this December 2004 event had been circulated to the 
entire BTWA membership, and a poster hung outside the GDNS 
building to advertise the event to the broader public: “First Time in 
Darjeeling: Thami Documentary Film Show ON BIG SCREEN”. The GDNS 
hall had not been renovated since it was first built in the 1930s, and 
rigging up a functional projection system was a major endeavor. As 
people began to trickle through the doors—circular migrants with their 
load-carrying head-straps slung over their shoulders, civil servants 
taking a lunch break, children sprung from school for this special 
occasion—I noticed a very large, cloth-draped box sitting on a table, 
right in the middle of the stage in a manner that blocked the screen 
which we had painstakingly erected. “What’s that?”, I asked nervously. 
 “That? That is a gift for you from the Thangmi people, an 
offering from us to express our appreciation for all you have done,” 
said Rajen, “Don’t worry, we plan to present it to you in the first part of 
                                                
1 The history of GDNS is described in Chapter 5. 
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the program, before you show the video. It won’t cause you any 
trouble.” 
My curiosity was piqued, and while the sound check continued, I 
couldn’t help but sneak a quick look under the cloth, which upon 
closer inspection appeared to be layers of kathas—white offering 
scarves in the Tibetan style, printed with the BTWA thurmi logo and the 
words “Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association, established 1943, 
Thangmi raksha”.2 The kathas covered a glass box, inside of which sat 
a model of what I immediately recognized as a Thangmi house. Made 
of wood, bamboo, and clay, each tiny detail had been crafted precisely, 
from the thick thatched roof to the hinged doors to the small hand-
mill which actually turned. A madal drum sat just outside the door, 
accompanied by a bamboo flute on which was etched the word 
“THAMI”. Next to the box sat two certificates, recognizing our “service” 
to the Thangmi community, and wishing for our good health through 
the process of publishing the results of our work (see Figure 9.1). 
I was overwhelmed by the obvious care and expense that had 
gone into producing this unusual gift, and wanted to understand more 
about its provenance. Several hours later, after we had formally 
received the glass-boxed Thangmi house to a standing ovation, 
showed our videos, and engaged in a lively public discussion with 
some of the over 200 Thangmi who had attended the event, I finally 
                                                
2 Raksha (T) denotes a guru’s ornaments. 
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had a chance to ask about the gift as we sat down at a restaurant with 
several BTWA officers and members. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 Model Thangmi house and certificates presented to Sara 
Shneiderman and Mark Turin by members of the Bharatiya Thami 
Welfare, December 2004. (The craftsman Saroj is second from left.) 
Rajen explained that they had commissioned a young Thangmi 
man named Saroj to make the Thangmi house. Saroj had completed a 
course in wood-working and made his living doing commercial 
artwork, but he had never crafted anything for the Thangmi community 
before. Rajen and his colleagues had approached Saroj about making a 
model of a Thangmi house after a tense meeting of the BTWA central 
committee, in which the officers had determined that since there was 
no obviously Thangmi object to gift us, they had to create one. They 
had first considered offering us a thurmi, or possibly a guru’s drum, 
but these items would make problematic gifts. Both were passed down 
through gurus’ lineages, becoming efficacious only in gurus’ hands, 
and even if one could be secured, treating it as a mundane gift would 
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be a surefire way to raise the ire of the gurus. Instead, they needed a 
sacred object with secular content, so to speak—something which the 
BTWA activists who were organizing the event could imbue with the 
originary power of Thangmi identity, yet maintain control of without 
requiring a guru’s mediation. 
A Thangmi house in a box was a perfect solution. A house was 
something that everyone had—not particularly the domain of gurus, 
activists or any other particular interest group—and was at once a 
symbol of clan affiliation, community and territory. Most Thangmi in 
India did not actually live in houses that looked like the one in the box; 
rather, this was clearly a representation of a Thangmi house in rural 
Nepal. However, this fact did not seem to alienate anyone as I imagined 
it might. Instead, the house appeared to be a multivalent symbol which 
everyone could relate to, either as a literal representation of a lived 
experience of “home”, or as a figurative representation of a desire for 
such a “home”—a metaphor for a clear and recognizable identity. 
Thangmi from Nepal who attended the program at which the house 
was presented to us oohed and aahed at the glass box just as Thangmi 
from India did, many of whom told me proudly in the ensuing days that 
making the model was an important achievement for the BTWA. 
Later, once we had taken the house back to Kathmandu with us 
(minus the glass box, which we apologetically left behind in Darjeeling 
out of fear it would break en route), it became a fixture of our living 
room and a source of endless fascination for Thangmi from rural 
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Dolakha and Sindhupalchok who visited us in the city. Ram Bahadur, 
the young guru from Dumkot who was described in Chapter 8, was 
particularly intrigued by it when he visited in early 2005. “Eh heh, it’s a 
‘real’ Thangmi house, isn’t it?” he said (using the word ‘real’ in 
English). He fingered each part of the model carefully, asked where it 
came from, and upon hearing that it was a gift from Darjeeling, he 
laughed and said, “Well, if they can make this over there, they must be 
‘real’ Thangmi too. I wasn’t sure about that.” 
I was taken aback by this statement. What was it about the 
capacity to build a model of a house that one had never lived in—Saroj, 
the craftsman, said that he had in fact only seen photos of such 
houses—that could make one a “real” Thangmi? Apparently, it was the 
capacity to objectify something which other Thangmi could recognize 
as “real”—whether that be a house, a ritual practice, or in the most 
abstract sense, Thangminess itself. 
 
*** 
In the introduction to Fluid Boundaries, his 2001 study of the Thakali 
ethnic group, William Fisher suggests that the flow of the Kali Gandaki 
river, the dominant geographical feature of the Thakali area in central-
western Nepal, serves as a useful metaphor for culture-in-process: 
 
It was the river that gave me an analogy to use to convey my 
thoughts to the Thakali, a river whose peculiarities would be 
obvious to all of them. Thakali culture, I said in part, is like the 
Kali Gandaki River. It flows in a wide riverbed that allows it to 
break up into several meandering streams that merge again 
downstream. These separations and mergings vary unpredictably 
over time, but the separated channels always rejoin further 
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downstream. If you ask me which channel is the main channel, 
how could I answer? I could tell you which stream is the 
strongest one today, but I could not tell you which channel was 
the original or true channel of the river. The flow of the river 
changes from one season to the next, from one year to the next. 
We can describe it as we encounter it at a particular moment. 
Other individuals viewing the river in another year or season and 
comparing it to our description would recognize it to be the 
same river by its general location and by the general boundaries 
of the riverbed hemmed in by the mountains, but they would 
find the specifics of our description inadequate, even inaccurate. 
The river changes over time. Sometimes it flows peacefully and 
at other times with great turbulence. ... But it is nevertheless the 
same river. 
 Similarly, any description of Thakali culture is at best a 
representation of a moment in an ongoing cultural process. The 
difficulty of locating cultural coherence does not mean that 
Thakali culture has broken down or that it is in a transitional 
phase between one coherent structure or another. It merely 
reflects the process in which Thakali culture has been continually 
renewed (2001: 19-20). 
I read this description early in my fieldwork, and returned to ponder it 
often as I struggled to understand the eddies of Thangmi culture that 
swirled around me. The processual view of culture that Fisher proposes 
matched well with my observations of Thangmi cultural life, and as 
outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, I defined the object of 
my study as the process of producing Thangminess in its totality in a 
cross-border context. 
Despite this focus on the process of culture, I found myself 
repeatedly drawn to what one might contrastively call the objects of 
culture. As I hope I have made clear in the course of this dissertation, I 
do not mean objects only in the tangible sense of a tiny house in glass 
or a guru’s thurmi, but also in the intangible sense in which notions 
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such as identity, origins, territory, and indigeneity, can be constituted 
as sacred objects through ritualized action. To pursue Fisher’s 
metaphor, most of the Thangmi I met were not content just to watch 
the river flow, as a tourist—or a scholar—might be. Rather, at some 
point, they sought to engage with it as an entity in the phenomenal 
world: to build a bridge across it, to drink from it, to catch fish in it. In 
other words, many Thangmi were aware at some level that identity was 
produced through processual action—recall the consciousness with 
which different forms of objectifying action, practice and performance, 
were deployed (Chapter 2), or the ways in which both gurus and 
laypeople suggested that others should recognize Thangmi as being 
distinct for what they did, not who they were like (Chapter 3)—but this 
consciousness of identity-as-process did not preclude the need for 
identity-as-object. For Thangmi seeking recognition, whether in 
spiritual, political, or scholarly realms, the capacity to objectify one’s 
relationship with the Thangmi sacred originary—in other words, the 
capacity for ritualized action that articulated Thangminess as a 
recognizable object—was what made one a ‘real’ Thangmi, to use the 
guru Ram Bahadur’s words. That such ritualized action had multiple 
recognizable forms, from deity propitiations to political conferences, 
was taken for granted as part of the synthetic, collectively produced 
nature of Thangminess itself. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to demonstrate that 
the processes of identity production neither take place exclusively 
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within the boundaries of single nation-states, nor in a flat and 
undifferentiated world of global discourse or flow. Rather, identity is 
produced within multiple nation-state frames, as well as in the 
movement between them. Policies of recognition, as well as the 
schemes of classification on which they are based, and the benefits 
which they enable, are legally implemented within individual countries, 
but the effects of such legislation on ethnic subjectivities often 
transcends borders. Ethnicity, therefore, as the broader sets of social 
relations within which identities are sacralized, takes shape at the 
intersections of locality and transnationality, nation-state and border, 
village, town and city, with belonging embedded in the diverse 
particularities of all of these places. 
The circular migration that characterizes Thangmi lives is just 
one of many types of cross-border movement that go on today, just as 
the particular set of historical, ritual, political, linguistic and other 
elements that shape Thangmi synthetic subjectivity is only one 
possible constellation among many. All of the arguments presented in 
this dissertation are therefore provisional, based on ethnographic work 
with a limited group of individuals who recognized themselves as 
Thangmi. I undertook the task of writing an ethnography of the 
Thangmi as a distinct group in part because, as described in Chapter 1, 
Thangmi themselves desired this, but along the way I came to 
understand that many of the experiences that shaped Thangmi lives 
were shared with others. In this sense, my ethnography of the Thangmi 
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may be read as a particular set of stories about a more general set of 
ongoing historical processes in the Himalayas and South Asia over the 
last half century, and particularly during the last decade during which I 
conducted fieldwork. 
Having said that, the conclusion of my fieldwork in 2008 was by 
no means the end of an era in any objective sense, and it remains to be 
seen how the Thangmi community will be shaped by the specificities of 
current spatio-temporal conjunctures and their unknown futures. Most 
importantly, these include Nepal’s political transformation from Hindu 
monarchy to federal democratic republic; the renewed movement for a 
separate state of Gorkhaland in India; the revision of citizenship and 
affirmative action legislation in both countries; and the ongoing 
deployment of the transnational categories of indigeneity, marginality 
and social exclusion to make localized claims for rights and funds from 
both states and non-governmental organizations. Within these 
contexts, it will be important to watch new modes of Thangmi 
expression in radio, print, and digital video media, which I have 
touched upon only briefly here. So too should we watch new sites of 
identity production, such as development/advocacy projects such as 
JANSEEP (described briefly in Chapter 6), and broader political forums 
such as Nepal’s Constituent Assembly and Darjeeling’s Gorkhaland 
Jana Mukti Morcha movement. 
For the vast majority of Thangmi, though, life will go on in the 
action of the everyday, hand mills perhaps giving way to electric mills, 
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thatched roofs to aluminum, rickety jeeps to air-conditioned buses. If 
the last ten years are any indication of what is to come, new roads will 
be carved out of hillsides, school buildings built alongside them, and 
loans taken to buy farmland elsewhere. Territorial deities will continue 
to gather in response to the paloke of young gurus like Ram Bahadur, 
and new temples will be built in their honor, where Thangmi will come 
on pilgrimages of self-recognition. Thangmi will be born, married, and 
die, affirming their individual and communal Thangminess in the 
process. Houses will remain starting points for journeys across 
borders, as well as anchors to territory, cultural heritage sites, and a 
symbol in a box of all of these things. Gurus, activists, and laypeople 
will continue to debate the nature of originary power. 
In the future, I hope that when Thangmi hear the question 
Thangmi ke ho?, some will point to this dissertation, which will be my 
modest contribution to their quest for sacred objects. Even if they have 
not seen or read it, I hope that they will know that this “book about 
Thangmi culture and history” (which is how many people with whom I 
worked referred to the anticipated result of my research) now exists. 
Perhaps some will answer the question Thangmi ke ho? in part by 
telling their interlocutors about the contents of these pages, 
understood—or imagined—as each Thangmi would like them to be. 
 
 
 
 
 580 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Adams, V. (1996). Tigers of the Snow and Other Virtual Sherpas: An 
Ethnography of Himalayan Encounters. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Adhikari, R.L. (1997). Thamini Kanchi. Kathmandu: Bhanu Prakashan. 
Ahearn, L.M. (2001). “Language and Agency”. Annual Review of 
Anthropology 30: 109-137. 
Allen, N.J. (1972). “The Vertical Dimension in Thulung Classification”. 
Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford 3(2): 81-94. 
Allen, N.J. (1978). “Fourfold Classifications of Society in the Himalayas”. 
Himalayan Anthropology: the Indo-Tibetan Interface. J. Fisher. 
Paris: Mouton. 
Amnesty International (1987). Nepal: A Pattern of Human Rights 
Violations. New York: Amnesty International. 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. 
Anthias, F. (2006). “Belongings in a Globalising and Unequal World: 
Rethinking Translocations”. The Situated Politics of Belonging. N. 
Yuval-Davis, K. Kannabiran and U.M. Vieten, eds. London: Sage. 
17-31. 
Appadurai, A. (1990). “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural 
Economy”. Public Culture 2(2): 1-24. 
Appadurai, A. (2004). “The Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of 
Recognition”. Culture and Public Action. V. Rao and M. Walton, 
eds. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Austin, J.L. (1975). How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Axel, B. (2001). The Nation's Tortured Body: Violence, Representation 
and the Formation of a Sikh “Diaspora”. Durham: Duke University 
Press. 
Bagahi, S.B. and A.K. Danda (1982). “NE-BU-LA: A Movement for 
 
 
 
 
 581 
Regional Solidarity”. Tribal Movements in India, Volume 1. K.S. 
Singh, ed. Delhi: Manohar. 339-348. 
Ballinger, T.O. (1973). “Simraongarh Revisited: A Report on Some 
Observations Made at the Ruins of the Former Capital of Mithila in 
the Terai of Nepal.” Kailash 1(3): 180-184. 
Barth, F. (1969). Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization 
of Cultural Difference. Boston: Little Brown and Company. 
Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller, C. Szanton Blanc, eds. (1994). Nations 
Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and 
Deterritorialized Nation-States. New York: Gordon and Breach. 
Bates, C. (1995). “Race, Caste, and Tribe in Central India: The Early 
Origins of Indian Anthropometry”. The Concept of Race in South 
Asia. P. Robb, ed. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 219–259. 
Bauman, R. and C. Briggs (1990). “Poetics and Performance as Critical 
Perspectives on Language and Social Life”. Annual Review of 
Anthropology 19: 59-88. 
van Beek, M. (2000). “Beyond Identity Fetishism: 'Communal' Conflict in 
Ladakh and the Limits of Autonomy”. Cultural Anthropology 15(4): 
525-569. 
Bell, C. (1992). Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Benedict, P.K. (1972). Sino-Tibetan: A Conspectus. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bennett, L. and D. Parajuli (2008). Nepal Inclusion Index: Methodology, 
First Round Findings and Implications for Action. Kathmandu. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
Bentley, G.C. (1987). “Ethnicity and Practice”. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 29(1): 24-55. 
Berreman, G. (1964). “Shamans and Brahmins in Pahari Religion”. Journal 
of Asian Studies 23: 53-69. 
Beteille, A. (1998). “The Idea of Indigenous People.” Current 
Anthropology 39(2): 187-191. 
 
 
 
 
 582 
Bickel, B. and M. Gaenszle, eds. (1999). Himalayan Space: Cultural 
Horizons and Practices. Zürich: Völkerkundemuseum Zürich. 
Bista, D.B. (1967). Peoples of Nepal. Kathmandu: Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting. 
Bloch, M. and J. Parry (1982). “Introduction”. Death and the Regeneration 
of Life. M. Bloch and J. Parry, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Blondeau, A.-M., ed. (1998). Tibetan Mountain Deities: Their Cults and 
Representations. Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. 
Blondeau, A.-M. and E. Steinkellner, eds. (1996). Reflections of the 
Mountain: Essays on the History and Social Meaning of the 
Mountain Cult in Tibet and the Himalaya. Wien: Verlag der 
Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Briggs, C. (1996). “The Politics of Discursive Authority in Research on 
the 'Invention of Tradition'”. Cultural Anthropology 11(4): 435-
469. 
Brody, H. (2001). The Other Side of Eden: Hunter-Gatherers, Farmers, 
and the Shaping of the World. London: Faber and Faber. 
Brown, M.F. (1996). “On Resisting Resistance”. American Anthropologist 
98(4): 729-735. 
Buffetrille, K. (1996). “One Day the Mountains Will Go Away—Preliminary 
Remarks on the Flying Mountains of Tibet”. Reflections of the 
Mountain: Essays on the History and Social Meaning of the 
Mountain Cult in Tibet and the Himalaya. A.-M. Blondeau and E. 
Steinkellner, eds. Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. 77-90. 
Buffetrille, K. and H. Diemberger, eds. (2002). Territory and Identity in 
Tibet and the Himalayas. Leiden, Brill. 
 
 
 
 
 583 
Burghart, R. (1984). “The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State in 
Nepal”. Journal of Asian Studies 44(1): 101-125. 
Butler, J. (1997a). Excitable Speech: The Politics of the Performative. New 
York: Routledge. 
Butler, J. (1997b). The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
de la Cadena, M. and O. Starn (2007). “Introduction”. Indigenous 
Experience Today. M. de la Cadena and O. Starn, eds. New York: 
Berg. 
Caplan, L. (2000 [1970]). Land and Social Change in East Nepal: A Study 
of Hindu-Tribal Relations. Kathmandu: Himal Books. 
Chalier-Visuvalingam, E. (2003). Bhairava: Terreur et Protection, Mythes, 
Rites et Fetes a Benares et a Katmandou. Bruxelles: Peter Lang. 
Chalmers, R. (2003). 'We Nepalis': Lanugage, Literature and the 
Formation of a Nepali Public Sphere in India, 1914-1940. PhD 
Thesis. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University 
of London. 
Chatterjee, P. (2001). A Time for Tea: Women, Labor and Post/Colonial 
Politics on an Indian Plantation. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Chhetri, D.B. (n.d.). “Thami Jatiko Mrityu Sanskar: Sankshipta Charcha”. 
Janajati Manch 1(1): 20-22. 
Clarke, G.E. (1995). “Blood and Territory as Idioms of National Identity in 
Himalayan States”. Kailash 17(3&4): 89-132. 
Clifford, J. and G. Marcus (1986). Writing Culture: the Poetics and 
Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cohn, B. (1987). “The Census, Social Structure and Objectification in 
South Asia”. An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other 
Essays. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 224-254. 
Coleman, S. and J. Eade (2004). “Introduction”. Reframing Pilgrimage: 
Cultures in Motion. S. Coleman and J. Eade, eds. London: 
Routledge. 
Connor, W. (1984). The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory 
 
 
 
 
 584 
and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Corbridge, S. (1988). “The Ideology of Tribal Economy and Society: 
Politics in the Jharkhand, 1950–1980”. Modern Asian Studies 22: 
1-42. 
Coronil, F. (1997). The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in 
Venezuela. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Davenport, W. (1959). “Nonunilinear Descent and Descent Groups”. 
American Anthropologist 61(4): 557-572. 
Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari (1977). Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. New York: Viking Press. 
Deliege, R. (1993). “The Myths of Origin of the Indian Untouchables”. 
Man 28(3): 533-549. 
Derrida, J. (1976). Of Grammatology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Des Chene, M. (1996). “Ethnography in the Janajati-yug: Lessons from 
Reading Rodhi and Other Tamu Writings”. Studies in Nepali 
History and Society 1(1): 97-162. 
Desjarlais, R. (2003). Sensory Biographies: Lives and Deaths Among 
Nepal's Yolmo Buddhists. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Dirks, N. (2001). Castes of Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and Danger: an Analysis of Concepts of 
Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge. 
Douglas, M. (1967).”The Meaning of Myth”. The Structural Study of Myth 
and Totemism. E. Leach, ed. London: Tavistock. 49-69. 
van Driem, G. (1993). A Grammar of Dumi. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
van Driem, G. (2001). Languages of the Himalayas: An Ethnolinguistic 
Handbook of the Greater Himalayan Region, containing an 
Introduction to the Symbiotic Theory of Language. Leiden: Brill. 
van Driem, G. (2003). “Mahakiranti Revisited: Mahakiranti or Newaric”. 
Themes in Himalayan Languages and Linguistics. T.R. Kansakar 
and M. Turin, eds. Kathmandu: South Asia Institute and Tribhuvan 
University. 21-26. 
 
 
 
 
 585 
Duara, P. (1995). Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning 
Narratives of Modern China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Durkheim, E. (1995 [1912]). The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 
New York, The Free Press. 
Fardon, R. (1990). “Localizing Strategies: The Regionalization of 
Ethnographic Accounts”. Localizing Strategies: Regional Traditions 
of Ethnographic Writing. R. Fardon, ed. Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press: 1-35. 
Fischer, E.F. (1999). “Cultural Logic and Maya Identity: Rethinking 
Constructivism and Essentialism”. Current Anthropology 40(4): 
473-499. 
Fisher, J. (1986). Trans-Himalayan Traders: Economy, Society, and 
Culture in Northwest Nepal. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Fisher, J., ed. (1978). Himalayan Anthropology: The Indo-Tibetan 
Interface. Paris: Mouton. 
Fisher, W. (2001). Fluid Boundaries: Forming and Transforming Identity 
in Nepal. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Fjeld, H. (2008). “Pollution and Social Networks in Contemporary Rural 
Tibet”. Tibetan Modernities: Notes from the Field on Cultural and 
Social Change. R. Barnett and R.D. Schwartz. Leiden: Brill. 113-
138. 
Forbes, A.A. (1998). “Sacred Geography on the Cultural Borders of 
Tibet”. Tibetan Mountain Deities: Their Cults and Representations. 
A.-M. Blondeau, ed. Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften. 111-121. 
Forbes, A.A. (1999). “Mapping Power: Disputing Claims to Kipat Lands in 
Northeastern Nepal”. American Ethnologist 26(1): 114-138. 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New 
York: Pantheon. 
Fraser, N. (1992). “Rethinking the Public Sphere: a Contribution to the 
Critique of Actually Existing Democracy”. Habermas and the Public 
Sphere. C. Calhoun, ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 109-42. 
 
 
 
 
 586 
Fricke, T.E. (1990). “Elementary Structures in the Nepal Himalaya: 
Reciprocity and the Politics of Hierarchy in the Ghale-Tamang 
marriage”. Ethnology 29: 135-58. 
Fuller, C.J. and V. Bénéï, eds. (2000). The Everyday State and Society in 
Modern India. New Delhi: Social Science Press. 
von Fürer-Haimendorf, C. (1964). The Sherpas of Nepal: Buddhist 
Highlanders. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
von Fürer-Haimendorf, C. (1975). Himalayan Traders: Life in Highland 
Nepal. London: John Murray. 
Gaborieau, M. (1968). “Le partage du pouvoir entre les lignages d'une 
localité du Népal cenral”. L'homme 18(1-2): 37-67. 
Gaborieau, M. (1978). Le Nepal et Ses Populations. Bruxelles: Editions 
Complexe. 
Gaenszle, M. (1999). “The Making of Good Ancestors: Separation, 
Transformation and Exchange in Mewahang Rai Funerary Rites”. 
Ways of Dying: Death and Its Meaning in South Asia. E. 
Schömbucher and C.P. Zoller, eds. New Delhi: Manohar. 49-67. 
Gaenszle, M. (2000). Origins and Migrations: Kinship. Mythology and 
Ethnic Identity among the Mewahang Rai of East Nepal. 
Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
Gaenszle, M. (2002). Ancestral Voices: Oral Ritual Texts and their Social 
Contexts among the Mewahang Rai of East Nepal. Münster: LIT 
Verlag. 
Gaenszle, M. (forthcoming). “Scripturalization of Ritual in Eastern Nepal”. 
Ritual, Heritage, and Identity. C. Brosius and K. Polit, eds. Delhi: 
Routledge. 
Galanter, M. (1984). Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward 
Classes in India. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Gautam, R. and A. Thapa-Magar. (1994). Tribal Ethnography of Nepal. 
Delhi: Book Faith India. 
Gellner, D.N. (1992). Monk, Householder, and Tantric Priest. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 587 
Gellner, D.N. (1997). “Introduction: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the 
World's only Hindu State”. Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu 
Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. D. 
Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka and J. Whelpton, eds. Amsterdam, 
Harwood Academic Publishers: 3-32. 
Gellner, D.N. (2003). “From Cultural Hierarchies to a Hierarchy of 
Multiculturalisms: the Case of the Newars of Nepal”. Ethnic Revival 
and Religious Turmoil in the Himalayas. M. Lecomte-Tilouine and 
P. Dolfuss, eds. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 73-131. 
Gellner, D.N., ed. (2003). Resistance and the State: Nepalese 
Experiences. New Delhi: Social Science Press. 
Gellner, D.N. (2007). “Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal”. Economic 
and Political Weekly 42(20): 1823-1828. 
Gellner, D.N. (forthcoming a). “Initiation as a Site of Cultural Conflict 
Among the Newars”. Hindu and Buddhist Initiations in India and 
Nepal. A. Zotter and C. Zotter, eds. 
Gellner, D.N. (forthcoming b). “Introduction: How Civil are ‘Communal’ 
and Ethno-Nationalist Movements?” Ethnic Activism and Civil 
Society in South Asia. D. Gellner, ed. Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Gellner, D.N., J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, and J. Whelpton, eds. (1997). 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of 
Culture in Contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood Publishers. 
Genetti, C. (1994). A Descriptive and Historical Account of the Dolakha 
Newari Dialect. Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and 
Cultures of Asia and Africa. 
Ghosh, K. (2006). “Between Global Flows and Local Dams: 
Indigenousness, Locality, and the Transnational Sphere in 
Jharkhand, India”. Cultural Anthropology 21(4): 501-534. 
Ghurye, G.S. (1963 [1943]). The Scheduled Tribes (The Aborigines So-
Called and Their Future). Bombay: Ramdas for Popular Prakashan. 
Godelier, M. (1999). The Enigma of the Gift. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Goffman, E. (1971). Relations in Public. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
 
 
 
 588 
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Goldstein, M.C. (1971). “Serfdom and Mobility: An Examination of the 
Institution of ‘Human Lease’ in Traditional Tibetan Society”. 
Journal of Asian Studies 30(3): 521-534. 
Goody, J. (1986). The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goody, J. (2000). The Power of the Written Tradition. Washington, DC: 
Smithsonian Institution. 
Graham, L.R. (2005). “Image and Instrumentality in a Xavante Politics of 
Existential Recognition: the Public Outreach Work of Etenhiritipa 
Pimentel Barbosa.” American Ethnologist 32(4): 622-641. 
Graner, E. and G. Gurung (2003). “Arabko Lahures: Nepalese Labour 
Migration to Arabian Countries.” Contributions to Nepalese 
Studies 28: 295-325. 
Grierson, G., ed. (1909). Linguistic Survey of India (Vol. III, Part I, Tibeto-
Burman Family: General Introduction, Specimens of the Tibetan 
Dialects, the Himalayan Dialects and the North Assam Group). 
Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, India. 
Guarnizo, L.E. and M.P. Smith (1998). “The Locations of 
Transnationalism”. Transnationalism from Below. M.P. Smith and 
L.E. Guarnizo, eds. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 3-
34. 
Guha, R. (1983). Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial 
India. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Guha, S. (1999). Environment and Ethnicity in India 1200–1991. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Guneratne, A. (1998). “Modernization, the State, and the Construction of 
a Tharu Identity in Nepal”. Journal of Asian Studies 57(3): 749-
773. 
Guneratne, A. (2002). Many Tongues, One People: The Making of Tharu 
Identity in Nepal. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Gyatso, J. (1987). “Down with the Demoness: Reflections on a Feminine 
 
 
 
 
 589 
Ground in Tibet”. Feminine Ground: Essays on Women and Tibet. 
J. Willis, ed. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications. 33-51. 
Hachhethu, K. (2002). Party Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership 
and People. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
Hale, C.R. (2006). “Activist Research v. Cultural Critique: Indigenous 
Land Rights and the Contradictions of Politically Engaged 
Anthropology”. Cultural Anthropology 21(1): 96-120. 
Handler, R. (1984). “On Sociocultural Discontinuity: Nationalism and 
Cultural Objectification in Quebec”. Current Anthropology 25(1): 
55-71. 
Handler, R. (1986). “Authenticity.” Anthropology Today 2(1). 
Handler, R. (forthcoming). “The ‘Ritualization of Ritual’ in the 
Construction of Heritage”. Ritual, Heritage and Identity. Brosius, C. 
and K. Polit, eds. Delhi: Routledge. 
Hangen, S. (2005a). “Race and the Politics of Identity in Nepal”. 
Ethnology 44(1): 49-64. 
Hangen, S. (2005b). “Boycotting Dasain: History, Memory and Ethnic 
Politics in Nepal”. Studies in Nepali History and Society 10(1): 
105-133. 
Hangen, S. (2007). Creating a 'New Nepal': The Ethnic Dimension. 
Washington, DC: East West Center. 
Harrell, S. (2002). Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press. 
Hertz, R. (2004 [1907]). “A Contribution to the Study of the Collective 
Representation of Death”. Death, Mourning and Burial: A Cross-
Cultural Reader. in A. Robben, ed.  Malden MA: Blackwell. 197-
212. 
Hitchcock, J. (1966). The Magars of Banyan Hill. New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. 
Hitchcock, J. and R. Jones, eds. (1976). Spirit Possession in the Nepal 
Himalayas. Warminster: Aris and Phillips. 
(HMG/N) His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (1996). Nepal Multiple 
 
 
 
 
 590 
Indicator Surveillance: Second Cycle, Primary Education. 
Kathmandu: UNICEF and National Planning Commission 
Secretariat. 
(HMG/N) His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (2001). Population Census 
2001. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission, Central Bureau 
of Statistics. 
Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger, eds. (1983). The Invention of Tradition. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hodgson, B.H. (1874). Essays on the Languages, Literature and Religion 
of Nepal and Tibet. London: Trubner and Company. 
Hodgson, B.H. (1880). Miscellaneous Essays Relating to Indian Subjects 
(2 vols.). London: Trübner and Company. 
Höfer, A. (1999). “Nomen est Numen: Notes on the Verbal Journey in 
Some Western Tamang Oral Ritual Texts”. Himalayan Space: 
Cultural Horizons and Practices. B. Bickel and M. Gaenszle, eds. 
Zürich: Völkerkundemuseum Zürich. 205-244. 
Höfer, A. (2004 [1979]). The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal: A 
Study of the Muluki Ain of 1854. Kathmandu: Himal Books. 
Hoftun, M., W. Raeper, and J. Whelpton, eds. (1999). People, Politics & 
Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal. Kathmandu: 
Mandala Book Point. 
Holmberg, D. (1988). Tribe and the Anthropological Image of Nepal. 
Paper presented at the 17th Annual Conference on South Asia, 
University of Wisconsin, Madison. Unpublished manuscript. 
Holmberg, D. (1989). Order in Paradox: Myth, Ritual, and Exchange 
Among Nepal's Tamang. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Holmberg, D. (2000). “Derision, Exorcism, and the Ritual Production of 
Power”. American Ethnologist 27(4): 1-23. 
Holmberg, D. (2005[1989]). Order in Paradox: Myth, Ritual, and 
Exchange Among Nepal’s Tamang. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Holmberg, D. and K. March with S. Tamang. (1999). “Local 
Production/Local Knowledge: Forced Labour from Below”. Studies 
in Nepali History and Society 4(1): 5-64. 
 
 
 
 
 591 
(HPP) Himali Parivar Prakashan (2041 VS). Piskar: Daman ra Pratirodhko 
Katha. Varanasi: Janata Press. 
Huber, T. (1999a). The Cult of Pure Crystal Mountain: Popular Pilgrimage 
and Visonary Landscape in Southeast Tibet. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Huber, T., ed. (1999b). Sacred Spaces and Powerful Places in Tibetan 
Culture: A Collection of Essays. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan 
Works and Archives. 
Hughes-Freeland, F. and M.M. Crain (1998). “Introduction”. Recasting 
Ritual: Performance, Media, Identity. F. Hughes-Freeland and M.M. 
Crain, eds. London: Routledge. 1-20. 
Hutt, M. (1997). “Being Nepali without Nepal: Reflections on a South 
Asian Diaspora”. Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: 
The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal. D. Gellner, J. Pfaff-
Czarnecka and J. Whelpton, eds. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers. 101-144. 
Hutt, M. (1998). “Going to Mugalan: Nepali Literary Representations of 
Migration to India and Bhutan”. South Asia Research 18(2): 195-
214. 
Hutt, M. (2003). Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood, and the 
Flight of Refugees from Bhutan. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
(ICDM) Integrated Community Development Movement (1999). “Profile 
of the Village Development Committee of Lapilang”. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Inda, J.X. and R. Rosaldo (2002). “Introduction: A World in Motion”. The 
Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader. J.X. Inda and R. Rosaldo, 
eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
INSEC (1995). “Appendix 3: Peasant Movement in Nepal”. Human Rights 
Yearbook 1995. Kathmandu: INSEC. 
Isbell, B.J. (1978) To Defend Ourselves: Ritual and Ecology in an Andean 
Village. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Jaffrelot, C. (2006). “The Impact of Affirmative Action in India: More 
Political than Socioeconomic”. India Review 5(2): 173-189. 
 
 
 
 
 592 
Jenkins, L.D. (2003). Identity and Identification in India: Defining the 
Disadvantaged. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 
Kaila, B. and A. Yonzon, eds. (2056 VS). Rastriya Bhasaka Kabita 
Sanggalo [A Compilation of Poetry in National Languages]. 
Kathmandu: Rastriya Janajati Bikas Samiti. 
Kapila, K. (2008). “The Measure of a Tribe: the Cultural Politics of 
Constitutional Reclassification in North India.” Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 14: 117-134. 
Karlsson, B. (2003). “Anthropology and the ‘Indigenous Slot’: Claims to 
and Debates about Indigenous People’s Status in India.” Critique 
of Anthropology 23: 402-423. 
Karmay, S. (1998). The Arrow and the Spindle: Studies in History, Myth, 
and Ritual in Tibet. Kathmandu: Mandala Book Point. 
Kaviraj, S. and S. Khilnani, eds. (2001). Civil Society: History and 
Possibilities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kennedy, D. (1996). The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations and the British 
Raj. Berkeley: University of California. 
Kharel, D. (2006). Heavy Loads Toward a Better Life: Thami Slate Miners 
in Alampu, Northeast Nepal. MA Thesis. Tromso, Norway: 
University of Tromso. 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B. (1995). “Theorizing Heritage.” 
Ethnomusicology 39(3): 367-380. 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B. (1998). Destination Culture: Tourism, 
Museums and Heritage. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Kohrt, B.A. and I. Harper (2008). “Navigating Diagnoses: Understanding 
Mind-Body Relations, Mental Health, and Stigma in Nepal.” 
Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry 32: 462-491. 
Krauskopff, G. (2003). “An 'Indigenous Minority' in a Border Area: Tharu 
Ethnic Associations, NGOs, and the Nepalese State”. Resistance 
and the State: Nepalese Experiences. D. Gellner, ed. New Delhi: 
Social Science Press. 199-243. 
Krauskopff, G. and M. Lecomte-Tilouine, eds. (1996). Célébrer le 
Pouvoir: Dasain, un Rituel Royal au Népal. Paris: CNRS Éditions, 
 
 
 
 
 593 
Éditions de la MSH. 
Kuper, A. (2003). “The Return of the Native”. Current Anthropology 
44(3): 389-402. 
Lall, K. (1966). “The Thami”. The Rising Nepal. Kathmandu. 3. 
Leach, E. (1964). Political Systems of Highland Burma. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 
Leach, E. (1967). “Introduction”. The Structural Study of Myth and 
Totemism. E. Leach, ed. London: Tavistock Publications. vii-xix. 
Lecomte-Tilouine, M. (1993). “About Bhume, a Misunderstanding in the 
Himalayas”. Nepal Past and Present: Proceedings of the France-
German Conference Arc-et-Senans, June 1990. G. Toffin, ed. New 
Delhi: Sterling Publishers. 
Lecomte-Tilouine, M. and P. Dollfus, eds. (2003). Ethnic Revival and 
Religious Turmoil. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Leve, L. (2007). “"Failed Development” and Rural Revolution in Nepal: 
Rethinking Subaltern Consciousness and Women's Empowerment.” 
Anthropological Quarterly 80(1): 127-172. 
Lévi, S. (1905). Le Nepal: Etude Historique d'un Royaume Hindou. Paris: 
Ernest Leroux. 
Levine, N.E. (1981). “The Theory of Rü: Kinship, Descent and Status in a 
Tibetan Society”. Asian Highland Societies in Anthropological 
Perspective. C. von Fürer-Haimendorf, ed. Delhi: Sterling 
Publishers. 
Levine, N.E. (1987). “Caste, State, and Ethnic Boundaries in Nepal”. 
Journal of Asian Studies 46(1): 71-88. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1979) Myth and Meaning: Cracking the Code of 
Culture. New York: Schocken Books. 
Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1987 [1973]). The Story of Asdiwal. Structural 
Anthropology, Volume 2. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Levitt, P. (2001). The Transnational Villagers. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Levy, R. (1990). Mesocosm: Hinduism and the Organization of a 
 
 
 
 
 594 
Traditional Newar City in Nepal. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Lewis, T.T. (1993). “Newar-Tibetan Trade and the Domestication of 
‘Simhalasarthabahu Avadana’”. History of Religions 33(2): 135-
160. 
Li, T. (2000) “Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource 
Politics and the Tribal Slot”. Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 42(1):149-179. 
Li, T. (2005) “Beyond “the State” and Failed Schemes”. American 
Anthropologist  107(3): 383-394. 
Li, T. (forthcoming). “Indigeneity, Capitalism and the Management of 
Dispossession”. Current Anthropology. 
Linnekin, J. (1991). “Cultural Invention and the Dilemma of Authenticity”. 
American Anthropologist 93(2): 446-449. 
Macdonald, A. (1975). Essays on the Ethnology of Nepal and South Asia. 
Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 
Macfarlane, A. (1997). “Identity and Change Among the Gurungs (Tamu-
Mai) of Central Nepal”. Nationalism and Identity in a Hindu 
Kingdom. D. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka and J. Whelpton, eds. 
Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 185-204. 
Majupuria, I. and T.C. Majupuria (1978). Marriage Customs in Nepal 
(Ethnic Groups, their Marriage Customs and Traditions). 
Kathmandu: Indra Majupuria. 
Majupuria, I. and T.C. Majupuria (1980). Peerless Nepal, Covering Broad 
Spectrum of the Nepalese Life in its Right Perspective. Delhi: Smt. 
M. Devi. 
Malinowski, B. (1974 [1948]). “Myth in Primitive Psychology”. Magic, 
Science and Religion. London: Souvenir Press. 93-148. 
Manandhar, R. (2001). “Dolakhako Thamiharu Yetiko Santan Thanchan”. 
Spacetime Daily. Kathmandu. 
Marcus, G. (1999). “The Uses of Complicity in the Changing Mise-en-
Scene of Anthropological Fieldwork”. The Fate of “Culture”: Geertz 
and Beyond. S.B. Ortner, ed. Berkeley: University of California 
 
 
 
 
 595 
Press. 86-109. 
Marcus, G. and M. Fischer (1986). Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An 
Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Maybury-Lewis, D. (1960). “Parallel Descent and the Apinaye Anomaly.” 
Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 16(2): 191-216. 
McHugh, E. (2001). Love and Honor in the Himalayas: Coming to Know 
Another Culture. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
McHugh, E. (2006). “From Margin to Center: 'Tibet' as a Feature of 
Gurung Identity”. Tibetan Borderlands. P.C. Klieger, ed. Leiden: 
Brill. 115-126. 
Metcalf, P. and R. Huntington (1991). Celebrations of Death: the 
Anthropology of Mortuary Ritual. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Michaels, A. (1999). “Ancestors, Demons and the Ritual Impossibility of 
Death in Brahmanical Hinduism”. Ways of Dying: Death and Its 
Meaning in South Asia. E. Schömbucher and C.P. Zoller, eds. New 
Delhi: Manohar. 112-134. 
Michaels, A. (2004). Hinduism: Past and Present. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Middleton, T. and S. Shneiderman (2008). “Reservations, Federalism and 
the Politics of Recognition in Nepal”. Economic and Political 
Weekly 43(19): 39-45. 
Miller, C.J. (1997 [1979]). Faith Healers in the Himalaya: An Investigation 
of Traditional Healers and Their Festivals in Dolakha District of 
Nepal. Delhi: Book Faith  India. 
Minami, M. (2007). “From tika to kata? Ethnic Movements Among the 
Magars in an Age of Globalization”. Social Dynamics in Northern 
South Asia: Volume 1, Nepalis Inside and Outside Nepal. H. Ishii, 
D. Gellner and K. Nawa, eds. Delhi: Manohar. 477-502. 
Mumford, S.R. (1989). Himalayan Dialogue: Tibetan Lamas and Gurung 
Shamans in Nepal. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Myers, F.R. (2002). Painting Culture: The Making of an Aboriginal High 
 
 
 
 
 596 
Art. Durham: Duke University Press. 
(NFDIN) Nepal Federation for the Development of Indigenous 
Nationalities (2003). National Foundation for Development of 
Indigenous Nationalities: An Introduction. Kathmandu: NFDIN. 
(Niko) Thami, B. and S.T. Dahal, eds. (2003). Niko Bachinte. Darjeeling, 
Bharatiya Thami Welfare Association. 
Northey, W.B. and C.J. Morris (1928). The Gurkhas, their Manners, 
Customs and Country. London: J. Lane. 
(NTS) Nepal Thami Samaj (2005). Second National Convention Report. 
Kathmandu: NTS. Unpublished manuscript. 
Ogura, K. (2007). “Maoists, People and the State as Seen from Rolpa and 
Rukum”. Social Dynamics in Northern South Asia: Volume 2, 
Political and Social Transformations in North India and Nepal. H. 
Ishii, D. Gellner and K. Nawa, eds. Delhi: Manohar. 435-475. 
Ohnuki-Tierney, E. (1987). The Monkey as Mirror: Symbolic 
Transformations in Japanese History and Ritual. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Ong, W. (1982). Orality and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word. 
London: Methuen. 
Onta, P. (1996a). The Politics of Bravery: A History of Nepali Nationalism. 
PhD Thesis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania. 
Onta, P. (1996b). “Creating a Brave Nation in British India: The Rhetoric 
of Jati Improvement, Rediscovery of Bhanubhakta and the Writing 
of Bir History”. Studies in Nepali History and Society 1(1): 37-76. 
Onta, P. (1996c). “Ambivalence Denied: The Making of Rastriya Itihas in 
Panchayat Era Textbooks”. Contributions to Nepalese Studies 
23(1): 213-254. 
Onta, P. (1999). “The Career of Bhanubhakta as a History of Nepali 
National Culture, 1940 - 1999”. Studies in Nepali History and 
Society 4(1): 65-136. 
Onta, P. (2006). Mass Media in post-1990 Nepal. Kathmandu: Martin 
Chautari. 
 
 
 
 
 597 
Oppitz, M. (1982). “Death and Kin Amongst the Northern Magar”. 
Kailash: 377-421. 
Oppitz, M. (2006). “Die Geschichte der verlorenen Schrift”. Paideuma 52: 
27-50. 
Ortner, S.B. (1989). High Religion: A Cultural and Political History of 
Sherpa Buddhism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ortner, S.B. (1995a). “The Case of the Disappearing Shamans, or No 
Individualism, No Relationalism.” Ethos 23(3): 355-90. 
Ortner, S.B. (1995b). “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic 
Refusal.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 37(1): 173-
193. 
Ortner, S.B. (1996). Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
Ortner, S.B. (1999a). “Thick Resistance: Death and the Cultural 
Construction of Agency in Himalayan Mountaineering”. The Fate of 
“Culture”: Geertz and Beyond. S.B. Ortner, ed. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 135-164. 
Ortner, S.B. (1999b). Life and Death on Mt. Everest. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Parry, J. (1994). Death in Banaras. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
(Patuko) Thami, D.B, ed. (2054 VS). Nan Ni Patuko. Kathmandu: Niko 
Pragatisil Thami Samaj. 
Peet, R. C. (1978). Migration, Culture and Community: A Case Study 
from Rural Nepal. PhD Thesis. New York: Columbia University. 
Pettigrew, J. (1999). “Parallel Landscapes: Ritual and Political Values of a 
Shamanic Soul Journey”. Himalayan Space: Cultural Horizons and 
Practices. B. Bickel and M. Gaenszle. Zürich: Völkerkundemuseum 
Zürich. 247-270. 
Pettigrew, J. and S. Shneiderman (2004). "Women and the Maobadi: 
 Ideology and Agency in Nepal’s Maoist Movement". Himal 
 Southasian 17(1): 19-29. 
 
 
 
 
 598 
Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. (1996). “A Battle of Meanings: Commemorating the 
Goddess Durga’s Victory Over the Demon Mahisa as a Political 
Act”. Kailash 18(3-4): 57-92. 
Pigg, S.L. (1992). “Inventing Social Categories Through Place: Social 
Representations and Development in Nepal”. Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 34(3): 491-513. 
Pigg, S.L. (1993). “Unintended Consequences: The Ideological Impact è 
of Development in Nepal”. South Asia Bulletin 13(1-2): 45-58. 
Pignède, B. (1993 [1966]). The Gurungs: A Himalayan Population of 
Nepal. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 
Pollock, S. (1998). “India in the Vernacular Millennium: Literary Culture 
and Polity 1000-1500”. Daedalus 127(3): 41-74. 
Pommaret, F. (1999). “The Mon-pa Revisited: In Search of Mon”. Sacred 
Spaces and Powerful Places in Tibetan Culture. T. Huber, ed. 
Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. 52-75. 
Povinelli, E.A. (2002). The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities 
and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Pradhan, K. (1991). The Gorkha Conquests. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Pradhan, K. (2004). New Standpoints of Indigenous People’s Identity and 
Nepali Community in Darjeeling. Kathmandu: Social Science Baha 
(Mahesh Chandra Regmi Lecture Series). 
Pradhan, Q. (2007). “Empire in the Hills: The Making of Hill Stations in 
Colonial India.” Studies in History 23(1): 33-91. 
Pradhan, R. (1994). “A Native By Any Other Name.” Himal 7(1): 41-45. 
Pradhan, R. (2007). Negotiating Multiculturalism in Nepal: Law, 
Hegemony, Contestation and Paradox. Paper presented at an 
international seminar on “Constitutionalism and Diversity” in 
Kathmandu. Unpublished manuscript. 
Quigley, D. (1993). The Interpretation of Caste. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
 
 
 
 599 
Rai, T.B. (2041 VS). “Thami Janjivan - Choto Parichaya [Thami Life - A 
Short Introduction]”. Paruhang 4(2): 1-4. 
Rai, U.K. (1997). “Thami Kham [The Thami Language]”. Rodung. 
Kathmandu: Kirant Bhasa Samrakshana Samiti. 1-3. 
Ramble, C. (1982). “Status and Death: Mortuary Rites and Attitudes to 
the Body in a Tibetan Village”. Kailash 9(4): 333-360. 
Ramble, C. (1983). “The Founding of a Tibetan Village: the Popular 
Transformation of History”. Kailash 10 (3-4): 267-290. 
Ramble, C. (1993). “Whither, indeed, the Tsampa Eaters”. Himal 6: 21-
25. 
Ramble, C. (1997). “Tibetan Pride of Place: Or, Why Nepal's Bhotiyas are 
not an Ethnic Group”. Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu 
Kingdom. D. Gellner,  J. Pfaff-Czarnecka and J. Whelpton, eds. 
Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. 379-413. 
Rana, S. (2049 VS). Thami Jati: Sanskriti ra Bhasa [The Thami Ethnicity: 
Culture and Language]. Kathmandu: Saptahik Nepali Avaj. 
Redfield, R. (1960). The Little Community and Peasant Society and 
Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Regmi, M.C. (1976). Landownership in Nepal. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Regmi, M.C. (1980). Regmi Research Series Cumulative Index for 1980. 
Kathmandu: Regmi Research Series. 
Regmi, M.C. (1981). Regmi Research Series Cumulative Index for 1981. 
Kathmandu: Regmi Research Series. 
(Reng) Thami, M.R., ed. (1999). Dolakhareng. Jhapa: Thami Bhasa Tatha 
Sanskriti Utthan Kendra. 
Riccardi, T. (1975). “Sylvain Lévi: The History of Nepal, Part 1”. Kailash 
3(3): 5-60. 
Rimal, G.N. (2007). Infused Ethnicities: Nepal's Interlaced and Indivisible 
Social Mosaic. Kathmandu: ActionAid Nepal. 
Robben, A. (2004). “Death and Anthropology: An Introduction”. Death, 
Mourning and Burial: A Cross-Cultural Reader. A. Robben, ed.  
 
 
 
 
 600 
Malden MA: Blackwell. 1-16. 
Rohatynskyj, M. (1997). “Culture, Secrets, and Ömie History: A 
Consideration of the Politics of Cultural Identity”. American 
Ethnologist 24(2): 438-456. 
Rosaldo, R. (1989). Culture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis. 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
Rose, N. (1993). Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Samanta, A. (2000). Gorkhaland Movement: A Study in Ethnic 
Separatism. Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation. 
(Samudaya) Thami, K. and T.B. Thami, eds. (2061 [2056] VS). Thami 
Samudayako Aitihasik Chinari ra Sanskar Sanskriti [The Thami 
Community’s Historic Symbols and Ritual Culture]. Kathmandu: 
Nepal Thami Samaj. 
Samuel, G. (1993). Civilized Shamans: Buddhism in Tibetan Societies. 
Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press. 
Sapkota, P.P.S. (2045 VS). Dolakhako Thami: Jati tatha Sanskriti - Ek 
Adhyayan [The Thami of Dolakha: An Introduction to Ethnicity and 
Culture]. Jhapa. 
Scott, J.C. (1985). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant 
Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Scott, J.C. (1998). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve 
the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Seddon, J.D., J. Adhikari, and G. Gurung. (2001). The New Lahures: 
Foreign Employment and Remittance Economy of Nepal. 
Kathmandu: Institute of Development Studies. 
Seddon, J.D. with J. Adhikari and G. Gurung. (2002). “Foreign Labour 
Migration and the Remittance Rconomy of Nepal”. Critical Asian 
Studies 34(1): 19-40. 
Shafer, R. (1966). Introduction to Sino-Tibetan, Part I. Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz. 
 
 
 
 
 601 
Shafer, R. (1974). Introduction to Sino-Tibetan, Part IV. Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz. 
Shah, A. (2006). “The Labour of Love: Seasonal Migration from 
Jharkhand to the Brick Kilns of Other States in India”. 
Contributions to Indian Sociology 40(1): 91-118. 
Shah, A. (2007). “The Dark Side of Indigeneity? Indigenous People, 
Rights and Development in India”. History Compass 5: 1-27. 
Sharma, B.K. (2057 VS). Nepali Sabdasagar. Kathmandu: Bhabha Pustak 
Bhandar. 
Sharma, P. (2007). Unraveling the Mosaic: Spatial Aspects of Ethnicity in 
Nepal. Kathmandu: Himal Books. 
Shaw, R. and C. Stewart (1994). “Introduction: Problematizing 
Syncretism”. Syncretism/Anti-Syncretism: The Politics of Religious 
Syncretism. C. Stewart and R. Shaw. London, Routledge: 1-26. 
Shneiderman, S. (2002). “Embodied Ancestors: Territory and the Body in 
Thangmi Death Rituals”. Territory and Identity in Tibet and the 
Himalayas. K. Buffetrille and H. Diemberger, eds. Leiden, Brill: 
233-252. 
Shneiderman, S. (2003). “Violent Histories and Political Consciousness: 
Reflections on Nepal’s Maoist Movement from Piskar Village”. 
Himalayan Research Bulletin 23(1): 38-48. 
Shneiderman, S. (2005a). “Swapping Identities: Borderland Exchanges 
along the Nepal-TAR Frontier”. Himal Southasian 18 (3): 32-33. 
Shneiderman, S. (2005b). “Agency and Resistance in the Thangmi-Newar 
Ritual Relationship: An analysis of Devikot-Khadga Jatra in 
Dolakha, Nepal”. The European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 28: 
5-42. 
Shneiderman, S. (2006). “Barbarians at the Border and Civilising Projects: 
Analaysing Ethnic and National Identities in the Tibetan Context”. 
Tibetan Borderlands. P. Christiaan Klieger, ed. Leiden: Brill. 9-34. 
Shneiderman, S. and M. Turin (2004). “The Path to Jansarkar in Dolakha 
District: Towards an Ethnography of the Maoist Movement”. 
Himalayan People's War: Nepal's Maoist Rebellion. M. Hutt, ed. 
London: Hurst & Co. 77-109. 
 
 
 
 
 602 
Shneiderman, S. and M. Turin (2006). “Revisiting Ethnography, 
Recognizing a Forgotten People: The Thangmi of Nepal and India”. 
Studies in Nepali History and Society 11(1): 97-181. 
Sinha, A.C. and T.B. Subba, eds. (2003). The Nepalis in Northeast India: 
A Community in Search of Indian Identity. New Delhi: Indus 
Publishing Company. 
Sjöberg, K. (1993). The Return of the Ainu: Cultural Mobilization and the 
Practice of Ethnicity in Japan. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood 
Academic Publishers. 
Slusser, M.S. (1982). Nepal Mandala: A Cultural History of the 
Kathmandu Valley. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Srinivas, M.N. (1989). The Cohesive Role of Sanskritization and Other 
Essays. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Stein, G. (1972). “Swadesh 100 Word List for Thami”. Comparative 
Vocabularies of Languages of Nepal. A. Hale, A.M. Hari and B. 
Schöttelndreyer, eds. Kirtipur: Summer Institute of Linguistics and 
Tribhuvan University. 37-38. 
Steinmann, B. (1996). “Mountain Deities, the Invisible Body of Society”. 
Reflections of the Mountain: Essays on the History and Social 
Meaning of the Mountain Cult in Tibet and the Himalaya. A.-M. 
Blondeau and E. Steinkellner, eds. Wien: Verlag des 
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. 179-218. 
Studholme, A. (2002). The Origins of Oṃ Maṇi Padme Huum:̣ a study of 
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